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
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“ Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report.”

EDITED BY

**THE REV. WILLIAM BENGOLLYER, D.D.
LL.D. F.A.S.**

**THE REV. THOMAS RAFFLES, LL.D.
(OF LIVERPOOL,)**

AND


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1824.



PREFACE.

AFTER making trial for a twelvemonth of the practicability of conducting their Journal on a reduced scale, without an undue interference with the rapid increase of their professional and private engagements, the Editors of the Investigator, at the close of the eighteenth number, and Eighth Volume of their work, are reluctantly, but imperatively, compelled to say, "Here our labours terminate." Their wish would have been to proceed, but the great inconvenience of superintending a periodical work through the press, whilst hastily removing from place to place, at a distance of two hundred miles from home, and in the midst of the bustle and complexity of the business which regularly calls him thence, has rendered it impossible for the final Editor longer to continue at a post, from which his colleagues have as little leisure to relieve him. With sincere thanks, therefore, to their friends and contributors, for the support they have experienced for the last five years—and with the hope, that in a period in which splendid talents have been shamelessly prostituted to the cause of vice and irreligion, their efforts to counteract its pestilential influence have not been altogether in vain—in that editorial capacity, which has but more strongly cemented the ties of an early and most intimate friendship, they bid their readers an unwilling, yet a final adieu; referring them for a continuation of several of the articles commenced in this work, to the Philomathic Journal, a quarterly publication, edited at an institution, of which they are all honorary members, and over which one of them presides. Where their wishes or recommendation can have any weight, that journal will succeed, on the shelves of their subscribers, the one they now abandon.

September 24, 1824.



Engraved by Thompson, from a Miniature in possession of Mr Raffles

Sir Tho. Stamford Raffles, K^t/FR&A.S.

Lieut-Governor of Benccolen, &c

Published by Henry Fisher, Coxton, London, Jan^y 1824

The Investigator.

JANUARY, 1824.

*Memoir of SIR THOMAS STAMFORD RAFFLES, Knt., F.R.
and A.S., Lieut.-Governor of Bencoolen, &c. &c. &c.*

SIR THOMAS STAMFORD RAFFLES was born on board the ship *Ann*, at sea, off the harbour of port Morant, in the island of Jamaica, on the 6th of July, 1781. His father, Benjamin Raffles, was one of the oldest captains in the West India trade, from the port of London. Sir Stamford received his education principally under Dr. Anderson, who presided over a respectable academy at Hammersmith. At an early age he was admitted on the establishment at the East India House, where his talents and his industry obtained for him the esteem and confidence of the then secretary, the late Wm. Ramsay, Esq., through whose interest, in 1805, the directors gave him the handsome and flattering appointment of assistant-secretary to the government in Prince of Wales's Island, together with the rank of junior merchant, and an eventual succession to council. He had not been long in that settlement before he became chief secretary.

While there, he diligently applied himself to the study of the Malay, and other languages of the Eastern Archipelago. To these studies he was incited in no small degree by the late lamented Dr. Leyden, with whom he formed a friendship the most endearing, which was unhappily terminated by the death of that eminent scholar, who expired at Batavia in the arms of his friend. Such was the success with which he cultivated the study of these languages, that he was appointed Malay translator to the government; and Lord Minto, then governor-general of India, honoured him with especial notice in one of his anniversary discourses to the college of Calcutta. Thus he became known to that truly enlightened nobleman, whose highest regard and confidence it was afterwards his happiness to enjoy, and in whose death he has had to deplore the loss of a most steady and inestimable friend.

In 1811, Sir Stamford was induced to visit Calcutta, whence he accompanied Lord Minto in the expedition against Java, in the capacity of private secretary to his Lordship, and his agent in the Malay states; and in the

month of October in that year, he was appointed to the high station of lieutenant-governor of that island, and its various important dependencies. How he discharged the trust reposed in him by this distinguished appointment is well known; while the mildness and equity of his administration endeared him to the millions, amongst whom he then dispensed the blessings of the British government, to a degree almost unexampled in our colonial history.

During his residence in Java, he lost his first wife, to whom he was united previous to his leaving this country; and his health having materially suffered from the combined influence of domestic affliction, and the severe duties of his station, he was induced to visit England. He arrived at Falmouth in the autumn of 1816, bringing with him the Ráden Rána Dipúra, a Javanese prince, with his suit; and a more splendid and extensive collection of specimens of the productions, costume, &c. of the Eastern Archipelago, than had ever before been received into a British port. The reception with which he met in England, must have been highly gratifying to him. He had the pleasure to see that his services were appreciated by the public, while from persons, of all ranks and classes of society, he received the most flattering marks of kind and respectful attention.

During his stay in this quarter of the globe, notwithstanding the numerous engagements by which he was oppressed, he found leisure to accomplish a tour on the Continent, the details of which have been given to the public by one of the party,—and to publish his History of Java in two large quarto volumes, containing an immense mass of valuable information relative to that interesting country. He also, while in England, had the happiness to form a matrimonial connexion with a most amiable lady, Sophia, the daughter of J. Watson Hull, Esq. late of Great Baddow, in Essex.

As an acknowledgment of his services, and as the best appointment, after the resignation of Java, at their command, the East India Company confirmed his nomination to Bencoolen, in Sumatra, which had been held in reserve for him, in the anticipation that such an event might possibly occur. With this appointment, the rank and title of lieutenant-governor was conferred upon him. He also received the honour of knighthood from his Majesty, then Prince Regent, who graciously permitted the dedication of his History of Java to himself.

Sir Stamford left the shores of England for his new

station, in November, 1817, having been detained at Falmouth by contrary winds, long enough to receive the melancholy intelligence of the death of the lamented Princess Charlotte, whose friendship, together with that of her illustrious consort, he had the distinguished gratification to enjoy; and his first public act, on his arrival in his new government, was the forwarding of an address of condolence to his majesty on that most mournful event.

Since the commencement of his administration in Sumatra, Sir Stamford has been most laboriously and successfully employed in resisting the unwarrantable aggressions of the Dutch—in promoting friendly intercourse with the natives of that vast island—in improving the moral and social condition of the people—and advancing, by all the methods which a liberal and enlightened policy could suggest, the commercial interests of Britain in the Eastern seas. Of all his measures, that of establishing the free port of Singapore, at the extremity of the Malay peninsula, is perhaps the most important. This settlement has already prospered to an astonishing degree, and promises, if continued under British patronage, to become the emporium and pride of the East. There is, perhaps, no place in the known world more advantageously situated for the purposes of commerce. It commands the straits of Malacca, places our intercourse with China beyond risk or annoyance, and may become the connecting link and grand entrepôt between Europe, Asia, and China—it is in fact fast becoming so, for merchants from all parts are resorting to it, and establishing themselves there, while vessels come from China to Singapore, in five days, to purchase their goods.

Amidst these important commercial affairs, Sir Stamford has not been unmindful of the claims of science. Natural philosophy, in its various departments of Botany, Zoology, Entomology, &c. has been greatly enriched by his own researches, and those of scientific individuals who have enjoyed his patronage. Considerable collections from the interior of Sumatra have already reached this country, and descriptions of some of the most curious and splendid articles have been presented to the public. Nor should we omit to mention, the decided protection which he has always extended to the accredited Missionaries of every denomination—promoting their views to the utmost possible extent, and affording them the most efficient aid in the prosecution of their sacred and benevolent designs.

We lament, and every friend of the human race and lover of his country must lament with us, that, in the midst of so

much usefulness, the subject of this brief memoir has been awfully warned by disease and death to quit the scene of his honourable labours. Three, out of four, of his children have been torn from him by a malignant climate; of his personal friends, scarcely one remains; and he himself, with his amiable lady, have been in a state of health the most alarming and critical. Under these distressing circumstances, Sir Stamford has deemed it an imperious duty to forward his resignation to the East India House; and his last movement, of which we have received intelligence, was a voyage to Singapore, to make suitable arrangements there, prior to his final departure from the Eastern Archipelago.

The History of Ethics: a Lecture delivered at the Surrey and Philomathic Institutions. By the Reverend WILLIAM BENGO' COLLYER, D.D. LL.D., President of the Philomathic Institution, &c. &c. &c.

WHEN I undertook to lecture on Ethics, I had not the presumption to hope that it would be in my power to present to my auditory any thing absolutely new; but it was my object, and it remains so, to produce, on a subject always important, something which may be generally useful. The syllabus which has been submitted to your consideration is of so general a kind, as to preclude any very close discussion of those hypotheses which it will be necessary to examine: and the whole that can be attempted will be, to define principles as clearly as possible, and to trace their action, as well upon the various branches of society, as upon the individual himself influenced by them. If I shall be able to do this at all to your satisfaction—if, in beguiling a few wintry hours, I shall awaken the attention of any one individual to the great law of his nature, which associates him with his fellow-men, and with his God, and succeed in explaining the duties inseparable from it—I shall be more than compensated; and your indulgent patience will not be exercised in vain. Such are my humble pretensions, and I submit them to your candour.

The term *Ethics* signifies *manners*—or rather, the regulation and *cultivation* of manners—which attention to conduct, deeply influencing both ourselves and others, is expressed better by the appellation of *morals*. Plato distinguishes them into three branches. Moral Philosophy, regarding man in his individual capacity, was called *Ethics*—when it

related to him in his family-relations, it was denominated *Œconomics*: but extending to the larger confederation of general society, it received the name of *Politics*. To the latter of these, Plato principally directed his attention, although he wrote upon the whole. These distinctions have been less respected in modern disquisitions; and Ethics have been properly understood to comprehend morals in all their branches, emanating from the individual, diffusing themselves through his immediate connexions, and spreading over all the face of society. Nor does it appear possible to separate morals in their principle, from an operation as extensive as the relations of life, and the influence of the individual—his duties being commensurate with his capacities.

In tracing *the History of Morals*, which is the subject of the present lecture, the mind naturally reposes upon Socrates, as the first philosopher who reduced morals to system, uncovered their source, and applied them practically to the duties of the individual, and his relations to others. The philosophy which preceded this illustrious man, related to nature, and might be called speculative; but he directed knowledge to purposes of moral utility—renounced such sciences as appeared to him to conduce little or nothing to this great design—gathered the scattered precepts of a remote antiquity—reduced them to order—established their truth, or refuted their sophistry—inferred from them practical results; and, to use the language of Cicero, was the first who led the studies of mankind to the important inquiries after virtue and vice, and to the establishment of the distinctions and the boundaries of good and evil.* As this unrivalled philosopher wrote nothing, we must be satisfied to learn the outline of his Ethics from Plato, by whom they were adopted and recorded. Morals themselves are as old as man's existence, and have been objects of inquiry and of speculation in all ages; but the reduction of them to form, (if we except the sacred writings, the oldest of all, and from which there are strong reasons to conclude, they were all borrowed,) must be referred to Socrates among the Grecians. He becomes, therefore, a central point—equally removed from the scattered elements to be found among his predecessors, who borrowed them from the eastern world, and the modern writers on this interesting subject, who seem substantially to have adopted his principles, with the advantages fur-

* Cic. Acad. Quest. i.

nished by the increasing experience of ages, and the more powerful assistance, not always acknowledged, sometimes peremptorily denied, but not the less real and influential, of the sublime code of Christianity. I take my stand upon the simple and beautiful system of Socrates—as upon an elevation from which I may myself see, and be able to point out to you, in every direction, the moral landscape stretched all around it—losing itself, on the one hand, among the shadows of the remotest antiquity, and extending, on the other, to the age in which we live, to the country in which it is our privilege to dwell, and to the very lecture-room in which we are now assembled.

Pythagoras stands nearest Socrates, as his precursor in this study ; and claims the highest attention and respect, whether we consider the extent of his scientific researches, or the accuracy of his judgment, or the value of his precepts, or the zeal which prompted him to explore the most distant lands, and to bring home the wisdom collected with such toil, from the most celebrated and the most copious sources. He gave his testimony also to the superiority of this science over all other researches ; and deemed that philosophy which could not cure, at least some of the human passions, as worthless as that medicine which has no effect upon bodily disease.* He touched upon all the branches of morals virtually, although not methodically ; and his mode of recommending moral duties, as well as of defining them, was by figures—by a symbolical and emblematical method of instruction. To the individual who refused his advice, and abandoned his school for sensual indulgences, he appealed by addressing the senses ; and placing *an empty coffin* in the seat which he had been accustomed to occupy, as the emblem of that state of moral death to which he considered the mind of the unhappy profligate to be reduced.

He was accustomed to represent the friendship, and union, and harmony, which should prevail among his scholars, by *setting salt* before them. He expressed moral precepts in the same parabolic manner. *Sloth*, he reproved by the admonition, “Receive not a swallow into your house.” The swallow sports but for a season, soon disappears, and is supposed to be torpid during the greater part of the year. He guarded them against *provoking the irritable and the powerful*, by advising, “Strive not the fire with a sword.” He cautioned against corroding and useless *cares*, by exhorting, “Eat not the heart.” He recommended a strict

* Stobæus Serm. 80.

regard to justice, by the command, "Pass not over the balance." The "concord of sweet sounds," the harmonies of music, were with him favourite images of moral excellencies. These symbols might be multiplied, if it were necessary to our present purpose; but such as have been adduced are sufficient to establish and illustrate the emblematical and parabolic mode of instruction relative to morals employed by Pythagoras.*

Nor did Pythagoras stand alone in this appeal to the understanding through the medium of the senses. Plato calls virtue, the *harmony* (*αρμονία*), and *music* of the soul. (*ψυχῆς μουσική*.) Temperance, he describes as a certain symphony and concord of the affections. (*συμφωνία τινι, καὶ ἀρμονία*.) Plato himself demands of those who read his allegories, that they should not rest satisfied with the image, but penetrate the hidden meaning of the truth so veiled.† And it was therefore justly observed, that "He is no Platonist who thinks that Plato must not be understood allegorically, unless he will, with Aristotle, triumph over Plato's words, and not regard his profound sense."‡ The philosophy of Socrates was plain and simple, and proceeded upon a method peculiar to himself, of asking questions, until he obtained the induction which he desired, from the concessions of his opponents. That of Plato was more dogmatical, more ornamented, and often allegorical. His symbols, indeed, were much less obscure than those of Pythagoras. But Aristotle was the first who wholly laid allegory aside; and in considering Plato as the representative of the morals of Socrates, we must not forget that he has added to his master's principles much of his own manner.

The sages who obtained the distinguished title of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, directed their attention principally to morals; and conveyed their precepts in the shape of short and pointed aphorisms. Quintilian esteems them certain rules of life. "As yet," said that eloquent writer, "disputation had not obtained—but couching their instructions in a few expressive terms, they were presented as so many religious mysteries."§ One grand sentence may be produced, ascribed by some to Thales, and by others to Chilo, which while it explains this aphoristic mode of teaching, immortalizes the wisdom in which it originated—"Know thyself." This was one of those precepts read in the temple of Delphos; and which Cicero so esteemed as to

* Gale, b. ii. c. 7. vol. ii. p. 167. &c. † Plato. Phæd. and Repub. 6. and 10. ‡ Coel. Redig. lib. 9. cap. 12. § Quint. lib. 5. c. 11.

call it the precept of Apollo; and he remarks, with singular beauty, that it was given not exclusively to humble man by sending him into his bosom to learn its weakness, but principally, to urge him to form an acquaintance with his own soul, in all the majesty of its powers, and all the importance of their application.*

These characteristics of the earliest method of teaching morals, lead us still higher towards their indisputable source. The parabolic mode of instruction is notoriously oriental: so also is the proverbial form chosen by the seven Grecian Sages. The institutes of Menu may afford a sufficient evidence of the latter; while the gorgeous imagery interwoven with the very texture of Eastern composition, proves the former. The Grecian poets, older than these historians and philosophers, (for even Thales, Chilo, and his celebrated associates, lived more than three centuries after Hesiod,) chose allegory, the very garb of poetry, as the grand vehicle of their moral sentiments. And while their mythological traditions may be distinctly traced to an oriental origin, their fables were regarded by the sages of Greece as containing philosophical truths, under the veil of fiction. Doubtless they drew their ethics from the sources whence they derived their philosophy; and the very form in which Hesiod gives his moral precepts, combines both the characteristics of aphorism and poetry.

Thales, although said to be born at Miletus, is contended to have been of Phenician extract; and it is certain, that he travelled into Asia to acquire oriental wisdom. Pythagoras is known to have traversed various countries in that direction, and to have extended his researches as far as India. Plato visited Egypt, then the receptacle of the learning of the world—having received her knowledge from the latter—and confesses that the principles of his philosophy, as well as the use of symbols, were derived from older nations, whom, in conformity to the usage of the Greeks, relative to all people except themselves, he calls Barbarians. The Phenicians, as the earliest navigators, carried the sciences, and the symbols under which they were couched, from the oriental world, and from Egypt immediately to Greece, and even to Britain; whose Druids, more ancient than those of Gaul, resembled in many striking points, as well of philosophy, as of religious observances, the Hindus; and shew in the most obvious particulars, the oriental origin of their system.

* Cic. Tuscab. I. 22, &c.

It is difficult to obtain information relative to the origination of ancient science, from any records except those of sacred history. From whatever fountains the sages of India drew their theories, it is evident that those of Greece drank of the same wells of knowledge. The philosophical schools of the East comprise the metaphysics of the different sects of Grecian philosophy; and, as oriental systems are unquestionably older than those of Greece, if a real analogy subsists, it must have been imparted to the latter: it could not have been derived from them by the former. The grand and favourite doctrine of Pythagoras, relative to the transmigration of souls, adopted even in the purer and more simple philosophy of Plato, is so evidently of Eastern origin, that it becomes a powerful argument in support of the hypothesis of the derivation of other parts of the same system from the same quarter. And with the general principles of philosophy, came their Ethics, both as to substance and to the form of communication. Conjecture and hypothesis may, however, be well spared, when we have the testimony of Diodorus Siculus direct to this point. "All those," he says, "who were renowned among the Greeks for wisdom and learning, did in ancient time resort to Egypt, thence to deduce philosophy and laws." The peculiar dogmas of the Grecian philosophers are respectively acquired from Egypt, Phenicia, Chaldea, India, and Persia. The sun of knowledge rose, like the orb of day, in the East. Certain terms, and even the names of their idols, are by the Grecians borrowed from the Egyptians, between whose language, and that of the Phenicians and Chaldeans, is such an affinity, that they may, with little difficulty, be traced to an Hebrew origin.

Having touched upon this point, I will venture to remind you, that there is a book, the most ancient of all existing records—for even should its inspiration be denied, none pretend to question its antiquity—in which the purest moral precepts, and the most sublime religious truths, are seen veiled in parables, couched under symbols, and communicated in proverbs. To this book may be traced as well the traditions of the East, as the systems of Greece; and as an important fact, it is necessary to remark, that if we are desirous of following the history of morals up to its spring-head, sound learning and diligent research have found, in this neglected volume, the grand and inexhaustible source after which the world has been so long looking; and which, like the fountains of the Nile, lay concealed from ages and generations.

The Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries, those astonishing and characteristic parts of Grecian religion, were symbolical representations of things moral and philosophical. They were an attempt to ground a sublime philosophy upon a mass of fabulous tradition; and so far the attempt was correct, in that those very fables originated in either scientific researches, natural phenomena, or moral truths, symbolically expressed. Plato represents these mysteries as typifying the external evils associated with material existence—the vices and humiliation of the spirit in its corporeal union—and the future transformations through which it is to pass. In the mean time, while philosophical and moral truths were intended to be taught, the mind was corrupted, and the passions inflamed, by the indecencies and sensualities encouraged, as symbolizing the communication of divine energies to the various forms of intellectual being. The same exposition has been already suggested of the fables of the poets, and of the whole Grecian mythology—moral precepts, philosophical truths, and natural sciences, are all conveyed by these parables. Such is precisely the religion of the Hindus at this hour. It is philosophical in its character, closely allied with astronomy, and moral in its purposes. But to whom does it bear these features of virtue and sublimity? To the Bramins, who, like the British Druids, (evidently of the same family,) are at once the priests and the philosophers of the country; to the select number, who, like the initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, have the concealed physical and moral truths explained; while these symbols are to the Eastern multitude, what corresponding symbols were to the Grecian populace, the organs of gross idolatry and of irrational superstition. The conformity, however, of the greater and lesser mysteries so celebrated in antiquity, with the existing practices of India, both covering morals with the veil of fiction, both abusing the multitude with fables, and degenerating in ordinary use into the grossest licentiousness, shews again the origination of these moral symbols in the East.

In conformity with this oriental method of representation, we find the prophets of the Old Testament symbolizing in like manner, virtues and vices, judgments and deliverances, things spiritual and future. It was the genius of that country, it remains so, and it was evidently transplanted thence to Greece and Rome; this luxuriant moral vegetation springing originally in a warmer clime, and from a richer soil, than Europe could boast. The conquerors who have successively plundered the East, have brought home

more valuable spoils than her silver, and her gold, and her gems; and Greece had the meanness to steal her morals and her philosophy, and then to brand her as barbarian. They did not even leave behind the beautiful and many-coloured vest in which she clothed her systems, wrought in the loom of her own splendid imagination, and mingled like the radiant hues of her own dayspring; and when they had decorated themselves with her intellectual and moral riches, they put her out of the pale of their privileged society: for if the term barbarian did not mean with them, as with us, the absence of civilization—it signified emphatically, a *foreigner*—and drew a broad line of distinction between her and her imperious enslavers. Nay, Aristotle justified the policy which then prevailed, by laying down as a fundamental and self-evident maxim, that “Nature intended barbarians to be slaves.”

I have already directed your attention to one significant symbol employed by Pythagoras, which was the use of *salt* as the emblem of the union and harmony which ought to subsist among the members of his philosophical school. This is so truly oriental, that it at once shews whence it was derived. Salt is still the symbol employed in the East to denote the confirmation of any engagement, and it remains the pledge of inviolable friendship. Treachery would be stigmatized by this figure: and as we should say, that he who ate of our bread had forgotten us; they would mark the ingratitude by saying, that the offender had eaten of the salt of the injured party. No man, of whatever rank, who had any regard to his character, to public opinion, or to sacred obligations, would venture to break a promise established by this significant symbol. It is one of the most solemn forms of an oath—the person swearing receives into his mouth a little salt, placed for that purpose upon the blade of a scymeter, imprecating his own death, if he shall prove unfaithful to his engagement, or a violator of truth. Salt stood in the most sacred relations, as it was inseparable from sacrifice, and the symbol of covenants of the highest order, religious as well as civil. If we connect these usages with the distinct and important use of this symbol in the Jewish church, with which Pythagoras and Plato were well acquainted, and to which they both allude, sometimes calling them Chaldeans, and sometimes Syrians, because of the abhorrence in which they held the Jews, as separating themselves from all other people by their strict and singular institutions, and to conceal the fountains whence they

drew their knowledge of morals and religion, we shall discover that it was indeed a most significant emblem. It implied *confederation*, as salt was the seal of a covenant—*communion*, as it was a bond of friendship—*sanctity*, as it was inseparable from sacrifice—and *perpetuity*, from its properties of preservation—a covenant of salt, signifying not only a confirmed agreement, but an indissoluble engagement—the use of the symbol in the sacred writings implying eternity.

I have thus, taking my stand upon the Ethics of Socrates, looked back upon the history of morals, before his day, so far as it can be discerned. It is fairly traced to the East, and I should not fear, were this the time or the place, to enter into the discussion, to prove the origination of the general philosophy of all ages, in revelation, either oral or written—traditional indeed to these nations, but recorded upon the imperishable pages of inspiration; and I advance this sentiment with the greater confidence, because it is not out of order, that distinguished philosopher himself, upon whose system of Ethics we have taken our stand, referring all illumination to the Deity, confessing the want of a divine teacher, and expressing his confident expectation that such an instructor would appear.

When Socrates devoted the powers of his mighty mind to morals exclusively, it was not from any conscious deficiency in the other branches of science and philosophy. It was not the effort of an uncultivated intellect, labouring to conceal its literary poverty under the covering of an interest in moral attainments which left neither time, nor taste, for other pursuits. Socrates was rich in all. He studied under Anaxagoras and Archelaus, the most distinguished physiologists; and we have the testimony of Plato and of Xenophon, rivals and opponents on all other questions, but agreeing in this, confirmed long after by the judgment of Cicero, that this great man was skilled in all sciences, eminent for all learning, distinguished as well for his literary acquirements as for his mental endowments, and that to whatever he applied himself, in that he was sure to excel. Such was his acknowledged pre-eminence, that he was pronounced by the oracle, *the wisest of men*. It arose, then, from a noble disdain of those pursuits, which, however ingenious and applauded, terminated in speculation, or closed without producing a moral benefit. Socrates had one grand *object*; which was to reduce philosophy to practice; therefore he cultivated exclusively the science of morals, and bent to it

alike the sublime powers of his mind, and the extensive acquisitions which he had made. What was, with philosophers preceding him, wrapped up in dark sayings, he reduced to the plainest terms; what was with them incidental and occasional, was with him a study, and the work of a life; a work, moreover, to which he finally sacrificed that life. He had one great subject—I call it one, because although it divides itself into two parts, these are inseparable; and out of their relation all morals arise. This *subject* was, the consideration of God, and of Man. The first was the object of his most intense contemplation; the second, he became acquainted with by the most intimate and familiar conversation. The one formed the substance of his metaphysics; the other, laid the basis of his morals.

Plato had the spirit of his master, but he covered it with his own magnificent mantle. The *Cynics*, acknowledging *Antisthenes* as their head, imbibed the noble sentiment of *Socrates*, that all philosophy ought to be resolved into moral. Whatever coarseness might attach itself to their contempt of present things—and *Diogenes* justified fully the censure, that there was at least as much ill-nature as sincerity in the sect—they deserve the praise of regarding science only in so far as it can conduce to the moral benefit of man. “Why,” said this severe Cynic to an astronomer, “do you look after the moon and stars, and disregard the things which are under your feet?” To another, speculating upon dreams, and seduced by astrology, (a study, moreover, which was transplanted from *Chaldea*,) he observed with pointed indignation, “You are curious to define the import of your dreams, but you pay no regard to your waking actions.” “To live according to virtue,” (*το κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν*), was their grand maxim, as the very end of our being.* Such a philosophy deserved to be separated from brutality; such attention to morals, from a disregard to manners, that thus their science might merit the name of *Ethics*; and such elevation of sentiment, from a contempt of literature. Neither morals nor religion require that the forms of polished society should be laid aside, or the common sympathies of our nature be renounced; but both, the one as the principle, and the other as its application, will, when rightly received and exercised, soften the manners, while they purify the heart.

The *Stoics* followed the *Cynics*, and formed a close alliance with them, dismissing their contempt for literature. Their

* Gale, vol. ii. b. 4. c. ii. p 422.

head was Zeno; their title was taken from the porch in which they met, similar circumstances giving the name of Academics to the school of Plato, and the distinctive appellation of other sects of Grecian philosophers. Although discriminated by some peculiarities, the Ethics of Zeno for the most part resembled those of Socrates; and while Cicero is an illustrious disciple of the Academics, Epictetus is as splendid a representative of the Stoics.

We must not forget, in the history of morals, a most abused name, *Epicurus*; a man whose life was as pure, as his principle was sound, if it be taken in the sense in which he evidently proposed it, and of which his whole character was a visible interpretation. He made the end of life to be pleasure; but he commanded it to be sought in the path of virtue. There were who adopted his principle, and disregarded its operation; who professing enjoyment as the great object of being, sought it in the grossest sensuality, and transmitted the name of Epicurus with dishonour, to a posterity that would otherwise have done justice to his principles, and venerated his personal character. A man who held, that "the principal happiness is in God," that the sublimest pleasures are mental, and that there is an inseparable connexion between enjoyment and virtue; however he may have been misconceived, misrepresented, and misapplied, held no principles destructive of morals, nor which indeed differed widely from the received bases of Ethics; and to these sentiments, his irreproachable character gave the most ample and decided testimony.* The blemish in his system was his atheistic tenets, which, whenever they are adopted, cannot fail to neutralize morals. Nothing could be more demonstrative of this fact, than the abuse of his own Ethics, and the immorality of his own professed disciples. Those who adopted his atheism, soon forgot his morals; and avowing pleasure to consist in sensuality, sacrificed reason to the passions, and philosophy to licentiousness.

Among the sects of philosophers who arose after Socrates, none neglected morals, nor failed to consider Ethics as a science, and to blend the study of it with their philosophy, with the exception of the *Sceptics*—properly so called, because they doubted of every thing. The name which has been preserved to an ignoble immortality, in this connexion, is *Pyrrho*. They denied that truth could be discovered—denied that any thing was just, or unjust, moral or the con-

* Laertius, and Gale, vol. ii. p. 444.

trary—denied any rule of action, and any end of being. Every thing was denied, and nothing established—every thing pulled down, and nothing built up in its room. The sect, alas, has not confined itself to Greece, nor perished with Pyrrho. And where this unfortunate perversion of powers, this obliquity of intellect, obtains, the happiness of the individual, and the well-being of society, are alike endangered. It is also a pursuit which requires neither genius nor understanding. It is easy to unravel the web which has been wrought, with the greatest skill, into the most perfect beauty. It is easier to demolish a temple, than to construct a novel. That which requires so little knowledge, can confer no renown; but unfortunately, the damage to society bears no proportion to the facility of the operation: that which costs no labour, does nevertheless incalculable injury.

I have purposely delayed naming *Aristotle* until the present moment, although he preceded some of the last-mentioned sects in point of time, because of the entire change which he introduced into his philosophy in respect of form. Under this distinguished leader, the Peripatetics ranged themselves. His mighty and comprehensive genius embraced all subjects. We find him in all the walks of science—Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, all occupied his attention. What profession does not trace some of its elements to his industry and talents? In respect of the subject immediately under consideration, his principles were substantially those of Socrates; but he changed the whole order of communication, and razed the usages of all antiquity. The great principle which he established was, that nothing should be taken from tradition, but every thing demonstrated by reason. The establishment of this principle caused men to lose sight of the origination of that very philosophy which he had himself embraced. All Greece received her information from tradition, or rather from those who had themselves so gathered it. Her dependence upon the East, the country of tradition, was evident from the forms in which she clothed her precepts, and which she borrowed, with the principles themselves. With perfect consistency, when Aristotle refused tradition, he decried the symbolical mode of instruction. With him originated those logical subtilties, and those metaphysical disquisitions, which captivated and distinguished the schoolmen, so many centuries afterwards, and impeded the progress of knowledge, while they assumed her name—banished the substance, while they

worshipped the shadow, until the immortal Lord Bacon arose, and once more appealing to nature and to truth, emancipated philosophy from the trammels of hypothesis, and placed her upon the immoveable basis of experiment.

Such were the principal Grecian philosophers, and such their modes of moral instruction, Socrates being still the central point. The Romans conquered Greece, and learned her philosophy. The illustrious names of Cicero, Seneca, Pliny, and others no less distinguished, (for who can enumerate the stars in that constellation, of every thing majestic and imperishable, comprised in the eternal name of Rome?) confessed these Grecian sages to be their masters, and manifested towards them all the warm affections of disciples. After the fall of the Roman empire, an awful blank occurs in the history of morals; and it was not until ages elapsed, that the fountains of ancient philosophy were again broken up, and syllogistic wranglings yielded to the new impressions received from systems which had been long forgotten, but not one of whose immortal features time had been able to injure, although he had succeeded for some centuries in obscuring them. The immediate effects of this restoration of the old philosophy to the light of day, I have already anticipated. The disciples of the Grove, of the Stoa, and of the Lyceum, could not more eagerly contend for the characteristic distinctions of their schools, than did these new Academics, Stoics, Peripatetics, for the respective dogmas of antiquity. The results of Bacon's bold and steady investigation overthrew the whole system of physics, and opened the path of knowledge before the pupil of science, broad and unobstructed. In respect of Ethics, the event was far different. The very freedom of inquiry which demonstrated the physical absurdities of antiquity, displayed to the greatest advantage the general grandeur and truth of its Ethics. And it would be injustice to the great names which have been produced, not to confess, that of all the modern systems of Ethics, not one is to be found which does not, directly or indirectly, emanate from the principles of one or other of the schools.

I grant all the advantages arising from our nearer approximation to the eternal Fountain of light and truth—and this is a superiority for which I shall contend, before the present course of Lectures closes—but the general principles were derived from tradition, approved and adopted by these illustrious minds, and have received, with the applause of ages, the sanction of modern moralists. I never read

the Offices of Cicero, without feeling that Grotius, Puffendorf, and some of our brightest luminaries, have borrowed no small portion of their splendour from this brilliant orb. And while some of our professed writers on Ethics have adopted the characteristic distinctions of the respective schools, as their fancy, or their judgment, guided them: there have been found those, who have not scrupled to patronize the principles of Pyrrho, and to attempt to bring again the shadows of scepticism over the dayspring of revelation. They have imbibed the atheism of Epicurus without his morals; and employed the sophistry of Stilpo, to establish the laxities of Protagoras. Of this unhappy class is the theory of Hobbes, whose metaphysical atheism, exposed by various writers, has been combated by none more successfully than by the learned and distinguished Cudworth, supported by Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price. Lord Shaftesbury and Hutcheson take other grounds, into the detail of which it does not comport with a simple historical sketch, such as is the present Lecture, to enter. These were followed by Mr. Hume; contemporary with him, and since his day, we have had a Butler, a Paley, a Priestley, a Hartley, a Smith, a Cogan, a Stewart, a Reid—some of whom are spared to the world of letters, while others have passed away with former generations. I have mentioned these slightly, and have omitted others, because they will come before us in their order hereafter, when their principles shall demand investigation. Having conducted the history of morals down to modern times, I may close the outline which I have attempted, and not intrude any further observations upon facts which are generally known, and names universally familiar, whose merits, as moralists, will be the subjects of future discussion.

It was the great object of Socrates to lead the contemplations of his school to the Deity. From his Being, and our relation to him, he argued moral obligations; and impelled by a sense of duty so arising, he reduced speculative philosophy to practice; and renouncing those disputations, which were merely intellectual, or related to science as irrespective of any active result, he bent the whole force of his vigorous mind to render men wiser, better, and therefore happier, than he found them. He referred them to the Deity as the fountain of good—to his will, as the grand rule of morals. He said expressly, that “virtue came by Divine inspiration;” and whatever we are to understand by that mysterious demon, which he affirmed constantly intimated

to him what he should or should not do, it is evident in general, that this professed and supernatural impulse was part of his adopted system, that referred all things excellent in man to the Divine Being. It was this conviction that induced him to devote himself to the study of morals, in preference to any other branch of science; and which imparted that purity and sublimity to his *Ethics*, which distinguished him above all other philosophers.

I call Socrates the first who reduced morals to system, only by courtesy, as he was the first among heathen philosophers who effected this; by that kind of courtesy too, which has, in my opinion, been carried too far, and deprived the Bible of its due rank in the world of science, its just share in the discussion of morals, not to say, the fair claim of having been the first, as well in point of antiquity as of success, in the field of *Ethics*. It has every way the superiority over the system of Socrates, as over every other; and it is shameful cowardice in the friends of revelation to dismiss so lightly its pretensions in connexion with the great question of morals, when no pains are spared on the part of those writers on *Ethics* who deny its authority, to nullify its influence on the subject. The same delicacy is not observed on the part of those who would exclude it from the moral code, and they at least set us the example of boldly speaking out those sentiments which we hold in respect of its claims. If it shall hereafter appear, that this book stands closely allied with *Ethics*; that it states clearer principles, furnishes more certain rules, and produces more extended and decided results, than any other system of morals which has yet appeared—to pass it over, as unworthy attention—to yield its superiority, without investigating the ground on which it is assumed—to dismiss it, without observing the stand which it takes—is not merely treating the book without candour, but doing the subject itself irreparable injustice.

Should its inspiration be disputed, or even denied, its system of *Ethics* lies before us for examination, in common with that of Socrates, or of any other philosopher, and has at least an equal right to be heard, and equal claims to respect. It is abundantly more ancient than any other system. It is the code whence most of the principles of jurisprudence have been taken, and from which all lawgivers have borrowed the substance of their legislation. Even the moral system of Socrates proceeds upon principles which may be distinctly traced to a scriptural origin;

and the way in which it was derived may be easily conceived, after what has been said respecting the deduction of Grecian philosophy from Eastern nations, and by the confession of Plato from the Syrians. Socrates laid down four great principles, which were obviously the same with those established in the Bible; and as he flourished a century and a half later than the destruction of the Jewish empire by Nebuchadnezzar, it is evident with whom the principles, common to both, originated. These four leading sentiments were, First, the spiritual, infinite, and eternal nature of Deity, together with the doctrine of his unity, for which this distinguished man may be said to have died a martyr. This is the grand doctrine of the Scriptures. Secondly, the corruption of human nature, (*κακον εμφντον*, &c.) a fundamental fact, affirmed at the very commencement of the Jewish records. Thirdly, a native blindness in which all men are enveloped; the natural result of the former principle, if that be conceded, and constantly insisted upon in the Hebrew writings. Fourthly, that virtue was not attainable by nature or art, but is the product of a Divine inspiration; an opinion which has been generally considered peculiar to the volume of revelation. These things Socrates asserted as the basis of his philosophy; and they are so allied to the sentiments held by the Hebrews, that one can scarcely fail of the conclusion, that they were traditionally derived thence, through some of the channels opened by the Phenicians, or acquired by the personal intercourse of the principal sages of Greece themselves, with the oriental nations. If, therefore, the principles of the greatest of the Heathen philosophers appear to be borrowed from the Scriptures; or if it be only evident, that there is a striking coincidence between the Ethics of Socrates and the doctrines and precepts of the Bible, in giving the history of morals, it was impossible to overlook the latter; and if it be at all noticed, its native grandeur will not fail to entitle it to rank first in the scale of moral disquisitions.

These remarks will have tenfold weight, if they are applied to the New Testament, where the superiority of its moral system is so striking, that it is maintained with the most affecting eloquence by Rousseau himself, in the person of a Savoyard priest, and in a work in which it was evidently intended that the imaginary speaker should convey the sentiments of the philosophical author. He states justly, that Socrates, who had been considered by some as the inventor of morality, was in fact, which we have now

represented him, only the first who reduced it to system among the Greeks ; and he supports this remark, by producing some splendid examples of justice, patriotism, temperance, and the moral virtues, as practised long before he had framed his scheme of Ethics. He maintains a superiority so great on the part of the Son of Mary, over the Son of Sophronisca, that it will not admit of a comparison between them : and, to use his own words, he confessed, that “ the majesty of the Scriptures filled him with admiration, and that the sanctity of the gospel addressed itself to his heart.” If Rousseau thus thought and spake of the moral system of the Bible ; if he could add, that “ the works of philosophers, with all their affectation of greatness, appeared to him mean, when compared with that volume ;” I repeat, it would have been inexcusable indeed, on my part, to have passed it by unnoticed, in professing to give a history of morals.

If it be important to learn the crude elements, out of which mighty empires have been composed ; if it be interesting to trace grand political results to their secret source, a source sometimes as obscure as the effects are tremendous and astonishing ; if nothing is indifferent which associates itself with the faculties of men, and points out the march of intellect ; if we cannot contemplate the sublime operations of human skill and industry, without being anxious to ascertain by what mind they were conceived, and by what hand they were executed, that the immortality of the artist may be co-extended with that of his work—a nobler principle than curiosity impels us to learn the history of morals. When the pyramids of Egypt shall be covered with the sands of the desert which drift upon them, or, yielding at last to that influence of time which they have so long resisted, even these stupendous monuments of ancient science shall sink under the weight of accumulated ages, the structure of morals, whose foundations are laid in eternity, shall rear its awful head in the heavens ; and, standing unmoved amidst the shock of elements, surviving the dissolution of nature, remain alone, majestic, and uninjured, surrounded by the wrecks of the material universe.

On the Results of Art, as connected with the Happiness of the Human Race in general.

THE progress of Invention and Discovery, the results of human Art, and the transactions of mankind, have been

generally viewed through a medium, too partial and particular, not sufficiently generalized, and either too sanguine, too despondent, or too disdainful. There have been some gloomy prophets, who, with melancholy broodings, have predicted the ruin and downfall of every thing terrestrial; who are constantly pointing to the ages of excellence, ages long gone by, and moralizing upon the degeneracy of recent times; who pronounce every innovation pernicious, and every deviation from the past, an approximation to ruin!

On the other hand, we have dreams of human perfectibility; of an indefinite and interminable advancement towards perfection, though never to be attained. Here every step is an improvement, every change beneficial—all science is progressing, every art advancing—virtue is triumphant, and vice abashed and diminished! In a word, “the world is grown honest.” Again, we have had pictures drawn of the golden age; yet the best authority has told us, that the first man who was born into the world slew the second, and it has rather provokingly been asked, *when* were the times of simplicity, of innocence, and of peace?

Rousseau, in his first memorable production, contended, that the savage state was more happy than the civilized. This was undoubtedly a paradox. He reasoned from false premises; his description of savage nature was disguised and decorated in the flowing periods of his matchless eloquence, whilst the picture of cultivated man was distorted and caricatured by the pencil of exaggeration. His definition of Happiness might, also, require some critical examination, and probably very few would agree in its accuracy.

It is not by any means certain, that man ever *did* live in a *purely savage state*. Either we must believe the account presented in the sacred writings, which describes man as created, and *created perfect*; or we must believe that he existed *through all eternity*—there is no choice, no medium between the two. If, then, man was created perfect, where is the evidence of his primitive ignorance? If he existed from all eternity, is it *reasonable* to conclude that it was reserved for the present, or any recent period, to discover the important knowledge of the means of happiness?

There are, indeed, abundant statements to be found in the books of travellers, of men who live, even now, in a state very different to that which we term civilized. But the whole subject is one of the most vague and indefinite description. It is, at the best, entirely comparative: we know of no men who are absolutely and strictly uncivilized. The Romans used

to call all the rest of the world "barbarians," and justified their wars under the pretence of introducing civilization in the train of conquest. Those who compose a society, state, or clan, and live under the dominion of social ties, however limited in extent, are so far civilized. They are influenced by the wishes and approbation of each other: they learn from experience, however rude and confined, some principles of moral and social order, and some knowledge of the distinctions between right and wrong. In the very lowest state of human society; out of the common association in the chase, or in the means of obtaining subsistence, there would arise something resembling concert and order. But the number of those who have been found in this rude condition is comparatively few, and unworthy of estimation in any general view of human society; and it is obvious to remark, that the advantages of refinement being unknown in the ruder ages, they would be undesired, and their absence consequently unregretted. Our present happiness is never affected by any unascertained good, which may be discovered in the lapse of future time. But, leaving this point as a matter in dispute, the leading proposition intended to be maintained, is, that no arts, inventions, discoveries, or attainments of mankind, *of which we can trace the first existence*, or which can be claimed by any *particular age*, have increased the general stock of human happiness. All that those arts and attainments have done, has been merely to *change*, not to *improve*, the state or condition of human existence, to vary it in some particular features, to modify and refashion old customs and habits, and by new combinations and manners, to alter the external aspect and mere surface of artificial life.—It will not be necessary to review the two extremes of human society, to contrast the supposed period when nature existed in all its wildness, and when art is asserted to have been yet unborn, with that era, in which the latter had attained its greatest eminence. We may observe, however, in passing, that the advocates of the high benefits derived from human acquisitions, very naturally select the most favourable period and country upon which to found their argument. On the other hand, they would drive us to choose the opposite extreme of imputed barbarity; but the existence of both extremes, is questionable. Let us, however, allow that some few individuals, unfavourably circumstanced, may experience the misery arising from a total ignorance of the arts of life. Allow that others, "happily born," derive superior enjoyment from the

possession of all the refinements of polished society. These, surely, are not the results of human art, at which there can be any cause, or reason, to rejoice—one person in a hundred thousand rendered happier than the rest of the species. This is a noble result, worthy of the exultation of the patriot and philanthropist!

It is, however, no fair consideration of the *general* question, to contrast the two extremes. Let us view the ages described in the pages of Homer and Ossian, or in the historians of the earliest times, and compare those periods with the supreme elevation of modern refinement. Look at the time when literature scarcely existed, when every thing mental was centred in the songs of the bard, the minstrel, and the prophet; when there was some splendour and magnificence, but little taste or elegance; when there was evident abundance, but little luxury—yet when there were the same distinctions amongst men as in the present period, the same gradations of rank, the same inequalities of wealth, and the same varied degrees of renown—when there were, also, the same kindred and social ties, and when the same passions, feelings, and faculties existed as at the present day.—There was a period which might be called *the empire of the sword*. In that age, *valour* was the chief quality in estimation, and it consequently attained the highest reward. Comparatively speaking, there now exists over a large part of the habitable globe, *the reign of mind*. The mode by which it governs is *opinion*, and talent is now the chief quality in request; yet influence, not reason, is the agent by which its purposes are effected.

In rude ages mankind obtained their objects by physical, not mental, force: hence it followed, that strength, activity, and bravery, were so highly estimable. In polished times, wealth, public opinion, and influence, in general, bear sway; yet the *object*, at both periods, is the same—to enable the few to govern, perhaps, sometimes, to *enslave*, the many.

The criterion by which we may try the value of human art, and of all that it has accomplished, is *the degree of happiness* which has resulted to mankind in general. There is no test, except this, by which we can ascertain the merit of any production. Every thing should be estimated by the quantum of innocent pleasure it affords to the human race. All art and science is encouraged in proportion as it administers to the real, or supposed, satisfaction and convenience of society. The encouragement is sometimes fastidious, and ill-placed, but it always assumes the existence of

practical good. No one is such a Bedlamite as to like what does not please him. But it is just possible, that he may affect to be pleased, when he is not really so—that he may be regulated in his choice, and in the clamour of his applause, by the opinion of others.

It has always been considered extremely difficult to define happiness. The difference of opinion has obviously arisen from *the variety of means* which each person requires to constitute his own; but, by whatever means it may be produced, all will allow that it consists in *agreeable thoughts and sensations*. In other words, we are happy when we are thoroughly pleased. Now all the faculties and feelings, on the exercise of which happiness is dependent, were of the same nature and extent, in the earliest times, as they are at present. The *objects* by which they were aroused, may be changed or altered, or differently modified, but the capacity for happiness remains the same. There is the same amount of pleasure and pain, the same amount of hope and fear, the same amount of expectation and disappointment; and it would appear, therefore, that the elements being the same, and the general combination of those elements being similar, there must, with the exception of some slight modifications, be a corresponding result.

Leaving this general view of the subject, let us ask what portion of mankind is it, whose happiness *has* been improved by the progressive advances of art? Are those who possess *great capacity and most exquisite feeling*, in possession of higher or more numerous means of enjoyment? They were equally gratified in the rudest times, as in the most refined. The heroes of Homer and Ossian were as much elated with their distinctions as the most gifted moderns: they possessed equal objects of ambition. The plumed warrior, who dragged his captives at his chariot wheels, received as loud and swelling a shout of human applause, as ever greeted the ear of a modern orator or a modern statesman. If refinement has increased the number of factitious gratifications to those who possess great sensibility, who have more softness of heart than energy of head; if it enables them

“To fill the languid pause with finer joy,”

the same refinement has created, with its gratifications, endless wants—with more numerous expectations, more numerous disappointments—with a greater variety of amusements and pleasures, a correspondent share of languor, pain, and vexation.

There is certainly a large portion of mankind who are not much visited with the delicate susceptibilities to which we have adverted. They are in *the lowest class*. They have been the most numerous and most oppressed in all ages and in all countries. It will not be contended that art or invention has done much for *them*. Will any one say, that "the lean unwashed artificer," the pallid mechanic, or the squalid manufacturer, who crowd the great towns and cities of modern refinement—will any one assert that these are superior in thought or sensation to even a wild man of the woods, to the intrepid and fiery savage, to him who depends on his bow and his arrow, or on the bounties of a fertile though uncultivated soil?—or will you analyze the gratifications of the vassal of a military chieftain, or a feudal lord, and compare him either with the former or with the latter? If art has the convenience of its cities, nature bestows the glowing health of its fields, the inspiring brightness and sublimity of its prospects, its endless grandeur, and its exhaustless variety.

Happiness, as we have seen, consists in agreeable thoughts and sensations. But these thoughts and sensations must have correspondent means and causes. Many of our agreeable sensations may be very easily traced to the cornucopia of plenty. Famine is not so well adapted to afford pleasure, nor is the prospect of it even in the very lap of ease an agreeable thought. The *means of subsistence* administer to the appetites and the gratification of the senses. Now, in all ages, the means of subsistence are nearly equal. The supply is generally proportioned to the demand. No one age can in this respect boast much over another. There has been occasional famine and disaster at all periods.

But agreeable thoughts and sensations are produced, in a considerable degree, by the *approbation and sympathy* of our fellow-beings. The praise of the praiseworthy is a fit and meritorious object of ambition. We never act without motive, and the applause of the good and wise is a powerful incentive to action; but the approbation of men is not always sufficiently discriminating. It sometimes administers to the petty follies of vanity, it sometimes arouses the malice of envy, it sometimes swells the selfishness of pride, and it sometimes gratifies the ignoble ambition of possessing qualities in themselves utterly valueless, and often pernicious, though admired because of rare and difficult attainment. But this approbation and sympathy of our fellow-beings is not the result of art, or a discovery that belongs

to any particular age, much less to any recent one. Men have sought for applause, and have been applauded, in all ages, and the amount of this desirable object has been the same throughout all time. The attainments which have produced it have, indeed, been different. Circumstances have changed the means by which it was obtained, but have neither increased or diminished its value or extent. At one period superior skill in hunting, or in war, has been the supposed perfection of the human character,—at another, excellence in the fine arts, in science, in literature, “bears the palm alone.” The civilian then surpasses the warrior, and “the gown triumphs over the sword;” yet this is a mere change of the means—the end remains the same—the path of the race is altered, but the goal stands immutable.

The accumulation of facts, the extension of what is called knowledge, is esteemed by many as incontrovertibly advantageous to the human race. It would be as unnecessary, as laborious, to walk the extensive round of the sciences. In few words, however, we may advert to *two* of them, and probably in the selection it will not be alleged, that the least important, or the most easily depreciated, have been chosen. *Astronomy* and *chemistry* are among the most eminent of the sciences. The one, as it were, grasping within its range the whole material universe, and the other analyzing the nature even of its minutest particle. The one calculated to fill the mind of the sublimest genius, and the other to occupy the attention of the most inquisitive and active observer.

To some few persons it is doubtless satisfactory, that the solar system has been so well explained. It is undoubtedly true, that when the mind is contemplating the stupendous nature of that system, it derives a high and positive gratification. But this is a pleasure enjoyed only by a few, and if the thought which we are now examining had never existed, who is prepared to say, that the happiness of those few cultivated minds would have been less? The same mind that is occupied in the admiration of the system thus developed, would not have been vacant. It would have been filled by some other thought, and it is *the exertion of the faculty* that constitutes the pleasure. Besides, it is by no means clear that the explanation of the theory of the universe is, in itself, an object of much pleasure. The far greater part of the agreeable thought is made up of that to which we are not indebted to art. It consists in the positive pleasure we derive, first, from the exertion of the mental

power; and secondly, of the corporeal organ; and the employment of the latter depends on that flood of light which is every where poured on the visual sense. What satisfaction would a blind man have in contemplating the abstract theory of the universe? Independent of this, too, our own sensations are, after all, the most important in the production of the agreeable idea. What does a man, amidst the writhings of torture, care for the Newtonian system? When he is happy, when the train of his thoughts is agreeable, when he enjoys "the sunshine of the soul," when "his bosom's lord sits lightly on his throne," there is no art, no invention, no discovery, no acquisition that can by possibility add to the amount of his happiness.

The ancient chemists reduced, as they thought, the material world into four elemental substances. The modern chymists have discovered a great many more; but it does not follow, that the substantial interests of the human race are much affected by it. Whether there be four, or forty, or four hundred primitive substances, does not appear to be of much consequence. We cannot alter the substances themselves, nor can we prevent the combinations amongst those substances which take place in the general operations of the material world. It is not the mere nomenclature that is so very important. The *names* by which they are called, whether few or many, can make no difference in the utility of their nature. Perhaps it will be said, that chemistry has been applied to the purposes of life, to cookery and medicine. Of the former, it may be sufficient to say, that the ages of Epicurus and Lucullus were amply advanced in all the arts of the banquet, for any purpose, either useful or pleasurable. Gluttony and drunkenness are not of modern discovery; neither is simplicity of diet. Those who have been edified by a recent production, called "*Death in the Pot*," will not be very prone to boast of modern excellence in the arts of the kitchen. But chemistry is useful in the *materia medica*. One would wonder, indeed, amongst so many discoveries, how people can be so extremely foolish as to remain sick, or, under any circumstances, to give up the ghost! Yet perhaps we shall, after all, arrive at the conclusion, that the sick and wounded, and the deaths, have been very nearly equal at all periods of the known world.

The limits of an Essay do not allow of more than a very brief reference to *the Arts*. There are some which are useful to *the few*, and some which are useful to *the many*. Nothing appears more delightful than music, painting,

poetry, and rhetoric. One remark which may be made is, that mankind are as well pleased, if not more pleased, in the *origin* and *rise* of these arts, by the rudest efforts, as when they attain their utmost perfection. As the arts advance, the knowledge of them advances—with superior artists, rise up superior critics. The blissful ignorance of wonder, the enthusiasm of unlettered novelty, is no more. The pain of the artist, in attaining perfection, is as great as the pleasure of the amateur in beholding it.

Architecture is an ornamental, as well as a useful art; but is any one the better, or wiser, or happier, for the five orders of architecture? Suppose there had been only one—suppose the art had terminated with the invention of the Tuscan order, and we had heard nothing of the Doric, or the rest; is there any person whose real advantages would have undergone the slightest reduction?

But, then, there are happily others, the *culinary* and *luxurious* arts. We have sumptuous fare, fine dresses, splendid houses, and brilliant equipages. Unfortunately, however, the possessors of these things think very little of them, and perhaps the most illustrious amongst them have no more agreeable thoughts or sensations in entering the great halls of their ancestors, than we have in entering the humblest cottage.

“Some are, and must be, greater than the rest—
More rich, more wise—but who infers from hence,
That such are *happier*, shocks all common sense.”

The invention of the *alphabetic* and *numeral characters* has been generally considered as very important. Letters were a great improvement upon hieroglyphics, in the facility of conducting business: yet so far as amusement and ingenuity are concerned, we are not perhaps much the gainers. It is more agreeable to look at a picture than at a great A. The Chinese are said to have 80,000 characters, and certainly if novelty and variety be, as we generally suppose, agreeable, the Chinese have the advantage. The acquisition of them would, it is true, be rather operose; yet the number of arts and accomplishments, which some attain amongst us, do not demand a less consumption of time and trouble. But, apart from this, does any one suppose that the Egyptians, or the Chinese are less happy than we are, because they are not blessed with the sublime invention of our A, B, C?

There is another art, connected with the use of these

A, B, C's, which it is still more dangerous to undervalue, *the art of printing*. Its utility, of course, can only consist in the diffusion of knowledge. Now, the facts and principles which are really known, or discovered, are very easily diffused—those facts and principles, so far as they are important, are few in number, and capable of being easily disseminated. The *necessity* of printed books may therefore at least be *questioned*. It may even be thought that their number is becoming an evil—that there is far more error, prejudice, and falsehood, now issued from the press, than accuracy, correct judgment, or truth. That which is good in moderation, is an evil in excess; and the extreme fondness for books, so far as it extends, is a diminution of the pleasures of social intercourse. The studious character in general either shuns society, or, when he enters it, is useless or unamiable.

Amongst the *discoveries* of mankind, that of the continent of *America* was undoubtedly the greatest. In reading its history, even as described by the admirable pen of Dr. Robertson, and in viewing its general effects on the old, as well as the new world, we are compelled to conclude, that it has hitherto only carried war and devastation into the regions of the *West*, and opened the pernicious floodgates of new wealth and new luxuries, upon the nations of the *Eastern Hemisphere*. Well might the Americans reject the European promise of bettering their condition. "They boast they come but to improve our state, enlarge our thought, and free us from the yoke of error. Yes! *they* will give enlightened freedom to our minds, who are themselves the slaves of passion, avarice, and pride! They offer us their protection. Yes! such protection as vultures give to lambs—covering and devouring them!" "If Europe," says Montesquieu, "has benefited much by America, Spain must have derived still greater advantages. Yet Philip the Second was obliged to make the nation bankrupt. This is owing to an inherent and physical defect in the nature of riches, which renders them vain—a defect which increases every day. Gold and silver are either a fictitious or a representative wealth. The representative signs of wealth are durable. But the more they are multiplied, the more they lose their value, because the fewer are the things which they represent. Spain behaved like the foolish king, who desired that every thing he touched might be converted into gold, and who was obliged to beg of the gods to put an end to his misery." It may be urged, that the productions of America

are useful, because they increase the number of our gratifications. But, 'tis doubtful whether there be any thing imported from the new world that was not to be found in the old. Let us see what was the state of ancient commerce whilst it was limited to the Eastern hemisphere. Its productions appear to have been numerous enough to satisfy the most luxurious and voluptuous. Those productions have scarcely been surpassed since the discovery of America. The following is an abridged description of the traffic of the Eastern nations: "The Phœnicians, coasting the peninsula of Arabia, bent their voyages to the Persian Gulf, and imported from thence the pearls of Havila, the gold of Saba and Ophir, the aromatics and precious gems of Ceylon, the diamonds of Golconda, the silver, the gold dust of Africa. By the Black Sea, in ships of Egypt and Syria, were exported those commodities which constituted the opulence of Thebes, Memphis, and Jerusalem. Sometimes, ascending the course of the Tigris and Euphrates, they awaked the activity of the Assyrians, the Medes, the Chaldeans, and the Persians; and, according as they were used or abused, cherished or overturned their wealth and prosperity. Hence grew up the magnificence of Persepolis, of Ecbatana, of Babylon, of Nineveh, and of the melancholy and memorable Palmyra." It may be urged, that many of these sources are dried up or exhausted: an answer may be quoted from the same author: "Do the mountains retain their springs? are the streams dried up? and do the plants no more bear fruit and seed? Has heaven denied to the earth, and the earth to its inhabitants, the blessings that were formerly dispersed?"

If it be still contended that America itself, or that Europe, has been benefited by the discovery, we should recollect some of the evils that followed in its train. In order to work the mines of America, to cultivate its lands, and manufacture its productions, it has been considered necessary to depopulate the villages of Africa. The practice has generally been to destroy, or drive into the woods and mountains, the natives of the newly favoured country, to take possession of their territories, and import the poor negroes to cultivate and work them. It is not essential to sketch the picture of the horrors of the slave trade. It may be necessary only to remind those, who, in the exultation of partial abolition, have forgotten its former, and its still existing, atrocities, that it was conducted by treachery, by fraud, rapine, and violence:—that these miserable beings

were torn from their native land, "nor wife, nor children more did they behold, nor friends, nor happy home." They were driven, chained in herds, like cattle, to the sea-shore, and embarked, like cargoes of senseless logs, to a distant and unhealthful region.

If our attention be pointed to the luxuries we derive from this extension of commerce, let us recollect that the same wave that bears to one man a new source of sensual gratification, rolls over the ruined hopes and fortunes of another: that multitudes perish in attempting to reach those fatal shores: that multitudes die a sudden or lingering death in its heated and pestiferous or ungenial climates: that multitudes sink beneath the waters in the ungratified wish to regain the land of their sires. Count together these human calamities, and add the loss of property, and of health, which others sustain in this boasted traffic, and then determine which should preponderate in the scales of good and evil.

"In the savage state," it was said by Lord Kaimes, "that man is almost all body, with a very small portion of mind. In the maturity of civil society, he is complete both in mind and body. In a state of degeneracy, by luxury and voluptuousness, he is neither mind nor body."—Now, the tendency of the intercourse with America, has merely been to increase the quantum of luxury, already sufficiently great.

"Have we not seen round Britain's peopled shore,
Her useful sons exchang'd for useless one?
The wealth of climes, where savage nations roam,
Pillag'd from slaves, to purchase slaves at home?
Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen who survey
The rich man's joy increase, the poor's decay;
'Tis your's to judge, how wide the limits stand
Between a splendid and a happy land:—
Proud swells the tide with loads of freighted ore,
And shouting folly hails them from her shore—
Yet count our gains—this wealth is but a name,
That leaves our useful products still the same."

Let us, to complete the picture, view the stability of this great commercial discovery. Look to the facts enregistered on the pages of history. It has been well said, that "commerce has wings." It flew from Egypt, from Phœnicia, from Carthage. It fled from the Pisans, the Florentines, the Genoese, the Venetians, the Hanseatics. Do we expect it will now change its nature, or that its advantages will remain when it has changed its abode?

If the productions of human art, in the course of so many centuries, comprised even in authentic history, have been so beneficial to mankind, and so progressive in their improvement, probably some one will indulge us by saying what it is they have permanently effected in the mental or the moral condition of human nature. Is health increased, or life prolonged, by the labours or the discoveries of the sons of Esculapius? *They* are not, however, to blame. Their chief occupation is to correct the evils of excessive luxury and refinement. They cannot add to sound health, or lengthen the allotted span of human existence. It would be unreasonable to expect it. The changes effected in the culture of the earth, in edifices, in furniture, in dresses, in equipages, in luxurious living, are enjoyed by a few only. If there were no attendant and correspondent evil, such a result would be an advantage. To produce the unmixed happiness of *one individual*, unconnected with the misery or inconvenience of another, would be something gained. But the enjoyments of the few are unhappily obtained at the severe labour and expense of the many.

In *the mental progress* of the world, we take the credit of being now more correct in our ideas than at a former period. Let us pass the egotism of judging upon our own merits; let us look to the state of the facts, and we shall find, that the age has not gone by in which one set of mental philosophers deny the existence of mind, and another the existence of matter. How far then are we superior to the ancients? Are our mental attainments more agreeable and pleasant than those of our ancestors? Are they more numerous, are they more novel and intense, as well as more numerous? It is probable we may all recollect the time when we had fewer thoughts to occupy our minds, or, it might be said, fewer to *distract* them. But we may doubt the memory, or the candour, of the person who asserts, that in the spring-time of life, when every thing appeared "new and strange," he was less pleased with the few bright and novel ideas with which the mind was filled and delighted, than at a later period, when, indeed, the number was increased, but certainly neither their intensity nor their pleasure.

But this is contemplating the subject with respect to the individual. Our business is strictly of a more general nature. Has any new idea been added to the stock? Has the genius of the present enlightened times suggested any single thought that was before unknown? Have we not been going on, from age to age, borrowing of one another?

Have we done any thing more (even if we have done that) than vary a little *the arrangement* of our mental stores? Can it be proved, that the most learned, or the most scientific, are the happiest? Select in your mind the most eminent man of the present age, in this or any other country, and if he be really happy, you will find his felicity very little dependent upon his learning, his science, or his skill in any art whatever.

We come next to *the moral improvements* which are supposed to have been effected. The benefits of *Christianity* cannot be appealed to on the present occasion. That purest and best religion, that system of moral perfection; whose precepts, if made the universal rule of conduct, would humanize the world, and create another paradise in this vale of tears, was *revealed*, and never could have been discovered. It is not the production of imperfect man. It is no art, and no science; but is above them all. Independent of this revealed system, what new truth in morals has been discovered? The earliest of all moralists suggested all that the latest enjoin. In all ages it has been taught, in all ages it has been known, that our happiness depended on the practice of virtue. What new maxims have been discovered? What new motives of action? At all periods of the world, recorded in profane history, there have been folly, vice, and crime. Religion has denounced the wrath of eternity. All laws have issued their thunders: yet folly, vice, and crime, have still existed. They have varied only in mode and object. They have changed with the times, and been proportioned to the pressure of distress, and the temptation of relief.

Advancing even to higher ground, what has the wisest system of legislation effected, what have all the forms of government accomplished? Unequal and oppressive laws, and despotic rule, are considered as tremendous evils. But the general principles of justice pervade all laws, and these "when best administered are best." Liberty can only be esteemed as a means of happiness. No one would admire it, if misery were its natural consequence. It is the fact, however, that in every age persons have called aloud for better laws and more liberty; yet

"How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which kings, or laws, can cause or cure."

If we consult the catalogue of complaints at the present period it would appear, that so far from our possessing more

justice and liberty than any antecedent age, "since the great flood," we are positively groaning under the weight of the most oppressive system of law and government that ever plagued the human species!

An argument of no small force is to be derived from the conception we must have of the goodness of "the great First Cause." No one will dispute, that the end and object of our creation was evidently the production of happiness. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose any thing but goodness. Now, is it conceivable, that mankind should be left to grope their way in the dark, in search of this *summum bonum*; that the very purpose of their being should be left to the uncertain cultivation and progress of countless ages? Where would be the justice of leaving all the early races of mankind to struggle through comparative infelicity, and reserve the possession of happiness to some remote generation? We may thoroughly understand, why the happiness of each individual should, in a great degree, depend on himself; but it is incomprehensible, to every natural feeling and notion of justice, that one race of men, as deserving as another, should possess a less degree of *the reward* of virtue.

In favour of our position, we may refer to the argument offered by the analogy in the appearance of the universe. There every thing was created, *at first*, as perfectly as was necessary. The material world remains the same. It neither improves, nor retrogrades: it undergoes a partial change, but in its general features it is immutable. In the long lapse of time, mountains may be raised or levelled, the elevation of a hill, or the depth of a valley, may be increased or diminished; but these appearances of nature still exist. The species may change, but the genus continues the same. The great ocean may roll its mighty waves into new channels, but its nature, and its magnitude, are unchanged. The waters sometimes produce fertility, and sometimes destruction. The periods and the modes of operation change, but the general result is the same. The earthquake, the tempest, the tornado, the pestilence, visit different portions of the globe; they change the site and scene of their devastation, but in no age has the whole earth been exempt from their influence. The sun is not increased in brightness, nor are the stars diminished in lustre. They have illumined the world, they have shone on man's fitful life for many thousand years—they still shine in the same splendour. The vegetable kingdom, and all the tribes of lower animals, have remained the same. It is reasonable, therefore, to

infer that human nature, its passions, its thoughts, its feelings, and its happiness, have been, are now, and will continue to the end of time to be, as they were at the beginning.

Yet, notwithstanding these views of art and science, and human acquisitions, it must be allowed that the world is greatly indebted to those ingenious, active, and enterprising spirits, who, in all ages, have exerted their faculties to amuse or gratify the human species. The strains of music charm and captivate the ear—the eye is delighted with the exhibitions of the pencil—the fancy is dazzled and elevated by the “fine frenzy” of the poetic lay—the understanding is gratified by the skill of the rhetorician, and the heart by the eloquence of the orator.—Science has done much. It has amused, as well as been useful. Literature in general is a source of gratification, very important to an age of high refinement, and it sometimes removes the leaden languor of idleness.

But still we must contend against the assumption, that the welfare of society, and of the human species in general, can materially depend on the eminence or the extension either of art, science, or literature. The attainments and supposed advantages of the present age, are not superior to those of former periods. Throughout all authentic time, the arts have existed in all the extent and perfection that can be necessary or useful in the production of human enjoyment, and the promotion of human happiness. The welfare of mankind, the utmost range of its felicity, the truest and most permanent interest of the species, consists not in the perfection of art. It depends on

“What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy,
The soul’s calm sunshine, and the heartfelt joy.”

It does not depend upon the most boundless extent of riches—it does not depend on the utmost summit of worldly wisdom. It is to be found in all climes and all situations—in every age, and in every period of the world. It is the gift of Heaven itself. It cannot either be destroyed, or improved, by the vicissitudes of human invention. It requires only to be rightly appreciated, and to be temperately enjoyed. In fine,

“That *virtue* only makes our bliss below,
And all our knowledge is *ourselves to know*.”

R. M.

The Mischievous Effects of Gaming: a Charge delivered to the Grand Jury of the County of Berks, in the State of Pennsylvania. By the HON. JACOB RUSH, President of the Third District of the Court of Common Pleas and Quarter Session for the State of Pennsylvania.

[THE lamentable instance of the effects of gaming, which has for many weeks past superseded all other topics of general conversation and public interest, has induced us to select the present moment for presenting to our readers the following excellent charge, by an American Judge whose name is well known in England, and highly respected there, as it deserves to be, for the boldness with which he has ever maintained from the seat of justice, the distinguishing, and what, in the estimation of the world, are deemed the opprobrious doctrines of the gospel. His judicial charges were published at Philadelphia, at the particular recommendation of the Presbyterian clergy of that city, as "enforcing a number of moral and religious duties, in a manner that will appear to many at once new, just, and striking," as "particularly and highly estimable, as they demonstrate the connexion between the principles of religion and those of social happiness, to be necessary and indispensable," and from their being "well calculated to render every person who seriously and candidly reads them, both a better Christian and a better citizen;" and though they have since been reprinted at New-York, we are assured, that to most of our readers, if not to all, they will be perfectly new, as we from time to time commend the most striking and generally interesting of them, to their notice.]

Gentlemen of the Grand Jury,

The practice of gaming, with the long train of evils generally resulting from it, have been pointed out and deplored, not more frequently by the divine and the moralist, than by the statesman and the patriot. Whether the love of this pernicious amusement be deeply implanted in human nature, as some have supposed, or be altogether the effect of habit, as others believe, it is certain, when once it gets possession of the mind, there is no vice that tyrannizes over its miserable votaries with more uncontrolled sway. Such is the infatuation which often attends it, that innumerable instances might be mentioned, of persons, who, by venturing their all upon this ocean of chances, have been reduced from opulence to poverty and wretchedness, in the

short space of a few minutes. And though such desperate scenes of guilt and folly do not often occur in *our* country, yet as all vice is in its nature progressive, and we are making rapid advances in every kind of luxury, there is reason to fear we shall, ere long, rival our European brethren in this, as well as in every other mode of criminal dissipation. There is, however, a species of gaming conducted on a lower scale, which abounds extremely among us, is chiefly carried on at taverns, and is practised by persons of all descriptions, high and low, rich and poor, old and young. It is to this scandalous violation of the laws of the land, this open insult upon government, I mean at this time to turn your attention, as to an evil of growing magnitude, which threatens our country with very calamitous effects.

It would consume too much time, and is not my intention, to go into a full discussion of the innumerable evils flowing to society from the practice of gaming. They are so obvious, as to present themselves to the understanding of the most unreflecting person. Let it suffice to observe, generally, that as it *springs* chiefly from idleness, the fruitful, the inexhaustible source of almost every vice, so it has a natural *tendency* to produce idleness. It operates as cause and effect, and is at once both parent and offspring. When the heart is once thoroughly possessed of this passion, every thing is sacrificed to its gratification. In the mad pursuit, health and constitution are gradually destroyed by irregular hours, and disorderly conduct. Sleepless nights, corroding passions, and a neglect of business, accompanied with the intemperate use of ardent spirits, soon plunge both the gamester and his family into one common ruin.*

It would be a fortunate circumstance, if the detail of

* The pernicious consequences of play, have been frequently described in the strongest terms, and illustrated by the most striking examples. Seldom, however, have they been represented on so large a scale, as in the account of the fate of a *great body of gamesters* at Hamburgh, which an intelligent spectator has published in a German Gazette, as the result of his attentive examination, during a period of two years. Of *six hundred individuals*, who were in the habit of frequenting gaming-houses, he states, that *nearly one half* not only lost considerable sums, but were finally stripped of all means of subsistence, and ended their days by self-murder. Of the rest, not less than an hundred finished their career by becoming swindlers or robbers on the highway. The remnant of this unfortunate group perished; some by apoplexy; but the greater part by chagrin and despair. He mentions, that during the whole space of two years, to which his journal is confined, he did not see one of these six hundred gamesters with a single new dress.—See *Relf's Gazette of February 2, 1802.*

mischiefs ended in the destruction of the constitution and temporal concerns of the gambler: but the case is far otherwise. The fatal effects of gaming extend beyond the grave. The *mind* is deeply contaminated, and sentiments, the most hostile to its *final* peace and happiness, are harboured and indulged. The gambler is frequently tortured with paroxysms of rage against Heaven; the effect of raised expectation being suddenly dashed at a critical moment: meanwhile his countenance is almost as much distorted with agony, as that of a person suffering on the rack: from which we may form a pretty correct idea, what must be the sensations that are tearing his heart; and how infinitely injurious their effect must be on the temper and disposition of the soul. In short, I must be permitted to remark, however displeasing the observation may be, that a gaming-table generally exhibits a scene of great immorality, where the most criminal passions rage uncontrolled, and dreadful oaths and imprecations burst from almost every tongue. That this is not a false, or exaggerated description, *candour* itself must acknowledge—and, I *think*, it must at the same time be as readily acknowledged to be the duty of every *friend* of virtue and his country, to abstain from an amusement pregnant with the strongest temptations to avarice, fraud, lying, cursing, swearing, contention, fretfulness, and every emotion that can disorder the heart. Even the stern philosopher, who is supposed to consult *nothing* so much as the tranquillity of his own *bosom*, would do well to avoid it, as dangerous, if not destructive, to that serene and unruffled enjoyment of mind, which he affects supremely to pursue. He who voluntarily and unnecessarily places himself in a situation where his innocence may be lost, or his feelings become the sport of blind imperious chance, acts a part neither compatible with the character of sound wisdom, or virtuous circumspection. The ideas of the great philosopher, Mr. Locke, should not, therefore be hastily reprobated; who, after examining this subject with his usual acuteness, declares it to be *his opinion*, that in order to avoid *all* temptation, the best way is, never to learn to play a single card.

Impressed, no doubt, by these, or other considerations still more forcible, the legislature of our state have endeavoured to abolish every species of gaming. The axe has been laid to the root of the evil by the law of April, 1794, intitled, “An Act for the Prevention of Vice and Immorality, and of unlawful Gaming, and to restrain disorderly Sports and Dissipations,” which has rendered it completely,

and to all intents and purposes, unlawful in Pennsylvania. It will not be improper to lay before you a brief sketch of the law on this subject.

The fifth section forbids fighting cocks* for money, or other valuable consideration, under the penalty of three dollars; and as it is notorious, that nothing so much encourages this inhuman and brutal diversion, as laying bets, and that cock-fighting is often the result of a speculating, gambling temper, any wager on the event is prohibited under a like penalty. Playing at cards, dice, billiards, bowls, shuffle-board, bullets, and any game of address or hazard for money, or other valuable consideration, is also forbidden, under a penalty of three dollars. With respect to playing bullets on the highway, the act forbids it under the like penalty, whether there be any bet laid or not. The remedy in this case, is what the law calls cumulative or additional. For, as playing bullets in the highway obstructs the road, and incommodes passengers and travellers, it is an offence, independent of the act, for which the parties are liable to indictment and fine at common law. A penalty of twenty dollars is also annexed to the offence of horse-racing, for money or other valuable consideration.†

* In England, this inhuman and brutalizing sport is a favourite amusement with many of our gentry; nay, we ourselves could, without difficulty, name a nobleman, in whose veins flow the blood of as illustrious ancestry as our peerage can produce,—who is himself the lord-lieutenant of one of the most extensive and most important counties in the kingdom, and as such is placed at the head of, and has the virtual nomination of, its magistracy,—who is regularly to be seen at every cock-pit within his reach, fighting the most brutish and desperate mains, and betting on their event, in the most hail-fellow-well-met familiarity, with some of the greatest blacklegs and blackguards in the kingdom. Some years ago, a legal friend of ours, in another part of the country than that to which we have just alluded, happening to be attending a court of quarter session as an advocate, during the race week, in the town where those sessions were held, dined at the ordinary; where a magistrate of the county, who had not even shewn himself in court, asked him, if he had been at the cock-pit. “No, indeed, I have not,” replied our friend, “for I have been very differently engaged, in drawing an indictment against some people for cock-fighting.” “For cock-fighting!” exclaimed the expounder of the law, with mingled astonishment and alarm; (for his morning had been devoted to the cock-pit, rather than to the court, where the business was adjourned to the morrow for want of justices,) “and do you mean to say that cock-fighting is illegal?” “To be sure I do,” replied the barrister, “and if you will do us the honour to attend at the next quarter sessions, you may assist in sentencing the people who have been guilty of it, to fine and imprisonment for their offence.”—EDIT.

† This, as our readers will perceive from another article in the

The sixth section, after declaring that the various descriptions of gaming mentioned in the act, are frequently promoted and held at public-houses, or near them, imposes a penalty of fourteen dollars, and a loss of license for one year, upon every tavern-keeper, who shall promote any thing of the kind, or shall furnish *drink* to persons so employed, or shall allow any sort of gaming for money, or *other* valuable consideration, in his dwelling-house, or in any out-house belonging to him. In case of a *second* offence, he is subject to a fine of twenty-eight dollars, and is rendered for ever incapable of keeping a tavern in the state of Pennsylvania.

The seventh section, still keeping in view *taverns* as the grand theatre of gaming, forbids billiard-tables, E O tables, or *other* devices being kept in public-houses, for the purpose of playing for money, on pain of forfeiting the instrument of such play, and the sum of twenty-six dollars.

By the subsequent provisions of this law, a person *losing* money, or other valuable thing, at any of the games specified in the act, shall *not* be obliged to pay, or make good the same, or to discharge any security given therefore. And even if the loser has *actually* paid the money, or delivered the article to the winner, he may sue within *ten* days, and recover the same back again.

This, gentlemen, is a brief, but correct summary of our laws upon the subject of gaming, made for the best purposes, and with the best intentions. And thus anxiously and benevolently have the legislature of our country endeavoured to extirpate the evil, root and branch. You will, however, perceive, they have not prohibited playing merely for *amusement* at any of the games specified; not even horse-racing, where *amusement* is the only object. It is only when money, or any thing of value, is played for, that it is absolutely forbidden.

And now, gentlemen, let us pause a few moments, and seriously ask ourselves this *single* question—Is it our duty, as good citizens, to yield obedience to *this* law of our country, or is it not?

Many persons, I well know, are ready at once to exclaim, present number of our work, is an offence punishable by law in most of the United States. In England it is not so, save where the race is run for a less sum than £50, in which case, the owner of every horse running, is, by 13 Geo. II. c. 19. subjected to a penalty of £200; and every person advertising such race, to a penalty of half the amount. Newmarket and Blackhambleton courses are, however, expressly excepted from the operation of an act, which legalizes this species of gaming upon a larger, by suppressing it on a smaller scale.—EDIT.

the law is foolish and absurd, and we are resolved to treat it as such a law deserves to be treated, with contempt and neglect.

Waving for the present any inquiry into the merits or propriety of the law, we proceed to observe, that conduct of *this* sort strikes at the very root of government, inasmuch as it makes our obedience depend not upon the law itself, and its binding force upon *constitutional* principles, but on the *opinion* a man may form of its *wisdom* or *expediency*—which in effect is to assert, that *private* judgment shall defeat *public* authority, should they happen to clash with each other. The legislature have *decided* the point, that gaming is *injurious* to the social and moral interests of our country: and to this decision every citizen is bound respectfully to submit, unless he means to set himself up *above* the government in all those cases where they differ in opinion. Laws, in their very nature, are intended to operate as restraints upon the *will* and *inclination*. But this can never happen, if certain propensities and attachments are admitted to be good reasons for not yielding obedience to them. In fact, this would set mankind *free* from *all* law whatever. The gambler reprobates the law against gaming, because it interferes with his habits and his passions, and insists there is no harm in it. All he asks is, that he may be indulged in disobedience to the law in this *single* point, and he is willing to behave as a good citizen in every other respect. Why, gentlemen, this is the very language of the thief and the highwayman. They, like the gambler, only plead an exemption in behalf of *that* vice to which they have the strongest attachment, and which affords them the greatest pleasure. It is well known, the common swearer, the adulterer, the slanderer, and the wicked of every other class and description, shelter themselves behind the same excuse, viz. that their vices are harmless, and they have a particular fondness for them.

To reconcile us further to the obedience of this law, it should be remembered, that it is not the imperious mandate of an arbitrary monarch, or an edict of the dark age of ignorance and superstition, but the *law* of a *free* people, passed by one of the most enlightened governments upon earth—a *law* flowing from the deliberate act of our *own* *representatives*, selected from every part of the state for the sole purpose of legislation. In our republican governments, *he* only is a good citizen who obeys *all* the laws—those he *dislikes*, as well as those that meet his approbation. Upon the

ground of *obedience*, he makes no distinction. Convinced that even the best government requires a constant sacrifice of the will of *one* part of society to that of the *other*, he is ready on *all* occasions to take up his cross and follow his country. Obedience indeed is a very easy thing when it falls in with our particular habits and views, and in such cases there is no danger the law will prove a "stone of stumbling, and rock of offence." But what sort of a citizen is *that* man, who obeys only those laws which please his humour or his taste, and *deliberately* violates those he disapproves? I will venture boldly to assert, a person of *this* description has not a single drop of federal or republican blood in his veins, or benevolence in his heart—did he possess a particle of either, he would cheerfully acquiesce in *every* law that has any tendency to promote the general good. If I were asked, what is the *first* part of the duty of a good citizen? I would say, *obedience*. If I were asked, what is the *second* part? I would say, *obedience*. If I were asked, what is the *third* part? I would reply, *obedience*. In short, it is the very essence and consummation of the character of a good citizen in a republican government. We are told, that in the school of Pythagoras, his *autos epha*, that is, his bare opinion, was deemed such decisive evidence of truth as to adjust every controversy that arose among his captious and disputing pupils. Such precisely should be the profound respect paid to the laws in our government. "It is the LAW; the legislature have said so"—should silence every objection, stop every mouth, and restrain every hand and foot. Has the LAW, for example, said, Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD THY GOD in vain, or swear by any *other* name or thing? he that transgresses it, is neither a good *citizen* nor a good *man*. Has the LAW said, Thou shalt do no unnecessary work, nor practise any *sport* or *diversion* on Sunday? He that offends in those instances, against both heaven and earth, is a bad *citizen*, and a bad *man*. I speak plainly, gentlemen. In defending the laws of God, and my country, I am not to be deterred by the censures of any man, or set of men, from using any language, or freedom of speech, not inconsistent with truth and decency. I therefore repeat, that a person who breaks the laws of GOD and MAN, can have no better pretensions to the character of a virtuous *good citizen*, than the felonious robber on the highway. They *both* submit to the laws in general, and the highwayman, like the gambler, only breaks them where they oppose his *favourite* pursuit,

which is just the case with every *other* immoral man. They are both bad citizens, though there may be a difference in the nature and degree of their crimes.

In estimating the character of a man as a citizen, it is his *conduct* only that is decisive evidence for or against him. Professions are of no sort of consequence. What would it signify for a person boldly to assert he was an honest man, while he was notoriously addicted to lying and stealing? or to take an oath of fidelity to government, while he was in open arms against it? Equally absurd and ridiculous is it to *talk* of patriots and good citizens, where the life and practice are in *any respect* at war with the laws of our country; and they are treated with insolence and contempt, for no other reason, but because they happen *not* to accord with the *selfish* views of one man, or the *vicious* and *abandoned* inclinations of another.

Both in religion and patriotism, *obedience* constitutes the unerring *touchstone* of sincerity. It is the principle that tries the *spirit* of a man, and draws an infallible line of distinction between the hypocritical pretender on the one hand, and the genuine friend of virtue, religion, and his country, on the other.

Upon the whole, Gentlemen, obedience was made for *man* by his Creator, and *man* was made for obedience. It is the influence of this principle, diffused through all the works of God, that supports the universe, and maintains perfect harmony in his boundless dominions. It was disobedience hurled the apostate angels from heaven; and disobedience to his law is, at this moment, the cause of all the vice, war, and confusion, that agitate and convulse this unhappy globe, on which it is our lot to reside. *Order* is heaven's *first* law, and should be the first law of earth. Universal obedience to his infinitely holy and unerring laws, is necessarily productive of universal order—and *universal order* is necessarily productive of universal happiness.

MUSEUM HOURS, No. I.

Reading Rooms of the British Museum—their Regulations and Attendants—History, Condition, and Contents of the Cottonian Library of Manuscripts.

THE Reading-room of the British Museum is one of those scenes of quiet literary labour, into which the crowd of idly curious visitors, who flock there three times a week to see

the curiosities and monstrosities of the other departments of this national institution, are not permitted to intrude. On the public days, (that is, with the exception of holidays, and the summer, or rather the autumnal vacation of two months, on every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of the year,) the student in the gallery of antiquities, or half cellar and half barn-like building, in which the Elgin marbles are deposited, is interrupted in his pursuits by those impertinent gazings of idle saunterers through these receptacles of classical fragments and vestiges of all times, for which our countrymen and countrywomen are so universally distinguished. As we have occasionally escorted some of our country friends to see, amongst the other lions of the metropolis, these antiquities, which it is infinitely more disgraceful not to have visited, than not to know a syllable more of their history, or that of the persons or scenes which they represent, than does each lifeless statue of its silent and senseless neighbour, we have blushed for the rudeness of many of the company, whose dress at least indicated that they ought to have known better, in staring over the shoulder of a modest and unassuming artist, at the copy he is engaged in making of some statues, at which it would have been at least as modest in the female gazers not to have looked at all, either in the original or imitation. Once or twice, indeed, we have been seriously alarmed, lest a young student, perched upon two boards loosely placed one upon the other, and scarcely tall enough, with this assistance, (the best, it is to be presumed, that the institution can afford him,) to reach the top of his outstretched canvass, should be tumbled to the ground by the rude jostling of some little curious urchin against his ticklish standing-place, whilst plucking the tail of his or her equally curious mamma, to ask, "what that little boy is about with the long stick in his hand?" or to exclaim, "La, Ma, what a funny face that man is painting, do but look at him;" and the mother, who ought to correct such impertinence, accordingly looks, wonders, and admires with equal rudeness as her hopeful ill-mannerly child. Thus much, by way of contrast, for the reading-rooms happily exhibit, in most respects, a striking contrast to this lamentable want of politeness, no where more strongly exhibited than in those public spectacles to which the English are indiscriminately admitted. To the reading-rooms, (for a second has lately been added, though as yet it scarcely has been used,) none are admitted but those who have tickets granted them, renewable every six months, on the recommendation of a

trustee or officer of the institution ; a restriction, it is apprehended, which can scarcely exclude from them any one to whom the facilities to study and literary research which they afford, can be a real benefit, as few such men of any respectability are without the means of obtaining an introduction to at least one of these noblemen or gentlemen, from forty to fifty in number, and who evince the greatest readiness in forwarding the wishes of proper applicants. In France, we know, and in many parts of the continent also, no such introduction is needed, but the public repositories of literature are thrown open to every person who wishes to consult them ; and much popular clamour has been excited here, by complaints against the illiberality which prevents the adoption of a similar course in England. That clamour is, however, most unjust—the practice it would force upon the trustees of this national institution, most impracticable ; and that we hesitate not to say, because the difference of national character, or rather perhaps of the populace, in England and on the continent, renders that liberality safe in the one instance, which would be destructive of the safety of the collection in the other. Yielding to none in genuine patriotism, we are yet sufficiently citizens of the world to avow our honest conviction, that the English ought not to be admitted indiscriminately, or even where respectability of appearance is the only passport, to the various monuments of their own national munificence. We appeal, in support of our assertion, to the names scratched, sometimes in pencil, sometimes with knives, over the monuments in Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's Cathedral, and the books, which, with all the caution that can be exercised by officers of societies where the admission is select, have either been taken away altogether, or materially injured by the abstraction of plates or leaves in the London, the British, and other of our literary institutions. No one can indeed have been long a subscriber even to a circulating library, without having had occasion to blush for the character of his countrymen, in the necessity which exists for the proprietors to damage their property by stamping their names, &c. upon the front of every plate, with which the books in their collection are illustrated or ornamented, that by being rendered thus useless to collectors, they may escape being stolen, as would otherwise be their inevitable fate. We indeed ourselves recollect being exceedingly mortified at finding a volume of Pennant's works, belonging to a very valuable set, in one of the first libraries in the metropolis, despoiled

of every plate, which the thief had been at so much trouble in cutting out, that a part of the paper on which they were worked was left as a frame, to prevent the book from appearing thinner than when it was taken from the library, or the librarian from discovering that any plate had been stolen, unless he had minutely examined the volume for the very purpose. Nay, it is a matter of public notoriety, that one of the librarians of this very institution, now no more an inhabitant of a world which his writings and learning contributed at once to instruct and adorn, was dismissed from his situation, in consequence of felonies and depredations committed by some persons, of no mean reputation in the literary circles, upon valuable prints and manuscripts which he had permitted them to have access to at their own houses, contrary to the rules of the Museum.

Thus far in vindication of a restriction, the benefit of which is daily experienced by those who have occasion to make researches in the room, in which you will constantly find a great variety of characters labouring for the public, or for their own amusement and improvement, in the different departments of literature, to which taste, inclination, or circumstances may have directed them. Here you will see the zealous and laborious antiquary rummaging amongst charters and musty parchments, for the authentication, it may be, of a date, of as little importance, but to his brethren, as that of the day on which King John shewed the first epicurean attachment to lampreys, by which, it is said, England was eventually ridden at once of a tyrant and a fool. There, a second member of the same indefatigable fraternity, is as attentively engaged in a microscopic comparison of the seal of an old charter with the copy which he has taken of it, scrupulously anxious that not a letter should be straighter or more crooked than the venerable original of some mitred bigot, who fattened, lived riotously, and fared sumptuously every day, upon the revenues of a church, which he disgraced at once by his ignorance and his pride. The neatly folded manuscript that lies beside him, gives, however, an importance to his employment, in as much as it authorizes the hope that he may be about to add another effort to complete the series of our county histories, which the ill-requited toil of such Herculean labours still leaves lamentably deficient. For our own parts, we have not viewed with equal complacency, the numerous tribe of heraldic draftsmen and genealogy hunters, who are at work early and late, day after day, and week

succeeding week, to ascertain whether some thick-headed ancestor of as thick-headed a squire, bore for his arms a lion rampant, or demi-rampant only; or whether as great a fool, though bearing a title which he disgraced, gave, some five hundred years ago, the name of John or Thomas to his first-born booby and eldest son, or took a Mary or Catharine for his wife. Generally speaking, the men engaged in these edifying pursuits are evidently labouring in their vocation, and for hire; thankful, therefore, that their lot is not ours, we pity them, and let them pass. Now and then, however, during the sitting of Parliament, we have seen the room graced by the presence of some man of title and of family, determined to trust to no one but himself, the task of making out a pedigree, than which his manner plainly shews that nothing can in his estimation be of equal importance, save perhaps it be that of his race-horses and his dogs.

By the side of such a self-important idler, (for such in truth he is, though busy as a bee,) will perhaps be seated some toilsome labourer in the field of literature, in which both his person and his coat evince that he is well-nigh worn out, ere he has gained from its cultivation a reasonable certainty of where he can get his next day's dinner, or how long he may hardly earn his daily bread. Every thing bespeaks in him his having at length sunk to that most hapless condition into which a man of letters can fall; (perhaps, indeed, he never had talents or opportunity to rise above it,) and we have hardly been able to suppress the wish, that he speedily might have applied to himself the epitaph of Goldsmith upon poor Ned Purdon, a wretched member of a tribe, upon whose miseries that charming writer full feelingly could speak,—who

“ from misery freed,
Was no longer a bookseller's hack;
For he had such a horrible life in this world,
That he never could wish to come back.”

He is probably a death-hunter, a chronicler of births and marriages for magazines and annual registers—as the lady who has taken her seat opposite to him, undaunted, in the zeal of her pursuit of learning, by being surrounded by forty or fifty gentlemen, herself the only female in the room, may peradventure be the concoctor of some new historical romance, for the incidents of which she is spoiling the pithy but obsolete historians of the olden time. Admiring her literary

turn, we have sometimes wished that proper accommodations were afforded in a separate room for female readers; and we doubt not, but that a portion of the leisure which so many of the sex enjoy, and waste in fashionable triflings, would, then, at least for themselves, be more profitably devoted to the improvement of their minds, in a place affording such facilities for the purpose. Biographers, historians, lawyers, medical students, lexicographers, poets, translators, and we know not what besides, make up the group of those who here quietly and patiently collect the materials for works, which may hereafter purchase for some of them a deathless immortality—to others, the vexation of neglect—for some again, the mortification of their vanity, in a merited exposure of their incapacity for the task they undertook. But besides these working-bees, this hive contains several who are but sipping the dew from every flower, to form their honey at a future day—young students in every profession, laudably preparing themselves for distinction in the discharge of their duties, by recondite researches not elsewhere to be pursued, and which none but persons, bent, like themselves, on excellence, pursue at all. It has also here and there an idle drone—men evidently availing themselves of a gratuitous admission to this ample storehouse of learning and of literature, to pass away their time by turning over the pages of the last new pamphlet, or reading through the most popular novel of the day. These are confessedly few in number, and may be known by their poring over the catalogues as a gourmand ponders over his bill of fare, puzzled what to fix upon, because they have no definite object of pursuit. Half their time is occupied in observing others more busy than themselves; and we have even known some of them evince so little regard to politeness, as to take up the books lying by the side of another gentleman, evidently to ascertain what he was about. They occupy, too, the seats nearest the fire, in front of which they will sometimes sit and lounge with so little consideration for the comfort of others, as to require a very broad hint from the librarian, who is in constant attendance in the room, that gentlemen at the lower end of the table may be cold as well as themselves. Several of these are dandies and dandizets, animals who, some how or other, have intruded themselves into every circle; but some are older and graver men, from whom better manners might reasonably have been expected.

With the exception, however, of their rudenesses, and

the occasional breach of decorum in some one or two men, of great importance in their own estimation, talking to the servants of the institution, who bring them the books for which they write, or to their personal friends, in as loud a tone as they would in their own parlour, or to their footmen, if they have either, (which, by the way, their gross want of common politeness would induce us to suppose is not the case,) every thing is usually conducted here with the greatest regularity and decorum, in strict accordance with the rule of the institution, which requires silence in a place devoted to study. Once indeed, and once only, do we recollect to have witnessed any continued and unrepressed breach of so essential a regulation; and in the midst of the interruption it occasioned us in our recondite pursuits, we could not repress a smile at its cause, which was the pacing of the reading-room in its length and breadth, for some ten or a dozen minutes, by a certain eccentric bard of the last generation, at least as distinguished for dirt as for genius, for the shabbiness of his dress and his singular *outré* appearance, as the extent of his attainments;—the poet's eye, in the meanwhile, in so fine a frenzy rolling, as to render him totally unobservant alike of the frowns and the smiles which every other countenance exhibited, during the continuance of his fervid locomotion.

Enough, however, of sketches of men and manners, that may induce our brother readers to suppose, that we intend to adopt the very appropriate motto of Maister Jedediah Cleishbotham, schoolmaster and parish-clerk of Gander-cleugh, to the inimitable tales which the master-genius of our times has done him the honour of fathering upon him,

“ A chiel's amang ye takin notes,
An' faith he'll prent it.”

Pass we on now, therefore, to a brief account of the various collections of manuscripts and printed books, to which the student has, in these rooms, the freest and readiest access, and from which (as they come in our way, in the course of the more regular pursuits that have long led us here,) we purpose, either by extracts or otherwise, to give our readers, under the title of “*Museum Hours*,” some such occasional articles, as may enable them to pass away a few of their own hours with pleasure, and we hope, at times, with profit also.

The first of these, in point, perhaps at once of antiquity and importance, is, the Cottonian Library, the manuscripts of which are deposited in twenty-one presses, in the same

room with those of the Royal Library. It is on the second floor of the building, and the public have access to it, on account of the great curiosity it contains, in the original copy of Magna Charta, secured in a glazed frame, on a table in the centre, with the well-known fac-simile of Pine by its side. Here also, against one of the presses, is exhibited to public inspection, the original of the articles agreed upon by the barons, preparatory to the signing of the great charter, perfect both in the instrument itself and its seal. This valuable document formed, however, no part of either of the collections of ms. deposited here, but was presented to the Museum in 1769, by Earl Stanhope.

Few of our readers will need to be reminded, that the first of these collections was formed by the industry and perseverance of Sir Robert Cotton, the friend and fellow-traveller of the celebrated Camden, who, living shortly after the dissolution of monasteries, the visitation of our universities, colleges, and schools, and surviving also such indefatigable collectors of antiquities, as Joceline, Noel, Lambarde, Bowyer, Elsing, and Camden, from whose libraries, either by legacy or purchase, he selected their choicest treasures, had every opportunity his laudable curiosity could desire, of forming a collection of chronicles, charterlaries, and other muniments of the dissolved houses, which have since proved an invaluable treasure to the historian and the antiquary, and been of little less utility in the ascertainment and settlement of private rights. This collection was so highly valued, even in the lifetime of its founder, that in the arbitrary times of the Stuarts and the star-chamber, its public-spirited collector had the mortification of being excluded from his own library, by an order of the privy council, for the locking of it up, on the ground that its contents were of too great public importance to be exposed, as Sir Robert permitted it to be, to any one who wished to consult it; in consequence of which liberality, it was alleged, that in the time of James the First, some valuable state papers had been communicated to the Spanish ambassador, who had caused them to be translated into his native tongue. On this latter account, Sir Robert was himself imprisoned, though it would seem but for a short time, and on his release, the interdict was taken off which most unconstitutionally prevented his reading his own books, or entering his study. Fourteen years after, it was, however, renewed with increased severity, for a pamphlet having been circulated in ms. in 1629, under the title of "A

Project how a Prince may make himself an absolute Tyrant;" it was traced to the Cottonian library, into which it appeared to have found admission, without the knowledge of its owner, as a tract, written at Florence in 1613, by the Duke of Northumberland, under the less exceptionable title of "Propositions for his Majesty's Service, to bridle the Impertinency of Parliaments," and having been discovered there by some persons, to whom access to the collection had been granted, with its proprietor's accustomed liberality, (and there is room for suspicion that the celebrated Selden was one of them, for a copy seems to have been found upon him,) a bribe to a faithless librarian had procured permission to take two or three copies of it, which were handed about, under a title that never belonged to it. For this, Sir Robert was a second time taken into custody, but being able soon to establish his own innocence in the transaction, even to the satisfaction of the odious inquisition of the star-chamber, before which he was brought, he was released, although, under the old pretext of his library not being of a nature to be exposed to public inspection, it was a second time placed under sequestration, being sealed up by some of the officers of the royal household, under whose vigilant surveillance it remained until the death of its ill-used collector. That death happened in 1631, nearly two years after he had been thus unjustly and tyrannically excluded from the use of those literary treasures which he had spent his life in amassing, and for which, though he could scarcely set a value upon them beyond their intrinsic worth, he felt all the attachment of a scholar to his books, and a collector to a collection, unique, as it was curious and extensive. Few things, indeed, can be more interesting or affecting to minds imbued with the love of letters, than the simple narrative given by his brother antiquary, Sir Symonds D'Ewes, of the effect produced upon the mind and health of this distinguished lover and friend of literature, by his being excluded from his wonted sources of enjoyment. "When," says the annalist of Elizabeth, in a ms. account of his own life, still preserved in the same national repository which contains the rich collection of the friend whom he wished to console, "I went several times to visit and comfort him in the year 1630, he would tell me 'they had broken his heart, that had locked up his library from him.' I easily guessed the reason, because his honour and esteem were much impaired by this fatal accident; and his house, that was formerly frequented by great and honourable personages, as by

learned men of all sorts, remained now upon the matter, desolate and empty. He was so outworn within a few months, with anguish and grief, as his face, which had been formerly ruddy and well-coloured, (such as the picture I have of him shews,) was wholly changed into a green-blackish paleness, near to the resemblance and hue of a dead visage." Thus he pined and wasted away, dying as clearly broken-hearted, for the loss of his books, as ever did the most devoted lover, or the fondest wife, for husband, or for mistress, however bitterly regretted or tenderly beloved. This, indeed, is not matter of inference, but of fact, for on his death-bed he directed his friend, Sir Henry Spelman, celebrated alike as an antiquary and a jurist, to inform the lords of the council, that "their so long detaining of his books from him, without rendering any reason for the same, had been the cause of his mental malady." This touching message was immediately delivered, and wrought in those whose conduct had given occasion to it, an unavailing repentance; for when the lord privy seal came to comfort the dying man with a message from the king, he found that he was half an hour too late, as the victim of the tyranny of the council was no more; and all he could do was, to assure his weeping son, that, as the king had loved his father, so he would continue to love him.

He gave not, however, very early tokens of that love, of a less equivocal description than those which had brought the former object of its caprices in sorrow to the grave; for although its late possessor had entailed his library upon his heir, who also was his only son, the sequestration of it was still continued with unabated rigour, until, upon a petition being presented, stating, that his study had long been, and yet was locked up, and he himself denied the use of the books it contained, though all of them were his undoubted property, it was restored to Sir Thomas Cotton, the collector's son, who continued in quiet possession of it to the day of his death, which happened in the year 1662. During the convulsion of the civil wars, in which, after the success of the parliament, and the overthrow of the monarchical, and the establishment of a republican government, all documents relative to the constitution and laws of the country were industriously sought after and destroyed, it was carefully removed, principally by the zeal of ——— Bromsall, Esq. of Blunham, high-sheriff of the county of Bedford, in 1650, for the preservation of so inestimable a treasure, to Stratton, in that county, where it was kept in a

house of the eldest son of its possessor, (afterwards Sir John Cotton,) who had married Dorothy, daughter of Edmund Anderson, Esq. of that place.

By him, as had previously been the case with his father, Sir Thomas also, this collection was greatly enlarged, and ten years before his death, its value was so duly estimated by the government and legislature, that, on his expressing a wish to carry into effect the liberal and public-spirited desire and intention of his father and his grandfather, to have it preserved for the use of the nation, under the name of the Cottonian Library, an act of parliament (12 and 13 W. III. c. 7.) was passed in 1700, "for the better settling and preserving of the library, (described in the preamble to the act, as 'of great use and service for the knowledge and preservation of our constitution both in church and state,') kept in the house at Westminster, called Cotton House, in the name and family of the Cottons, for the benefit of the public." Sir John Cotton, the donor of this splendid gift to the country, died in 1702, when, in pursuance of the provisions of this act, the Library was vested in trustees, namely, in the Lord Chancellor or Keeper, the Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, for the time being, and four of the Cotton family, named in the act, whose places were, from time to time, to be supplied by the heir male in possession of the house in which the library was to be preserved, in the custody of a keeper, for the use of the public, who were to have convenient access to the room in which it was deposited. At Cotton House, situate at the back of the House of Commons, and still preserving its name, although long since converted into a residence for the chief-clerk of the House, the library remained in this state for between three and four years, when, in consequence of a report of Matthew Hutton, John Anstis, and Humphrey Wanley, the three most celebrated antiquaries of their day, who, on that account, were appointed to inspect the collection, which they certified to be ill arranged, partly in decay, and not kept in a place calculated for its preservation, another act of parliament was passed, (5 Anne, c. 30.) "for the better securing of her Majesty's purchase of Cotton House in Westminster." That purchase had been previously effected for the sum of £4500, and provision was now made by the legislature for the erection of "a convenient library in the house," to "the intent so great a treasure of books and manuscripts, so generously given for the public service,

might not remain any longer useless, and in danger of perishing for want of due care, and that it may be in her Majesty's power to make this most valuable collection useful to her own subjects, and to all learned strangers."

Five years after the passing of this act, the library, whether whilst a new building was to be prepared for its reception, or with what other view is not now known, was removed to Essex House, in Essex-street, in the Strand, where it remained from the year 1712 to 1729, when it was deposited in Ashburnham House, in Little Dean's-Yard, purchased by the Crown of Lord Ashburnham; and here, shortly after its removal, namely, on the morning of the 23d of October, 1731, a fire broke out, which destroyed several, and damaged many of the manuscripts, and amongst the latter the celebrated original of Magna Charta, which bears evident marks of the injury it has sustained. The whole collection would, in all human probability, have perished, but for the great exertions made to save as much of it as possible from the flames, especially by Mr. Speaker Onslow, who repaired immediately to the spot, and personally assisted in rescuing from the fire, the manuscripts, of which he was then an official trustee. Such of them as could be saved from the devouring element, (and not a quarter of the collection was materially injured by its ravages, 114 out of 958 volumes being destroyed, and 98 considerably damaged,) were immediately removed, at the solicitation of the trustees, and by permission of the dean and chapter, into a room intended for the dormitory of Westminster school. The former took also, without delay, the most efficient steps in their power, to repair, as far as it was repairable, the serious injury which this valuable national collection had sustained; and their laudable object was most cordially seconded by the House of Commons, to which, in little more than six months after the accident, namely, on the 9th of May, 1732, a report was made by a committee of its members appointed for the purpose, on the damage done by the fire, and the remedies which had been proposed, giving, by way of appendix, an accurate account of the mss. wholly destroyed or materially injured, in order that persons possessed of copies of them might have an opportunity of contributing to the reparation of the loss by communicating their transcripts.

The library does not appear to have been again removed, until the year 1753, when, on the formation of the British Museum, in consequence of the will of Sir Hans Sloane,

it was, by direction of the act of parliament passed for its regulation, removed to the new national establishment, two trustees, nominated in succession by the representatives of the Cotton family, being thereby for ever added to those appointed by the act for carrying its provisions into execution. Of that family, the male line has long since been extinct, the elder branch in 1731, with Sir John Cotton, Bart., the great-great-grandson of Sir Robert, who then died without issue; the younger in 1752, with his first cousin, Sir John Cotton, Bart. (standing in the same degree of kindred to the founder with the other Sir John, through the second son of the donor of the library,) who left issue but a daughter, married to one of the respectable and literary family of the Bowdlers. The representative of the elder branch was, until lately, Francis Annesley, Esq. LL.D. M.P. for Reading, who, through his great-grandmother, the daughter of Sir George Downing, and wife of John the great-grandson of Sir Robert Cotton, had also the singular good fortune to be the representative of the founder of Downing College, Cambridge, of which he was the first master. He was himself one of the family trustees. Those now acting, are G. B. Tyndale, Esq. and the Rev. Arthur Annesley.

Of this collection, three catalogues have been printed; the first, in Latin, by Dr. Thomas Smith, in the year 1696, eight years before Sir John Cotton had given it to the nation: this is a folio volume of 236 pages. The second was a neat 8vo. volume, printed by Samuel Hooper in 1777, from manuscripts furnished by the celebrated Astle, containing something like a systematic arrangement of Dr. Smith's catalogue, the corrections and additions of Mr. Casley, printed in 1734, with a list of the destroyed and damaged articles, as an appendix to his catalogue of the Royal Library of manuscripts; and an alphabetical list of the charters then first printed, from the original MS. of the Rev. Mr. Widmore, who had for many years the care of this inestimable collection. The third, and most ample, which has indeed entirely superseded the others, is that printed by command of his late Majesty, in consequence of an address from the House of Commons, founded on a recommendation of the Commissioners of Public Records, from that prepared in 1793, and some following years, by Joseph Planta, Esq., the historian of Switzerland, to whose care the collection was confided, on its being deposited in the Museum, as keeper of the manuscripts; an office from which

he was removed, but to the chief librarianship of the institution, which he still fills, with equal credit to himself and advantage to the public service and accommodation. For the preparation of that catalogue, he went most carefully over the collection, reduced by the fire we have already noticed, to 861 volumes, of which 105 were damaged bundles preserved in cases. Of these, the public are most deeply indebted to his skill and perseverance, for the restoration of fifty-one, (even where, as is the case with several, parts have been consumed or defaced by fire, so far as to give much useful information,) which he directed to be bound up in forty-four volumes. The other sixty-one appeared to him irretrievable, although our regret for their loss is considerably lightened by the assurance of so competent a judge, that they consist for the most part of obscure tracts, and fragments of little or no importance. They are now contained in 62 cases. The articles enumerated in Dr. Smith's catalogue were about 6200, although Mr. Planta has extended those of the remnant of a library then entire, to above four times that number, an improvement mainly owing to most of the 170 volumes of state papers and small detached tracts, having been entered but once as single articles, whereas, in point of fact, they consisted, on an average, of a hundred distinct pieces at the least. He has also corrected several errors of his predecessors, so gross, that besides ascribing to Chaucer a volume of poems by Hampole and others, and entering Lydgate's siege of Troy as an anonymous production, they give us Comestor's Bible Historiaux as a common French version of the Bible, and (worse and worse!) Marbodæus de Gemmis as a work of Evax, king of Arabia. Some of these errors had not escaped the observation of other learned men, who bitterly deplored the existence of such blunders, as greatly diminishing the utility of a catalogue, in which accuracy is every thing; but although honest Humphrey Wanley was so concerned at the misdescription of the valuable Saxon manuscripts contained in this collection, in the catalogues extant in his time, as to publish a more correct one in the second volume of the Thesaurus of Dr. Hicks, whilst other antiquaries, from time to time, contributed their additions to a list of errors as absurd as they were numerous, it was reserved for the learning and industry of Mr. Planta, to give to the world a reference to this splendid collection, which should make it really useful to those who wish to consult it. By his direction, the volumes have all been accurately repaged; and of the 26,000 articles,

which the library contains, he has given us a catalogue occupying 708 large folio pages. In its compilation, he has taken great and laudable pains to discover the real authors of anonymous and pseudo-anonymous works, and to give references to the books in which any of the manuscripts have been printed. Dates of letters and state papers, where, as was too often the case in the two last centuries, the writers have omitted them, have also, as far as possible, been inserted in the catalogue, in which even approximations have been given, with notes of interrogation affixed, when the real date could not be discovered. The supposed age of mss. previous to the 15th century, have also been noticed in the same manner, wherever it could be ascertained with any degree of probability. A full and accurate Index of seventy-five pages, of three columns each, completes this most useful catalogue of a library, richer than any other which England, or probably the world, can boast, in illustrations of the antiquities and early history of his country, to which it is the noble memorial of the learning and munificence of its illustrious, but ill-requited founder.

v.

Account of the Death, and a List of the Works, of the Rev. EDWARD WILLIAMS, D.D., late Theological Tutor in the Independent College, Rotherham. The former contained in a Letter from a Friend, to a near relative of the deceased.

You need not be informed, my dear —, that Dr. Williams lived constantly as in the immediate view of eternity. There never appeared to be a time, when he might not have joyfully hailed the approach of the angel of death. So practically and effectually was he convinced, that infinite wisdom and boundless goodness superintend all things, that he had no other will but that of God. His life was one most active and undeviating aim to promote the divine glory. Of such a man, the testimonies of a death-bed, so earnestly sought after on other occasions, were not needed. His death, be it what it might, could not speak so loudly, nor so effectually, as his life. However, in this case, his death was such as added a glorious emphasis to the language proclaimed by his life. The activity of his mind continued unabated to the last day he was spared to his friends on earth. It even seemed to have increased in the liveliness of its conceptions, the rapidity of its movements, and the intenseness of its ardour, during his last illness. He him-

self was sensible, that his feeble nature was sinking under the overpowering energy of the immortal part. "One prescription," said he, "which would be most of all effectual, none of you have thought of—to restrain the ardour of the mind." It was busily employed in devising plans for the good of the church. To the last day of his leaving his bed-room, he continued to employ his pen, as his strength allowed, for its benefit. On the Wednesday before his departure, I believe you know, the paroxysm of pain was long and dreadful. He told me, the following morning, he thought nature could not have sustained it. Ever after this period, it became indispensably necessary that he should be as still as possible. Few persons saw him, and all interrogatories were studiously avoided. However, to his dear wife he said, "I am happy in God, but I cannot talk:" and on a friend's coming in, and asking him how he was, he said most cheerfully, "I am in the hands of a sovereign God, and he will perfect that which concerns ME, and MINE, and the CHURCH, and all His." On another occasion he observed—"For some time, my mind has been engaged about personal concerns, now it is taken up with anxiety about God's public glory, and the affairs of his church; and this leads me to conjecture, he may have something more for me to do on earth." "Well," said that friend, "Paul would say, 'for me to live is Christ, and for me to die is gain.'" "Yes," rejoined he, "and for me too, as well as Paul, 'to live is Christ, and to die is gain.'" His physician, Dr. Young, observed the unabated vigour and intense activity of his mind, while his strength was momentarily sinking, and declared that this alarmed him most; this was the chief thing he had to contend against. To preach the necessity of suspending all mental effort, he said, was easy; but, in this case, the practice, he was afraid, was most difficult. Thus he continued till the Tuesday, when he remarked, "I know not how it is, but my mind, hitherto so much engaged, has now ceased to work. It is quite still." That, said his dear companion, is what we wished. If it rests, strength will again revive. But, alas! this hope was fallacious. Its work on earth was done, and before the close of that day, its energies were destined to unfold under incalculable advantages,—unrestrained by a dying body, and amidst the light of heavenly glory.

G.

A CATALOGUE OF WORKS PUBLISHED BY DR. WILLIAMS.

1. *Social Religion Exemplified*; written originally by the Rev. Matthias Maurice. Revised, corrected, and abridged, with occasional Notes, a copious Index, and a Preface containing some account of the Author. 5th edit. 12mo.

2. *Antipædobaptism Examined*; or a strict and impartial Inquiry into the Nature and Design, Subjects and Mode, of Baptism. 2 vols. 12mo.

3. *An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews*; with the preliminary Exercitations. By John Owen, D.D. Revised and abridged, with a full and interesting Life of the Author, a copious Index, &c. Including two Letters, the one to Dr. Priestley, and the other to Mr. David Levi, respecting this work. 4 vols. 8vo.

4. *A Discourse on the Influence of Religious Practice upon our Inquiries after Truth*. With an Appendix, addressed to the Rev. Mr. Belsham.

5. *A Discourse on the Christian's Reasons for glorying in the Cross of Christ*.

6. *A Circular Letter*, from the Independent Ministers assembled at Nuneaton, Aug. 6, 1793, to the Associated Churches in Warwickshire. With a Postscript, recommending the sending of Missionaries among the Heathen.

7. *An Introductory Discourse on the Nature of an Ordination*, delivered at the Ordination of the Rev. Daniel Fleming.

8. *A Charge* addressed to the First Missionaries to the Islands of the South Seas.

9. *An Account of the Old Yorkshire Academy, and the New Rotherham Academy*.

10. *A Charge at the Ordination of the Rev. Samuel Bradley*.

11. *The Christian Preacher*; or, Discourses on Preaching, by several eminent Divines, revised and abridged, with an Appendix on the choice of Books. 2d edition. 12mo.

12. *The Kingdom of Christ*; or, the Certainty of the Resurrection argued from the Nature of Christ's Mediatorial Kingdom; a Sermon preached at Nottingham.

13. *A Collection of above six hundred Hymns*, designed as a Supplement to Dr. Watts's Psalms and Hymns. 4th. edition.

14. *The Psalms and Hymns of Dr. Watts*; containing twenty additional Hymns by the same Author—a Table of the first line, not only of every Psalm and Hymn, but also of every Stanza in the Work; a new Arrangement of the

whole in a convenient Table prefixed ; with improved Indexes of Subjects and of Scriptures. 2 vols.

15. *Musical Hints*, designed to excite the laudable curiosity of Young People in reference to Sacred Musick ; with a Musical Index to above 250 tunes, (corresponding with Dr. Miller's two volumes of Tunes, original and collected,) adapted to all Dr. Watts' Psalms and Hymns, and the Supplement.

16. *Predestination to Life* ; a Sermon preached at Sheffield. With Explanatory Notes on Predestination, the Origin of Moral Evil, &c. 2d edition.

17. *Apostolic Zeal Recommended* ; a Sermon preached in London, at the eleventh General Meeting of the Missionary Society.

18. *Thoughts on a General and Explicit Union of Congregational Churches*.

19. *The Works of Dr. Doddridge* complete. With Notes Illustrative, Theological, and Philosophical, on the Preaching Lectures ; and an accurate, copious Index. 10 vols.

20. *National Reform* ; a Sermon preached at Masborough on the Fast Day, 1809.

21. *Christian Unanimity Recommended* ; a Discourse preached before the Annual Meeting of the General Congregational Union, London.

22. *An Essay on the Equity of Divine Government, and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace*.

23. *The Christian Minister's Main Study* ; a Charge delivered at the Ordination of the Rev. John Hawksley.

24. *Apostolic Benevolence towards the Jews*, recommended for imitation ; a Sermon at the Jews' Chapel, Spitalfields, London.

25. *The Works of President Edwards*, complete. Including Memoirs of the Life, Experience, and Character of the Author, by Dr. Hopkins, reviewed, corrected, and enlarged ; a Sketch of Mrs. Edwards's Life and Character ; a brief Account of their Daughter, Mrs. Burr ; the Life and Character of the Author's Son, Dr. Jonathan Edwards ; with occasional Notes on controverted Subjects, and an accurate copious Index. 8 vols.

26. *The Parent's Help* ; or the young Child's First Catechism, founded on familiar Scripture Characters. Seventh edition.

27. *The Union Catechism* ; First Part, the Church Catechism abridged, and adapted to the capacities of young children ; Second Part, the Assembly's Catechism abridged,

and adapted to the capacities of young children. Sixth edition.

28. *The Older Child's Catechism*; founded on Scripture Characters and Important Facts.

29. *An Exposition of the Assembly's Catechism*, comprehending a concise Body of Divinity.

30. *Scripture Questions*; containing a familiar Introduction to the Divine Dispensations, from the beginning of Genesis to the end of Revelations; accompanied with Engraved Charts, chronological, historical, and biographical, and an Explanation of the Charts. Second edition.

31. *A Defence of Modern Calvinism*; containing an Examination of the Bishop of Lincoln's Work, entitled, "A Refutation of Calvinism."

Dr. Williams had prepared a New Edition of the "Essay on the Equity of Divine Government, and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace," corrected and improved; and was preparing for publication, a work, to have been entitled, "The Principles of Moral Science."

J. B. W.

REVIEW.

Travels in New-England and New-York. By Timothy Dwight, S.T.D. LL.D., late President of Yale College, Author of *Theology Explained and Defended*. 4 vols. 8vo. pp. 515, 515, 525, 525. London, 1823. Baynes and Son.

Memorable Days in America: being a Journal of a Tour to the United States, principally undertaken to ascertain by positive evidence the Condition and probable Prospects of British Emigrants; including an Account of Mr. Birkbeck's Settlement in the Illinois, and intended to shew Men and Things as they are, in America. By W. Faux, an English Farmer. 8vo. pp. 504. London, 1823. Simpkin and Marshall.

"To shew things as they really are in America," has, from its first establishment, been one of the particular objects of this journal; and its editors trust, that they have not altogether failed in its attainment. This also is the avowed object of both the works before us; the one the elaborate production of an American divine, whose theological writings have long since made him advantageously

stated, that it is not to be found in America. The rapidity of the growth of the shoots from old stumps of a cleared, yet ever-living forest, securing on good ground a renovated supply of fuel once in fourteen years, considerably lessens, however, the inconvenience from the want of coal which would otherwise be felt.

At Ridgfield, in Connecticut, there is a mine of iron so pure, as to produce at the first forging steel of an excellent quality. Dr. Dwight saw indeed a very good and serviceable penknife made from the ore, as it came from the mine. Forest trees are abundant, and many of them grow to that extraordinary size which is characteristic of the productions of the new world. The white pine, the noblest tree in New England, and probably in the world, is frequently six feet in diameter, and two hundred and fifty feet in height. "The sound of the wind," says Dr. Dwight, "in a grove of white pines, has all the magnificence which attends the distant roar of the ocean." Besides the trees of ordinary growth in England, cedars and tulip trees there flourish in great abundance. The latter flowers most beautifully, the blossoms of its yellow species appearing at a distance as of burnished gold. From the black maple, sugar is obtained, at times, to the extent of fourteen pounds a season, from a single tree. Most of our fruits are successfully cultivated there; the meadow-strawberry of the country, being, for instance, brought to such a state of perfection as to have increased to twice its original size, some being four inches and a half in circumference, many four, and bushels between three and four. Apples also are so abundant, that although cider is the common beverage of the country, rich and poor alike, in a fruitful year they are often given to those who will gather them, and form, bushel after bushel, a delicious though not uncommon food for cattle and for swine; and if their flocks and herds are feasted with some of those exquisite Newtown pippins, on which it has frequently been our good fortune to regale ourselves in England, we cannot but observe, *en passant*, that we envy them their desert. Cantelopes, several varieties of melons, amongst which are water-melons weighing fifty pounds, figs, almonds, butter-nuts, prunes, vegetable eggs, mandrakes, winter and summer squashes, and love-apples, seem to be the principal fruits growing wild or cultivated there, which we either have not in England at all, or do not cultivate to any extent.

Their vegetables are pretty much the same as ours, and

with the exception of the artichoke, grows luxuriantly, and in some cases, in the cauliflower particularly, to greater perfection than with us. In the produce of farms, we see not much difference between the countries, as to its species, except that a great quantity of maize is grown in New-England, in most parts of which the Hessian fly has been so destructive to the wheat, as to compel the discontinuance of its cultivation in districts so extensive as the greater part of Connecticut. To peas also, the bugs are very fatal enemies, and neither barley nor oats are very generally grown. But besides these formidable foes to agriculture, New-England has others, to whose ruinous inroads the readers of the former series of our work will recollect that the ancient Israelites were also subject. We allude to the palmer-worm and the canker-worm. Of the appearance of the former in 1770, its only visit in his recollection, Dr. Dwight gives the following particulars, which we rather extract here, in that the ingenious essay of the valuable correspondent to whom we are indebted for the treatise on the agriculture of the Israelites, which has enriched the former numbers of our work, gives but little information respecting them; and this would not, we are assured, have been the case, had the various writers, whom he consulted for the composition of his elaborate article, collected any thing important upon the subject.

“ It spread over a great part of the country, and was stopped in its progress only by death, or by ploughing a trench before it, up the side of which it was unable to climb; the small particles of earth yielding to its feet, and falling with it into the trench. This worm was a caterpillar nearly two inches in length, striped longitudinally with a very deep brown and white; its eyes very large, bright, and piercing, its movements very rapid, and its numbers infinite. Its march was from west to east. Walls and fences were no obstruction to its course, nor indeed was any thing else, except the sides of trenches. It destroyed, rather than devoured, ascending a stalk of grass, or grain, cutting it off in a moment, and, without staying to eat any part of it, rapidly repeating the same process on all which stood in its way. The meadows, where it most abounded, appeared as if they had been mown with a dull scythe; and the grain, as if it had been reaped with a sickle which had gaps, and therefore had cut the stalks in a scattering, slovenly manner. In some places, immense multitudes of these animals died in the trenches which were formed to stop their progress, and were left uncovered. The mass soon became fetid, and loathsome; and was supposed, in several instances, to produce a fever, usually distressing, and sometimes fatal.” [vol. i. p. 49.]

These ravages are an evil of the greater magnitude, from the lamentable want of agricultural skill which pervades the New-England farmers, with few, if any, exceptions. The produce of their farms is confessedly inferior to that of ours; a circumstance which Dr. Dwight very justly attributes rather to the inferiority of their husbandry, than the poverty of their soil, which is said (and there appears to be no reason for doubting the truth of the assertion) to be naturally as rich and productive as that of England. Their husbandry must be miserable indeed, when a writer, evidently disposed to put the best face upon the condition of his country as is Dr. Dwight, admits that its farmers are generally ignorant of what crops will best succeed each other, whilst their fields are covered with a growth of weeds so rank and rapid, as that they often far exceed the crop in weight.

Of medicinal, and other plants, the species known here are almost innumerable.

On the subject of the quadrupeds of the country, we shall, in justice to America, allow Dr. Dwight to correct, in his own expressions, a gross mistatement to which European ignorance and prejudice have given rise.

“It is commonly asserted by the zoologists of Europe, that America, by a mysterious and malignant influence, derived from I know not what, and exerted I know not how, diminishes the size and deteriorates the qualities of all animals, both native and imported. I beg leave to assure you, that New-England comes in for no share of this charge. To an American it is amusing enough to see how far your writers have imbibed an opinion, which in its own nature sets probability at defiance. In Guthrie’s Geography, the following declarations have gone through fifteen editions:—
 “The caribou is the largest native animal in America, and is no bigger than a calf a year old.’ ‘The elk is a native of America, and is as big as a horse.’ Now, whether a calf a year old is in Great Britain as big as a horse, or not, the editors of this work will undoubtedly claim a right to determine, to which I can make no pretensions, since I have never seen a British calf exactly of this age. In this country a horse is certainly much larger than such a calf; and hence I venture to conclude, that the caribou is not the largest native animal of America. Certainly he is not so large as the elk. I should judge from looking at this animal, of which I have seen several, that he would weigh from one thousand to eleven hundred pounds. The moose, which is only a variety of the same kind, will probably weigh fourteen hundred pounds. A catalogue has been published by the Rev. Dr. Williams, in his History of Vermont, which very strongly illustrates the soundness of this philosophy. It is the following:—

| | Weight in Europe. | | Weight in Vermont. | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-----|--------------------|-----|
| | lbs. | oz. | lbs. | oz. |
| The bear | 153 | 7 | 456 | 6 |
| Wolf..... | 69 | 8 | 92 | 0 |
| Deer | 288 | 8 | 308 | 0 |
| Fox, red | 13 | 5 | 20 | 0 |
| Porcupine | 2 | 2 | 16 | 0 |
| Martin..... | 1 | 9 | 5 | 4 |
| Polecat | 3 | 3 | 7 | 8 |
| Hare..... | 7 | 6 | 8 | 0 |
| Rabbit | 3 | 4 | 7 | 0 |
| Weasel | 2 | 2 | 12 | 0 |
| Ermine..... | 8 | 2 | 14 | 0 |
| Flying squirrel | 2 | 2 | 10 | 0 |
| Beaver..... | 18 | 5 | 63 | 8 |
| Otter | 8 | 9 | 29 | 8 |

“ The weight of these animals in Europe is given by M. De Buffon, and will therefore not be questioned. That of the American animals is given by Dr. Williams, and may of course be regarded as undoubtedly just. You see that the comparison is not a little unfavourable to the eastern continent. If any conclusion is to be drawn from it, America is much more favourable to the growth of animals than Europe. At the same time you will remember, that the white pine and the cypress of this country are giants, in comparison with the trees of the eastern continent. What if we should turn the tables on you, and insist that your continent is grown too old to yield the productions of nature in their full size, while ours, young, if you please, certainly vigorous, nourishes them to a state of comparative perfection? Besides, were you once to behold the skeleton of our mammoth, you would be struck with astonishment, and regard the animals of Europe as a collection of pigmies.

“ There was last year raised in a town bordering on this, an ox of the common breed, generally named the small breed, in distinction from a larger heretofore common in this country, estimated by skilful judges to weigh alive three thousand five hundred pounds. There was also, a few weeks since, killed in this town, a hog, which weighed more than eight hundred and fifty pounds.

“ To give you my opinion on this subject, I readily believe, that on both continents, if you choose the proper climate, species, and food, you may raise any of these animals to its full size. In the view of a sober American, the contrary opinion, though dignified by the name of philosophy, and made the subject of grave discussions of grave men, ranks with the stories of Lilliput and Brobdingnag, and would be readily supposed to have had its origin in the island of Laputa.” [vol. i. pp. 24—26.]

We fear that this comparison of the growth of animals will, generally speaking, be little less advantageous to Europe, than will the justice and candour displayed by

our American writer, when contrasted with the misrepresentation and illiberality which have long pervaded most of our English accounts of that quarter of the globe. Of birds of prey, New-England has several formidable ones, and amongst them, the bald eagle, measuring sometimes nine feet between the extremities of its wings, and abundantly strong and bold enough to attack and destroy lambs, sheep, and calves. But even this gigantic marauder has an opponent more than his equal, in a curious, little, but very gallant bird, of which our author gives us the following account:—

“Birds of prey in this country are of many kinds; yet, if we except the common or hen-hawk, they are few in number. It is a remarkable fact, that the king-bird, or bee-eater, is an overmatch for any of them. This little animal, possessed of a sharp beak, unrivalled activity, and a spirit equally unrivalled, boldly attacks every other bird, and is always secure of victory. It is not a little amusing to see an enemy, so disproportioned in size and strength, vanquish the crow, the hawk, and the eagle. While on the wing he always rises above them, and, at short intervals, darting upon them with wonderful celerity, pierces them with his bill on the back and neck so painfully, that they make no efforts but to escape. Whenever they alight, he alights immediately over them, and quietly waits until they again take wing. Then he repeats the same severe discipline, until, satisfied with victory and revenge, he returns to his nest. This bird is an excellent defence of a garden against every enemy of the feathered kind.” [vol. i. p. 27.]

There are a few other ornithological singularities of the country, which, on so respectable authority as that of Dr. Dwight, we hesitate not to extract as facts, new and extraordinary as some of them appear. Thus we are told, that the crow is there easily taught to speak as well and volubly as the parrot; and that a bird so difficult to be approached, as not to admit of a more accurate description than that it is of a brown colour, and in size scarcely so large as the robin, sings at once so exquisitely and so sweetly, as to exceed in voice the tone of any instrument, save only the *Æolian harp*. But this is not all, for it forms a concert with one, and sometimes with two of its companions; the voice of one in the former instance, being elevated a third greater above that of the other, and in the trio the same performer raising his voice a fifth above the first, and of course a third less above the second.

“In this manner,” says Dr. Dwight, “a given set of notes is repeated alternately by them all at equal intervals, and with inimi-

table sweetness of sound, forming, it is believed, the nearest approach to harmony found amongst the feathered creation. I have named this bird *the songster of the woods.*" [vol. i. p. 28.]

And well, we would add, if this account of its performances be accurate, as we cannot doubt but that it is, does it merit a title so distinctive, as to induce us very earnestly to wish that we could be present at one of those extraordinary concerts of birds, in comparison with whom we should hold the black swan of Horace very little of a *rara avis in terrâ*.

Rattlesnakes are amongst the most formidable of the reptiles of which New-England has its full share, though Dr. Dwight, with somewhat more of nationality, we cannot but think, than of justice, says that though "commonly," it has been "erroneously supposed to be very dangerous to man." "His bite is, indeed," he admits, "a strong poison;" yet he adds, for the consolation of those who may be exposed to it, that it is "both certainly and easily cured;" besides the further assurance, that the animal "is so clumsy, as to be avoided without any difficulty." On these accounts, we find, that the rattlesnake has long ceased to be an object of curiosity in these states; notwithstanding which, from want perhaps of a familiarity with them, of which, while they are living, we are by no means ambitious, we should place our chief security in their being rarely met with, except in solitary places.

Most of our readers must have heard or read of the supposed power of snakes to fascinate birds, and will not, we are persuaded, be displeased with us, for extracting the following facts upon the subject, from the pages of Dr. Dwight, who gives unqualified credence to the statement, which he had received from a student of Yale College.

"As this young gentleman, together with some companions, was walking one morning through a grove, in the summer season, they heard a bird scream in an unusual manner. Upon examination, they found a blue jay flying in a horizontal direction, about fifteen feet from the ground, from a certain tree; and, after having extended its flight about thirty rods, returning again to the same tree. Its excursions, however, became in every instance shorter, and its flight at every return was directed to a particular part of the tree. This naturally led the young gentlemen to search for the cause of so remarkable a phenomenon. They found in that part of the tree a large black snake, extended upon a limb, at the height at which the bird flew. Curiosity induced them to continue their observation, until the bird became nearly exhausted, and

appeared to be on the point of becoming a prey to its enemy. One of the company then threw a club into the tree, and thus diverted the attention of both the snake and the bird. The charm, if I may be permitted to use this language, was immediately dissolved, and the intended victim escaped without any difficulty." [vol. i. p. 29.]

The insects of these states are not remarkable either for variety, number, or malignity. Hornets and wasps exist, but do not abound there; and although we question not the truth of the Doctor's assertion, that there are fewer noxious insects of any kind in New-England than in most countries in the Eastern continent, we cannot but think that it would be a more desirable place of residence, if freed from those swarms of musquitos, not unreasonably dreaded and disliked by our countrymen, when their bite is occasionally so venomous as to render it necessary to cut the sleeve of a coat, before it can be taken off the swollen arm which it covered. Locusts, too, as far as comfort is concerned, might, we should think, be dispensed with, although the injuries they do are confined to regular visitations every seventeenth year, productive only, we are told, of "a little mischief to the forest trees."

The fish in the waters of New-England are proverbially numerous, and many of them delicious.

On the subject of climate and seasons, our author enters into details far too minute for us to follow; too minute also, we should think, for the majority of those who are likely to be his readers. The results and principal features may be stated in a few words. The heat of summer is admitted to be somewhat greater than in European climes, a circumstance which, as far as England has been concerned for some years past, is in favour of America; although the advantage is more than counterbalanced by the greater degree of cold which prevails there at times, and still more strongly by the extreme variability of the climate, which sometimes changes more than thirty—to the amount even of forty-eight degrees in four-and-twenty hours. During the cold winds, of frequent recurrence, and which, from the severity of their effects, are not inappropriately termed blasts, rapid streams are sometimes so completely frozen over in a night, as to be crossed upon ice the morning after they had been flowing uncongealed and uninterrupted in their wonted course. These winds have been known to blow for a continuance of one-and-twenty days; and when, as is frequently the case, they are violent, houses prostrated, others unroofed, considerable tracts of forest levelled to the ground, and extensive

damage to shipping in the harbours, are amongst the fearful proofs of their destructive ravages. But with their ruinous march, it is but justice to contrast Dr. Dwight's very beautiful description of the thunder-storms of his country; objects with us not usually productive of pleasurable emotions, at least to the great majority of those who witness them.

“The thunder-storms of this country, generally so styled because a considerable number of them are actually storms, are in most cases equally beneficial and delightful. An immense grandeur invests them during the time of their approach. They are so frequent in ordinary seasons as to furnish an ample supply of rain for the demands of vegetation. The wind which brings them, and which blows one or two days after they have passed over, is remarkably pure, refreshing, and healthy. The earth, particularly in the months of May and June, the richest season of vegetation, is beautiful beyond description. The verdure glows with new life—the flowers exult with additional beauty and fragrance—

“The birds their notes renew; and bleating herds
Attest their joy, that hill and valley rings.”

The sun, in the mean time, beams through the purified atmosphere with a peculiar splendour. One, and often two rainbows are finely painted on the reverse of the departing storm. The clouds in the western regions, wrought into the boldest figures, and tinged in different places with all the elegant hues of the prismatic image, present to the eye mountains with summits of gold, and precipices of fire. To these storms the people of this country owe their general exemption from drought, which seems so much more frequently to afflict those of the eastern continent.” [vol. i. p. 48.]

The seasons seem to be as variable as with us, March having been occasionally the pleasantest, and June the most unpleasant month of the twelve. Notwithstanding this, however, New-England is a very healthy country, and many of its inhabitants attain to a great age, though not, it would seem, in a larger, if in quite so large, a proportion as in our own country. To earthquakes and storms these states have not infrequently been exposed—the former have, however, seldom done very extensive mischief, though the ravages of the latter have often been considerable, but not greater than those of similar convulsions of the elements in Europe. Nor are its tornadoes, the most formidable shocks of the atmosphere known in that country, by any means equal in violence to those which have frequently desolated large tracts of our own West Indian possessions.

The history of the colonization of New-England is given

in these travels with much minuteness of detail, in which justice is done to the character of the Puritans, from whom Dr. Dwight is not ashamed of deriving his descent. Nor need he to be so; for the real character of the first European settlers in his country, is truly given by him in this short sentence.

“Piety was indeed the common character, not unsullied by errors and faults, but nobly distinguished by that patient, regular, and conscientious continuance in well-doing, which lays the fair foundation for future glory, honour, and immortality.” [vol. i. p. 110.]

This is not, however, the character which they have borne in the world, and least of all in the country whence bigotry and tyranny drove them forth, to seek a refuge from oppression, and contumely, and wrong, in the wilds of America, amidst the rude habitations of fierce and savage men.

The New-Englanders have certainly, from their first settlement downwards, laboured under a heavy weight of obloquy, for the double crime of Puritanism and Republicanism. So long ago as the latter end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, the witty, but prejudiced and bigoted South, was in the habit of going out of his way to abuse them in strongly vituperative terms, in some of the most eloquent discourses which he delivered from the pulpit; and his vigorous fulminations carry with them to many minds a perpetuity of reproach. Very different feelings will, however, be awakened in the minds of those who set a proper estimate on all they did and suffered for liberty and conscience’ sake. Of those sufferings, the following animated sketch, in Dr. Dwight’s best style, glances not at the half.

“The greatest of all the evils which they suffered were derived from the savages. These people, of whom Europeans still form very imperfect conceptions, kept the colonists, after the first hostilities commenced, in almost perpetual terror and alarm. The first annunciation of an Indian war is its actual commencement. In the hour of security, silence, and sleep, when your enemies are supposed to be friends, quietly employed in hunting and fishing; when they are believed to be at the distance of several hundred miles, and perfectly thoughtless of you or yours; when thus unsuspecting, thus at ease, slumbering on your pillow, your sleep is broken up by the whar-whoop, your house and village are set on fire, your family and friends are butchered and scalped, yourself and a few other wretched survivors are hurried into captivity, to be roasted alive at the stake, or have your body stuck full of skewers

and burnt by inches. You are a farmer, and have gone abroad to the customary business of the field; there you are shot down from behind a tree in the hour of perfect security; or you return at evening, and find your house burnt and your family vanished; or, perhaps, discover their half-consumed bones mingled with the ashes of your dwelling, or your wife murdered, and your little ones lying beside her, after having been dashed against a tree." [vol. i. pp. 117, 118.]

Such were the men who planted these colonies; such the dangers they braved; such the difficulties they surmounted. Of the effects of their views and principles upon their descendants, Dr. Dwight gives the following representation, at the close of a very complete vindication of the conduct and character of those original settlers, occupying the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th letters of the first volume of his journal, to which we refer such of our readers as may be anxious for further information upon the subject.

"Of the piety of the New-England people, their accusers have furnished abundant evidence. Change the words superstition, fanaticism, enthusiasm, and bigotry, into piety, (the thing almost invariably meant by them all,) and you will find from their enemies themselves ample testimony, that the objects of their calumny were distinguished for this superior kind of excellence. The numerous churches in this country, a great part of them good, and many of them handsome buildings, are a strong illustration of the spirit of the inhabitants concerning the subject of religion. The number of these structures already exceeds fourteen hundred, and is annually increasing. In almost every part of the country, except where the settlements are quite new, they are found at the distance of five, six, and seven miles; and with their handsome spires and cupolas, almost universally white, add an exquisite beauty to the landscape, and perpetually refresh the eye of a traveller." [pp. 142, 143.]

Towards the close of his work, he gives also, in one-and-twenty letters, occupying upwards of 200 pages, (vol. iv. p. 265—482,) a most elaborate disquisition on the language, learning, morals, religion, and characteristic features, of the inhabitants of New-England, on which we of course can cast but the merest glance, referring our readers to the work itself for a vindication of his countrymen, upon which the Doctor has bestowed a degree of labour equal to the zeal which he uniformly manifests in their cause.

That zeal will readily be admitted to be as active as any New-Englander could wish, when the first proposition which it prompts him to maintain is, the bold, and to us somewhat startling one, that the English "language is pronounced

more correctly *there* than in England ;” and this he proves by a reference to Pegge’s notable catalogue of Cockneyisms, including, besides the worn-out jokes of “weal, vine, and winegar, are wery good whittles I wow,” and “Villiam, I vant my vig, the vite vig in the vooden vig-box, vich I vore last Vednesday vas a veeek at the westry,” such fancied or obsolete vulgarisms, as “partender” for partner, “pee-aches” for piazzas, “vemon” for venom, “disgruntled” for offended, “nolus bolus” for nolens volens ; expressions which we never heard during a residence of twenty years in London, and which we will undertake to say, never were heard from the lips of any but the very lowest of the canaille. Had we a similar list of the vulgarisms of Boston and Newhaven quays and pot-houses, we doubt not that they would be quite as ridiculous. To the charge of coining new words, giving new meanings to old ones, and retaining many that are obsolete, Dr. Dwight pleads guilty ; but puts upon record a justificatory plea in the necessity of the case, from the different circumstances of the two nations, though, we apprehend, that if he were now living, he would not be able to demonstrate the necessity for some of his own departures from the classical phraseology of our best English writers, to which we shall refer before we close our notice of his work.

The greatest attention appears to be paid throughout the states of this division of America, to the important subject of education, much more so indeed than even in these days of active exertion for the promotion of this great object, is shown with us, the country being every where divided into societies, for the establishment of parochial and district schools, the districts having power to tax themselves for their maintenance, towards which, the state also contributes a small proportion of its funds. The result of this system is, that the children of New-England are universally taught to read and write, or at least education is as nearly universal as it is possible to be, without a law compelling the education of every child under a severe penalty. The number of academies, or public-schools resembling our endowed grammar-schools, in the different states, was, in 1812, between ninety and an hundred ; its universities and colleges eight, of which Harvard College, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is the principal, that of Vermont, at Burlington, the least considerable. The former has seven academical, and as many medical professors, the number of students being near upon nine hundred. There is also a law-school at

Litchfield, in Connecticut, far better conducted than our inns of court, where the student need do nothing but eat a given number of dinners in a given number of years, to qualify him for the bar; whereas in the New-England institution, not only is law taught as a well-compacted system and a science, but the students are initiated into its practice with its theory. For this purpose, courts are constituted, in which actions are brought and conducted through a regular process, and nice questions of judicial technicality are raised, (or, to use the phraseology applied to similar exercises in the good old times of our own law societies, when they were somewhat more than mere eating-houses of state, are *mooted*;) and thus they are regularly trained to the duties of the advocate, the knowledge of which, as far as any steps taken to advance it by the societies, of one or other of which our students are and must be members, is concerned, they gain by intuition, or from the stars. The medical profession has also three societies, formed expressly for its improvement—agriculture and philosophy, two—history, (a branch of literature for whose encouragement no provision whatever has been made with us,) one. Social libraries, somewhat similar it would seem to our reading societies, exist in many of the towns and parishes, to whose inhabitants they have naturally imparted a literary taste. That taste is, however, confessedly gratified, chiefly by the productions of writers of our own country, the dearth of native authors, arising, as Dr. Dwight contends, (and we go along with him in the major part of his argument,) from the great mass of people in New-England being men of business, with little time for study or for much desultory reading—the want of leisure from the very laborious duties of their office, and of libraries, in the clergy—of the lettered ease, which the rich endowments of our own universities so abundantly furnish to the man of study and research, and a consequent deficiency of patronage to the few individuals who, in America, have been authors by profession, if indeed, with the exception of one splendid genius, lately transplanted to our own more genial soil, authors by profession she can be said to have produced any.

A distinct letter is devoted to a contradiction of the bold and not very liberal assertion of the Edinburgh Reviewers, that though “all that federal America has written were obliterated from the records of learning, there would (except the works of Franklin) be no positive diminution of the useful or the agreeable,” whilst “the destruction of her

whole literature would not occasion so much regret as we feel for the loss of a few leaves from an ancient classic." To this sweeping anathema, Dr. Dwight opposes the works of president Edwards, (too well known in this country to need more than their being named,) but he is the only author,—with the exception of Franklin, whom the censors themselves except, and the ingenious natural philosopher Rittenhouse,—known on this side of the Atlantic, whom he does, or whom he probably could adduce. Professors Winthrop and Williams, of the university of Cambridge, are also quoted as natural philosophers, who would have done honour to any country; and we are referred to a certain poem of M^c. Fingal, as not inferior in wit and humour to Hudibras, whilst in every other respect it is superior. This is certainly no slight praise; but in the absence of all means of forming a judgment upon the merits of such a constellation of poetical excellence as Dr. Dwight describes a poem to be, never heard of, we believe, in England before, we cannot help suspecting his character of it to be tinged with the same pardonable nationality, that induced the somewhat vaunting assertion, that "President Edwards has more enlarged the science of theology than any divine of whom either England or Scotland can boast," and that Marshall's Life of Washington (tedious and heavy as we have ever thought it) "will not suffer by a comparison with any piece of biography written in Great Britain, with the exception of those of Johnson." We wish not, however, to prolong an unpleasant, useless, and acrimonious discussion, and cannot better terminate it, as far as we are concerned, than by expressing a conviction, in which we are satisfied that all our readers who know any thing of American literature will agree, that putting this list of American literati altogether out of the question, Dr. Dwight's own writings, those of Drs. Mason and Romeyn, the novels of Browne, and the sprightly essays and sketches of Washington Irvine, are in themselves sufficient to give a direct contradiction to the grossly illiberal and unfounded dictum of our northern Zoiluses, that his country "has done nothing either to extend, diversify, or embellish the sphere of human knowledge."

But to confine ourselves more strictly to New-England. The people in general appear to be remarkably honest, in proof of which Dr. Dwight adduces a practice, which we could not recommend to adoption in Old England, of two-thirds of the inhabitants sleeping the year round without

locking their doors, and that too in houses containing large quantities of property easily removable. They must also be quiet, peaceable, and orderly, as, in journeying twelve thousand miles, he never saw two men fighting, and indeed never witnessed such an exhibition, of every day's occurrence in our streets, more than once in his life. On this subject, it is but justice to the New-Englanders, though it is as disgraceful to the inhabitants of our own country, to give the contrast, which our author thus briefly draws.

“Now permit me to call your eye to your own newspapers, and observe how often their columns are ornamented with the feats of Humphries and Mendoza, Crib and Molinex. What a grave aspect is given to the accounts which describes the brutal contests of these bullies! Observe also, that not the mob only, not the middle ranks of life only, but gentlemen, noblemen, and even princes of the blood,* have been present at these rencounters. I do not believe that a gentleman of New-England could be persuaded to be present at such a scene by any inducement whatever, unless to perform his duty, as a magistrate, in committing and punishing such disturbers of society.” [vol. iv. pp. 324, 325.]

When we remember how often these prize-fights, thus severely, though justly reprobated, have terminated in the death of one of the combatants, we cannot but hold it a disgrace to our laws and our police, that such brutal exhibitions are permitted, as is also the continuance of such sports as are thus alluded to in another parallel, equally to our disadvantage.

“In New-England, horse-racing is almost, and cock-fighting absolutely, unknown. I need not remind you to what a degree these barbarous and profligate sports prevail in Great Britain. In New-England there never was such a thing as a bull-baiting. Suffer me to recall to your remembrance the debates, not long since held in the British parliament on this subject, the decision of that august body, and the speech delivered at that time by the Hon. Mr. Windham.” [vol. iv. p. 326.]

As with us, the poor are here effectually provided for by law, whilst charitable institutions are numerous, though confessedly supported on a less liberal scale than in Great Britain.

For his countrymen, Dr. Dwight claims a marked superiority over ours, in affability, facility of access, sociality, and readiness to oblige friends, points on which we have personally had few opportunities of forming a judgment by con-

* “A horse-race, a fox-chase, or a boxing-match, is never without its trains of reverend attendants.”—*Letters to the Rt. Hon. Mr. Perceval.*

trast; but as these amiabilities of life are not at least the most characteristic virtues of an Englishman, but those, on the contrary, in which he is far excelled by neighbouring European nations, who possess not half his sterling worth, we shall not contend for precedence here; nor do we doubt but that the descendants of our pious forefathers, recently placed under new and popular forms of government, which every citizen has a direct interest to preserve inviolate, are at the present period more orderly, quiet, and peaceful, and governed with less difficulty, and by milder measures, than is the superabundant population of the parent state. What they will be, however, when their government has, like ours, stood the test of a thousand years, and only improved by the many fruitless attempts made to subvert it, is a secret in the womb of futurity, to be revealed to the present inhabitants of both countries, but when they shall know all things, and shall themselves be known of all.

To his fair countrywomen, as in gallantry he was bound, our learned tourist attributes every excellence of the sex, save that he gently intimates an apprehension, that their domestic economy may be rather less systematical and perfect than ours, and that their activity may also be somewhat less skilfully directed, than with us; but these are points upon which we can assure his countrymen, (would, for their interest, and that of the Christian church, though not his own, we could assure him!) our fashionable mode of female education will not leave them long behind us, unless indeed similar false steps (of which, by the way, in his strictures on the education of "young misses," the Doctor seems to have traced the earlier ones,) should as rapidly unfit the daughter for the mother and the wife, and convert, as, generally speaking, it has done with us, ladies' boarding-schools (we beg pardon, "establishments" we should have said,) to nuisances, instead of benefits. It is hardly worth notice, but as some of our readers may feel a little curiosity upon the subject, we will state in a word, that the ladies of New-England are said, for the most part, to be regularly featured, comely, and frequently handsome; not so fair indeed as British, but, to use the very phrase of their American panegyrist, "sensibly fairer than French women." It is admitted, however, that, like the women of other American states, they lose the brilliancy of their beauty and of youth at an earlier period of life than do those of England, many of them shedding their teeth and growing old at thirty. Excessive abstemious-

ness, and want of exercise, (walking being very little practised, and riding on horseback scarcely known among them,) are judiciously suggested as some of the prevailing causes of this national difference in the sex.

But pass we now from beauty which fadeth as a flower, to that which shineth as the brightness of the sun, increasing more and more unto the perfect day. The religious character of the New-Englanders is that in which, we doubt not, our readers will feel most interested; and on this point Dr. Dwight has entered into a minute detail of near a hundred closely printed pages, from which we can but very briefly extract the result. To the influx of foreigners during the war in America between the French and English, from 1755 to 1763, of whom the dissipated and often sceptical officers of our own army were not the least injurious, and during that revolutionary one also, which terminated in the independence of our colonies;—to the rapid spread of the irreligious and infidel tenets which were so uniformly blended with the political ones of the French revolution,—and in a degree at least not inferior to the political dissensions and party spirit which long prevailed at home—Dr. Dwight very sensibly attributes a deterioration in the religious character of the Americans, affecting, however, as might naturally be expected, less materially than any other state of the Union, the New-England descendants of our expatriated Puritans. As a people, they still merit the characteristic distinction of a religious one, and one of those extensive revivals, of which from America we read so much, and in the experience of our own country, where the progress of the gospel has of late years been slow and sure, rather than marked by its rapidity and eclat, we know so little,—happily counteracted the dangerous effects of these powerful agents of infidelity, and have left the church there more numerous than ever it was, and (to adopt an Americanism, pardonable perhaps when writing on America,) still progressing in numbers, and we fain would hope, in piety and zeal. In the first of these Christian graces, we nevertheless despair of their ever attaining to the stature of their forefathers, though they have already surpassed them in the proper direction of the latter. What those were, and these are, how far they resemble each other, and in what they differ, let the following well-drawn parallel of Dr. Dwight, inform us:

“The present state of our moral and religious character cannot,

perhaps, be more advantageously illustrated, than by a comparison of it with that of our ancestors. The religion of former times was more zealous, rigid, scrupulous, and uniform. At the same time it was less catholic, gentle, indulgent in lawful cases, graceful, and amiable. The strictness, the energy, the commanding character of their religion, we have in a great measure lost. Where they stood firmly against the blast, we bend to escape its force. Where they watched, we are asleep. Where they fought manfully, we are employed in parleying. Where they triumphed, we are satisfied with a drawn battle. On the other hand, we have, in some respects, advantageously relaxed from their austerity and rigour. We live more kindly and evangelically with Christians of other denominations. Our religious controversies are less violent; and we regard fewer things as fundamental grounds of difference. On the other hand, they educated their families more virtuously, regulated society with greater skill, executed laws with more exactness, and settled the affairs of men on a more solid foundation. They chiefly exhibited the magnanimous, we the gentler virtues. Ours are more amiable, but less firm. Theirs were rough and uninviting, but more to be relied on. In justice to these excellent men, it ought to be added, that to them we are indebted for almost every thing in our character which merits commendation. In some respects we have polished, but, upon the whole, instead of improving, we have impaired their system." [vol. iv. pp. 378, 379.]

In one important point, the due observance of the sabbath, it is but justice to the present race of New-Englanders to state, that, like their forefathers, they stand honourably distinguished from most other people of the world. In the two principal states, of Massachusetts and Connecticut, travelling upon that day (with us, perhaps, in South Britain, the greatest travelling day of the seven,) is peremptorily forbidden by the law; and in every other respect its sacredness is generally observed with so great sobriety and strictness, that—assembling in companies, as is done to so shameful an extent in the dinner and musical parties of England—going to taverns, or receiving guests there, are all of them finable offences; parents and guardians being also required to correct their children for breaches of the acts for the due observance of the sabbath, (from convictions upon which there is no appeal,) under the penalty of half a dollar. In those states, provision is made by law, for the erection of places of worship, and the support of a regular ministry amongst every sect, for which purpose the states are divided into parishes, consisting of one or more religious societies of the same or different denominations, the majority of whose members, rated on a real estate of nine, or a personal

one of 134 dollars per annum, are empowered to choose the ministers of the societies to which they respectively belong, and to levy taxes for their support, and the repair of their church, (for all are churches here,) and the maintenance of public worship, there. Within a year after attaining the age of twenty-one, becoming a widow, or settling in a parish, all persons have liberty to enroll their names in that religious society of the place which they prefer; or, in default of such enrolment, the son belongs to the religious society of the father; the widow to that of her deceased husband; the new settler, to the lowest on the list; and is of course taxable with them by the vote of the majority already explained, whose acts, as these societies are for various purposes, bodies corporate in themselves, are binding upon their successors. For the collection of what we, in England, should call their church-rate, tax-gatherers are regularly appointed; and persons refusing to take upon themselves this or any other office in the church, are as regularly fined, as in our parishes are those who refuse to serve as constables or overseers. Negligent collectors of the minister's salary are liable to have a distress taken out against them, by the committee for managing the temporalities of the church, and to make up the deficiencies occasioned by their neglect out of their own estates; as are the committee themselves, should they be guilty of a similar negligence. In case of a collector not being chosen, the civil magistrate, in the shape either of a selectman or a justice of the peace, appoints one. Nor is this the only instance of the interference of the secular authority with the concerns of the church, for where there is but one society in a town, its selectmen or chief civil authorities, are *ex officio* the committee of the church; and as, in all other cases, are bound, as such committee, to see the tax for paying the minister's salary speedily collected, and that salary duly paid within two months after it has become due. Wherever also a society shall have voted the erection of a place of worship, the civil authority of the court of common pleas determines its site; and in case of any attempt at erecting one without its approbation first had and obtained, a fine of one hundred and twenty-four dollars; (somewhat more than thirty pounds,) is levied on the offenders; whilst, for omitting to build after its sanction has been procured, the court certifies the contempt to the general assembly of the Congregational churches, by whose authority a sufficient tax is laid upon the society, and expended under the direc-

tion, or by the appointment, of the assembly. That ecclesiastical body has power also to determine what salary shall be paid to their minister, by societies or churches, which have made no agreement with, or do not support their pastor; whilst they further direct what tax shall be laid upon destitute churches, for the support of the ministry amongst them. On their certificate of permission, churches unable to support a minister have leave to tax themselves for the preaching of the gospel, and other necessary purposes, and they have a concurrent jurisdiction with the separate churches, in allowing members to withdraw from the church to which they belong.

It will be perceived at a glance, how essentially these legislative provisions, so singularly combining and confounding lay and ecclesiastical authorities, church and state, differ—the Congregationalists of New-England, (for they form by far the majority of the inhabitants, though frequently, and somewhat indiscriminately, termed Presbyterians,) from the Independents or Congregationalists of our own country, amongst whom no parochial taxations—no connexion with a church or congregation but by your own act, when arrived at years of discretion, and nothing like a compulsory contribution either to support a place of worship, or its minister,—are known. Much of this, we are aware, is fairly to be attributed to the different condition of the denomination in the two countries; in one, as the prevalent, and formerly the established—in the other, but a merely tolerated sect—yet are we anxious to claim for ourselves the firmer adherence to the principles of the old Independents, who would, we are satisfied, have exhibited in their countenances other indications of astonishment, than the smile which relaxes ours, at the argument employed by Dr. Dwight in favour of the practice of his country which we have just described, in a long and very elaborate letter in “vindication of the establishment of the public worship of God by law,”—that St. Paul, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, (c. xvi. v. 2.) in thus providing for “the collection for the saints,” “upon the first day of the week, let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings when I come,” has determined, “that a tax is a right and proper measure” for providing the salaries of ministers, although, could we bring ourselves to believe that the text had any thing to do with the matter in hand, we should draw a diametrically opposite conclusion in favour of voluntary contributions only.

The education of young men for the ministry of the gospel is conducted in a very similar manner to that pursued in the Dissenting academies of England, save that their colleges grant academical degrees, for which no extent of learning or information is deemed with us sufficient to qualify any man, unless he can conscientiously, or will unconscientiously, subscribe to his belief in every iota of the articles, liturgy, and homilies, of the established faith; clogs upon learning, which America happily has shaken off. In the commencement of their ministrations, the Scotch Presbyterian mode of licensing to preach for a given time is followed, and the call of a particular church to any such licentiate, (which call is determined upon, and given, in our English Congregational form,) is submitted to the decision of a standing committee of ministers of the district, called the Consociation, by whom, if they approve his settlement, the candidate is examined, and ultimately ordained. The average salary of the minister, is four hundred dollars, (£90,) though sometimes it does not amount to 250 dollars, (sixty-eight pounds fifteen shillings of our currency,) and in a few cases may reach 1100 dollars, or nearly £250. This at least is the general amount of their remuneration in Connecticut, and that state has, throughout the present description of the religion of New-England, been referred to as a specimen of the whole, because, as it was the one with which Dr. Dwight was most familiarly acquainted, he himself has selected it for the purpose; assuring us at the same time, that, save where we have followed him in particularly noticing it, the other states differ but immaterially from it.

In doctrine, the Congregational churches of New-England adopt, in substance, the doctrinal articles of the Westminster and Savoy confessions; but in discipline more nearly approximate the Presbyterian than the Independent form, having consociations in lieu of synods, and a general association in place of the general assembly. The ministers have also separate associations among themselves, meeting twice a year at least, to consult concerning the duties of their office, the common interest of the churches, to examine and license candidates for the ministry, to superintend destitute churches, and recommend proper pastors, and to take cognizance of the accusations of any of their own body of heresy or scandal, and, if they see occasion, to direct the calling of the consociation, to proceed against them. This system of doctrine and discipline was, soon after its forma-

sion in 1708, adopted, recognized, and established by law; securing, however, at the same time, to all churches soberly differing and dissenting from it, the full right of exercising worship and discipline in their own way, according to their consciences. Formerly the churches of New-England were divided, in opinion and practice, with respect to ruling elders, some of them admitting, others rejecting them; but they are now utterly discarded, to the great dissatisfaction of Dr. Dwight, who holds the office to be of apostolic institution. For our own parts, we, however, are much more disposed to join in his censures of the singular ecclesiastical court of appeal in the second instance, which, after an appeal from a single church to the association, permits the case to be reheard by the same consociation, and a neighbouring one invited to assist their deliberations as assessors; which is, in fact, little better than an appeal from the Pope, to the Pope better advised. The general association is but a deliberative, or, as Dr. Dwight has it, advisory body, although their recommendations have great influence; and, by means of delegates, they are connected with the other states of New-England.

On the letter containing a "comparison of the state of religion in England with that in New-England," we shall make no remarks; because that comparison is instituted between our established church in its worst features, and the Congregationalists of New-England in their best, and for the mode in which the chapels are attended in our universities, the profanation of the sacrament, in its compulsory reception by every student there, the state of patronage, and neglect of ecclesiastical discipline in the church, and non-residence, we are any thing but advocates; though we should be disposed to add, the numerous pluralities in Old as in New-England, to this catalogue of ecclesiastical grievances, which, if not reformed in time, will speedily reform themselves. We give, however, from this letter, a single sentence of its account of the sermons of New-England preachers, because it contains a short, but just character of the compositions of two of our own divines.

"None of them can boast the eloquence and sublimity of Robert Hall; but some of them are eloquent and sublime. At the same time, they are rarely trifling; rarely are they merely attempts to display the preacher to advantage. We have no Sidney Smith sermons; gewgaws intended to be shewn like a diamond-ring or snuff-box, to prove that the preacher is the owner of such trinkets." [vol. iv. p. 429.]

Of the other sects of New-England, our zealous Presbyterian tourist gives a very brief account, and we must needs be still more brief. Several Arminians and Unitarians are to be found in its eastern parts, especially in Massachusetts. The Episcopalians principally inhabit the northern districts, and are generally Arminians, or of our high-church party. The Baptists are as generally Calvinists, though several of them are Arminians. To the former especially, Dr. Dwight attributes an excessive spirit of proselytizing rather to their party, than to the church of God. The latter have adopted the creed of a sect recently sprung up in Vermont and New-Hampshire, who hold for their prominent tenet, "that the wicked will be destroyed on the day of judgment." The Methodists are principally Wesleyans, the followers of Whitfield being very few. The leaven of Antinomianism is here but too widely spread amongst the churches, especially of the Separatists, as those who avail themselves of the permission of the law to avoid the support of a minister, are usually termed. The Friends have several societies in New-England; the Roman Catholics and Independents one or two; the Moravians and Jews a single congregation each. These, with the exception of the Shakers, of whom more hereafter, form nearly all the sects dispersed over its different states.

Thus much for the civil and religious institutions of New-England, and the general character of its inhabitants, although upon the latter point we wish to add a particular or two before we quit the subject, which we have reserved to the last, because they may be important to those who seek to mend their fortune by emigration to the United States. The price of labour is high throughout the states of New-England, but the labourers are almost universally idle, diseased, or vicious. They might work, but they will not, save for the attainment of a bare subsistence, very easily obtained. The mechanics are, however, industrious and prosperous. The tillers are, almost without exception, the owners of the land, which is universally held in fee-simple, and descends by law in equal shares among all the children. It is not necessary for us to remark, how very little encouragement this statement affords to the emigration of English agriculturists.

Few of our readers need perhaps to be reminded, that New-England embraces the states of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New-Hampshire, through each of which we shall accompany our

reverend and ingenious tourist, for the purpose of extracting from his pages whatever information may appear to us most interesting to an English reader, beginning, as he does, with Connecticut, of which Hartford and New-Haven are the capitals. Amongst the laws of this state which we deem worthy of notice, is one imposing upon the inhabitants of the different counties, the burden of defraying the expense incurred in consequence of prisoners confined for debt escaping through the insufficiency of the gaol. On a similarly equitable principle, townships upon whom is imposed, as (generally speaking, is the case also with us,) the duty of making and keeping in repair the bridges and highways within their limits, are compellable to pay to the surviving relations of every person whose life is lost in consequence of any defectiveness in either, 344 dollars, (£77. 8s. sterling,) as a fine for their neglect; and where carriage, goods, or cattle, are lost from the same cause, they are to pay double damages as a fine and compensation. Its laws with respect to the poor and strangers, are very strict, we should say, tyrannical; as every person not an inhabitant of a town from birth, the vote of the inhabitants, consent of the selectmen and civil authorities in public meeting assembled, or by being chosen into some office, or having during his residence in it possessed an estate in fee of one hundred dollars value, or supported himself and family there for six years, is removable by the civil authority of the town, or the selectmen; the latter of whom have also the power to warn all persons, not inhabitants of the state, to depart out of their town, under the penalty of forfeiting about seven shillings of our currency per week, so long as they neglect to do so; or, possessing no property, yet refusing to depart, of being publicly whipped. Those who hire or entertain any such inhabitants of other states, (apprentices and servants bought for a time alone excepted,) and refusing to give security to the satisfaction of the civil authorities and selectmen, to save the town from expense on their account, are subjected to the like pecuniary penalty per week; and for having entertained any such person for fourteen days without reporting him to the selectmen, shall themselves provide whatever relief the stranger may afterwards require. For a free republican state, these, we cannot help thinking, are measures for preventing vagrancy and parochial burdens, rather stronger than (even since the passing of the new vagrant act,) an English legislature would venture to adopt, or our English population would patiently submit to. We apply

not, however, the same character to another legislative provision of the state, which enables the selectmen to apprentice out, or place in service, the children of poor inhabitants, who either cannot or will not bring them up to some honest and profitable calling, and properly provide for them, or such as live idly, or are exposed to want and distress. This is a very wholesome power entrusted to their hands, and we equally approve of the equitable provision against the abuse of their office, by directing, that if they do not truly account for the town's money entrusted to their hands, and pay over the balance to their successors, they shall be committed to gaol *at their own costs and charges*, until they do so. "Their powers," says Dr. Dwight, "at first sight may seem enormous;" to us, we confess, they do even upon a sober review; and it requires all the high respect which we unfeignedly entertain for his character, and the firm reliance which we place on his veracity, to believe that he never knew them abused, especially as their services, which must be arduous, are generally gratuitous. A somewhat singular, yet in our opinion a very judicious, regulation pervades this republican state, in the appointment of these and other officers of its various towns, in the prohibition of any debate at their election, save on the right of persons tendering their votes, no discussion being consequently permitted on the merits of the candidates, who are merely put in nomination. Undue influence in procuring votes for a representative in the state, legislature, or in congress, is very properly punished by a fine of seven dollars. The latter are nominated seven months before the day of voting; a precaution peculiar this state, and judiciously preventing elections from the popular fury of the moment, or from the intrigues of factious clubs, which generally guide the choice of other states of the Union. Strong efforts have, however, of late years been made to remove these obstacles to bribery and corruption, the almost inseparable attendants on popular elections. Dr. Dwight, with the foresight natural to a superior mind like his, apprehended great evil from these attempts; and we have reason to believe, that, since his death, the cause for such apprehension has been very much augmented. The elections are, however, still conducted with an order and decorum forming a striking contrast to those of our own country, and even of other states of the Union. Dr. Dwight assures us, that he never saw an individual intoxicated or quarrelling, or heard a profane or indecent word, or even a noisy conversation, at any of them. When will this be said

of us? The powers of justices of the peace are nearly the same as in England, with this alteration, however, (it may perhaps also be an improvement,) that they have cognizance of all civil actions in which land is not concerned, where the demand does not exceed fifteen, or, on bond or note, where it does not exceed thirty-five dollars.

The criminal code of Connecticut was originally constructed on that near approximation to the Jewish law, which distinguished the legislative institutions of Puritan settlements; and worshipping false gods, witchcraft, blasphemy, adultery, where one of the parties was a married woman, cursing or smiting father or mother, save when they had grossly neglected the offending child or his education, provoked him by cruelty, or forced him to strike in his own defence,—and filial stubbornness and rebellion,—were accordingly punished with death. This, however, is no longer the case; but at present the only crimes not punished with death in England, which are capital in Connecticut, are perjury, with a design to take away life, disabling the tongue, and voluntarily depriving any one of his sight. Neither robbery, burglary, nor forgery, are there punishable with death, but with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years for the first offence, and for life for a second, or wherever violence is used or threatened; forgers paying also double damages for the injury they have done, and being rendered incapable of giving evidence, or serving as jurors, within the state. Simple theft, and the receiving of stolen goods, are, on the same principles of penal jurisprudence, punished by a fine not exceeding seven dollars, and the payment of treble damages. Where the offender is not able, or refuses to pay the fine, he is punished by whipping, not exceeding ten stripes; and if unable to pay the damages, must make satisfaction by personal service. In these respects, it is obvious that the code of Connecticut is at once milder, more scriptural, and, we are inclined also to think, more equitable and efficacious, than our own; but by it manslaughter is more severely and less justly punished than it is with us, even now that a very wholesome statute, recently passed, enables our judges, in aggravated cases, to transport for it; the offender, in addition to the forfeiture of goods and lands, whipping and branding with the letter M. in the hand, being there subject to a perpetual disability to give a verdict or evidence in any court of justice,—a penalty infinitely too severe, for a child being run over by a cart, through the negligent driving of a carter, although we will

readily admit, that it is by no means severe enough for the duelist, who, in England, generally escapes under a verdict of manslaughter, with a short imprisonment, the sentence of death, to which as a murderer, in the eye of God and man, those laws condemn him. In America, however, he rarely meets with any punishment whatever, although in Connecticut the law contains an express provision against an offence, which is a still more crying sin in the country of which she forms a constituent state, than it is in England; for dueling is there prohibited under a fine of three thousand dollars, by the person accepting, or even knowingly delivering a challenge, as well as he who gave it, and are perpetually disabled from holding any office of profit or honour in the state; and where unable to pay the forfeiture, are subject to close imprisonment for a year. The principals in a challenge are also very properly required to give security for their good behaviour during life.

Other laws of this state appear singular to us, though we wish that their principle, if not their details, were rather familiar than unknown to our criminal code. Thus, adultery with a married woman, here but a ground for a civil action for damages, for an injury which no damages can compensate, is there punished in both parties, by whipping, branding the letter A in the forehead, and wearing a halter round the neck during their abode in the state, which surely cannot be long, when, if found abroad there without the degrading and very significant badge of their crime about their necks, they are liable to receive a public whipping of thirty stripes. Bigamy, with us a clergyable or transportable felony, is punished in the same manner. Horse-racing, where any bet or wager is laid, is an offence proscribed by the laws, under the effectual penalty of forfeiting the horses running, and the stakes for which they run, together with a fine of fifty dollars upon every person subscribing to such stake, and of thirty dollars each by every stake-holder, rider of the horses, and printer or other advertiser of the race. These are punishments and prohibitions, at which we are aware that the lovers of this popular but most demoralizing national amusement will smile in contempt and scorn, branding them, as they do so, as puritanical and methodistical; yet we would ask even them, whether they form not a part of a more consistent system of Christian legislation, than does the conduct of our own royal Defenders of the Faith, who issue proclamations with one breath for the suppression of all vice and immorality,

especially of all gaming *eo-nomine*, and with the other, graciously furnish from the royal purse, some twenty or thirty king's plates, to be run for at races, most notoriously and pre-eminently the scenes of the very worst vices, in their very worst enormities, of which gaming is the fruitful parent. One other singular law of this state we copy rather for its curiosity, and to shew the minute attention paid by its legislators, the earlier ones especially, to every thing that regards morals and decorum, than from any wish to see it adopted here, although it might not be without its benefits in putting a stop to at least one of the violations of decency so common in our places of theatrical amusement. We allude to that which prohibits the appearance of one sex in the dress of the other, under penalty of a fine not exceeding seventeen dollars.

In most other respects the laws of the state are very closely assimilated to those of England, of which the common law is that also of Connecticut, wherever its own statutes are silent; and where that also is silent, our statutes passed before the settlement of the American colonies, are sometimes appealed to and admitted as law—a tribute to the merit of our jurisprudence, not by any means confined to this state of the Union. Whilst on this point, we cannot deny ourselves the gratification of quoting from Dr. Dwight's valuable pages, the following liberal, though strictly just acknowledgment of the advantages derived by Americans from their former connexion with, and origination from, Great Britain.

“The present race of Americans can never be sufficiently thankful, that their ancestors came from Great Britain, and not from any other country in Europe. In Great Britain they formed most of their ideas of liberty and jurisprudence. There, also, they found their learning and their religion, their morals and their manners. The very language which they learned in that country, opens to their descendants, as in a great degree it had opened to them, more valuable literature, science, and sound wisdom, than could be found in all the languages of Europe united. In some branches of learning, the British have been excelled; in all they have not been equalled. In science and sound wisdom they have no rivals.

“It is with no small satisfaction, that I see this language planted in every quarter of the globe. Those who speak it, are almost absolutely the only persons who appear solicitous to spread Christianity among nations to whom it is unknown. By this dispensation of Providence, a preparation is, I think, evidently making for the establishment of a general vehicle of communication for mankind,

by means of which the religion of the cross may, in its purity, be diffused over both continents." [vol. i. pp. 259, 260.]

The same candour which dictated this general acknowledgment, induced the estimable and lamented author of these travels, to admit also in detail, that although the processes in the courts of Connecticut are often simpler than those of the country whence they are derived, they are so, in some cases, with manifest disadvantage, though in others, advantageously.

"Generally," says he, "there is less regularity in them, and therefore less perfection. At the same time, they are usually much less expensive. It ought to be observed, that they are gradually approximating towards the system of the British courts." [vol. i. p. 260.]

For our own parts, we should hold it an improvement in their laws, were that approximation to extend to the limitation of a justification of a libel by its truth to the remedy by action, although we are too well aware of the prevalence in this country of an opinion, that it should be extended also to indictments, to enter now into the grounds of the views which we take of the subject, though in support of them an opportunity may, on some future occasion, be afforded us of saying a word or two. Other defects, however, are too obvious to require more than pointing them out as we pass on; such, for instance, as the dependence of the judiciary on the executive department of the government, alike in the tenure, and the emoluments of the offices of its ministers—the confinement of criminals convicted of serious offences, in a dreary cavern under ground; although we are free to admit, that the general system of prison discipline of the state is very superior to our own, especially in the care which is taken effectually to separate the sexes by confining women in totally distinct gaols. But a defect producing more serious evils, is the law relative to divorces, which ever since the year 1667 have been granted not only for adultery, fraudulent contract of marriage, or an absence of either party for seven years without being heard of, but for a wilful desertion of husband or wife, for three years, or the omission of that care and provision for each other and their family, which is incumbent upon those who have contracted so near, and as, save for scriptural causes, it ought to be so indissoluble a connexion. Against the demoralizing tendency of this law, Dr. Dwight has entered a strong protest, equally creditable to him as a divine, a patriot, and a politician.

Before we quit the institutions of this state of the Union, we would just remark, as very important departures from our own legislation and policy, (in England at least,) that marriages are celebrated by magistrates and ordained ministers indifferently, but that to render them valid, they must have been previously published before the congregation assembled in some place of religious worship in the town or parish in which each of the parties dwell, or have been publicly notified in writing, in or near the door of some church or meeting-house there, for eight days previous to the celebration of the rite. Minors must also have obtained the consent of their parents or guardians. And what more than this, we would ask, can reasonably or equitably be required from Dissenters here? Nothing, certainly, (save perhaps a longer notice,) to guard against improper marriages; all that the state can be concerned to prevent, whatever influence or emolument the church may fear to lose. The last things we notice are, the religious character of the inhabitants, which has occasioned the election in most instances of men of probity to the highest offices of the state, very frequently filled also by persons eminent for their piety; the steadiness of their attachment to faithful servants, evinced in the office of secretary of state, although annually elective, having been filled by one family through three generations—that of one individual having for more than fifty years been chosen a member of the legislature, and *a fortiori*, of the judges, though annually chosen to their office, seldom holding that office but for life—and, finally, of the very trifling salaries paid to the governor and chief-justice; the former receiving but 1200 dollars, (£270) the latter but a thousand, or two hundred and twelve pounds of our currency; a remuneration infinitely less than is paid for their services to many of our mercantile clerks, and about half as much as is made by the half-clerks and half-servants of our leading barristers, waiting as they do, meanwhile behind their master's chair at dinner, attending to the door of his chambers, and brushing the mud off the tail of his great coat. Of this economy, some Americans are apt to boast, as a striking proof of the Roman-like simplicity and purity of their republican government. Not so, however, does so candid and sensible a man as Dr. Dwight, for he very judiciously observes, that

“ It cannot, however, be questioned, that this system has been carried too far. The salaries of the principal public officers ought, without a question, be considerably increased. The very least

which wisdom or justice can admit is, that they should be sufficient to furnish such a support for the incumbents as is decently suited to their respective stations." [p. 258.]

Another glaring defect in the government of this state, which seems to have escaped our observance, though common we believe to every state in America, is the resort to lotteries, for providing for public improvements, such as the building of piers, &c. Here also, as in some other states of New-England, a very mischievous practice has long prevailed, of dividing and subdividing counties and parishes into districts, too small to afford respectable representatives in the legislature in the one instance, or adequately to provide for the building of churches and the maintenance of their ministers, in the other.

The prevalent religious denominations in this state are the Presbyterian and Congregational. When Dr. Dwight wrote, in 1812, it contained 216 Congregational, 9 Independent, 61 Episcopalian, and 67 Baptist churches, besides which, a few Methodists are scattered over the state, in which no material alteration in these numbers has since been made. Though America is alike without the advantages and the disadvantages of an established faith and mode of worship, (whatever they severally may be,) she is not altogether free from what many in this country consider one of the greatest abuses of such a provision, the appointment of pastors to flocks which they cannot feed; as, of the Episcopal churches of Connecticut, more than half, and of the Presbyterian not a few, are held by pluralists. Of the ministers of the Baptist churches, Dr. Dwight, who was a staunch and thorough-paced Presbyterian, speaks with more contempt than liberality, representing their preachers as "farmers and mechanics, not a whit better qualified for the desk, unless by superior volubility, than their hearers, taken at an average," generally unpaid for their services, and uneducated for their sacred office. We rejoice, however, to learn from a note of the publisher, that ten years has wrought a very favourable revolution in a body of Christians, which in our own country can boast of a Hall, a Ryland, a Carey, and, alas! that we must only add, *could* boast of a Fuller, and a Ward; and that considerably more attention is now paid to the education of their teachers in holy things. Education generally is so well attended to, that there is scarcely a child in the state who is not taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, in one of the schools, which in number amount to about 2600, containing about 78,000 scholars.

Newhaven, one of the capitals of this state, exhibits a scene no less delightful than it is singular, in the re-erection, by mutual consent, of the places of worship of the different sects on the same side of the same street, where the elegance of their structure contributes greatly to the beauty of one of the handsomest parts of the city. "Rarely," says our author, and in fancy we realize the scene, "is a more beautiful object presented to the eye, (I have never met with one,) than the multitudes crossing the green in different directions to the house of God." Religion flourished extensively in Newhaven, the place of his residence, and scene of his labours, for many years, in his time; and we are happy to learn, that its friends have since considerably increased, both in number, in unanimity, and in zeal. "Behold how good and pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." In the spirit of this text, the Methodists were here enabled to erect their church by the liberal contribution of their fellow-citizens of different and even opposing sects; and as those sects live together in harmony, they are interred in one common cemetery, the description of which is too striking not to be extracted.

"The Honourable James Hillhouse, one of the inhabitants, to whom the town, the state, and the country, owe more than to almost any of their citizens, in the year 1796, purchased, near the north-western corner of the town, a field of ten acres, which, aided by several respectable gentlemen, he levelled and enclosed. The field was then divided into parallelograms, handsomely railed, and separated by alleys of sufficient breadth to permit carriages to pass each other. The whole field, except four lots given to the several congregations and the college, and a lot destined for the reception of the poor, was distributed into family burying-places, purchased at the expense actually incurred, and secured by law from every civil process. Each parallelogram is sixty-four feet in breadth, and thirty-five feet in length. Each family burying-ground is thirty-two feet in length, and eighteen in breadth; and against each an opening is made to admit a funeral procession. At the divisions, between the lots, trees are set out in the alleys, and the name of each proprietor is marked on the railing. The monuments in this ground are almost universally of marble, in a few instances from Italy; in the rest, found in this and the neighbouring states. A considerable number are obelisks, others are tables, and others slabs placed at the head and foot of the grave. The obelisks are placed universally on the middle line of the lots, and thus stand in a line successively through the parallelograms. The top of each post, and the railing, are painted white; the remainder of the post black. After the lots were laid out, they were all

thrown into a common stock. A meeting was then summoned of such inhabitants as wished to become proprietors. Such as attended drew for their lots, and located them at their pleasure. Others in great numbers have since purchased them, so that a great part of the field is now taken up.

“It is believed, that this cemetery is altogether a singularity in the world. I have accompanied many Americans and many foreigners into it, not one of whom had ever seen or heard of any thing of a similar nature. It is incomparably more solemn and impressive than any spot of the same kind within my knowledge; and, if I am to credit the declarations of others, within theirs. An exquisite taste for propriety is discovered in every thing belonging to it, exhibiting a regard for the dead, reverential but not ostentatious, and happily fitted to influence the views and feelings of succeeding generations.” [vol. i. pp. 160, 161.]

To this singularly interesting spot, the monuments erected to the memory of the dead, in the church-yard, placed injudiciously, though in strict conformity with our English custom, as absurd as it is general, in one of the finest and most crowded parts of the city, were all removed about two years ago. This town, like most of those of Connecticut, and indeed of New-England generally, is so thinly inhabited, compared with the larger towns of our own country, that the houses are built at very considerable distances from each other, in streets, which in summer are as verdant as the fields.

Near Montville, lived towards the close of the seventeenth century, Uncas, sahem or chief of the Pequod and Mohagan Indians, a firm friend to the English, with whom he was too prudent to quarrel, but who had no occasion to be proud of their ally, on the score of superior civilization or humanity; for having defeated and taken prisoner a Narrhagansett chief, who attacked him with twice his numbers, he put him to death, and then, cutting a piece of flesh from his shoulders, roasted and ate it, declaring, after he had done so, in the true spirit of a savage, that it was the sweetest meat he had ever tasted.

The conflicting claims of two towns in this state, Lyme and New-London, to certain lands, formerly belonging to the Indians, gave rise, it appears, to a species of settlement of title, which we apprehend to be new in the annals of civilized nations.

“The land,” says Dr. Dwight, “though now of considerable value, was then regarded as a trifling object. The expense of appointing agents to manage the cause before the legislature, was

considerable, and the hazard of the journey was not small. In this situation, the inhabitants of both townships agreed to settle their respective titles to the lands in controversy, by a combat between two champions, to be chosen by each for that purpose. New-London selected two men, of the names of Picket and Latimer: Lyme committed its cause to two others, named Griswold and Ely. On a day, mutually appointed, the champions appeared in the field, and fought with their fists, till victory declared in favour of each of the Lyme combatants. Lyme then quietly took possession of the controverted tract, and has held it undisputed to the present day. This, it is presumed, is the only instance in which a public controversy has been decided in New-England by pugilism." [vol. ii. p. 498.]

Gorton, a town on the borders of Rhode Island, seems to have suffered from its proximity to a state in which a regular provision for a gospel ministry is held in abomination; for when Dr. Dwight was there, it had been for a long period without a minister, the last who had officiated, though a very worthy man, being obliged to leave his people for want of support, although they could, without inconvenience to themselves, have maintained three ministers at least. It is but justice, however, to add, that in the state of Connecticut, a similar destitution of the means of religious instruction, from a similar cause, is of very rare occurrence; and that before our author died, it no longer existed here. In the adjoining township of Stonington, reside, partly in small ragged and unhealthy wigwams, and partly on the farms of the white inhabitants, in houses built purposely for them, the wretched remnant of the Pequod Indians, the original proprietors of the land, and for a series of years the most formidable enemies of the English settlers on the territory of their forefathers. Lazy, dishonest, prodigal, thieves, liars, and drunkards; living together without marriage, or any tie but their own lust, half-naked and often half-starved, the former proud heroic spirit of their race, terrible even to the prouder and more heroic spirits around them, is sunk into the tameness and torpor of a half-reasoning brute; all the vice of the original being left, after all its energy has vanished.

The township of Stamford, containing near 5000 inhabitants, affords an instance of the manner in which great part of America was obtained by the Europeans who peopled it, for it was purchased of the Indians by the agent of the colony of Newhaven, for twelve coats, twelve hoes, twelve hatchets, twelve knives, two kettles, and four fathom of

white wampum. The inhabitants of this state are, generally speaking, industrious, moral, and religious, but in many of its districts, the prevalent practice of their inhabitants to lead the wandering lives of hawkers and pedlars, has had a demoralizing effect upon their principles, conduct, and manners.

MASSACHUSETTS, the largest and most populous of the New-England states, differs not in any material part of its constitution from that of Connecticut. Its representatives in the legislature are, however, far too numerous, equalling in number those of Great Britain, with a population at the least twenty times as large. Each town having, in the elegant language of America, 150 ratable polls, sends one member, and another for every 225 additional polls. Education is provided for by law, in a most exemplary and effectual manner; every town or district in the state, containing fifty householders, being required to provide a schoolmaster to teach children reading, writing, and arithmetic, six months in every year. Those containing one hundred householders, are obliged to do the same for twelve months; those which have 150, two such schools, one for six, and the other for twelve months; and those having 200, an English schoolmaster, and another well qualified to teach Latin, Greek, and English, in a grammar-school, each of them for twelve months. Failing in this, or negligently performing the duty, they are liable to penalties of from ten to thirty pounds. Persons keeping schools, either for boys or girls, on their own account, are required to be citizens of the state, and to be furnished with a certificate of competency for their office, from two ministers in the vicinity, and as to moral character, from the minister, or a selectman, of the place to which they belong. The academies already described, are more numerous and better endowed than in Connecticut. As to the provision for ministers, the laws respecting it are essentially the same in both states, as indeed are their legal institutions in general. Nor is there any very material difference in the character of their inhabitants, save that those of Massachusetts are somewhat more ardent, impassioned, and sudden in their affections and actions, than those of Connecticut.

Of Boston, the celebrated capital of this state, Dr. Dwight gives a minute description, for no part of which have we room in our pages, save for the following very creditable testimony to the detestation manifested by its inhabitants,

of a practice which seems to be one of the crying sins of their countrymen.

“ An honourable specimen of the Bostonian character was lately exhibited. Two young gentlemen, natives, fought a duel: one of them was killed, the other fled. The inhabitants, with one voice, manifested an unequivocal wish to have the law executed upon the survivor. Even his own friends are said to have made no efforts in his favour. It is doubted, whether the same opposition to this crime, and the same respect for the decisions of law, would be found, in a similar case, in any other town of equal distinction. It ought to be remarked, that the survivor was intensely provoked, and had made numerous, unusual, and very patient exertions to prevent the unhappy catastrophe.” [vol. i. p. 470.]

Religion, pure and undefiled, formerly flourished in a most remarkable degree in this great commercial city, but of late years Socinianism has made sad inroads and havoc there; but vigorous efforts have, for some time past, been making, to stem its progress and counteract its influence, and most ardently do we wish them every possible success. We regret, however, to have occasion to extract, from the more recent tour of Mr. Faux, the following account of a Bostonian sabbath, in the year 1819.

“ I accompanied one gentleman to church, an edifice inwardly and outwardly splendid, and the congregation fashionable; but I thought the service and sermon very dull and insipid, and the worship altogether inanimate. As Sunday here vanishes with the daylight, I went in the evening to the Town-hall, to Caucus, a grand political meeting of thousands of the *mobocracy*, met to deliberate upon the choice of a state-governor, &c. The orators, on the present occasion, being principally well-educated federalists, seemed, some of them, eloquent and ingenious abusers of the democrats, who angrily retorted on their opponents. Thus I found two strong parties, which I am at present unable to define, except as mutual haters of each other, like Whigs and Tories in England.” [Faux, pp. 28, 29.]

To the beauty, elegance, and convenience of this great commercial city, and its noble harbour, our English tourist bears ample testimony; but of its inhabitants, he says, that they are thankful for nothing, or, at least, they do not shew that they are grateful for any thing. “ The poor,” he adds, on the authority of a domiciled Scotch landlord of an inn, “ are not wanted there, nor any where in the state of Massachusetts, where many are unemployed, and nobody is satisfied.” He accordingly dissuades his countrymen from

emigrating thither, unless they can bring with them from five hundred to a thousand pounds.

To his account of the character and manners of the inhabitants of this city, with which, on the whole, they have every reason to be satisfied, Dr. Dwight has appended a letter on fashionable education, written in his very best style, and equally adapted to the meridian of London as of Boston. We therefore, very warmly commend it to the attentive perusal of our readers; to such of them, more especially, as sustain the weight of the parental character; whilst it contains many hints which might be profitably perused by all, though we cannot but wish that less occasion had been afforded for the severity of its remarks.

In this state, as in Connecticut, and indeed throughout America, lotteries seem to be the favourite mode of effecting public improvements, for by it the South Hadley canal was mainly constructed, or rather rendered an efficient navigation. It was at Hadley, one of the first townships in this state, visited by our observing tourist, that the English regicides, Goffe and Whalley, found for many years a refuge, in the house of the Rev. Mr. Russell, the then minister of the place; and during their close seclusion there, the following singular event is traditionally said to have occurred.

“ In the course of Philip’s war, which involved almost all the Indian tribes in New-England, and among others, those in the neighbourhood of this town, the inhabitants thought it proper to observe the 1st of September, 1675, as a day of fasting and prayer. While they were in the church, and employed in their worship, they were surprised by a band of savages. The people instantly betook themselves to their arms, which, according to the custom of the times, they had carried with them to the church, and, rushing out of the house, attacked their invaders. The panic under which they began the conflict was however so great, and their number was so disproportioned to that of their enemies, that they fought doubtfully at first, and in a short time began evidently to give way. At this moment, an ancient man with hoary locks, of a most venerable and dignified aspect, and in a dress widely differing from that of the inhabitants, appeared suddenly at their head, and with a firm voice, and an example of undoubted resolution, reanimated their spirits, led them again to the conflict, and totally routed the savages. When the battle was ended, the stranger disappeared, and no person knew whence he had come, or whither he had gone. The relief was so timely, so sudden, so unexpected, and so providential; the appearance, and the retreat of him who furnished it, were so unaccountable; his person was so dignified and commanding, his resolution so superior, and his interference so decisive;

that the inhabitants, without any uncommon exercise of credulity, readily believed him to be an angel sent by Heaven for their preservation. Nor was this opinion seriously controverted, until it was discovered several years afterward, that Goffe and Whalley had been lodged in the house of Mr. Russell. Then it was known that their deliverer was Goffe, Whalley having become superannuated some time before the event took place." [vol. i. pp. 317, 318.]

The bones of the former of these determined republicans, on the house in which Mr. Russell lived having been pulled down about thirty years ago, were found buried just without the cellar wall, in a kind of tomb formed of mason's work, and covered with flags of hewn stone. It was said also, that Goffe was interred near the spot, but—as he is reported to have gone into Connecticut after the death of his companion, thence to have removed to the neighbourhood of New-York, where, though, the better to disguise himself, he sometimes carried vegetables to market, he was discovered, and on that discovery, to have retired secretly to Rhode Island, lived there with a son of Whalley during the remainder of his life—the traditions respecting him are too obscure and doubtful to be relied upon. But be this as it may, the place of their first retreat seems to have been well adapted to their concealment, though surrounded by beautiful scenery, which the strictness of that concealment would not permit them to enjoy.

Dr. Dwight expressly disclaims all attempts to render his tour interesting, by filling it with landscapes, a fault with which he charges, and we fear with but too much reason, many of our European travellers, who would, he observes, and observes correctly, "have been more agreeable writers, had they been less liberal of their garnishing, and furnished us to a greater extent with more solid entertainment." It would, however, be an act of gross injustice, at once to his powers of observation and to the scenery of his country, not to direct the attention of our readers to his very glowing description of the view from Mount Hoylake, three miles to the southward of Hadley, with which, in richness and grandeur, we apprehend that few scenes in England can compete. It is too long, however, for extraction, we can therefore only recommend its perusal, in a work from which, but for a like reason, several others of equal beauty might be selected. Yet, to picturesque effect, the agriculture of the country, which is that also of most of the other states of New-England, presents one very material obstacle, in the walls of stone rudely laid together, (as with us, in some of

the mountainous regions of Cumberland, Westmoreland, Lancashire, and Yorkshire, and even in the hilly districts of Oxfordshire, Worcestershire, and midland counties,) being substituted for the beautiful hedges, so generally used as enclosures in England. In some of the districts of this state, these hedges are formed by the natural growth of the barberry, often spreading itself an unwelcome visitant over a fifth, sixth, and even a fourth of the surface of fields, from which it is extirpated with difficulty, save from the stone enclosures, under which pass its bushes, and spring up so numerously, as to render it almost impossible to eradicate them. Their blossoms are said to emit an effluvium so acrimonious, as to blast both wheat and rye, and even to prevent esculent roots and other vegetables from living.

At Haverhill, the last town of this state, on the borders of New-Hampshire, a natural curiosity is presented, in a small island, situated in the midst of a lake, which has from time immemorial floated from shore to shore, whenever it was impelled by a violent wind. Trees and shrubs grow on it, and it is covered with fresh verdure, so as, during its alternations, to exhibit a scene picturesque as it is extraordinary.

Salem, the most ancient town in this extensive state, except Plymouth, and the next in size to Boston, was once the scene of the ministerial labours of the celebrated Hugh Peters, the eccentric chaplain of Oliver Cromwell, who here originated many improvements in the affairs of his parishioners, directing them by his exhortation, and still more strongly by his own successful example, into new channels of industry, and thereby laying the foundation of that commercial prosperity which has rendered Salem, for its size, one of the most industrious and thriving places in the Union. The neighbouring town of Danvers is remarkable for a supposed prevalence of witchcraft there in 1692, in consequence of which, nineteen persons, the majority of them members of Christian churches, and people of unblemished character, were executed in the town or its neighbourhood, whilst one man, according to the humane practice of our then common law, was pressed to death, for refusing to plead to so absurd a charge. Yet although the absurdity of preferring that charge was here carried so far as to lead to the imprisonment of a child of between four and five years old, as a witch, let not Europeans laugh at that instance of folly in Americans—let not, especially, Englishmen place themselves on any superiority, in this respect, over their transatlantic descendants, when it is remembered, that the philo-

sophers, the legislators, the divines, of every country, were at this period devout believers in the extensive diffusion of this singular crime, for which, in our own country, and in the same age, so profound a scholar, so devout a Christian, and so humane a judge, as Sir Matthew Hale, condemned to death, and delivered over to the executioner, more than one of his innocent and persecuted fellow creatures, unlamented victims of a superstition, to whose deadly influence even his master mind willingly surrendered all its mighty powers.

This state appears not to have adopted such severe measures for the suppression of horse-racing, as that of Connecticut, as, at Lynn, Dr. Dwight passed one of the only two spots used as a race-course.

In noticing the condition of Williams's college, on the borders of this state, occasion is given to our author to point out the defects of that and other collegiate institutions of this country, in being all but utterly destitute of fellowships, or any other endowments by which students may be enabled to pursue literary inquiries to any extent; the professorships alone excepted, and even they are, generally speaking, but very moderately and inadequately supported, and impose much active exertion upon those who enjoy them.

On the side of Saddle mountain, in the immediate neighbourhood of this university, Dr. Dwight procured an interesting account of the ravages of a singular deluge of rain, descending in a moment, to which the mountainous parts of New-England are occasionally subject, and there called the bursting of a cloud; nor, unphilosophical as the term confessedly is, would it be easy to find one more characteristic of a phenomenon, of which we extract the following description.

“In the autumn of 1784, in the latter part of the night, a deluge of water descended from this mountain. A family, which lived in a house at some distance from the foot of the mountain, not far from a brook, were suddenly awaked out of their sleep by the united roaring of the wind and the torrent. In their fright, they hastily dressed themselves, and escaped from the house, the ground-floor of which was, by this time, six inches under water, and fled to that of a neighbouring inhabitant. When they returned in the morning, they found their own dwelling so completely swept away, that no part of it was left. The brook, through the channel of which this flood discharged itself, had never before, not even in the highest freshets, approached the house by a considerable distance.

“ Mr. C——, in his excursion to this mountain, on the day when we left Williamstown, followed the path of this torrent from its commencement, through the principal part of the tract which it ravaged. He informed me, that the channel worn by these waters, began instantaneously a little below the summit, and was there, and in various other places, as he judged, twenty feet deep, and, where widest, at least twenty feet in breadth. A tract of about ten acres was entirely desolated of its trees, which the flood and the storm had thrown down, and which were lying on the lowest part of the tract in heaps of confusion. The face of this ground was now either bare, or covered with small shrubs, apparently sprung up since the period of this devastation. Every appearance which met his eye, corresponded with the opinion and language of the people in the vicinity.” [vol. iii. pp. 234, 235.]

MAINE, the next division of New-England in population and importance, but which in his time, and indeed until the year 1820, when it was admitted into the Union as an independent state, formed a part of Massachusetts, seems not to have stood very high in our author's estimation, although we cannot help suspecting, that religious prejudices had some effect upon his judgment, as his complaints are principally directed against schism among the people, or, as we should term it, their exercising the undoubted right which they possess, of thinking and acting in religious matters as they please; the influx of “ ignorant, wandering, and unprincipled preachers, too lazy to labour, blown up with spiritual pride, and assuming to themselves the character and employment of religious teachers, because they believe themselves, as peculiar favourites, to receive immediate communications from Heaven,” and, above all, (a point on which we observe that the reverend Doctor is always peculiarly sore) the dependence of the clergy upon the precarious pittance furnished at the good pleasure of their hearers, rather than by the more sure mode of a compulsory payment by legislative enactments. In this latter predicament, however, the entire dissenting ministry of England (with the very few exceptions of endowments,) stand at this moment, and, we most ardently hope, will ever continue to stand.

The inhabitants of many parts of this state are, it appears, very improvident with their wood; a fault so general, indeed, in most districts of America, that our author expresses considerable apprehension of its hereafter putting a final stop to the progress of population, before it will have reached to its natural height. The evil is, it appears, generally acknowledged, and yet not a single efficacious measure has

hitherto been taken to stop its alarming progress. But few circumstances of the journeys of Dr. Dwight through this state, are particularly interesting.

The town of Litchfield affords a singular instance of the manner in which settlements have been formed in this country, as, of upwards of one thousand inhabitants, not one had a better title to house or land, than was derived from what, in the middle and northern states of America, is called *squatting*, that is, planting yourself in the wilderness on any piece of ground you may chuse, without purchase from, or even the consent of, the proprietor. To this predatory invasion of undisputed rights, the weakness of new governments compelled a submission at the time, which it would now be alike impolitic and unjust to attempt to supersede.

Amongst the natural curiosities of the state of VERMONT, one of the most singular is Mount Toby, extending about thirty miles, and chiefly composed of breccia, or pudding-stone, with a cave in it, undoubtedly formed by some violent shock, and reaching directly across one part of the mountain from east to west. At Bennington, another *lusus naturæ* presented itself, in the ravages of swarms of grasshoppers of a peculiar kind, whose operations are thus described by our tourist.

“Bennington, and its neighbourhood, have for some time past been infested by grasshoppers, of a kind with which I had before been wholly unacquainted. At least, their history, given by respectable persons, is in a great measure novel. They appear at different periods, in different years, but the time of their continuance seems to be the same. This year (1798) they came four weeks earlier than in 1797, and disappeared four weeks sooner. As I had no opportunity of examining them, I cannot describe their form or their size: their favourite food is clover and maize. Of the latter, they devour the part which is called the silk, the immediate means of fecundating the ear, and thus prevent the kernel from coming to perfection. But their voracity extends to almost every vegetable, even to the tobacco plant and the burdock. Nor are they confined to vegetables alone. The garments of labourers, hung up in the field while they are at work, these insects destroy in a few hours, and with the same voracity they devour the loose particles which the saw leaves upon the surface of pine boards, and which, when separated, are termed sawdust. The appearance of a board fence, from which the particles had been eaten in this manner, and which I saw, was novel and singular, and seemed the result, not of the operations of the plane, but of attrition, the cause of which I was unable to conjecture.

“At times, particularly a little before their disappearance, they collect in clouds, rise high in the atmosphere, and take extensive flights, of which neither the cause nor the direction has hitherto been discovered. I was authentically informed in Shaftesbury, that some persons, employed in raising the steeple of the church in Williamstown, were, while standing near the vane, covered by them; and saw, at the same time, vast swarms of them flying far above their heads. The customary flight of grasshoppers rarely exceeds four or five yards, and their wings are apparently so weak, as to forbid excursions extended much beyond these limits. It is to be observed, however, that they customarily return, and perish on the very grounds which they have ravaged.” [vol. ii. pp. 384, 385.]

Sunderland, a town in this state, was formerly the residence of Colonel Ethen Allen, who was taken prisoner by the British, on a mad attempt, which he made during the American war, at the head of but one hundred men, to get possession of Montreal. He was an avowed Deist, and author of the first work published on the other side of the Atlantic, against the Christian religion. The following affecting anecdote evinces, however, the little faith which he reposed in his own tenets in the hour of danger and of death.

“Dr. Elliot, who removed from Guildford in Connecticut, to Vermont, was well acquainted with Colonel Allen, and made him a visit at a time when his daughter was sick, and near to death. He was introduced to the library, where the Colonel read to him some of his writings with much self-complacency, and asked, Is not that well done? While they were thus employed, a messenger entered, and informed Colonel Allen, that his daughter was dying, and desired to speak with him. He immediately went to her chamber, accompanied by Dr. Elliot, who was desirous of witnessing the interview. The wife of Colonel Allen was a pious woman, and had instructed her daughter in the principles of Christianity. As soon as her father appeared at her bedside, she said to him, ‘I am about to die; shall I believe in the principles you have taught me, or shall I believe in what my mother has taught me?’ He became extremely agitated; his chin quivered; his whole frame shook; and, after waiting a few moments, he replied, ‘Believe what your mother has taught you.’” [vol. ii. pp. 389, 390.]

Of the legislature of this state, at least of the legislature as it existed some twelve or fourteen years ago, the following passage in Dr. Dwight’s description of Vergennes, gives us no very exalted idea. It is, however, the representation of an American and a New-Englander, and there-

fore we may quote it at length, without any risk of subjecting ourselves to the charge of libelling our republican friends.

“ It was, indeed, intended for the seat of government, and so are half a dozen other places. Whether any of them will ever become what they so ardently covet, whether there will be a seat of government in the state, or whether the legislature will continue to roll upon wheels from town to town, as they have hitherto done, no human foresight can determine. The legislature itself has been at least equally freakish with the projector of this city, and seems at present little more inclined to settle, than any other bird of passage.” [vol. ii. p. 401, 402.]

Neither of the government of Vermont, however, nor its inhabitants, does the Doctor, himself a devout believer in the superiority of his own state of Connecticut over every existing government, entertain any favourable opinion, for through at least a dozen pages he expostulates practically on the vices of all new settlements, from their being composed of the very refuse of the older states, with so much severity, that although we could safely recommend the censure to our aristocratical readers, we would advise its being passed over by those, who expect from American writers, any thing like the sentiments termed radical and jacobinical on this side the Atlantic. His portrait of a genuine democrat, and would-be patriot, dissatisfied with every thing, and to whom nothing can give pleasure, is at least as highly coloured as it could have been by the most violent antijacobin in this country.

The constitution of the state of NEW-HAMPSHIRE is altogether one of the best in the Union, the two branches of the legislature, the house of assembly, and the senate, having each of them a negative on the bills passed by the other, and the judges holding their offices during their good behaviour; a provision very much needed in some of the larger states. In the limitation of seats in the senate to Protestants, we trace however a restrictive spirit, ill accordant with the general liberality of the American states, and irreconcilable, as it appears to us, with the declaration of its own constitution, that “ every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves as good subjects of the state, shall be equally under its protection, and entitled to equal privileges, and that no sect shall ever be legally subordinated to another.” In the same just and equitable spirit, another article provides, that no person of any religious

denomination shall be compelled to pay towards the support of any minister, or place of worship, of a religious persuasion to which he himself does not belong.

Portsmouth, the principal town and seaport of the state of New-Hampshire, is, like most of the towns of New-England, built chiefly, if not entirely, of wood; we need not therefore be surprised to learn, that conflagrations have frequently destroyed large portions of this ill-constructed capital.

At Dover, a party of Indians once committed as gross an outrage as ever disgraced the most savage horde of any time or region of the globe. Being then professedly at peace with England, one of their sachems or chiefs, and two women, applied to Major Waldron, formerly governor of New-Hampshire, for a night's lodging; which was granted with equal readiness and good will. In reward, however, for this kindness, these fiends in human shape, whilst the family were asleep, admitted a body of their warriors into his house, and having knocked down their gallant and venerable host, who was then in his eightieth year, by striking him on the head from behind, whilst he was valiantly but ineffectually resisting his numerous and brutal assailants, they seated him in an elbow-chair upon the table, cut him across the breast and stomach whilst he was still alive, severed his nose and ears, and forced them into his mouth, and finally, by placing his sword under him as he fell, terminated his honourable and most useful life. To finish their work of destruction, they then killed or captured the remainder of the family, and set fire to their habitation.

Early in the next year, the neighbouring town of Brunswick was attacked by a body of French, powerfully supported by these their fearful allies; but they were driven back, after they had killed about thirty and captured fifty of the inhabitants. The treatment received by the latter from their savage captors, though acting as the coadjutors of men professing to be Christians, was horrible beyond conception, and would scarcely be credible, were it detailed by a writer of less unquestionable veracity than he who thus affectingly relates it.

“ One of the prisoners, named Robert Rogers, a corpulent man, being loaded with a heavy pack, found it impossible to keep pace with his captors. When he had fallen behind them, thinking himself out of their reach, he threw down his load, and attempted to make his escape. The savages pursued him to a hollow tree, in which he endeavoured to conceal himself, and, forcing him out,

stripped him, beat him, and pricked him forward on the journey, until the evening arrived. They then made a feast for themselves, and, tying the prisoner to a tree, (his hands being fastened behind his back,) sang, shouted, and danced around him. When they had sufficiently amused themselves in this manner, they made a great fire near the unfortunate man, bade him take leave of his friends, and allowed him a momentary respite to offer up his prayers to his God. After this, they moved the fire forward, and roasted him by degrees; and when they found him failing, withdrew the fire again to a greater distance. Then they danced around him; cut, at each turn, pieces of flesh from his perishing frame; laughed at his agonies, and added new pangs to this horrible death, by insults and mockeries. With a refinement in cruelty, not obvious to civilized man, they placed the rest of the prisoners just without the fire, that they might be witnesses of the catastrophe. With the same spirit, after his death, they seated his body, still bound to the tree, on the burning coals, that his friends might, at some future time, be racked by the sight.

“Such was one, among innumerable specimens of Indian cruelty. Such are the benefits of that state of savageness, which approximates nearest to the state of nature. Let modern philosophers look on, and learn here how romantically innocent, gentle, and amiable, man becomes in this, which they have been pleased to extol as the state of human perfection. In the next panegyric, which is pronounced on the state of nature by one of these gentlemen, it is to be hoped, that he will recite, as a proof of its beneficent and delightful influence, the story of Robert Rogers.” [vol. i. pp. 387, 388.]

To such would-be philosophers, men who, in erecting their theories, overlook all fact, and contradict all experience, we very earnestly commend this wholesome advice, which has been our principal inducement to extract the passage containing it.

At Somersworth, the next stage in his journey, our traveller was entertained, much to his satisfaction, at an inn kept by a Captain R. a circumstance which induces him to enter into an explanation and justification of the inns of this state, and indeed of most others in New-England, and even throughout the Union, being kept by persons whose titles indicate them to be men of some consequence. This he does with much zeal; but although we are fully ready to admit with him, the propriety of houses of accommodation for travellers being kept by persons of respectable character, we are not convinced by any arguments which he has adduced, that there can be the least necessity for their being kept by landlords, whose education and feelings as gentlemen, would in most other countries be an insuperable

bar to their following such a pursuit. Colonel A. of the Bear and Billet, Captain B. of the Goose and Gridiron, and Mr. Justice C. of the Crown and Magpie, would, in any country in Europe, appear so absurd an anomaly, that our American friends must bear with our smiles at a combination of which, we doubt not, but that when their middling classes shall have attained to the respectability of that grade in old established communities, they will themselves be ashamed, however they may affect to glory in it now.

Near Hinsdale, a border town of this state, an irruption of the Indians, in 1775, issued, in the capture, amongst other persons, of a Mrs. Howe, whose subsequent sufferings and history are detailed in so interesting and affecting a manner, that we cannot but refer such of our readers to it as may wish to combine all the witching interest of a novel, with a faithful detail of some of those extraordinary transactions which occasionally form the romance of real life. They will find it in the second volume of the work, pages 70 to 76.

Dartmouth college, near Lebanon, originally founded in 1769, by the exertions of the Rev. Dr. Eleazar Wheelock, of Lebanon, in Connecticut, under the patronage of the good Earl of Dartmouth, for the purpose of educating Indians, and Missionaries to them, has failed of answering its purpose, two natives only having ever graduated here; and it being found difficult, and almost impossible, to get students from among them, whilst missionary education was necessarily interrupted by the breaking out of the American war, soon after the foundation of the college, the work has since been advantageously carried on by other societies, and through other channels. By the education of from fourteen to fifteen hundred young men, of whom a fourth devoted themselves to the ministry, the college has, nevertheless, in another way, conferred most important benefits upon the state in which it is erected, and the Union of which that state is a part.

In the neighbourhood of Bethlehem, a town not far distant from the White Mountains, Dr. Dwight found the roads in a very bad condition, which leads to some observations that cannot, we think, be uninteresting to our readers, pointing out, as they very forcibly do, some of the difficulties which their forefathers, by whose perseverance those vast trans-atlantic regions were peopled, cultivated, and civilized, encountered and overcame.

“A reflecting traveller, passing over these roads, is naturally

induced to recollect the situation of the first colonists in New-England, and to realize some of the hardships, which those intrepid people endured in settling this country. Among the difficulties which they had to encounter, bad roads were no contemptible one. Almost all the roads in which they travelled, passed through deep forests, and over rough hills and mountains, often over troublesome and dangerous streams, and not unfrequently through swamps, miry and hazardous, where wolves, bears, and catamounts, haunted and alarmed their passage. The forests they could not cut down, the rocks they could not remove, the swamps they could not causey, and over the streams they could not erect bridges. Men, women, and children, ventured daily through this combination of evils, penetrated the recesses of the wilderness, climbed the hills, wound their way among the rocks, struggled through the mire, and swam on horseback through deep and rapid rivers, by which they were sometimes carried away. To all these evils was added, one more distressing than all. In the silence and solitude of the forest, the Indian often lurked in ambush near their path, and from behind a neighbouring tree, took the fatal aim, while his victim, perhaps, was perfectly unconscious of danger." [vol. ii. pp. 280, 281.]

At Davis's Farm, a station in this thinly populated district, he met with another novel illustration of those hardships, some of which are still entailed on the descendants of these bold, laborious, and much-enduring men, in a tract, recently ravaged by one of those destructive fires, which kindled originally by the hunters to drive the prey from their coverts, often do incalculable and irreparable mischief to the neighbourhood, which they lay desolate and waste for many miles around.

"When," says Dr. Dwight, "we had reached Davis' farm, we were presented with an object entirely new, and not a little interesting. A fire, which had not long before been kindled in its skirts, had spread over an extensive region of mountains on the north-east, destroyed in its progress all the vegetation, and consumed most of the soil, consisting chiefly of vegetable mould. The whole tract, from the base to the summit, was alternately white and dappled, while the melancholy remains of half-burnt trees, which hung here and there on the sides of the immense steeps, finished the picture of barrenness and death." [vol. ii. p. 282.]

The state of RHODE ISLAND differs from most other states in New-England, of which it is the most insignificant and the least, in that the sabbath is there neither noticed by the law, nor sanctioned by any general religious observance; hence, when Dr. Dwight wrote, many years had not elapsed

since the market, the streets, and wharfs, of Providence, its capital, were little less frequented, as marts and scenes of business, on the Sunday, than on any other day. The general feeling of the inhabitants had, however, so strongly manifested itself against this profanation of the day of rest, that but few carts were then seen entering the town, (which, contrary to the usual order of things, and to experience also, was more moral than the surrounding country,) and their numbers had been yearly decreasing. The Rhode-Islanders appear to be great sticklers for liberty, and even carry their attachment to it to the height of absurdity, having for many years gone without a most useful turnpike-road, through the very heart of their state, because turnpikes, and the establishment of religious worship, had their origin in Great Britain, the government of which was a monarchy, and the inhabitants were, as they considered, slaves; as were also those of the neighbouring states of Massachusetts and Connecticut, from being compelled by law to support ministers, and pay turnpikes. These, argued they, if they chose to be slaves, undoubtedly had a right to their choice, but free-born Rhode-Islanders ought never submit to be priest-ridden, nor to pay for the privilege of riding on the highway. They accordingly jogged on in mud and mire, and liberty, until 1805, when the impassability of their roads compelled them to bow their free-born necks to the horrid slavery of travelling on good, in preference to bad ones. With a spirit so opposed to all improvement, and so incapable of enjoying real, whilst it prompts to unfounded clamour after fancied liberty, we are not at all surprised to find, that the general features of this state were mean houses, ill repaired miserable barns by the road-side, misnomered churches, chiefly of the Baptist denomination, and a cultivation of a piece with every thing else, rarely, if ever, exhibiting to the eye proofs either of skill or of success.

“Every thing,” says Dr. Dwight, in passing the boundary of his own state, to enter that of Rhode Island, “indicates a want of energy, a destitution of all views and efforts towards improvement, a sluggish acquiescence in inconveniences and imperfections, which a more vigorous disposition would easily remove. [vol. iii. p. 28.]

Less attention is paid to education in this state than in any other of New-England, in consequence of which, its inhabitants are more vicious, and its churches worse supplied with ministers, than its neighbours. Horse-racing is here a favourite pursuit. “This gross amusement,” says

our author, and we quote his words for the benefit of such of our countrymen as are enamoured of the sport, "turns polished men into clowns, and clowns into brutes." The sabbath was at this time, with very many of the people, but a day of visiting and sport, and, with others, regularly devoted to their customary labour. So little indeed were sacred things regarded there, that some of the missionary societies of the neighbouring states treated, and not, it would seem, without abundant reason, Rhode Island as missionary ground. Our readers will not, however, be surprised at the wretchedness of its moral and religious condition, when we inform them, that a considerable number of the inhabitants of its trading towns were engaged in that bane to every thing that is virtuous or good, the slave trade. Yet we are assured, that they will rejoice with us, at a very considerable amelioration in the condition of this state, in the twenty years which have transpired since the account of it was given, increasing wealth having, as we learn from a note of the American publisher of this work, imparted more liberal views to its inhabitants, particularly of the large towns, with respect to the importance of education to the community. Revivals of religion have also taken place within these few years, in several parts of the state.

Turn we now from NEW-ENGLAND to NEW-YORK. On the constitution of this state, we need not to make many remarks, after the full account already given of that of Connecticut, as a sample of the government of the separate states of the Union, which, differing as they do from each other in minute particulars, have the same general republican and elective features. New-York has a council of revision, composed of the governor, chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, to which all bills must be sent before they are passed into a law by the legislature, and if returned within ten days to the senate, or house of assembly, according as the bill may have originated in the one or the other of those bodies, with their objections in writing, to its passing into a law, these objections must be considered, and recorded, in the nature of a protest, upon the minutes of the house; but if two-thirds of the members still adhere to the bill, it passes. Of this, the nearest approximation to our third estate, that a republican government can perhaps admit, we are inclined very cordially to approve; though we join with Dr. Dwight, in reprobating the practice of keeping the judges dependent upon the executive for the tenure of their offices; a fault common, we believe, to most of the

United States; and two other provisions of the constitution of this very important one. These are, the council of appointment, formed of a senator from each of the four districts of the state, annually elected by the house of assembly, in whom, with the chief of the executive for the time being, though he has, as president, but a casting vote, the sole patronage is vested of the great majority of offices throughout the state; all, indeed, but such as are elective in the people, or by the legislature. The consequence of this regulation is, the influencing of elections to the house of assembly and the senate, of persons likely to serve the electors; and we have the respectable authority of Dr. Dwight for asserting, that to secure this important patronage to men likely to promote the self-interested views of its members, the house of assembly is itself rendered a scene of cabal and intrigue, often issuing in measures openly subversive of "law, principle, and decency." The other error is little less fatal to the stability of the constitution, with which the due and impartial administration of justice is intimately and inseparably connected; and in a large commercial state like New-York, that object can never be accomplished by a supreme court of errors, constituted of the senate, the chancellor, and the judges of the superior court, in which the deliberate decisions of the ablest and wisest judicial tribunals are frequently reversed by a majority of farming, mercantile, speculating, and office-hunting senators, some of them without sufficient honesty, and all of them wanting in legal knowledge, for the judgment of the last resort, which it is their duty to pronounce. These defects must be remedied, or they will remedy themselves in a way not very propitious to the safety of the government, many of whose provisions exhibit great equity and wisdom. Such, in our judgment at least, is the ineligibility of ministers of the gospel to any civil employment in the state, and the enjoyment of perfectly equal rights and privileges by members of every religious sect, without discrimination or preference. To these every Englishman will be disposed, with us, to add, the preservation of the great palladium of our liberties, the trial by jury, inviolate; and the recognition, as part of the laws of the state, of such parts of our own common and statute law as were in force there in April, 1775.

Pass we now to the ecclesiastical arrangements of the state, which, as they respect the maintenance of ministers of the gospel, differ very widely from those of New-

England, and have a much nearer conformity to the mode of supporting them, in use amongst the Dissenters of our own country, though, if men of talent, piety, and probity, they here experience but in a very slight degree; evils, the most distant apprehension of which instinctively excites our reverend tourist's wrath. Thus, for example, in describing the town of Paris, he says,

“There are three Presbyterian congregations in this township, and two clergymen. These gentlemen, though held in high estimation, and deservedly loved by their parishioners, consider themselves as holding their connexion with their congregations by a very precarious tenure. The laws of this state concerning the support of clergymen are so loosely, and so unwisely formed, as to leave them in a great measure dependent on the fluctuating feelings of parishioners, rendered much more fluctuating by the laws themselves. A voluntary contribution, except in a large town, is as uncertain as the wind; and a chameleon only can expect to derive a permanent support from this source. By several very respectable gentlemen, with whom I conversed largely on this subject, I was informed, that the opposition to supporting clergymen by law had lately very much increased among the New-England people of this region. My informants believed, that not more than one-tenth of the principal inhabitants, and not more than a twentieth of the people at large, are in favour of this system. This is a lamentable degeneracy.” [vol. iii. p. 177—178.]

Nor is the reverend Doctor better satisfied with the legislative provision, authorizing religious societies of every denomination to appoint trustees of their property, which may be held to the amount of 3000 dollars, (nearly £640) per annum, although such trustees are made corporate bodies with a common seal, and empowered to regulate pew-rents, perquisites, and all matters connected with the temporal concerns of their respective churches. How infinitely less are the legal rights with which the Congregationalists and other dissenters in England are obliged to be content! for their places of worship cannot be endowed with lands even to the value of a shilling by the year, and are moreover liable to vexatious assessments for the relief of the poor, and even for the building and repairs of the parochial places of worship belonging to the Establishment.

The Sabbath is, however, directed by law to be strictly observed; and a proof that it is so in practice, more to the satisfaction of the tourist than this mode of proceeding for the maintenance of the clergy, was afforded on his journeying with his companions from Saratoga to Cambridge,

on account of the latter containing a place of Evangelical worship, which the former wanted. We give it in his own words.

“On our way, a decent Scotsman came up to us on horseback, and very civilly inquired why we travelled on the sabbath; observing to us at the same time, that such travelling was forbidden by the law of the state, and that the people of that vicinity had determined to carry the law into execution. We easily satisfied him, and were not a little pleased to find, that there were people in this vicinity, who regarded the law of the land and the law of God with so much respect.” [vol. iii. p. 222.]

The most numerous denomination of Christians in this state, as in New-England, is the Congregationalist, although in the number of their churches the Baptists far exceed them; but then, those churches very frequently consisting only of three or four families, but occasionally visited by itinerant preachers, the number of members of course bears a less proportion to that of their congregations than in any other sect. As in New-England, the Baptist ministers are generally uneducated men. Episcopalians, Quakers, and Methodists, are the next numerous sects, Dr. Dwight's catalogue of which is closed by “a considerable number of Nihilists,” a term, we presume, ingeniously invented to describe that most numerous of our English sects, those who have no creed, and make no profession, at all.

Before we quit this subject, we cannot deny ourselves the gratification of extracting a short passage, exculpatory of a body of Christians, some of whose ministers we have the pleasure to number amongst our friends and correspondents, from the censure which our author pronounces upon most other sects, for not making a proper provision for their ministers.

“The Dutch congregations are to be regarded as a general exception to these remarks. This sober, steadfast people, deriving their birth from the United Netherlands, where the wisest plan for supporting the ministry of the Gospel, which the world has ever known, had been long adopted, came to America with fixed habits concerning this subject, and have hitherto retained them. They pay the salary, which they have once engaged, so long as the minister lives, whether he be able or unable to officiate. In this honourable conduct, it is believed, they stand alone, and exhibit an example worthy of being followed by those of every other religious denomination.” [vol. iii. p. 261.]

No state of the Union has discovered a more munificent spirit in the promotion of learning, than that of New-York,

in which a corporation has long existed under the title of "The Regents of the University of New-York," invested with full power to establish colleges and academies in every part of the state, in which they may think them necessary. It is also charged with the general superintendence of literature, and annually reports the condition of its seminaries to the legislature of the state, which has provided with a liberal hand for the three colleges and fifty academies already established, besides furnishing very large funds for the support of the common schools.

Murder and treason are the only two crimes now capital here; felonies of all other descriptions being punished by confinement in the State Prison for life; and most other subordinate offences, by a similar confinement there for shorter periods.

In morals, it seems not, however, to be so exemplary as New-England; for at Weymouth, Dr. Dwight was surprised to find a considerable number of men and women of the neighbourhood assembled round a table in the inn at which he stopped, playing at cards, a thing he had never seen at any of the numerous inns at which he had sojourned, in journeyings of at least fifteen thousand miles—a fact which we notice to the credit of the New-Englanders.

Near Stockbridge, he visited a village of Shakers, or Shaking Quakers, to whose enthusiastic vagaries he devotes twenty pages of his work, where those who are curious in tracing the singular aberrations of the human mind, alike from sound reason and the plainest truths of the gospel, will find much that may at once both please and instruct them. Our limits compel us to be very brief in our notice of this singular combination of blasphemy and enthusiasm, which has happily confined itself, and will, we hope, ever be confined, to the new world. The sect derives its name, in which, unlike the epithets given to most sectarian distinctions, they glory, from one of the leading tenets of its members, that "the work which God promised to accomplish in the latter day, was universally marked out by the prophets to be a work of shaking;" in support of which opinion they quote Haggai ii. 7. "I will shake all nations," "and the desire of all nations shall come," and in fact every text, indiscriminately, that happens to contain the word *shaken*, or any of its derivatives. Their great head was, and though she has long since been dead, still is, with them, Anne Lee, the daughter and wife of a blacksmith, at Manchester; who, after having been imprisoned and confined in

a mad-house in this country, passed over to America in 1774, and became the Johanna Southcott of another hemisphere. She declared, and, what is more extraordinary, hundreds believed, and still believe, her blasphemous declaration, that she was the Word spoken of in scripture,—that in her Christ appeared a second time,—that there are two persons in the Godhead; the Father and Wisdom, or the Holy Ghost, who is a woman, and held the place of the mother of whom Christ was born the Son of the Deity; as was also Anne Lee, the blacksmith's wife, and the mother of four children, the daughter, by whom the Holy Ghost or mother is revealed, as the Son is by the Father. But why pollute our pages with such blasphemous absurdities? Suffice it to say, that after having pretended to miraculous gifts, and proved her title to them, by predicting the destruction of the world at a period long since gone by, and with a claim to perfection which her followers devoutly believe in having repeatedly got drunk with spirituous liquors, which she called one of God's good creatures, this woman, notwithstanding the confident expectations of her disciples that she was immortal, went the way of all flesh in the year 1781, leaving her gifts to her successors, who still lay claim to perfection, the miraculous power of healing and speaking in unknown tongues. Some of their tenets and practices closely resemble the very worst features and dogmas of popery; such, for instance, as the infallibility of their leader—the denial of all right of private judgment—the lawfulness of doing that which is wrong, to promote the good of the church—the eternal damnation of all without their pale—confession of sins to the elders, (to whom they assert, that angels and departed spirits also make confession of their transgressions,) and penance in inflicting flagellations on their disciples, and even making them scourge themselves. In others, they resemble the New Jerusalem church, such as hearing angels and departed spirits sing, and enjoying visions of the invisible world. In some points of discipline, and a few of doctrine also, the Quakers have evidently been their model, though they have pushed the constant influence of the Spirit, even in the minutest concerns of life, to a point of absurdity to which the wildest fanatic in the early history of the society of Friends never approached; as witness the following ludicrous tale, which we should not have ventured to extract from the pages of a writer whose veracity was not so unquestionable as that of Dr. Dwight.

“Among their other early peculiarities, this was one, that they

were always under the immediate and inspiring guidance of the Spirit of God. The direction of this divine agent was made known to them by an involuntary extension of the right arm, pointing always towards some object, or business, which, though absolutely unknown to themselves, demanded, with a call from Heaven, their immediate attention. A man of my acquaintance, whose mind had always been wandering, who had gone from sect to sect, to find one sufficiently religious, and from doctrine to doctrine, to find a scheme sufficiently rigid for his own taste, ultimately attached himself to this fraternity. A gentleman, at whose house he was with some other company, asked him to drink some punch. He declined the proposal, and said, that the Spirit did not move him to drink punch, but to something else. In an instant his right arm was stretched out, and he arose and followed the direction. It led him out of the door, in a straight line, to a hog-trough, by the side of which he dropped upon his knees, and made a hearty draught of the swill, with a number of pigs, who were regaling themselves on the same beverage." [vol. iii. pp. 144, 145.]

They have, however, more successfully copied the neat and industrious habits of so highly respectable, if somewhat enthusiastical body of Christians, as are the society of Friends, maintaining themselves in a common fund by constant labour, highly creditable to their own characters, and advantageous to the whole community. Amongst themselves, they live in great harmony, and their treatment of others is fair, sincere, and obliging. If, on the one hand, they are so fanatical as to term a succession of unmeaning, half-articulated sounds gotten by heart, and jigged out to the tune of Nancy Dawson, singing by inspiration in an unknown tongue; it is but candid to state, on the other, that they hold more soberly, that a dirty, slovenly, careless, indolent person cannot be religious, and every member of their society is accordingly required to be continually employed in moderate labour. They have several establishments in New-England, Ohio, and other parts of the Union.

In this respect, at least, their practice seems to be far better than that of their neighbours, who between their settlement and Utica, a distance of more than one hundred miles, were generally in a low condition, both as to morals and religion; fathers and sons being not infrequently seen at the same gaming table, swearing at, and endeavouring to win money from each other, and dealing out by wholesale mutual recriminations for cheating and lying, whilst remaining at the ale-house to a late hour of the night, in a state of beastly intoxication. In close connexion with this spirit of low gambling, a taste for horse-racing very generally

pervaded this district, and, as usual, calls for a severe vituperation from the highly moral and religious tourist, whose indignant censures of a diversion pre-eminently English, we shall extract, for the edification of lovers of the turf at home.

“Among the causes which here assemble multitudes with high pulsations of hope and pleasure, a horse-race is one of the most memorable. This diversion, when least exceptionable, is a deplorable exhibition of human debasement. The gentleman here dwindles at once into a jockey; imbibes his spirit; assumes his station; and, what is worse, sinks to the level of his morality. The plain man, at the same, becomes a mere brute; swears, curses, cheats, lies, and gets drunk; extinguishing at once virtue, reason, and character. Horse-racing is the box of Pandora, from which more and greater mischiefs flow than any man ever counted or measured.” [vol. iii. pp. 161—162.]

At Brothertown, Dr. Dwight visited an Indian settlement of forty families, in a considerable degree of comfort and civilization, and following the peaceful pursuits of agriculture. This interesting village, formed a part of the township of Paris, whence a few hours' ride across and by the banks of the Mohawk, brought them to Rome, a very humble rival of the eternal city, containing twenty houses at the most.

In his visit to Long Island, which contains three of the southern counties of this state, our observant traveller had occasion to remark the ravages of the Hessian-fly, which by regularly depositing its eggs in the autumn, just above the first joint of the wheat, in the spring above the second, and in summer above the third, deprives the ear of its nutriment to such an alarming extent, as well nigh to have compelled the discontinuance of its cultivation in Connecticut, and materially to have diminished its produce in other parts of New-England and New-York, to the amount of a hundred thousand dollars a year.

The religious and moral condition of the inhabitants of this island is very different to that of most other districts of the important state of which it forms a part. This the Dr. attributes to its insular situation—a strong attachment to horse-racing—the attractive influence of the city of New-York, separated from it but by a narrow strait, on persons of intelligence and property—and, though last, not least, the splitting up, as he has it, of the people into sects, leaving the congregations small, and their ministers but ill-supported. *Et hinc illæ dolores.*

“In various parts of these two counties the sabbath is considered by many of the inhabitants as scarcely sustaining a sacred character. It is devoted extensively to visiting, to amusement, and, during the seasons of mowing and harvest, not unfrequently to labour. In some places there are, for long periods, no ministers; in others the people are the prey of ignorant teachers, recommended by nothing but ardour and vociferation. [vol. iii. p. 318.]

In traversing Lake George, Dr. Dwight had an opportunity of witnessing a mode of stag-hunting, as new to us as it was to him,

“The huntsmen with their hounds,” he tells us, “rouse them from their retreats in the forest: when they immediately betake themselves to the water, and swim towards the opposite shore. Other huntsmen, engaged in the business, place themselves on the points, to watch their entrance into the lake. Each of these is provided with a small, light batteau, which he is able to row faster than the deer can swim. When he has overtaken the deer, he despatches him with a stroke or two of his oar, and then tows him back to the beach.” [vol. iii. p. 326.]

Bears are caught here in the same manner, except that, being too dangerous to approach, they are shot.

To the description of New-York, the capital of this state, two letters are devoted, in which the reader will find the most minute statistical particulars of its condition, at the period of its being visited by Dr. Dwight, although our exhausted limits will allow of our noticing but few. One of its most attractive objects to the curious visitor, is the State Prison; but we have given so much more recent an account of its condition in our pages, that we rather notice here, a singular provision or two of the city Bridewell, in the abolition of whipping offenders there, from its being found revolting to the feelings of the community—the punishment of idleness in the task-work which they are compelled to perform, by lessening their allowance of food; their employment in repairing the public roads; and the entrance even into this place of punishment and disgrace of American pride of colour, in not permitting a white rogue and vagabond, liable, at the pleasure of the municipality, to be chained to a barrow, as he wheels it along the public streets, to be subjected to the greater degradation of being locked up in the same prison-room, or associated in work, or otherwise, with his fellow thief and vagabond the black. In the city alms (or, as in England we should call it, poor) house, it appears, that paupers are actually set to work, instead of living in a state of idleness and inaction, as they do with us;

in direct contradiction at once to the letter and the spirit of the statute which humanity provided for their relief.

The benevolent societies of this capital are very numerous, and many of them (especially those under the direction of the ladies,) are productive of great benefit to the objects of their bounty. We regret, however, to find, that amongst the other sex, societies professedly established for charitable purposes are made most convenient and effectual political engines in influencing elections.

The inhabitants of New-York are remarkable for their industry, but not so for economy, the magnificent and expensive style of living, which has of late years been so extensively introduced into most of our large commercial towns, (where they are also sea ports, especially,) having induced many of them to live far above their means; though Dr. Dwight gives to its merchants, a character for fair and honourable trading, which we have every reason to believe to be their due. They are distinguished for hospitality, and, generally speaking, by a virtue not always its associate, sobriety. The clergy of all denominations are here highly esteemed, and treated with very great respect, as we should expect would be the case in a metropolis, a very large proportion of whose inhabitants are on the best grounds believed to be religious; and where we are rejoiced to hear and know, that evangelical religion and vital godliness are making rapid progress. The vanities and amusements of this world are nevertheless pursued here, at least with as much avidity as in most other large towns; theatrical entertainments, assemblies, balls, concerts, and other modes of killing time, being more favourite objects of attachment and pursuit, than consists either with the profession of religion, or the possession, with a due attention to its dictates, of common sense.

"The general attachment to learning" is said, by Dr. Dwight, "to be less vigorous in this city than in Boston: commerce having originally taken a more entire possession of the minds of its inhabitants." He admits, however, that the character of those inhabitants has for some time past been materially and advantageously changing in this respect; and, as far as we can judge by a very extensive correspondence with both cities, the love and the cultivation of literature is now pretty equally diffused through the capitals of Massachusetts and of New-York.

Columbia college, established in this city, is attended by very many of the children of the more opulent inhabitants,

but it has the disadvantages of having no other tutors than the professors, and of leaving the students to lodge where they can in the city; a practice subversive of academical discipline, though one, we are fully aware, shared in common with our Scotch Universities, and from which Cambridge itself is not entirely free. With all the facilities for instruction so abundantly furnished here, many persons can yet neither read nor write, though, to their shame be it added, most of them are Europeans. It can scarcely be necessary to remind our readers, ere we quit New-York, of the celebrity of its steam-boats, which afford a ready and very convenient mode of conveyance thence to the most distant parts of the United States, and to Europe. With the spirit of improvement and of enterprise, which has prompted them thus extensively to avail themselves of this important invention, we are surprised to find that the inhabitants of this great city are still miserably supplied with water, one of the first objects, we should have thought, to which patriotic speculation would have been directed.

In journeying through this state to the majestic falls of Niagara, Dr. Dwight experienced some of those inconveniences of meeting with inns but in names and signs, to which travellers through the less frequented parts of our own country, are (as we have often painfully experienced) somewhat more than occasionally exposed; and the contrast which they exhibited to the inns of his native state, seems, as we should guess from the following vituperative philippic, rather to have disturbed the wonted equanimity of his temper.

“About four miles from the ferry, we came to an inn, kept by a Scotchman, named Hanna. Within this distance we called at several others; none of which could furnish us a dinner. I call them inns, because this name is given to them by the laws of the state; and because each of them hung out a sign, challenging this title. But the law has nicknamed them, and the signs are liars. It is said, and I suppose truly, that in this state any man, who will pay for an innkeeper’s license, obtains one of course. In consequence of this practice, the number of houses, which bear the appellation, is already enormous. Too many of them are mere dram-shops; of no other use than to deceive, disappoint, and vex travellers, and to spread little circles of drunkenness throughout the state. The government probably derives from them a small pecuniary benefit; but the purpose, for which the license is given, is frustrated. No inquiries, if I am correctly informed, are made concerning the character of those, to whom they are distributed.

Not a question is asked, whether they are able or unable to entertain travellers; whether they are men of fair reputation, or of none. No system is formed, no restrictions are prescribed. The object is left to chance, and the licenses are offered for sale, as goods, wares, and merchandise. The effects of this negligence in the government of the state are deplorable. A traveller, after passing from inn to inn in a tedious succession, finds that he can get nothing for his horse, and nothing for himself. At the same time he is molested, by night and by day, by a collection of dram-drinkers, who offend his eye by their drunkenness, and his ear with their profaneness and obscenity; while they prevent or disturb his sleep, by the noise and riot of their intoxication. In many parts of this state, whether the object of the traveller be food or lodging, he must diligently inquire, at a sufficient previous distance, for a comfortable place of entertainment; and must shorten or lengthen his journey, so as to suit these indispensable purposes." [vol. iv. p. 15.]

These, however, are some of the ordinary nuisances of travellers in every country, even in our own, where travelling is confessedly more convenient than in any other in the world: pass we therefore, to some not quite so common, in the treating of wolves around the path of our tourist's party, as they journeyed through the western regions of this state, where these animals often do much mischief to the flocks of sheep and other smaller cattle, and are sometimes so bold as to attack men at day-light; whilst at night, companies of them frequently compel individuals travelling alone, to betake themselves to trees for safety, and have confined them to their unpleasant lodging until the morning dawned. From such an attack by day, and such a lodging for the night, the present party was sufficiently secured by its numbers, and reached in safety the falls of Niagará, which have been too frequently described, to permit of our taking any further notice of them in this extended article, (with the main objects of which they are also utterly unconnected,) than earnestly to recommend to our readers, the very minute, yet spirited sketch of them, drawn by Dr. Dwight, on whose well-stored mind, their sublimity produced an effect similar to the disturbance of the mighty waters beneath, and the lonely grandeur of every thing around him.

The western states of New-York, through which the travellers retraced their homeward steps, exhibit frequent instances of the singular disease so common in some of the mountainous districts of Switzerland, and there called goitres; and we learn, from information collected by Dr. Dwight, that the same extraordinary and most unsightly

swelling of the neck, as extensively pervades great part of the regions lying north of the Ohio, and west of the Alleghany mountains. Women are here more severely afflicted with this disease than men, feeble than vigorous persons, children than adults; nor though in its later stages it increases to great personal deformity, not only as an unnatural protuberance, but by imparting a disagreeable cast or distortion to the features of the face, does any method of cure appear to have been discovered, save in the removal of the patient to a part of the country where the disease is unknown, when it not uncommonly decreases, and sometimes totally disappears. This circumstance shews, that, as in Switzerland, the disorder depends upon something peculiar in the soil; and the fact, that every district of America, wherein this singular affection prevails, is calcareous, tends very strongly to confirm the ingenious suggestion of Mr. Coxe, that the disorder is caused in Switzerland by matter of that description there called tuff.

We are fully conscious of having far exceeded the limits of a review in this present article, and therefore bring it to a close, by briefly stating our reasons for this departure from our usual course. Anxious to give our readers a correct notion of the state of things in America, we have extracted from a work of upwards of two thousand very closely printed pages, the most interesting particulars of a native American's account of New-England and New-York, as important as any of the states of the Union; and the singular character and arrangement of that work has compelled us to do this at unwonted length, or to leave our object incomplete and unattained. The travels of Dr. Dwight contain a great mass of valuable information, and many very eloquent and entertaining passages; but it is withal so unusually heavy a composition; so full of minute and tedious details of insignificant circumstances, that we fear few persons, unassured of their sterling merit, will have resolution to encounter the fatigue of wading through an accurate enumeration of the various traders in lumber, butchers, schools, inns, tallow chandlers, Windsor-chair makers, tailors, barbers, clergymen, lawyers, physicians, and surgeons—or, of the number of horses, oxen, and cows, within the limits of a particular township. Nor will their tedium be very sensibly relieved by long biographical notices of men, whose lives furnish not incidents, and whose names are not important enough, for an obituary in a magazine.

With some of these notices of men who took an active part in the American Revolution, or who are otherwise familiar to English ears, they will, however, we doubt not, be as pleased as we have been, especially with those of the Edwards, Bedell, Colonel Allen, Generals Arnold, Lyman, Putnam, and Sir William Johnstone; nor will their author's very detailed, if somewhat national account of the principal battles and leading incidents of the Revolution, and the preceding wars with the French, be less amusing and instructive. Most Englishmen will also be delighted with the antigalican and antijacobin spirit pervading a work, which, as the production of a zealous American, they would have expected to exhibit other, and very opposite prejudices. It also abounds with sketches of the history, character, manners, and habits of the Indian aborigines of the country, as interesting as in most instances they are novel to English readers.

Of the Americanisms, and other defects of its style, let the following instances suffice:—"sinuous ingenuity of the French," "with water round the year," instead of the year round; "semi-annual," "semi-capital," "lives at a provident distance within his income," "continually receiving benefits for the efficacy of a moderate sum," "governmental measures," "rectilinear integrity," "the prisoners are confined to hard labour, the avails of which go to their support," "we arrived at sun-down," "unwarping public spirit," "the Indians killed and captivated," (meaning, captured, "a half-shire town," "often they will not come together at all," "and wears the aspect of thrift," "attest to the justice of these observations," "views and intentions wholly diverse from," "a new bridge crosses the Connecticut against the city," "well-appearing houses," "the swamps they could not causey," "the property designated in this bequest was loaned on interest," "with a snail-like progress, therefore we trembled through this part of our way," "any legal meeting warned for that purpose," "a good degree of propriety," "a good share of information," &c. "a counting-room," "a well-appearing man," "aside from the change of hue," "sparsely formed," "the usual powers attached to the gubernatorial chair," "the waters of Lake George are fine and potable," "206 killed outright," "the school-law heretofore recited," "scarcely at all inhabited," "a few other diseases are rife in this country," "its site is a handsome plain, limited westward by hills," "of this township we saw nothing but a skirt."

To these, we may add the following entire sentences, or material parts of them:—"Sand appears, I think, evidently to be a congeries of multifarious materials;" "in sufficient season for divine service;" "nor did I ever before mistrust how much a human being can resemble a monkey;" "our travellers pursued their stag with entire decency;" "our companions were even uncensurable for their wishes;" "the water is of an elegant hue, and appearing as if a soft lustre undulated every where on its surface, with a continual and brilliant emanation;" "the beauties of the shore and of the islands are at least double, by being arranged in the fine expanse, below which they are seen in perpetual succession, depending, with additional exquisiteness of form, and firmness of colouring;" "those who can get along with some aid, short of an entire subsistence, are left at home, and called out-door poor."

Of Mr. Faux's book, we can only say at present, that it is well worthy the attention of Englishmen proposing to emigrate to America, though we intend to resume our notice of it on a future occasion, in connexion with some American and English works, enabling us to give as complete a view of the other states of the American Union, as we have now done of its eastern ones, and the most important of its middle division.

The length to which this has unexpectedly extended, will, we are assured, excuse our substituting this review, for our usual American intelligence; or rather, for not adding, under that head, to the information collected here.

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1. *A New Method of acquiring the Reading of Hebrew with the Vowel Points, according to the ancient Practice.* By an Experienced Teacher. On a Folio Sheet. London, 1822. Ogle and Duncan.
 2. *An Easy Method of acquiring the Reading of Syriac with the Vowel Points.* By an Experienced Teacher of Oriental Languages. On a Folio Sheet. London, 1822. Ogle and Duncan.
 3. *An Easy Method of acquiring the Reading of Arabic with the Vowel Points.* By an Experienced Teacher of Oriental Languages. On a Folio Sheet. London, 1823. Ogle and Duncan.

We consider these modest and unassuming tables admirably calculated to answer the purpose for which they seem mainly to have been constructed the assistance of

schools and private families, in the instruction of youth of both sexes, (for we rejoice to know, that the study of the Hebrew language at least is occupying some portion of that time which, in female tuition, was formerly wasted on mere accomplishments, and even on more frivolous pursuits,) in the acquisition of the three most important of the Oriental languages, with the vowel points; a mode of reading them, the knowledge of which, to say the least of it, can do no harm. These tables are divided into three lessons, the second in each case containing the vowel points of the language, (in the Syriac, both the ancient and modern ones,) with the rules for their pronunciation, well illustrated in the third, by their annexation to every letter of the alphabet, the pronunciation of which is given in small Roman letters under it. The Hebrew table contains for its first lesson, the different alphabets in use among the Jews, *i. e.* besides the one commonly adopted, the Rabinical character, so called from its use by the Rabins, both in printing and in manuscript, though the latter is now chiefly confined to the Portuguese and Eastern Jews; and the German Hebrew, employed by the German and Polish Jews in works printed in their vernacular tongues. The other two contain for their first lessons, the forms final, (separate and joint) medial, and initial, of each letter, with its sound and pronunciation, in Roman letters, which are also given in the two last columns of the first Hebrew lesson.

From this brief account of their contents, and we cannot from their very nature give more, the self-instructing student in these Oriental Languages, and even those who have made considerable advances in their acquisition, will be enabled to determine, whether the small sum of four shillings and sixpence, (for they are published at so low a price as eighteen pence each,) would be thrown away in giving them a place upon the walls of their study. We think not; but on the contrary, very cordially commend them to the notice of every one engaged in the acquisition of the Hebrew, Syriac, and Arabic languages.

From the imprint, we conclude that their author is Mr. Borrentslein, most probably a German teacher of languages, in the metropolis; and though we never heard of his name before, we are so pleased with the design and execution of these cheap and very useful tables, as to receive, with peculiar satisfaction, the announcement of a concise Grammar of the three tongues to which those tables relate, divided into easy lessons, as a work which he is now preparing for

the press. Several oriental grammars have, we are aware, been published within a few years, some of them books of great merit; but they are so critical, abstruse, dissertational, and withal so expensive, that for the work of tuition, we cannot but consider a cheap and practical grammar of the Hebrew, Syriac, and Arabic, by a practical man, a desideratum.

POETRY.

AFFLICTION.

“WHOM HE LOVETH, HE CHASTISETH!”

Ah, why, when I feel the soft hand of my God,
 Should I murmur because of the pain?
 Oh, no!—let me cheerfully bow to the rod,
 As I kiss it again and again.
 The hand of a Father, in *mercy* is laid,
 On the son whom he loves, to chastise;
 And though I go down the dark valley to tread,
 I've a rod, and a staff, and a prize.

That prize is not gold, nor is it diamonds rare,
 Nor riches, nor honour, nor fame;
 Nor garments made costly by silver so fair,
 The Mammon of earthly acclaim!
 'Tis a crown, starr'd with wonders of richer array
 Than all this vain world can afford;
 More bright than the orient splendours of day,
 And sure as the oath of his word.

His bow in the cloud is his promise to man,
 I have seen it stretch'd over the sky,
 And gaz'd with ecstatic delight on the span,
 As the brilliant arch mounted on high.
 Its colours have faded, but not in my mind
 Has so faded the promise of rest;
 For traces are left on my bosom behind,
 Of the way to the land of the blest.

The cross on the mountain,—when darkness was nigh,
 And JEHOVAH groan'd under the load;
 When endless compassion gave JESUS to die,
 And Heaven spread weeping abroad!—

When blood was the sacrifice,—CHRIST was the Lamb,
And all nature beheld him expire,
An atonement for sin,—by the promise he came,
As “with burning and fuel of fire.”

And will not my God, with his Son, freely give,
Whatsoever is needful for me;
When he bids me drink deep at the fountain, and live,
Of his grace, and for ever be free?
Peace, peace, doubting heart, and no longer complain,
Thy Father is loving and kind;
He bids thee look up, and give sorrow and pain,
And thy sighs, to the wings of the wind.

Then, on thy dear bosom, my Lord, I'll recline,
Till doubt shall distress me no more;
Already, by faith, the great promise is mine,
And I long to behold and adore.
There, there I shall dwell in ineffable light,
And range the wide palace abroad;
And ever be thine, and be blest with the sight,
And the smiles, and the glory of God.

Histon.

R. M.

EARTHLY AND HEAVENLY HOPES.

Soft was the slumb'ring dream, a gaudy train
Of exhalations, from a youthful brain,
Pass'd closely round my couch, and Hebé wove
Her roseate garland,—Genius stood with Fame
Painting a thousand rainbows,—that my name
Would travel through the world, and hallow'd love,
With silken toils and lambent wings, would move
Elysian hopes. When, lo! they cruel fled
Quick as the vanish'd spirits of the dead.

I woke in tears,—I saw a heavenly ray,
Not bright, but pure; the dawning of a day
Free from illusion, and a gentle voice,—
O! 'twas the sweetest music—whisper'd peace,
And on my ravish'd senses still increas'd,
And bade me look for everlasting joys,
And antedate a bliss that never cloy.
I gaze, and am not mock'd,—a light is given,
A stream of glory from the throne of Heaven.

J.K.F.

THE ADVICE OF NUSHIREWAN TO HIS SON HORMUZ, JUST BEFORE HIS DEATH.

From the Bostan, or Garden of the Persian Poet SADI.

Hear, thou, my Son, the orphan's cries,
And wipe the widow's tearful eyes;
Nor think the monarch can be blest,
Who lolls him on the couch of rest;
For, if the careless shepherd sleep,
When wolves are near,—who guards the sheep?
Protect the people,—they alone
Secure thine empire, and thy throne;
Thou art the tree, and they the roots,
From which thy branch of grandeur shoots.

β.

THE SUSCEPTIBLE MIND.

From "Moral Pieces, in Prose and Verse, by LYDIA HUNTLEY," of Hartford, Connecticut.

Hast thou seen the Mimosa, within its soft cell,
All shrinking and suffering stand,
And draw in its tendrils, and fold its young leaves,
From the touch of the tenderest hand?

Hast thou seen the young Aspen that trembles and sigh
On the breath of the lingering wind?
Oh! these are but emblems, imperfect and faint,
Of the shrinking and sensitive mind.

LIFE.

From the same.

Life is like a painted dream,
Like the rapid summer stream,
Like the flashing meteor's ray,
Like the shortest winter's day,
Like the fitful breeze that sighs,
Like the wavering flame that dies,
Darting—dazzling on the eye,
Fading in Eternity.

The Investigator.

APRIL, 1824.

*"On the Standard of Taste." An Essay intended to compete for a Prize, given by the University of Glasgow. By the late WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT.—PART I.**

"It is with good reason, says Sancho to the Squire with the great nose, that I pretend to have a judgment in wine: this is a quality hereditary in our family. Two of my kinsmen were once called to give their opinion of a hogshead, which was supposed to be excellent, being old, and of a good vintage. One of them tastes it; considers it; and, after mature reflection, pronounces the wine to be good, were it not for a small taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precaution, gives his verdict in favour of the wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how much they were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laughed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an old key with a leather thong tied to it!"

WHAT is the Standard of Taste? Is it to be ascertained by attending to that constitution, in consequence of which the "common nature" appears at once "invariable" and "perfect?"† Or, if "some particular forms or qualities from the original structure of the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to displease;" and, "if in the sound state of the organ there be an entire or considerable uniformity of sentiment among men"‡—in what way can we so accurately determine the original constitution of the human mind, as to be justified, in considering decidedly erroneous every thing that deviates from one standard? Can we, from what we know of the human mind, safely deduce the prin-

* Our limits compel us to make a division which does not exist in the original Essay. Of that Essay, the father of its lamented author, gives the following account in his most interesting memoir of his singularly gifted son:—"Though the Essay could not be presented for competition, both Dr. Wardlaw and I thought it not undesirable, that a few of the professors, who knew and respected my son, should see it. In a letter, dated March 2, Dr. Wardlaw says, 'I have this morning sent the exercise on Taste to Mr. Mylne, accompanied with an explanatory letter. It is one, I think, which will more than maintain (dear lamented youth!) the high reputation he had acquired. Alas! that that reputation should now attach to the memory only, instead of attending, as we fondly but vainly hoped, the living author, through an active, and brilliant, and (what is best of all) useful career! The perusal of it has only served to awaken all my bitter, and, I had almost said, and I fear I might say, with too much truth, *infidel* regrets. But, oh! if all were as clear to us, as it is to the Supreme Disposer himself, where would be the trial of faith? where the room for the exercise of trust? 'Be still, and know that I am God.'"

† Elements of Criticism, esp. 26.

‡ Hume's Essays and Treatises part.i. essay 23.

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ciples of criticism? Is it strictly true, that “none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings *a priori*?”* Is “Taste a sort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles more or less with the feelings of sentiment?”† Or, ought a line of distinction to be drawn between “Taste and the natural sensibility to beauty?”‡ so that the presence of the latter “does not necessarily imply” the existence of the former? Such are a few of the questions, to which our attention is demanded.

To avoid the perplexity which metaphysicians have introduced into this subject, I shall take the liberty of stating what I conceive to be the real object of our present inquiry. Thus throwing out the extraneous matter which disputants have so copiously introduced,—our labour will be considerably diminished. How can we, in any instance, ascertain the correctness of taste? Here the subject naturally divides itself into two branches; to each of which it will be necessary to devote a share of attention. Our first inquiry, then, shall be, In what sense can Taste be denominated *correct*? Our second, By *what common standard* is its correctness, in any particular instance, to be estimated?

FIRST.—*In what sense can Taste be denominated CORRECT.*

Dependent as Mind is, for her first ideas, on those material organs which are, from their nature, solely conversant with the phenomena of the material world, all our notions on the subjects of mental science have necessarily a very strong affinity to those trains of thought by which the attention is more usually occupied. Few things, however, have proved more injurious to the interests of knowledge, than has analogical reasoning from the movements of matter, to the operations of the thinking principle. Any attempt to elucidate the latter by a reference to the former, is apt, unless managed with extreme caution, to degenerate into a mere series of affected and unmeaning conceits. Never, I think, has the truth of this position been more fully displayed than by the writers who have discussed the question we are about to consider. These reasoners, not content with establishing a metaphysical doctrine on nothing better than the ambiguous meaning attached to a single word—determined to push to its utmost extreme the fancied analogy between the external senses and the internal. Finding themselves pressed by unconquerable difficulties, they have

* Hume, *ibidem*. † Blair's Rhetoric, lecture ii.

‡ Stewart's Phil. Essays, Essay iii. on Taste, chap. 3.

recourse to reasonings as inconclusive as they are unnecessary; and, at last, are satisfied with evasion instead of reply. The analogy between the sensations of the palate, and the emotions of beauty—incomplete as it is—might, had it been steadily prosecuted, have conducted them to a correct result. But when met by objections, they attempt to account, on principles already admitted, for facts apparently irreconcilable; and never seem to have examined the foundation of their system, or to have suspected any defect in the premises, of which their whole argument presupposed the correctness. I ought, perhaps, to apologize for speaking so strongly with reference to men of such undoubted superiority, as were some of those to whose sentiments I have alluded. If, therefore, I am occasionally compelled to express my decided convictions on so delicate a subject, let it be understood that my reflections are intended to apply, not to individuals, but to opinions.

No maxim seems to have been at once more offensive, and more perplexing, than the proverb, that “there is no disputing about tastes.” The analogy, which some writers have been at such pains to verify, seems here completely to fail. It may, however, throw no little light on the subject, if, without entirely deserting an illustration which is by no means inappropriate, we spend some time on the previous consideration of this particular proposition. In the first place, then, neither an emotion nor a sensation can be, in strict philosophical accuracy, denominated correct, or incorrect. “If any one,” (I quote from Dr. Blair) “should assert that sugar was bitter, and tobacco was sweet, no reasoning could avail to prove it.”* Nor, I would add, to disprove it; if the assertion mean no more than that the substances referred to, produce, in the particular instance of the individual who makes that assertion, the effects here ascribed to them. If he be, however, paradoxical enough to assure us that the taste of others resembles his own; in what way do we answer him? Not by appealing to some common standard, of which he is so constituted as immediately to recognize the authority; but by referring him to facts. The question, we should say, is one that must be decided by experience; and, to reason about it, is foolish and unnecessary, because the testimony of all mankind is against you.

With the emotions of Taste, the cause is exactly similar. Were any man to tell me that a Chinese temple, with its

* Blair's Lectures on Rhet. &c. lec. ii.

frippery ornaments, appears to him more beautiful than the simple and majestic elegance of the Parthenon; I would not attempt to disprove the asserted fact. The fact is, with him, a matter of consciousness; and, feeling as he does,—he can no more doubt that the Chinese temple is, as far as his sentiments are concerned, the more beautiful building of the two; than, in the case above mentioned, he could question the sweetness of tobacco, or the bitterness of sugar.—If he were, however, to go any farther, and to assert, that the object of his admiration excited the same emotions in the breasts of others, I should again say, that this is a question of individual consciousness; and that his statement is opposed to the almost universal experience of mankind.

How then does it happen, it will be asked, that, in cases so strictly analogous, such different modes of treatment are adopted? No argument will alter the taste of my friend, in the one case; and, however convinced he may be, that the peculiarity of his sensations arises from some malformation of the organ, those sensations remain unaltered. In the other case, however, argument or thought may, and probably will, be effectual in removing the first impression, and in producing a relish for purer and simpler beauties: so far from despairing of my object, I exert myself with the hope of effecting it. I endeavour to shew him, that his present sentiments are inconsistent with his feelings under analogous circumstances; and deduce the conclusion, that his mistake arises from some unmarked association that has influenced his decision. I point out the proofs of wisdom which he may previously have overlooked. I shew him the intended expression, to which his habits of thought may have rendered him hitherto insensible. I trace, in every portion of the edifice, the marks of superior intelligence; and display, in the united whole, harmony of parts, and uniformity of design. If I am able to convince his understanding, a new emotion succeeds to that which he before cherished; his bosom swells with sentiments of admiration; and his feelings undergo a change corresponding to that which has taken place in his intellectual habits.

The reason of this is sufficiently obvious: impressions on the external organ are uniformly succeeded by sensation. Emotion, on the contrary, is never excited without a previous intellectual operation. The same impression on the material organ, uniformly produces the same sensation; and the same judgment, or conception of the mind, is as

uniformly followed by the same emotion. While, however, the same material substance, in contact with the organ, generally produces the same effect on that organ; and while the same material effect is always followed by the same sensation; sensations themselves are not connected by so close a tie with the conceptions to which they give rise; nor, of consequence, with the emotions by which these conceptions are succeeded. By producing a change, therefore, in the judgments which we form with regard to the objects of any of our senses, we produce a correspondent change in the emotions to which the perception or the recollection of these objects gives rise. An alteration in the intellectual process affects the subsequent emotion as entirely as the substitution of one body for another would affect the movements of the nervous system, and the sensation consequent. I should scarcely have deemed it worth my while to expend so much time on the establishment of a proposition apparently so obvious, did it not appear that inattention has often betrayed the best writers into a strange confusion of ideas, or, at least, into remarkable ambiguity of expression.

Lord Kaimes, in his *Elements of Criticism*, commences an essay on the standard of Taste, with the following remarks: "That there is no disputing about tastes—meaning taste in its figurative as well as proper sense—is a saying so generally received, as to have become a proverb. One thing, even at first view, is evident, that if the proverb hold true with respect to Taste in its proper meaning, it must hold true with respect to our other external senses: if the pleasures of the palate disdain a comparative trial, and reject all criticism, the pleasures of touch, of smell, of sound, and even of sight, must be equally privileged. At that rate, a man is not within the reach of censure, even where he prefers the Saracen's head upon a sign-post, before the best tabature of Raphael; or a rude Gothic tower, before the finest Grecian building; or where he prefers the smell of a rotten carcase before that of the most odoriferous flower; or discords before the most exquisite harmony."* Now, without at present noticing the general tendency of the reasoning here introduced—what a confusion is here of things that most essentially differ—of the mere organic pleasure, and the emotions of beauty and sublimity! The author evidently gives us to understand, that we approve of an exquisite painting—are charmed with a

* *Elements of Crit.* chap. 25.

sublime and expressive piece of musical composition—prefer the architecture of a polished and intellectual people, before that of military barbarians, in the infancy of civilization—enjoy the delightful sensations communicated by a fragrant nosegay, and shrink with disgust from the stench of a rotten carcase—all on one and the same principle. For this inadvertence, I find it difficult to account, since, how close soever might be the supposed analogy between the senses and the reflex senses—between the “conviction” and admiration of what Lord Kaimes denominates “the common nature,” and that adaptation by means of which physical gratifications are, through the external organ, derived from its appropriate objects;—no man, surely, would confound the sensation with the emotion, the physical with the intellectual pleasure. The distinction between internal and external senses (how obscure soever that distinction may be) is, at least, a proof that a difference between them is acknowledged to exist. Every argument adduced recognizes the distinction by impliedly allowing that the subject is capable of elucidation. And it surely need not be repeated, that sensation is not susceptible of analysis, or of any proof, illustration, or STANDARD, beyond the feelings and testimony of the individual. It is, therefore, certainly desirable to attend to the distinction which I have just attempted to lay down; because, although every author may not have been led into errors so remarkable as those to which I have just adverted,—scarcely any have, till of very late years, expressed themselves at all unobjectionably. When Mr. Hume, who was himself adverse to the notion of any new or peculiar sense—after having come to the important, although imperfect, conclusion that “reason, if not an essential part of Taste, is at least requisite to the operations of the latter faculty”^{*}—goes on to speak of the organs of internal sensation, and of their labouring under some defect, or being “vitiating by some disorder;” can we help regretting that he is encumbered with this technical phraseology. Does not even HIS penetration appear to have suffered from the influence of this forced analogy?

In a word, nothing can be truer than an assertion of Dr. Blair’s, of which, indeed, his own subsequent reasonings afford a practical illustration—that “there are few subjects on which men talk more loosely and indistinctly than on Taste.”[†] This indistinctness is, as I have before hinted,

^{*} Hume’s *Essays and Treatises*, p. 2. Essay xxiii.

[†] Blair’s *Lectures on Rhet.* lect. ii.

attributable to the strange confusion of emotion with sensation. That this obscurity was the consequence less of inadvertence than of a mistake which lay at the root of the system, may, I think, be gathered from the style of reasoning by which these writers support the opinions of which they are the advocates. Dr. Blair has been pleased to give us, in the following passage, some insight into the meaning which he attaches to the term thus frequently employed: "Taste," says he, "may be defined the power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and of art. The first question that occurs concerning it, is, whether it is to be considered as an internal sense, or as an exertion of reason? Reason is a very general term, but if we understand by it that power of the mind, which, in speculative matters, discovers truth, and, in practical matters, judges of the fitness of means to an end, I apprehend the question may be easily answered. For nothing is more clear than that Taste is not resolvable into any such operation of reason. It is not merely through a discovery of the understanding, or a deduction of argument, that the mind receives pleasure from a beautiful prospect, or a fine poem. Such objects often strike us intuitively, and make a strong impression, when we are unable to assign the reasons of our being pleased. They sometimes strike, in the same manner, the philosopher and the peasant, the boy and the man. *Hence*, the faculty by which we relish such beauties, seems more nearly allied to a feeling of sense, than to a process of the understanding."*

Now, this argument either proves an undisputed fact, or it proves nothing whatever. If Dr. Blair merely mean, that the emotions of beauty and sublimity are essentially different from the intellectual process by which they are preceded, he is arguing for the admission of a truth, so self-evident as to be, I should conceive, wholly undeniable. If, on the other hand, he intend to assert that emotion, like sensation, immediately follows the external impression, without the intervention of any intellectual operation—his argument is not merely inconclusive, but wholly irrelevant. Nay, if his meaning be that the sensation itself, without any subsequent judgment of the mind, is followed by the emotion of beauty—his argument is equally irrelevant. The sophistry lies in the selection of terms calculated entirely to mislead the inquirer. If by "a discovery of the understanding," and "a deduction of argument," be meant those formal processes of thought, which it is sometimes necessary to con-

* Blair, *Lec. ii.*

duct, and those important conclusions to which such processes may occasionally lead,—I am ready to admit, that the emotions of Taste are rarely, if ever, consequences of these intellectual operations. If, on the other hand, we are, under the terms employed, to include those momentary judgments, every trace of which vanishes with the consciousness that accompanied their formation;—those habitual reasonings which take place with a rapidity the metaphysician alone can correctly estimate; and those trains of associated thought, which naturally present themselves in unbroken succession—I must beg leave to dissent from the opinion. True it is, that the objects of taste sometimes strike, in the same manner, the philosopher and the peasant, the boy and the man;”* but do no other objects “strike, in the same manner, the philosopher and the peasant, the boy and the man?” Is there no combination of circumstances which universally produces alarm? Would not a certain concurrence of events inspire every human breast with the animating emotions of hope, of gratitude, or of joy? And should we, therefore, be entitled to appropriate different internal senses to the emotions accompanying these different passions, and to speak of the sense of fear—the sense of joy—the grateful sense? Yet, as far as this reasoning goes, the conclusion would be as legitimate in the one case as in the other; and the analogy, on which the latter phraseology would rest, quite as little exposed to objection, as is that which has given occasion to the former.

It is, I confess, not very easy to attach to the statement before us any definite meaning. This obscurity of expression probably arises from indistinctness of thought. The author appears to entertain one, of two notions. He conceives, either that the impression on the organ is followed by the sentiments of taste, simultaneously with the sensation which that impression produces: or, (and this is, I presume, his real meaning)—that the sensation is invariably and IMMEDIATELY followed by some correspondent emotion. That certain sensations give rise to certain emotions, I am exceedingly willing to allow. I would, however, contend that it so happens, not because there is in the sensation itself any thing necessarily productive of this consequence; but because, constituted and circumstanced as we are, certain sensations suggest certain ideas, and excite, according to the fixed laws of mind, associated trains of thought. These intellectual operations are, as has been before stated, the

* See above, page 137.

immediate antecedents of emotion; and when these are excited, they naturally draw in their train those rapturous feelings which are produced by the perceptions of beauty or of sublimity. While on this part of the subject, it may not be improper to remark, that the feelings of Taste are, according to my ideas, restricted to *emotion*; that is, to those feelings or sentiments which succeed an intellectual operation. Taste is, of course, like every other word, an arbitrary sign of thought; and its meaning must, therefore, be fixed by ordinary usage. But while ordinary usage appears to sanction the restriction which has been proposed, difficulties innumerable seem to attend its removal. All our merely organic pleasures may claim a place among the gratifications of taste; and thus present a field of inquiry, including the varied phenomena of sensation, and nearly coextensive with the circle of human enjoyments. I am aware, that I have high authority against me. Speaking of the beauty of colour and form, Mr. Stewart observes, "With the greater part of Mr. Alison's remarks on these qualities, I perfectly agree; although in the case of the first, I am disposed to ascribe more to the mere organic impression, independently of any association or expression whatever, than he seems willing to allow:"* and again, "The circumstances which please, in objects of Taste, are of two very different kinds. First, those which derive their effect from the organical adaptation of the human frame to the external universe."† To differ from Mr. Stewart, is, under any circumstances, perilous; nor should I, perhaps, have ventured to make a single remark on the passages I have cited, had I not the consolation of knowing that if I err, it is after the example of Mr. Alison. Mr. Stewart has stated, not merely with his usual temperance, but even with considerable reserve, the point on which he differs from Mr. Alison.

From the terms employed in one of the passages cited above, it would appear that Mr. Alison is himself disposed to attribute something to "the mere organic impression." That much of our pleasure is ascribed by him to this cause, I am quite ready to admit: the real question, however, is simply, whether he would choose to give the denomination of beauty to any of those qualities, from which this immediate pleasure is derived. It is not always easy to select from a considerable work, any one passage sufficiently deci-

* Stewart's Phil. Essays, part ii. essay i. p. 1. chap. ii.

† Ibid. Essay iii. chap. iii.

sive to serve for the foundation of an argument like the present. Under this difficulty, however, it does appear to me, that we do not at present labour; and I will therefore take the liberty of citing Mr. Alison's own words, both because the quotation appears to me peculiarly apposite to the immediate subject of inquiry, and because it contains a luminous exposition of sentiments the most philosophical, and the most important to our subsequent reasonings. "With the emotions of Taste, in almost every instance," says this elegant and philosophical writer, "many other emotions of pleasure are united: the various simple pleasures that arise from other qualities of the object; *the pleasure of agreeable conversation*, in the case of material objects; and in all that pleasure which, by the constitution of our nature, is annexed to the exercise of our faculties. Unless, therefore, we have previously acquired a distinct and accurate conception of that peculiar effect which is produced in our minds when the emotions of Taste are felt, and can precisely distinguish it from the effects that are produced by these accidental qualities, we must necessarily include in the causes of such emotions, those qualities also which are the causes of the accidental pleasure with which this emotion is accompanied."* If the passage just quoted should leave any doubt with regard to the writer's real opinions on the subject more immediately under consideration, that doubt will be removed by what I am about to adduce. The emotion of beauty "involves, in all cases, 1st, The production of some simple emotion, or the exercise of some moral affection; and, 2dly, The consequent excitement of a peculiar exercise of the imagination:"† and a little farther on, "I shall endeavour to shew that *all* the phenomena are reducible to the same general principle, and that the qualities of matter are *not* beautiful or sublime in themselves, but as they are by various means the signs or expressions of qualities capable of producing emotion."‡

The question at issue, therefore, between these two writers, is not—in what proportion does the mere organic impression contribute to that complex feeling, which we denominate the emotion of beauty? But—Does the mere organic impression contribute any thing at all to this effect?—Having thus shielded myself under so considerable an example, I may venture humbly to state my reasons for dissenting from the opinion of Mr. Stewart.

* Alison's Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste; introduction.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

The only notion I can attach to the phrase, "mere organic impression," is, that it is intended to express the mental change which takes place, when an organ of sense has been affected by some material object. This change, whether accompanied by pleasure or by pain, cannot, it appears to me, be in any respect different from sensation. I do not suppose that Mr. Stewart himself would give any other definition of it; or that the organic gratification, which he reckons among the constituents of beauty, is intended, in his use of it, to signify any thing more than an agreeable sensation. My chief objection to the required concession, is founded on the difficulty of assigning any limit to the admissions which seem to be its natural consequences. If any class of sensations is to be considered one of the constituent elements of beauty, no good reason can be given, why every other class of sensations may not be allowed to occupy a similar rank: and if sensations be indiscriminately admitted, the pleasures of Taste must soon come to comprehend all the varieties of human enjoyment. The leading idea which this supposition is intended to confirm and illustrate, stands in no need of such corroborative evidence. This theory is, if I fully comprehend the writer's intention, of the following kind:—

"The epithet, beautiful," says Mr. Stewart, "literally denotes what is pleasing to the eye."* This last phrase is, I confess, somewhat ambiguous, since it may refer to those pleasures, which, although dependent on thought and emotion, are ultimately traceable to a sensation communicated through the organ of sight, and suggesting a long train of associated thought. It may, however, mean—and this idea it is, I believe, intended here to convey—a pleasure strictly organic—in other words, an agreeable sensation immediately arising from some material effect on the visual organs. After this word, then, had been appropriated to a particular class of what are ordinarily termed physical gratifications, its meaning was extended, in consequence of discovered resemblances, or analogies, between certain characteristics of these peculiar sensations, or of their causes, and certain qualities found to exist in other objects of our attention. The name, once having been transferred to objects possessed of these qualities—other objects were discovered, having some one property in common, not with that class to which the appellation was originally restricted, but with that second class to which it had been subse-

* Stewart's *Phil. Ess.* p. 2. *Essay i.* p. 1. c. ii.

quently applied : and hence arose another *transition*, and a further extension of meaning. Having thus traced the term in question to this simple origin, Mr. Stewart seems to have retained an affection for the “mere organic impressions;” which induces him to give them a place among the elements of beauty.

Before I conclude, it will be my duty to offer some strictures on his theory of “transitions;” or, rather, on some inferences which are drawn from it, and which are most intimately connected with our present inquiry. Just now, however, my only object will be, to shew that the conclusion, to which I have already objected, does not naturally flow from the facts which have just been noticed. Allow me to illustrate my meaning by a quotation, on which I intend to found a few observations. “I shall begin by supposing,” says Mr. Stewart, “that A, B, C, D, E, denote a series of objects—that A possesses some one quality in common with B ; B, a quality in common with C ; C, a quality in common with D ; D, a quality in common with E ; while at the same time, no quality can be found which belongs in common to any three objects in the series. Is it not conceivable that the affinity between A and B may produce a transference of the name of the first to the second ; and that, in consequence of the other affinities which may connect the remaining objects together, the same name may pass in succession from B to C, from C to D, from D to E ? In this manner a common appellation will arise between A and E, although the two objects may, in their nature and properties, be so widely distant from each other, that no stretch of imagination can conceive how the thoughts were led from the former to the latter.”* Now, then, let A stand for the primary meaning of the word under consideration, and E, or any of the intermediate letters, for that other idea to which the term beauty is transitively applied. Is it not possible that the importance of this last idea may be so great, and the necessity of discriminating between A and E be so apparent, as exclusively to appropriate to the latter, that term by which the former was originally designated ?

This subject we shall soon have an opportunity of more fully considering : but does not even this superficial view teach us, that allowing all Mr. Stewart has demanded, no proof, nor indeed any presumption, exists in favour of this extent of application ? It is admitted that the last appeal lies to ordinary usage ; and, if that be against us, that argu-

* Phil. Ess. p. 2. Essay i. p. 1. chap. i.

ment, on the one side, is superfluous and hypothetical; or *a priori* reasonings, on the other side, entirely futile. I feel convinced, however, that this usage is decidedly in our favour; and unwilling as I am to speak dogmatically, especially on any point connected with philological inquiry, I should not shrink from challenging our opponents to adduce a single instance in which the epithet "beautiful" is given to any "organic impression," except where that impression is compounded with other elements.

In this latter case, is it unnatural to conclude that the epithet is intended to designate, not the organic impression to which, in a simple state, it is never applied; but the union of those other elements, which enter into the composition of the complex feeling.

That ordinary usage is as has been stated, observation teaches us. The phrase, a beautiful sensation, would be considered a solecism—yet what but sensation is the "mere organic impression?" Those organic impressions which rarely, if ever, awaken a subsequent train of thought and emotion, are never denominated beautiful; while this designation is reserved for those sensations by which such trains are excited. The mere physical pleasure attendant on the sensations of taste, or even of smell, is, I apprehend, much more considerable than any immediate sensual gratification, which is derived from harmonious sounds, or from splendid colours: yet the term "beauty" is never correctly applied to the objects of the two former senses. These remarks on Mr. Stewart's opinions, I have hazarded with considerable diffidence. These opinions have incidentally come under our notice, in consequence of their bearings toward a distinction which lies at the root of our system. The principles they are intended to uphold, and the conclusions to the support of which they are rendered subservient, will, ere long, come again under consideration.

On the whole, then—the distinction which I have been labouring to establish, is simply of the following kind. Writers on Taste seem generally to have considered sensibility to beauty and sublimity, as a simple uncompounded act of the mind. I have, on the contrary, endeavoured to shew, that whatever beauty may be, some intellectual process must necessarily take place, before the emotions of Taste are experienced. To render this distinction the more obvious, I have endeavoured to draw a line between these emotions, and those pleasures of sensation by which they may be accidentally accompanied or preceded; and, to

accomplish my object, have endeavoured to trace the ordinary indistinctness of ideas on this subject, to what appears to have been at once a consequence and a source of confusion—I refer to the introduction of an internal, or reflex sense.

My great object in making this distinction, has been to justify the application of the epithet "*correct*," as used in connexion with the emotions of Taste. This I have attempted to effect, by considering emotions in general, and the emotions of Taste in particular, as consequences of certain intellectual states to which they owe their existence; and on which they depend for their distinctive characteristics. The epithet in question, then, is, in strictness, applicable, not to the *emotions* of beauty or of sublimity, but to those intellectual states, which are the immediate antecedents of these emotions.

As these trains of thought are, however, so rapid, as in almost every case to elude ordinary observation, and sometimes to defy metaphysical analysis; that term, which is, in philosophic strictness, applied to the process, is ultimately transferred to the result, or rather to that compound *senti-ment* of taste, in which both process and result—both thought and emotion—are included. The objections which may, perhaps, at first suggest themselves, will, I think, vanish as we proceed in the inquiry, and apply to the subject which we are to investigate the principles here laid down, as preliminary to further discussion. The great difficulty, however, still remains untouched—What is the nature of this intellectual process? Wherein consists its correctness? With what objects is it conversant? I am aware that an answer to these inquiries seems to involve a discussion of that question which we have reserved for subsequent consideration. There are, however, some points more immediately connected with this part of our subject, which require immediate attention, and which must be disposed of, before it will be possible to make any further progress. Supposing our previous reasoning to have been admitted, the most obvious reply to this list of queries will immediately present itself to every mind. Beauty and sublimity, it will be said, are the objects of this intellectual operation; and its correctness consists in forming an accurate estimate of the degree in which these qualities are found in different objects. No thinking man, however, will suffer himself to be detained for one moment on the threshold, by an answer so vague and unsatisfactory.—What is beauty? What is

sublimity? are questions naturally suggested by the very terms of the reply; and till these are set at rest, no progress whatever has been effected.

To enter fully into this subject, would not consist with the more limited plan of the present Essay; and I shall therefore restrict myself to such remarks as are absolutely necessary for the purposes of our argument. Philosophers seem at one time to have imagined, that there is some one quality in the various objects of Taste; and that of this quality, wherever it may be presented, certain *emotions* are the inseparable consequences. This theory was almost necessary to the uniformity of a system, which had provided reflex senses for almost every modification of feeling that was not directly traceable to a material cause. A variety of mistakes were the result of this radical error; and while this one quality was eagerly sought for, each theorist possessed his own secret, by means of which the great discovery was to be effected.

Led astray by the same incorrect hypothesis, some philosophers resolve the emotion, or, as it should in that case be denominated, the sensation of beauty, into relaxation of the fibres; and that of sublimity, into muscular tension or contraction. All such opinions seem to me to have arisen from a defective analysis. Writers had created certain internal principles, for which it was necessary to find a specific field of action; and phenomena were, therefore, tortured till they gave evidence in favour of the system which they were adduced to support. As particular external organs are appropriated to the perception of particular qualities of matter, so beauty and sublimity were conceived to be peculiar qualities, the appropriate objects of a certain internal sense—just as the quality of hardness is perceived by means of touch, and that of colour by means of sight alone.

Mr. Burke, who has gone well nigh to complete what his predecessors had commenced—who substitutes for the internal, the external organ—who concludes, “that beauty is, for the most part, some *merely* sensible quality, acting mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses;”^{*} yet, as if willing, as far as was consistent with his system, to adhere to the opinion of his predecessors, assures us, “that there is a chain in *all* our sensations;” that “they are but different kinds of feeling, calculated to be affected by various sorts of objects, but all to be affected

^{*} Burke's *Phil. Enquiry*, &c. part iii. sect. 12.

after the same manner.”* On this principle it is, that this distinguished writer so unwarrantably extends the application of the term *beautiful*. Finding, or fancying, an analogy between the qualities by which impressions are made on the different external organs, he seems to conclude, that where some one property of matter, acting on some one of our senses, is ordinarily followed by the emotions of beauty—this property will have the same effect, whenever it is so presented as to affect any of our other senses. Thus, in pursuit of this remarkable analogy of the senses, he denominates sweetness, “the beautiful of the Taste.”† Nor is such a conclusion by any means unnatural, if the premises be once admitted; and if the opinion, to which we have so often alluded, be adhered to. For if beauty be a merely sensible quality, and if it be at the same time a distinct quality of the object abstractedly considered, there seems no good reason why each of the senses should not be capable of transmitting the *sensation* which this quality is fitted to produce; unless, indeed, there be, as in the case of odours, colours, and of all our ordinary sensations, some one organ, of which, and of which alone, this quality is the appropriate object. Now, as it is impossible to point out any such organ, the conclusion to which Mr. Burke’s reasonings seem to tend, appears to me the natural, not to say the inevitable, consequence of the theory he has advanced, when it is taken in connexion with the prejudice by which he appears to have been influenced.

There is, however, another, and, as far as I am able to form a judgment, an equally erroneous extreme. It has just been remarked, that the older metaphysicians seem to have considered beauty as a peculiar quality productive of certain effects on reflex senses, which were, by a strange sort of intellectual mechanism, adapted to the perception of their object. Another class of philosophers, not content with the analogy, in tracing which their predecessors had been so sedulously employed—and living at a period, when it had become fashionable to look to physical discoveries, not as illustrative, but as explanatory of mental phenomena—seem to have altogether excluded emotion, in the sense which I have attached to it, from among the constituents of beauty, and to have considered the objects of Taste as little, if any thing, more than one class of sensual pleasures. Whether it arise from attachment to a peculiar theory, to which we shall not at present advert, or from a dread of

* Burke, *Sub. and Beaut.* p. iii. sect. 24. † *Ibid.* p. iv. sect. 22.

of that extreme toward which the speculations of former writers had tended, I am unable to determine. It does, however, I confess, appear to me, that Mr. Stewart is at least equally remote from truth on the other side of the question. It may be a mistaken view of his theory, which induces me to regard it with aversion; but to me it appears, that if carried out into all its consequences, it would destroy not only the precision, but the utility, of language.

It will be unnecessary to trouble the reader with many additional quotations, since I have already stated, in Mr. Stewart's own words, the substance, or at least the foundation, of his argument. He conceives, that where a common name is given to objects or qualities apparently distinct from each other, there is not, as most philosophers have supposed, some common property to which that name is in fact appropriated. On the contrary, he imagines that an analogy, that is discovered between the object to which the name was originally given, and some other object, produces an extension, or transition, of the meaning, so as to include that second object which has some one point of coincidence with the first. In time, however, another idea is found to possess something in common with that second idea to which the application of the word has now been extended. The process of generalization is thus carried forward, and notions indiscriminately connected, but without any common bond of union, are denoted by one word which is indiscriminately applied to each of them. Thus far I am fully prepared to acquiesce in the decisions of this distinguished writer; but we shall soon be called to notice those points, in relation to which I am forced to dissent from his opinions. Unfortunately, the discussion of these questions is intimately connected with a subject the most mysterious in the whole of mental science. To go into the controversy regarding general terms and abstract ideas, which has so long divided the literary world, and thus to enter on a field of inquiry which has employed the attention of so many gifted individuals, and from which, after all this labour, the unintelligible paradoxes of the schoolmen have been swept away, only to make room for modern paradoxes almost equally unintelligible, would be as much opposed to my inclination, as it is placed beyond the reach of my abilities. Confining myself, therefore, to the examination of that word which is the immediate object of our present inquiry, I shall carefully exclude the more general views which might otherwise attract a share of our atten-

tion; and, without accommodating my conclusions to any particular system, shall seek only to render them accordant with truth. I shall, therefore, proceed to offer a few remarks, which may appear so obvious as to be unworthy of notice. I know that I am suggesting nothing new—nothing which is not anticipated in the reasonings, to some parts of which I am bold enough to object. It is not, however, always unnecessary, nor uninteresting, to develop and examine principles, which, although neither unknown nor misapplied, may have failed to attract a due share of attention and regard.

On certain Regulations in DR. WILLIAMS'S Library, in Red Cross-street.

WE have been unfeignedly concerned to find, that our notice of the death of Dr. MORGAN, the late excellent librarian of the library founded by the late Dr. Williams, and long since deposited in Red Cross-street, has been construed into at least an implied censure of the conduct of the Rev. Mr. COATES, his successor; than which nothing could be further from the intention of the author of the necrological retrospect, of which that notice formed a part. The allusions to changes in the Institution, since the Doctor's death, were evidently meant for, and expressly directed to, the trustees; and whilst we feel the most anxious wish to remove every impression that could give pain to a gentleman, for whom, from his uniform urbanity and attention to the only one of the editors of this work who has had the happiness of a personal acquaintance with him, we entertain the highest respect, we do not feel ourselves called upon to modify in aught, our admonitory protest against the changes of which he is not the author, but the mere official instrument of their execution. We have every reason to believe, that the present librarian of the Institution will so conduct himself in the execution of his office, as to merit at our hands the same praise which we readily bestowed upon his predecessor, namely, that "no man could fulfil the duties of that office with more care, urbanity, gentlemanly attention, and liberality, towards all men, whatever their sentiments, political or religious;" though we hope it will be very long before we have to finish the sentence with, "than he did." That he cannot fill them so satisfactorily, to those gentlemen who have

occasion to consult the most valuable portion of the library, as did his predecessor, is no fault of his, but—if fault there be any—of the trustees, by whom the regulations of the library are exclusively framed. Of those regulations in the times of Dr. Morgan, when we ourselves have had frequent occasion to benefit by their liberality, the following is a copy :

Rules of the Library.—I. The library shall be open from ten o'clock in the forenoon till three in the afternoon, on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, in every week throughout the year, except Christmas and Whitsuntide weeks, and the month of August; and the librarian (unless prevented by sickness) shall constantly attend the library at such times. Nevertheless, a trustee shall have access to the library whenever he thinks proper.

II. All persons shall be admitted during the appointed hours, upon producing to the librarian a written order from one of the trustees; but they shall not be permitted to enter the back library, except in the presence of a trustee, or of the librarian.

III. Persons who are admitted by a trustee's order to consult the books, shall be introduced into the front library, which shall be used as a reading room. They shall deliver to the librarian a paper, on which is written the title of the work they wish to inspect, the date, their names, and places of abode. The book shall then be brought to them to the front library, there to be consulted or perused. No paper shall be laid on the book when any extracts are made. The written orders for books which may be thus delivered to the librarian, shall be carefully preserved by him on a file, to be afterwards referred to in case any work named in them should be discovered to have been mutilated or damaged.

IV. No book shall be taken out of the library, except by one of the trustees, on his giving a receipt for it to the librarian; and such book shall be returned at or before the next quarterly meeting, except the same be in the actual possession of such trustee.

V. The librarian shall keep a correct account of all books taken out of the library, with the time when taken, and the name of the trustee taking the same; and of applications for books already taken out. Such accounts shall be laid before the library committee previously to every quarterly meeting of the trustees.

VI. All books given or purchased for the use of the

library, shall be immediately, on such gift or purchase, inserted by the librarian in the catalogue, in their proper places, and stamped or marked; and also entered in the book of benefactions, in which shall be specified the time when, and the name of the person by whom, given: and such book of benefactions shall be laid on the table at every meeting of the trustees, and of the book committee.

VII. The librarian shall not receive any money, or other gratuity, from any person, for the use of this library.

The completion of the inquiries which led us to the library has prevented our personal observation of the mode in which these rules have been enforced, since the decease of Dr. Morgan, and indeed, from knowing how they were acted upon during the latter period of his life; but we have heard from several of our friends and fellow labourers there, that to the last day of his appearance in the discharge of his official duties, the late librarian of the Institution continued to afford the same facility of access to every part of the collection under his care, which was most fully, and even kindly, granted during the period of our acquaintance with it and him. We have also great pleasure in adding, that all our inquiries and information (for we have had no personal experience upon the subject,) abundantly satisfies us, that the same urbane and liberal course has been uniformly pursued by his successor, in as far as the *printed books* in the library are concerned; and if this has not been the case with the *manuscripts*, it is, we are as fully assured, because a new regulation of the trustees has prevented him from rendering the same assistance, for forwarding the researches of those who wish to consult them, as he appears ever most cheerfully to have afforded to such readers as confined their inquiries to the other department of this collection.

On that regulation, we deem it a duty which we equally owe to the public, and to the trustees of the library, to offer a few remarks. Few of our readers need perhaps, to be informed, that the library in Red Cross-street, contains several manuscripts of the older nonconformist divines, at the most interesting period in the history of Protestant dissent, and also several valuable statistical details of the condition of the same body in later times; and these, until recently, every person who had a regular admission to the library was permitted to consult, with as little difficulty as he could refer to a printed book upon the library shelves—save that, where he was not so well known to the librarian,

as to be safely left to himself, the second of the rules which we have here reprinted was carried into strict execution, by the librarian continuing with the reader in the back library the whole of the time that the manuscript was in use. The election of another librarian upon his death might not unnaturally lead the trustees to revise the regulations upon which he had acted, and then it was that the alterations were introduced, against which many persons are disposed, with us, to remonstrate. The former rules contained, it will be observed, nothing like a distinction between the printed books and manuscripts, and, with the slight and prudent exception already stated, none was observed in practice; but it is widely different now. We have not been able to procure a copy of the new regulations, which are not yet printed; but we are assured, from good authority, that the changes introduced are very trifling, except in the requisition of a special order from a trustee, for the inspection of any manuscript, by those who, on a similar order, have a general and unlimited access to the printed books. Now, this restriction we conceive to be inconvenient, unnecessary, and unwarranted by the precedent of any public library, with whose regulations we are acquainted. The library of manuscripts in the British Museum is, or we should rather say, the libraries are, of a thousand times the value and importance of that at Red Cross-street; yet every individual who has an admission to the reading-room of that national and noble institution, has precisely the same right to consult, and the same facility afforded him in consulting, the most valuable manuscript, in either of its magnificent collections, as he has to refer to the commonest printed book, or pamphlet, upon its shelves. The manuscripts of the library of the Inner Temple are also as numerous, at the least, as those placed under the care of Dr. Williams's trustees, and are to the full as valuable to a lawyer, as are the latter to a divine or ecclesiastical historian, yet are they as easy of access as those in the national library; nor are we aware of any stricter rule for regulating the care of those in the libraries of the other law societies, save perhaps, that the prohibition of publishing any of the manuscripts of Sir Matthew Hale, imposed by their donor, may render greater caution necessary with respect to them, at Lincoln's Inn.

With such examples before them, what reason, we cannot but ask, have the trustees of the Red Cross-street

library, for the additional restraints which they have imposed upon the use of the manuscripts by those for whose benefit they are committed to their care. Is it the fear of their being injured or abstracted? Those who would do either, are certainly most unfit persons to be admitted into the library at all; as, if they would pocket a manuscript, they are just as likely to secrete a scarce and valuable pamphlet, or to abstract a plate from a printed book, and they have moreover far better opportunities of doing so, as they are often left alone for hours in the room which contains the major part of the library, on open shelves, whilst, unless very well known to him, they consult the manuscripts but in presence of the librarian. Do they fear lest an improper use should be made of them? Why not adopt, then, the very prudent and proper rules of the other public libraries to which we have referred, which, prohibiting the transcription of any entire manuscript, or even a considerable portion of one, without express permission of the trustees for the purpose, leaves open to all readers the right of consulting, and of making extracts from, any and every part of the collection. This has long been found a sufficient control over the largest and most valuable collection of manuscripts in the kingdom; and if those to whose care one of the smallest and least important is intrusted, go beyond it, by determining what individuals, deemed by themselves proper persons for admission into the library, shall be permitted to consult the manuscripts, and which of those manuscripts they may refer to, they assume to themselves a power which we believe to be unprecedented, unnecessary, and incompatible with the proper discharge of their duties, as mere trustees for the benefit of the public. Nor shall any false notions of delicacy, or affectation of candour, induce us to withhold the expression of our opinion, that these remarks apply with double force, in that the manuscripts to which these instructions apply, contain theological sentiments diametrically opposite to those avowed by the majority of the trustees who imposed them, if indeed there be amongst them a single exception to the remark.

Dr. Williams, the founder of this library, was a Presbyterian; but he was a Trinitarian. From the designation of the trustees to carry into execution, and perpetuate the purposes of his will, by a distinction, founded rather on their mode of church discipline, than the nature of their doctrine, (for little could he have anticipated so wide a

separation on these points, as has since taken place on this side the Tweed,) the major part, if not the whole of the trustees, are now Unitarians, or at least, are not very unfavourably inclined to that form of doctrine; and, with every possible respect for them as men, they cannot be surprised, that Trinitarians view with peculiar jealousy their absolute control over manuscripts containing points of faith important to their side of the controversy.

Some of their body have already been refused access to manuscripts, which they formerly consulted in the composition of works, illustrative of the peculiar views of the writers of them; and in days in which such extraordinary efforts have been made, and are making, to prove what they consider the heterodoxy of some of the most eminent of the old divines, it can surely be no matter of complaint, that they wish the unpublished records of their sentiments to be readily accessible to every one; especially as it does so happen, that in the case of the Henry family, some interesting documents of this nature, which were in the library a very few years ago, are not forthcoming now. Whether they have strayed unto the portfolios of some autograph collector, in this autographical mania age, we know not; but this at least is certain, they are not to be found.

But we said also, that the restriction was inconvenient, and every one engaged in literary researches will see in a minute that it is so. His wish to consult a manuscript may suddenly arise (it has often done so with ourselves, at least, in the British Museum,) in the course of his examination of printed books; yet will he be prevented from gratifying it by not being furnished with the order of a trustee, for permission to refer to a document deposited in the next room to that in which he is sitting. It is, we believe, by persons from the country, that the manuscripts have chiefly been referred to, and to them, whose visits to the metropolis are neither very frequent, nor of a long continuance, the restriction is peculiarly inconvenient; for though furnished with a general order of admission to the library, they cannot now consult the manuscripts which may alone be the object of their visiting it, until they have first been there to examine the catalogues, to ascertain if what they want be there; and then they must set out in search of a trustee, to obtain a special permission to refer to it. Happily we live not in days, when to the Trinitarian and Unitarian might be applied the wide line of separation

existing in the ancient church, when "the Jews had no dealings with the Samaritans;" yet is it very probable, that a minister of the former sentiments, from a distant part of the country, would be put to considerable trouble, vexation, and loss of time, in obtaining an introduction to a trustee of the latter denomination, and then in procuring from him the order, without which his general and standing admission to the library would be to him of little use.

Having thus freely stated our views of this restriction, for the consideration of those who imposed it, we have a more gratifying part of our duty to perform, in acknowledging the obligation conferred upon the public by the trustees and their present librarian, in the preparation and printing of a catalogue of the manuscripts; thus approximating nearer to that facility of consulting them, so complete at the British Museum, that we earnestly wish to have it as perfectly established in the library at Red Cross-street.

β.

Unitarianism and Trinitarianism, compared in their Tendency to Convert Turks, Pagans, Jews, and Infidels, to Christianity.

THE subject of this Essay, is the comparison of the two systems of Unitarianism and Trinitarianism, in their tendency to promote the conversion of professed unbelievers, such as Jews, Turks, Pagans, and Infidels.

At the outset of our remarks, we beg leave to premise, that we should lay no stress upon the superior tendency of the latter system to proselyte, as a proof of its truth; except God had declared that "the knowledge of the Lord should cover the earth, as the waters cover the sea."

Indeed, a Christian will be the last man in the world, that is likely to do it; for, if such a principle were once admitted, it would go immediately to overthrow the end it was intended to subserve; and prove as dangerous to our own system, as to that to which it stands opposed. Cast your eyes upon the world, and you will find, that many systems have been infinitely more successful, in proselyting, than the Christian. Look into the realms of Paganism, and you will find it has converted infinitely more than Christianity, and Mahometanism has done the same. If, then, we were for a moment to proceed on the principle that a superior tendency to proselyte, is a proof of the truth of any system, we must pluck the palm out of the hand of the Christian

religion, and put it into that of the Pagan, or Mahometan; for these stand in the front rank of proselyting systems, and, compared with their converts, those of Christianity are as a little handful, compared with a mighty army.

That this principle is totally inadmissible, will further appear, from the consideration, that every system must have some proofs to render it plausible, or confirm its truth, before it can hope to make any proselytes at all. It cannot have proselytes to start with; it must have something else, some evidences on which it is built, and to which it appeals; and by these, and these only, it must either stand or fall. Again, a Christian, who believes in the necessity of an atonement, is the most unlikely man in the world to adopt this mode of thinking, because the very fundamental principle of his religion, proceeds upon a fact, which precludes the possibility of his doing it, and that is, universal depravity. If he believes that the heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; that the carnal mind is enmity against God—that every imagination of his heart is only evil, and that continually—and that there is none that doeth good, no, not one, (and he is no Christian, who does not believe these declarations,) he will be the last man in the world to think that religion the true one, which makes, or is calculated to make, the most proselytes from amongst men of this description; for if they be so bad, they will be most likely to fall in with a bad religion, such an one as accommodates itself to the gratification of their propensities; that winks at their crimes, while it creeps into their favour; that promises them peace, while it permits them to sin; that passes high eulogiums upon their dignity, and says nothing about their degradation. And this lets us at once into the reason why Christianity has made so few converts; because it is so unaccommodating—its spirituality stands opposed to carnality—its dogmatism to freethinking—its simplicity to refinement—its plainness to pomp—its holiness to immorality—its heavenly mindedness to worldly mindedness—and its humility to pride. We merely make these preliminary observations to shew, that although our system has made, and in our humble opinion is calculated to make, infinitely more converts than that of our opponents, yet that we lay no more stress upon this circumstance, than is warranted by scripture. God has said, yea, he has sworn, that to him every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess. That system, then, which has the greatest tendency to promote this end, must of course be the scriptural, and the true sys-

tem. It is our intention to compare the two systems under our notice, in this point of light—which of them has the greatest persuasives to present to professed unbelievers, to renounce their present delusions, and embrace Christianity. Not that by merely embracing Christianity, a man becomes converted to God, for in order to this, “he is born again; quickened out of a death of trespasses and sins, by the Spirit of God.” Yet this Spirit always operates upon us as rational creatures, and always addresses us, in his word, as such.

We now proceed to examine these two systems, in this their tendency. These professed unbelievers, Turks, Pagans, Jews, and Infidels, are destitute of the truths of Christianity. No truths can act where they are not—these truths must, if they operate at all on their minds, be carried to them—we have then to place these systems side by side; in the first place, as they will operate on our minds, to cause us to send them to these individuals; and in the second, as they will operate on their minds, when they reach them. In the first place, then, we ask, How will they operate on our minds, in inducing us to send them to these poor deluded devotees? This will depend entirely upon another question, viz. the light in which they cause us to look upon them in their present moral condition; for our exertions will be regulated by our feelings—our feelings by our views—our views by our creeds—and our creeds by our systems. Examine we then the systems, and first the Unitarian one. Let us gather our light from a sun in this system, Dr. Joseph Priestley—“If,” says the Doctor, “we could be so happy, as to believe there are no errors, but what men may be so circumstanced as to be innocently betrayed into; that any mistake of the head is perfectly consistent with rectitude of heart, and that all differences in modes of worship, may be only the different methods, which different men, who are equally the offspring of God, are endeavouring to honour and obey their common parent; our differences of opinion would have no tendency to lessen our natural love and esteem.”* Now, it is certain it would not; but then it would couch our minds, and make us perfectly easy about the conversion of the individuals in question; for, according to this sentiment, all the false religions under heaven may be harmless, there being no errors into which men may not be so circumstanced, as to be innocently betrayed. The Pagan, Mahometan, Popish, and every other religion, may

* *Diff. of Opinion*, sec. 2.

then be perfectly harmless. Harmless religion, the Pagan, whose morality is suicide and murder—whose worship is cruelty and debauchery—whose priests are bacchanalians—whose temples are brothels—whose annual festivities gorge vultures and tigers with human flesh—and whiten and blanch the surrounding soil with human bones! Harmless religion, the Mahometan, which was originally established amongst the nations with fire and sword, and propagated by a bigoted band of human butchers, guided by the bloody dictates of the impostor's koran! Harmless religion, the Popish, which established the infernal inquisition; tortured its unhappy victims, on instruments which had satanic ingenuity displayed in their invention, and satanic malignity exhibited in their design; and which has overwhelmed whole nations in promiscuous bloodshed, carnage, devastation, and massacre! Harmless religions these!—"so many different modes in which different men are honouring and obeying their common parent!" One stands perfectly astonished, that any man could utter such a sentiment. While Unitarians can, with such a philosophical composure as this, look upon the deluded devotees of these cruel superstitions, it is not likely they will make any efforts towards their conversion. Their creed and conduct are perfectly consistent with each other. What efforts have they made for the scriptural illumination of these poor wretches, that are sitting in darkness, and in the valley of the shadow of death? What missionary society have they formed? Into what languages have they translated the scriptures of truth? What seas have their missionaries navigated? What mountains have they climbed? What rivers have they forded? What forests have they traversed? What deserts have they crossed? With what sincerity must they pray, "thy kingdom come!"

Turn to the other system, which teaches its disciples to look upon the heathen, as rebels against God—transgressors of the first commandment of the law—as such, exposed to God's earliest curse—liable to perish everlastingly—and just on the brink of hell. Such a belief as this, causes the hearts of Trinitarians to bleed—their eyes to weep—their bowels to yearn—their heads to plan, and hands to execute, measures for their conversion. Hence they have formed, and zealously support, their missionary societies, those ornaments of the age—the glories of the country—the lights of the church—the benefactors of the world. Their missionaries have climbed mountains the most rugged, crossed

deserts the most inhospitable, forded rivers the most dangerous, traversed forests the most pathless; their agents have sent us home, as so many standards captured from the enemy, the idols that were formerly worshipped; their missionaries have many of them laid down the shattered remains of a worn-out constitution in a distant land, and many at this moment are "reclaiming another and another from the wastes of dark and fallen humanity; and are widening the domains of gospel light, and gospel principle, amongst them; and are spreading a moral beauty around the very spot, where they pitch their lowly tabernacle; and are, at length, compelling even the eye and testimony of gainsayers, by the success of their noble enterprise; and are forcing the exclamation of delighted surprise from the charmed and arrested traveller, as he looks at the softening tints they are now spreading over the wilderness, and as he hears the sound of the chapel bell, and as in those haunts, where at the distance of half a generation ago, savages would have scowled upon his path, he regales himself with the hum of missionary schools, and the lovely prospect of peaceful and Christian villages."

We are not boasting of what they have done, for there is no room to boast, but plenty for shame to ourselves that this was not done long ago; and to our shame be it spoken, that these things are so novel amongst us. But has any thing of this kind been produced by Unitarianism? It certainly has not yet. But is it likely to be? It is true, we cannot tell what is yet to come, for we know no more what a system will bring forth, than an hour. But if there be any thing to be done by it, it is certainly yet *to come*. Let us then grant the utmost they can require, and that we can bestow, viz. that efforts, equally as great as our own, will be made by Unitarians, for the conversion of the heathen; which will bring us to the second thing to be noticed—the effect of these different systems upon Turks, Pagans, and so on: we will then contrast them in their tendency to lay hold of the attention, understandings, imaginations, feelings, and fears, of these individuals,—all of which they are in possession. And of the effect they would produce on their understandings, imaginations, feelings, and fears, our readers may judge by the effect they produce upon their own.

Let us look at their tendency to arrest the attention of these poor infatuated men. Attention is first created, in the ordinary course of things, by a missionary teacher; that

attention is now engrossed, wholly by their own idolatrous superstitions, their minds are bound in a thousand invisible chains, and locked up, as it were in iron. Which of these two systems is the most calculated to arrest the attention of these men? Both of them are equally destitute of external pomp, and glitter, and dazzle, and parade. Which of them, then, will strike the minds of these men the most, who have heard neither of them before? That of course which is the most different from any they have ever heard before; which of the two would that be? That which says Christ was a mere man, his mission that of a prophet, his holiness mere morality, his life that of an exemplar, his death that of a martyr, and that since he was raised from the dead, we do not know what is become of him; or that system, which says, this same Christ was God and man, united together in one person; truly God who made us and all things else, and truly man, bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh; that he had eyes like ours, and with them he shed the tears of affection, at the grave of friendship; ears like ours, and with them he listened to the tale of woe; hands like ours, and with them he staunched the bleeding wounds of dismembered relationship, and steadied the knees that were feeble; feet like ours, and with them he went about ameliorating human wretchedness, and lessening the magnitude of human suffering; a soul like ours, that found this world too poverty-stricken to satisfy its wants; and too narrow to give ample range to its faculties: that his life was obedience, perfect obedience to the law we had broken; his death, atonement for the sins we had committed; his resurrection from the dead, the grand seal of his messiahship; his ascension to and reception in heaven, a proof that his work was accepted; his intercession, the source of all blessings to his church; and his second coming to administer justice, vindicate providence, fulfil prophecy, and sublimely consummate redemption, the last grand act that should be performed upon the moving theatre of life. Which of these would strike the attention the most powerfully? To hear of a mere man, a prophet, a teacher, a martyr, would not strike the minds of those so powerfully, who had heard of men, and prophets, and teachers, and martyrs, thousands of times before. But when they heard of a person who was God and Man together, and of his atonement and righteousness, and all that branches from his divinity, they would have something they had never heard before; they would see in it something they had never seen before;

they would feel from it what they never felt before; they are in a system altogether new in a moment, and attention is immediately put under arrest. From the supreme divinity of Christ being an integral part of the system, it has a character peculiarly its own; nothing like it will be found in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth; it can never be incorporated with any other system; its difference from all other systems on earth is so striking and so peculiar, that it can never be confounded with them by sophistry, demolished by familiarity, or crumbled by time.

Let us now look at the appeal these systems make to the understandings of these men. "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." It hath pleased Almighty God to grant these men an ordinary portion of human understanding, which displays itself in every thing except their debasing superstitions. These systems address themselves to this faculty. Every system proceeds on the ground that man is a sinner, and professes to find a remedy for the disorder, one in this way, another in that way, and another in the other way; for every system has its paradise and its perdition, in a future world; its perdition recognizes him as a sinner; its paradise, as a believer in, and participator of, the remedy provided. Now, this sin, so universally recognized in every system of religion, necessarily supposes a law; "for sin is a transgression of law," that law cannot be human, for men would never make a law to condemn themselves—as it is not human, it must be divine; as it is divine, it must be, like its author, holy, just, and good; as such, God, who is the moral governor of the universe, must of necessity enforce it in every point, for if he could dispense with one point, he could dispense with all. These men have broken this law, and it cannot recede from any of its requirements; the transgressors are therefore liable to the punishment it has denounced, even eternal death. Now then for the remedy provided by Unitarianism in this distressing dilemma, within the bounds of which men seem irrecoverably bound up. It tells us that repentance is a satisfaction to the law for transgressions; repentance, of the intensity of which, of the duration of which, of the depth of which, of the number of sighs he must fetch, or of the number of tears he must shed, or of the number of groans he must heave, the penitent is the only judge. Repentance, of which there are different degrees, and consequently different degrees of satisfaction—

which is absurd, for satisfaction to a law must be something definite, specific, and known; or else it is a burlesque on legislation: repentance a satisfaction to a broken law! a thing never admitted, or perhaps scarcely ever dreamt of, in human codes, although they are *imperfect* like the man who makes them, and the man who breaks them; while the law of God is an absolutely *perfect law*.

Let us now look at the remedy provided by the Trinitarian scheme. We have already observed, that satisfaction to a law must be something specific and definite, and with such a satisfaction this system presents us, in the *death* of the man Christ Jesus, who "being without sin, and no guile found in his mouth," voluntarily became a substitute in the stead of the sinner; and who, by being God and man, not only made satisfaction to the awakened justice of God, for the sins of one man, which, had he been man only, he might have done, but could do no more—but made a satisfaction to the law, sufficient for the sins of all mankind. Thus his death presents the understanding with a *definite* satisfaction to the awakened justice of Jehovah; the law is satisfied; sin punished; the divine government honoured; and the sinner saved. Now all this commends itself to the understanding in every point as luminous, as light, and as clear as crystal, except the incarnation of Christ, which, it is confessed, is a mystery; but if the fact of that incarnation is established by the most indubitable evidence, as it easily may be, the mode of the fact will never render it objectionable to a humble and consistent understanding, for the creation of God is full of mysteries equally incomprehensible with the incarnation, all of which are nevertheless believed; for to disbelieve them, would be an unnatural rebellion against the demonstrations of the senses. Every time a man sets his foot to the ground, he covers thousands of mysteries; for every atom on which he treads, is a mystery equally incomprehensible with the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

Thus we have examined these systems, in the appeal which they make to the understanding. Let us now look at them in another point of view.

Nothing is plainer, or may more easily be made so, than that if the laws of God were uniformly and universally obeyed, all lying, swearing, stealing, murder, drunkenness, sabbath-breaking, blasphemy, infidelity, covetousness, war, fornication, adultery, swindling, treason, malice, oppression, and the whole long and black catalogue of human vices, would disappear from the land of the living—that the

golden age, which has existed only in the dreams of poets, would be realized—our assizes would be all maiden assizes—our sessions mere forms—our judges and magistrates mere ciphers—our prisons empty and useless—our newspapers nothing but the undeformed and unvarying records of human excellence; that asylums for the distressed, and hospitals for the sick, and Sunday-schools for the gratuitous instruction of the ignorant, and benevolent societies for feeding the hungry and clothing the naked, and sanctuaries for the worship of the living God, would break out in all directions like stars on a winter's night, shedding round about them the blessings of science, humanity, and religion, over the face of this well-peopled world. If all this delightful vision would be realized, then, by a perfect obedience to the law of God, of which we are as satisfied as of our own existence, nothing can be plainer, than that the system which honours this law the most, and inspires men with the greatest respect for it, and supplies the strongest motives to its observation, must commend itself the most to the understandings of Turks, Pagans, Jews, and Infidels, and to all who have any understanding. The Unitarian system inculcates, that the law of God, which, in the Bible, demands *perfect* obedience; "for cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them," will be satisfied with *sincere* obedience. Now, what is sincere obedience? We take it for granted, it is not perfect obedience, else it would have been called such. But if it is not perfect obedience; it must be imperfect obedience; so then the law of God will be satisfied with imperfect obedience: but this proceeds on the ground that the law is relaxed. But to what extent is it relaxed? Every man must be judge for himself. Yet is it not highly paradoxical to suppose, that a system which recognizes an undefined relaxation of the law, can be favourable to obedience? or that it can inspire men with respect for the law? The law is sunk, by such a system, in the eye of the subject; for although, in the first place, it demanded *perfect* obedience, yet, as it cannot get that, it will be satisfied with *sincere*, which, mean what it may, cannot mean more than all it can get; reminding us (pardon the comparison) of the itinerating pedlar who comes to your door, and, in the first place, asks a high price for his article, but whom you may beat down from price to price, till at length he takes what you please to give him.

But we gladly turn from a system which thus sinks the

law, to one that magnifies it, and makes it honourable; that is, the Trinitarian system, which goes upon the ground, that the law must have perfect obedience in every punctilio, from the swaddling band to the shroud; that it is of no use what men say,—that they are good at the bottom, except they are good at the top, and good all the way from the bottom to the top; that perfect obedience was paid to it by Christ, and is imputed to every one that believes in him—and that the strongest motives to perfect obedience are supplied by the Redeemer's agony and sufferings,

“ ——— There strongest motives sting,
“ There sacred violence assaults the soul.” *Young.*

It will scarcely be necessary to stop, and ask which of these two will commend itself most to the understandings of these poor deluded devotees of cruel superstitions.

As we flatter ourselves that we have thus laid the foundation deep and sound in the judgment, we may now appeal to another faculty, the *imagination*, for the possession of which oriental unbelievers are celebrated. But here we are aware, that the soundness of this ground may be questioned by some, though we confess that we do not think it questionable. All the works of God are calculated, from their being awfully vast or elegantly little, to fill the imagination with the most sublime, and kindling, and admiring conceptions, and may be legitimately used for that purpose. “The heavens that he hath meted out with a span, the waters that he hath measured in the hollow of his hand, the mountains that he hath weighed in scales, and the hills that he has poised in a balance,” fill the imagination with the highest conceptions of his power, and wisdom, and goodness, and majesty, “who hath the heaven for his throne, and the earth for his footstool; the cloud for his chariot, and the winds for the wings” on which he flies through the universe, “glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders.” Why is it, then, that redemption—redemption of immortal souls from hell flames, is the only work of God that falls within the range of human knowledge—the only work of God that may not be legitimately employed to fill the imagination with the most sublime and exalted conceptions of him who accomplished it? Is it the fear, that being so glorious a work, it should fill the imagination with too exalted conceptions and sentiments of him who accomplished it? Or is it the fear, that it should raise expectations in the mind,

which the next world will not satisfy? Or what? Surely, if “the wave of mighty forests, and the rush of sounding waterfalls,” and distant glimpses of human territory, and pinnacles of everlasting snow, and the sweep of that circling horizon, which folds in its ample embrace the whole of this noble amphitheatre, are employed, and legitimately too, to give birth to the most exalted and majestic conceptions of God; then the incarnation of the Son of God, and his atonement for sin, and his resurrection from the dead, and his ascension to heaven—and his second coming to judge the world, and take his saints to a glory, of which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive,—may be employed to kindle it also. Yea, they will set the imagination of the believer on fire, in spite of all the cold water that men of no imagination, who are philosophically hard, and scientifically insensible, may throw upon it. With which of these two systems would the imaginations of these deluded devotees be interested, elevated, delighted, and kindled? Would it be with that which represents Christ a mere man—his mission that of a prophet—his holiness mere morality—his death a mere example of patience; and that, since his resurrection, we don’t know where he is? Or with that which represents him as God, who, though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor, in the assumption of our nature—that he first appeared amongst us in the form of a little child—that, from his swaddling band to his shroud, he buffeted with the billows of trouble, that he might know how to sympathize with us in our calamities—that he went about, God and man in one person, working miracles as benevolent as they were bright, and delivering parables as instructive as they were true—that he died in his human nature for our sins, and rose again from the dead on the third day for our justification—that he ascended to heaven, where, above that high arch, under which we sleep in our cradles, and worship in our sanctuaries, and rot in our graves, he intercedes at the right hand of God the Father Almighty—and that from thence he will come to judge the quick and the dead, separate the precious and the vile, and raise his saints to heaven, where, in their own nature, he shall shine for ever the object of their adoration, the source of their joys, the ornament of creation, and the wonder of the universe; while they shall sing the song, “Unto him that redeemed us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, be honour and glory for ever and

ever, in hallelujahs lofty as the theme they celebrate," and countless as the ages through which they shall roll.

We scarcely need stay to ask which system will fill their imaginations with the most sublime, ravishing, and rich conceptions.

Let us now look at them, in the appeal they make to the *feeling* of these individuals—that feeling which constitutes all the difference there is between fallen men and fallen angels; *feeling*, the only surviving lineament of original excellence, which has escaped the catastrophe of the fall, like the solitary servant of Job, escaped from the destruction in which his fellows were overwhelmed, and which, like him, if it could speak, would finish its tale of woe, by saying, "I, only I, am escaped alone to tell thee." Upon this feeling, how would these different systems operate? In order to judge, listen to the different statements they give of human ruin and human redemption. The Unitarian scheme represents man as being created with the principal part of the appetites he possesses, except a few which he may have contracted by education and example—and that God is so easy on the subject of sin, that although it is the bitter cause of all our calamities, yet he will pardon it without any mark of his decisive hatred against it, on our repentance, although its first object is to dethrone God, and its next to destroy man. The other system represents man as having fallen from original excellence and happiness into sin, which is the source, the prolific, the frightfully prolific source of all his sorrows; but that God so loved the world, and so hated sin, as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life. That "herein was love; not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for all our sins." Which of these two would operate most powerfully on the feelings of that poor Pagan, who stands with outstretched hands and horrible contortions, muttering his deadly incantations at the shrines of devils, hardening his heart with cruelty, and dyeing his hands with blood? or upon that poor Turk, who is paying a visit to Mecca, and, on his bended knees, is gabbling over a detached passage from the Koran, which is another rivet to his chain, another fetter to his delusion, another sin to his list? or upon the feelings of that poor Jew, who is seeking for justification by the law of Moses, although just when he seems to have arrived at the summit of his wishes, down all falls to the dust, owing to

the commission of some sin, the omission of some duty, like the wretch in the fabled Pagan mythology, who was doomed to roll a stone up to a certain eminence, and always, whenever it seemed just at the top, down it rolled to the bottom. We leave our readers to judge which will operate most powerfully on the feelings of unbelievers, by the manner they operate upon their own.

Lastly, let us look at them, as they are calculated to operate upon the *fears* of mankind. Is there any thing in the Unitarian system to make men, who are naturally in love with sin, afraid of committing it? Will they be afraid of offending God by it? No; for he is so easy and so kind, that he cannot at least be soon offended. Will they be *afraid* of future punishment? No; for there is none, according to this scheme, or next to none, even for the finally impenitent. What is there then to alarm their fears, if they commit sin? Nothing, comparatively speaking,—nothing.

Let us now look at the other system, and see how it alarms the sinner. It points us to the Saviour on the cross; and who, with that affecting spectacle before his eyes, can doubt for a moment, whether it is, or is not, God's intention *severely* to punish sin? Who that sees the Saviour swelled with strokes, pale with death, besmeared with spittle, and stained with blood, for sin, can doubt it for a moment? This determination *severely* to punish sin, is eminently calculated to work on the fears of mankind, for it is got, not from our own speculations about the matter, but from a fact; the same fact by which the feelings are operated upon, and that is, the crucifixion of Christ. It decides in a moment, in the mind of the man that believes Christ was crucified for sin, that it is God's determination *severely* to punish it—and although this fact does not say, that the punishment will be everlasting, yet still it convinces us, that it could not be from a punishment of short duration, that all this scale of continued miracles was constructed, or else there would be such a huge disproportion between the means and end. It must have been, from a punishment truly dreadful, and which is explained by the Saviour, the gentle Saviour, himself; and it is remarkable, that his language is the most awful that is to be found any where on the subject; “there their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched.” Which of these systems then will operate most powerfully on the fears of these men; the Unitarian, which prophesies smooth things, or the Trinitarian, which cries Fire! fire! in the ears of the sinner?

For the reasons thus stated at length, though we are apprehensive that they have been but too feebly enforced, we think it abundantly plain, that the Trinitarian scheme will operate most powerfully on the understandings, and imaginations, and feelings, and fears, of unconverted men, to whom, be they Pagans, Mahometans, Roman Catholics, or mere nominal professors of a purer form of Christianity, we would say, that the gospel answer to the question, "What must I do to be saved?" is, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved!"

HORÆ JURIDICÆ.—No. I.

On the Origin and Principles of the Law of Libel; and the Punishment of Defamation amongst the Jews, Egyptians, ancient Persians, and Lydians.

THOSE persons can have formed but a very imperfect notion of the nature and objects of Legislation, in a civilized state, who conceive that the pains and penalties of its vindictive sanction should be principally, if not exclusively, applied to those injuries which immediately affect the lives, the persons, or the property of individual members of the community. True it is, indeed, that in the earlier stages of society, the criminal code of every country was strictly confined within these limits; and it was so confined, for a reason at once sufficient and obvious. There were, then, no other rights for the lawless to violate, or which the peaceful subject could wish to defend. The "*honeste vivere; alterum non ledere; suum cuique tribuere*,"*—three short maxims, to which the Justinian code has reduced the whole elements of jurisprudence, has a higher origin, and a more binding authority, than that of a system which weakened every principle of equity it contained—and they were neither few, nor difficult to be applied—by a mark of tyranny in the sovereign, and of slavery in the people, which, conceived in but few words, was in itself capable of annihilating the liberty of the one, and establishing the despotism of the other: "*quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem*."† In fact, notwithstanding the various speculations of certain writers, who have shrewdly suspected that theft is not prohibited by the law of nature, it might easily be shewn, were this the place to enter on the disquisition, that these maxims constitute the elements, we had almost said the foun-

* Inst. i. 3.

† Inst. ii. 6.

dation, of those eternal, immutable principles of right and wrong, with which the revealed law of God accords, and every human law should harmonize, or lose its hold upon the consciences of men. These principles of justice are adapted, therefore, to every stage of society, and should, at all periods, form the basis of its laws. But the particular duties which they require to be performed; the variety of injuries they may be made to prohibit; the incitements necessary to be held forth, the punishments to be denounced, to secure the performance of the duty, and to prevent the commission of the crime, are not so fixed, but must change with the changing manners of a people advancing from barbarism to civilization; from civilization to refinement; and from refinement but too often sinking into premature decay.

Some considerable time would, for instance, elapse, ere the savage of the desert would be induced to admit the superior right of his brother savage to the skin of the beast he had slain in the chase, for a moment longer than actual possession demonstrated his intention of appropriating it to himself. His readiness and ability to maintain that possession, against any one who should attempt to strip from his back the trophy of his skill, and the only shelter of his person from the inclemency of the weather, would perhaps, too, after all, be the best protection of a property, so transient, so ill-defined, and so ill-protected by laws, which can only derive a permanent and effectual sanction from mutual compact, which, originating in mutual danger, ascertains mutual rights, and establishes, on an equitable basis, the mutual relations of civil and of social life. The terms of that compact must have been pretty well understood; the extent of those rights accurately, however disproportionately, ascertained; and the duties of those relations defined with a considerable degree of precision, before the legislative code of any nation could have provided remedies for those injuries, or punishments for those crimes, which have not a direct and immediate, but an indirect and more remote, effect upon the happiness of individuals, and the peace of society. If we look, therefore, to the earlier provisions of our own, or of any other body of laws, we shall find them chiefly, if not solely, directed to the prevention, or rather to the punishment, of offences committed by the strong arm of open and lawless violence, the tendency of which to put in jeopardy the lives and property of the more honest and peaceable members of the community, is

neither concealed, nor attempted to be concealed, rather than to guard against those more subtle devices which effectuate the same purpose by art instead of force, cloaking themselves the while with pretences so specious, and having so little about them to awaken the caution of the most prudent, that their real object is not immediately discovered. It never has been, and in the nature of things it never could be, a characteristic of those provisions, that they embraced circumstances which never could arise, injuries which could have no existence, until the manners and habits of the people, for the regulation of whose conduct they were enacted, in the slow, but certain march of civilization, of moral and intellectual refinement, and of commercial enterprise, had assumed very different features to those to which they could, and ought alone, to adapt themselves.

Legislation is a progressive work; and from its intimate connexion with the changing manners and circumstances of mankind, its advancement to perfection, if even to the standard of human perfection it ever can attain, must inevitably be slow. In its earlier stages, the protection of the lives, the persons, and the properties of individuals from the effects of immediate violation, and the prevention of direct attempts to subvert the government established, or rather permitted to have an uncertain existence, (suspended as it were by a single thread, which the sword of any powerful leader might cut, or the storm of popular commotion could in an instant tear asunder,) by pains and penalties the most effectual which the narrow capacities of the legislators could devise, or the imperfect subordination of the people would permit them to enact,—is all we must look for, and all that we shall ever find. But as civilization advances, as the arts are cultivated, as commerce extends itself, a new order of things arises; and it is discovered, that there are other and often more effectual means of gratifying a malicious, an envious, or a revengeful disposition, than by openly, or even secretly, though directly, attacking the persons or property of those at whose prosperity the heart sickens, or whose interests a malevolent spirit would seek to undermine. As the intercourse and connexion of men with each other, for the purposes of social life, or of commercial traffic, strengthen and extend themselves, the necessity for mutual confidence attaches a value to individual reputation, which in a savage and uncommercial state of society must have been at its lowest ebb, if indeed it can be said to have had any existence at all. But as the value of this personal

reputation, and the great importance of establishing and maintaining a national character for the strict observance of public faith, would increase in an exact ratio with the intercourse of individuals, of public bodies, of governments, and of nations, it must be self-evident, that whatever could contribute to extend this intercourse, would in an equal degree enlarge the means, and increase the opportunities, of injuring another, in a point which, under some circumstances, may be dearer to him than life, and often of more value than all the property he may possess. Upon the character he maintains in the world, the future enjoyment of the one, and the increase or even the continuance of the other, may indeed frequently be found most essentially to depend. It might also be demonstrated with equal ease, for it is a fact equally obvious, that whatever gives general facility to an attack upon personal reputation, must open, to such as are inclined to avail themselves of it, a wider field for attempts to excite in the minds of the people sentiments of dissatisfaction with the government under which they live, and thus to weaken its authority: but the point is too clear to need illustration.

In the combined operation of these two causes, the necessity of protecting the character of individuals from unjust and unwarrantable attacks, and governments from being brought into contempt and jeopardy, originated those legislative provisions, which are usually classed under the head of the Law of Scandal, and of Libel. Of that law it is the intention of the present article of our lucubrations, and of a few of its successors, to trace the history, with a view, from the practices of other nations, to illustrate and to defend some supposed peculiarities in our own. Against these the voice of faction and of ignorance has raised the clamour of innovation, when, in point of fact, the principles on which they are founded—for it is principles, and not mere technicalities, which we wish to discuss—are gathered from the collective wisdom of ages, and sanctioned by the usage of every nation and kindred of the civilized world. The assertion may be bold, but we hope to prove it to be true, to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced mind, and to an extent of which even our lawyers are not fully aware.

That the subject which is thus proposed for consideration is an important one to every person who takes the smallest share in our public affairs, or in the political discussions which they engender, or who, in the daily intercourse and mere private relations of life, is called upon to enter into

communications upon the character of another, it cannot surely be needful to demonstrate. Independent too of the immediate and personal interest which we may all of us take in its investigation, there is attached to the subject, a question of deep public interest, and of very general importance, involving no less than the liberty of the press on the one hand, and the check of its licentiousness on the other.

In discussing such a subject, it can scarcely be necessary to observe, that the term *Libel*, which, to a modern ear, is apt as it were intuitively to convey the idea of a publication of some criminal matter, is, in its literal meaning, perfectly harmless, being but a mere diminutive of the Latin word *liber*, and signifying nothing more than a written composition, or little book.* And even on its first adoption as a technical term by the Roman lawyers, its import was very different to that which we now attach to it, for they employed it as the distinctive appellation of the roll delivered to the prætor in open court, by the plaintiff or accuser, in every cause which was brought before him;† answering in substance to the declarations, indictments, and informations *ex officio* of our modern law, and indeed, when reduced to writing, to legal proceedings in general.‡ But in the forums, and the codes of the Roman emperors, the term thus engrafted on the law soon acquired a more exclusive application to those writings which reflected upon the conduct of persons in authority, or on the characters of individuals,§ though in its general application it was still variously, and, as it would seem, indifferently, employed to denote petitions and remonstrances to, and written answers or messages from, the emperors and other persons of rank;||—informations, state papers, and writings of a public nature in general;¶ briefs or instructions of the

* Ennius *Fragm.* Horace *Carm.* v. 8, 15; *Epist.* i. 13, 4. 9, 17, &c. Ovid, *Fast.* i. 124. ii. 549; *ex Pont.* iv. xxi. 25. *et passim*; Phædrus i. prol. 3.; Cicero *pro Clement.* 51; Ausonius, *Epig.* ix. 1. xxiv. 3. &c.

† Horace, *Sat.* i. 4, 66.; Plin. *Epist.* vii. 27. x. 6, 5.; Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. 143.; Quintilian, *Inst.* vi. 2. xii. 8.; Tacitus *Ann.* ii. 44.

‡ Plautus *Curculio* i. 2, 6.; Juvenal, *Sat.* xxxi. 107.; Suetonius *Nero*, 15.; Claud. 37. Cicero in *Verr.* i. 6.

§ Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 72.; Suet. *Aug.* 55.

¶ Quint. *Inst.* vi. 3.; Martial viii. 31, 82. xi. 1.; Cicero *ad Attic.* xvi. 16.; Plin. i. 10. *Epist.* iii. 18. v. 14. vii. 12. x. 297, &c.; Juvenal. *Sat.* xiv. 193.

¶ Ovid. *Ibis.* 39.; Tacitus i. 11, 74; ii. 30. vi. 8.; Suetonius, *Galb.* 80.; Florus, iv. 12.

advocates;* written papers held in the hand;† mere memoranda;‡ a packet or parcel;§ epigrams, and the little satirical effusions which have since been denominated pasquinades;|| advertisements of spectacles,¶ and public notifications in general;** booksellers' shops;†† the programma of the theatres, and painted exhibitions of every kind.‡‡

The very derivation of the term, upon which, for a wonder, our legal antiquaries are perfectly agreed, and have no shrewd surmises to offer, makes it self-evident that libelling, according to the strict definition of the term adopted by our law from the later of the Roman jurists, could not prevail to any very alarming extent, but with a people, amongst whom the art of writing was pretty generally practised. In the earlier of the ancient codes, as well as in those of more modern nations, before that art was in any very extensive use, we must not therefore be surprised, that we find but very little upon the subject. Most of them contain, however, provisions more or less severe, for the suppression of that disposition, which, by no means deficient in the will, wanted but the means to diffuse and perpetuate the slander, which, from pure necessity, was confined to a verbal publication, injurious and malicious in a greater or a less proportion, according to the circumstances of time and place under which it might be made. To those ruder enactments against scandal and defamation, which may not inaptly be termed the law of libels, *non scripti*, we shall therefore direct some portion of the reader's attention, inasmuch as they were the foundation of the more finished system of laws for preventing the publication of those *libelli scripti*, which, in modern days, have extended themselves, with the extension of writing and printing, to a degree that has alarmed some of the most zealous supporters of the liberty of the press, who wish not that its licentiousness should be permitted to attack, with equal impunity, the throne and the altar; whilst it affords a secure protection to the vilifier of his prince, the insulter

* Juvenal, Sat. vi. 243.; vii. 107.; Martial, v. 51. 1.; Quint. Inst. vi. 2.; xii. 8.

† Pliny, Epist. vi. 5.; Quint. Inst. x. 7.

‡ Suet. Aug. 84.

§ Cicero, Attic. xi. 1.

|| Juvenal, Sat. i. 92.; Suetonius, Domit. 14.; Quint. Inst. viii. 6.

¶ Catullus, liii. 4.

** Cicero, Philipp. ii. 38.

†† Cicero pro Quint. 6, 15, 19.; Senec. de Benef. iv. 12.; Petronius, Sat. 28.

‡‡ Horace, Sat. i. 41.; Suetonius, Tib. 306.

of his country's laws, and the bold blasphemer of his God. This course will, too, in some measure, prepare them for the remarks which we intend to offer, on what we cannot but consider one of the most glaring errors of our own law for the punishment of defamation generally; in the wide distinction which they make in the punishment of scandal spoken, and the same scandal when reduced to writing; a distinction which, as we shall then endeavour to prove, is not founded on any correct principles of reasoning, but which, on the contrary, in its practical application, is productive of the greatest evils, as well as pregnant with the grossest absurdity.

In all historical investigations, a believer in revelation is naturally led to look, in the first place, to the Jewish records, as by far the most ancient in existence; and of the state of the law of defamation amongst that extraordinary people, who for a long period had the Almighty at once for their lawgiver and king, the following account has been given by Mr. Holt, in the Introduction to his Treatise on the Law of Libel.*

“Amongst the Jews, to whom a distinct revelation was made, one of the main purposes of which was to revive the characters of the law of nature, and to retrace those laws which were defaced and almost obliterated by corrupt traditions,—to slander any one, particularly those in authority, was expressly forbidden, and the subject of a curse, by the law of Moses.”

We have, however, carefully examined the 22d and 23d chapters of Exodus, referred to in support of this statement; but neither there, nor in any other part of the Pentateuch, can we find any very express provision against slandering another. “Thou shalt not revile the gods, nor curse the ruler of thy people,”† is the only passage in the first, which has any relation to the subject; but surely, cursing the gods or rulers of the people, (for here, as in some other parts of the sacred writings, those terms are synonymous,) is a very different thing from expressly prohibiting to slander any one, and rendering that prohibition the subject of a curse. In the earlier of the legislative codes, the first of these offences is raised into a species of *læsa majestas*, or high treason; whilst of the latter—for they took much better care of kings, and those in authority under them, than of the people—they scarcely make the slightest mention. Nor does the second chapter afford much better

* Page 3.

† Exodus, xxii. 28.

ground for the assertion, since the first verse alone can at any rate be pressed into the service; and it may reasonably be doubted whether the enactment contained in its former clause, "thou shalt not raise a false report," does not much more nearly approach to the *falsa clamor*, than to the scandal or defamation of our law; whilst there can be no hesitation in identifying that of the latter, "put not thy hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness," with the perjury, and subornation of perjury, of modern times.

The laws of the ancient EGYPTIANS, as far as we are acquainted with their provisions, are equally silent upon the subject of simple defamation. That aggravated species of it, which was sought to be effected by rendering the courts of justice the unconscious ministers of personal malice, or by calling in the sanction of an oath to support a charge falsely preferred against another, was visited with great, and, in so advanced a stage of society, with very unnecessary severity. Perjury, partly from a religious, and partly from a political motive, was in all cases punished by death, it being looked upon as a crime little less destructive of the peace of the community, than it was insulting to the majesty of the gods. In the like vindictive spirit, false accusers were punished in the same manner as those whom they accused would have been, had they been convicted—an application of the *lex talionis*, by no means peculiar to this remote period of the history of the world, inasmuch as it still pervades the codes of several of the northern nations, and was once attempted in our own.* It may, however, be questioned, whether these laws for the punishment of perjury and false accusations, severe as they unquestionably are, would have been sufficient to prevent the evil resulting from individual reputation, being in other points left open to attack, amongst a people whose progress in the arts would abundantly furnish them with the means, as the extent of their commerce would readily supply the inducement, to traduce and undermine the character of their neighbours. But here the precautions of their well-arranged, though arbitrary system of police, aided the defective legislation of this singular

* By 37 Edw. III. c. 18. which provided, that such as preferred any suggestions to the king's great council, should put in pledges of taliation, to incur the same punishment as would have been inflicted upon the persons whom they accused, in case of their conviction, should the charge prove to be untrue. But after the trial of a single year, this law was repealed.

people, inasmuch as the strict injunction upon every individual to give in, to the governor of his province, a true and correct account of the manner in which he gained his livelihood, under pain of death, if that account should in any respect be false, would effectually prevent men of talent, without principle, from carrying on the trade of a common libeller, which, after all, is far more injurious to personal reputation, and to the safety of the state, than any attack that might be feared from the tongues of persons envious of individual prosperity, or who conceived themselves called upon to revenge their own real or imaginary wrongs, by holding up to the contempt of the people the government which had inflicted them. In the one instance, you have, it is true, plenty of combustible matter, but it may remain innoxious for ever, for want of the spark to explode it; in the other, you have the torch and the train always ready to be applied to every inflammatory substance, which waited but the first touch of ignition, to spread abroad in every direction a destructive volume of smoke and flame.

"The PERSIANS," says the writer already referred to,* in the Introduction to his work, "had a law which declared it infamous to be detected in a lie. A people enacting a positive law in mere morals, could not be unprovided with a punishment for defamation."

This certainly seems to be a very natural and legitimate conclusion: we would accompany it, however, by this observation, that the extraordinary attention bestowed by the ancient Persians, in training up their children in the public seminaries, to an habitual direction of their views to the public good; the military spirit of their nation, which appears for a long period to have been an utter stranger to commerce, and never to have pursued it to any extent; and, above all, their blind obedience to every indication of their monarch's will, and the awe with which they contemplated its ministers,—would, in all probability, render the infamy attached to detection in a lie, sufficient to prevent an inclination to public or private defamation from gaining much ground amongst them. It was the character also of the laws of the ancient Persians, according to the representations of Xenophon, who had sufficient opportunities of making himself acquainted with them, that they tended more than those of any other nation to prevent, rather than to punish, crime; to deter men from the commission of

* Holt's Treatise on the Law of Libel, p. 3, 4.

evil, by inspiring them with a love of virtue and a hatred of vice, rather than by a hope of reward, or fear of punishment.*

In a very short note upon a case in his twelfth Report,† my Lord Coke informs us, that the law of the LYDIANS was, "that he who slanders another shall be let blood in the tongue, and he who hears it, and assents to it, in the ear, &c.," but as he does not refer us to the authority upon which he makes this assertion, we have not been able to discover at what period of their history this law was enacted, though from its singular, and, if we may so apply the term, quaint infliction of punishment upon the very organs which were the immediate instruments in committing the offence, we should be inclined to ascribe it to an early stage of their legislation. There is every reason to conclude, that the Lydians were a far more commercial people than were their conquerors the Persians, and this circumstance may account for the pains taken by their lawgivers to prevent defamation, though the remedy they applied must have been somewhat more curious than efficacious.

β.

A Dissertation on the Importance of Biblical Literature.
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BIBLICAL Literature is usually divided into two great parts, denominated Criticism, and Interpretation, or Hermeneutics. The object of the former, is to determine what is the genuine text of sacred scripture; of the latter, to discover and exhibit its meaning.

The series of books which compose the sacred volume were written at different times, during a period of sixteen hundred years. The latest of these productions, therefore, have come down to us through a series of more than seventeen centuries; and the earliest have been preserved for more than three thousand years. During this long period, they have undergone innumerable transcriptions in almost every part of the world, and by every description of persons. We find, from our own experience, that it is difficult to transcribe a single page without making some mistake; and that to transcribe a volume without an error, would be

* Anab. lib. i.

† Page 36.

almost impossible. That the sacred scriptures, therefore, should have been exempted from all errors of this nature, would have required a miraculous superintendence of every one who undertook to transcribe them. We have the most convincing proof, that no such miraculous influence has ever been granted. It has been found, on the collation of the numerous manuscripts still extant, and on the examination of other sources of information, that the number of discrepancies is very great, and indeed at first view appalling. It becomes, therefore, a matter of great difficulty and importance, to determine, amidst this vast multitude, which is the true reading, and to fix with certainty the text which proceeded from the sacred penmen. The importance of this subject is such, that it early forced itself on the attention of the friends of revelation. Even as early as the time of Origen, the discrepancies between the several copies of the Septuagint were so numerous and serious, that he was induced to devote more than twenty-eight years of his life to a laborious attempt to restore its purity, and bring it to a nearer coincidence with the Hebrew. In this department of sacred criticism, he was followed by Lucian of Antioch, and Hesychius of Egypt, whose revised editions became the standard copies of their respective countries, and seem to have included the New Testament as well as the Septuagint.

The same disagreement which Origen had found in the Greek scriptures, Jerome complains of in the Latin. As this ancient version had been made from the Septuagint, which was then the standard both of the Eastern and Western churches, Jerome at first had courage to attempt nothing more than a correction of this translation, from the improved text of the Greek scriptures, furnished by the labours of Origen. But his manuscripts being lost or destroyed, he embraced the bolder resolution of making a version from the Hebrew text itself. This translation, about the year six hundred, received the sanction of the Bishop of Rome, and became the standard of the Roman church.

Previously to the time of Jerome, though at what precise period is unknown, the Jews had begun to devote much attention to the cultivation of the Hebrew language, and the preservation of their sacred writings. The two principal seats of their learning were, Tiberias, for the western Jews, and Babylon for the eastern. At the former of these places was composed the Jerusalem Talmud, at the latter

the Babylonish ; containing the traditionary law of the Jews, with the comments of their doctors. But what at present we are more interested in, is the incredible labour they devoted to fix the text of the Hebrew scriptures, and to preserve it immaculate. The Masora, which is one of the most surprising monuments of human industry, contains the result of their labours. It embraces the criticisms on the text, which had been handed down from their ancestors ; the most minute details respecting the size, form, and position of the letters ; the number of letters in each book, and in the whole Bible ; how often each letter occurs ; and the rules to be observed in transcribing the sacred volume ; in short, nothing seems to have been omitted, which ingenuity and industry could devise and accomplish, to preserve the Hebrew scriptures from the slightest alteration. When these Jews were driven from the east, they carried with them to the southern parts of Spain, their fondness for Biblical criticism, and rendered the twelfth century famous, by the writings of Maimonides, Aben Ezra, David Kimchi, &c. Such was the effect of the labours of the Masorites, that the Jews generally imbibed the belief of the perfect exemption of the Hebrew Bible from all errors in letters, points, and accents. On the revival of Hebrew literature among the Christians, shortly before the Reformation, the same belief of the immaculate purity of the sacred text was embraced by them. It was not until the Samaritan Pentateuch was discovered, and brought into Europe, in sixteen hundred and twenty, that much diversity of opinion on this subject seems to have existed. As this copy of the law of Moses was written in the Hebrew language, but without the vowel points, and in the Samaritan character, critics were led to question the antiquity both of the Hebrew points and letters. As it was still farther observed, that the Samaritan and Hebrew Pentateuchs differed frequently in their readings, Morinus was led to infer from this fact, and from the diversity which existed between the Hebrew and the Septuagint, that the former was much corrupted. In the year sixteen hundred and fifty, Capellus published his *Critica Sacra*, in which he took the more moderate ground of maintaining, that the Hebrew scriptures had descended to us with the usual inaccuracies attendant on all works frequently transcribed. The opposition made to these sentiments by Buxtorf and others, was of the most serious kind. The doctrines of Capellus, however, were soon adopted by Walton, and since that period have rapidly

gained ground. The prevalence of these opinions naturally gave rise to the desire of knowing the actual state of the Hebrew text, and the amount of the diversity which really existed. This led to the publication of Kennicott's celebrated edition of the Hebrew Bible, formed from an extensive collation of manuscripts, both in England and on the continent. This work was finally completed in seventeen hundred and eighty, attended with an immense number of various readings, though few of them are of the least importance. This collection has been considerably increased by the labours of De Rossi, who has been followed by J. D. Michaelis, and Eberhorn, in this department.

The high idea entertained of the purity of the Hebrew text, was to a considerable extent transferred to the received text of the New Testament, which was supposed, by Christians generally, to be as free from all imperfection, as the holy religion it recorded. This text became fixed in the Elzevir edition of sixteen hundred and twenty-four. The history of the formation of the received text, as exhibited in this edition, is thus briefly summed up by Griesbach on page forty-two of his *Prolegomena*. "The Elzevir edition was formed from that of Beza, and the third of Stephens. Beza followed the third of Stephens, with very few alterations. This edition of Stephens was the fifth of Erasmus reprinted, with the exception of the few instances in which he preferred the Complutensian. Erasmus formed his text from a few modern manuscripts, with the assistance of the Latin Vulgate, and the writings of a few of the fathers inaccurately edited."

Shortly after the formation of the received text, in the Elzevir edition in sixteen hundred and twenty-four, Biblical Literature received a considerable accession, in the publication of Walton's *Polyglott*, and subsequently of Father Simon's *Critical Histories of the Old Testament and New Testaments*. The attention bestowed on this subject gradually increased, and the number of discrepancies was found to be more and more considerable. The received text was gradually obtaining the sanctity of age, and the authority

* Griesbach very properly remarks, that no edition is entitled to any authority of itself, but is to be estimated by the value of the materials from which it was formed. It has providentially happened, according to the opinion of later critics, that the manuscripts whence Erasmus, and the other early editors, formed their editions, belong to the very class, which of all others is of the most value, and that therefore the received text is better entitled to our confidence than any other which has yet been formed.

of long continued acceptance, when the Christian world was aroused by the appearance of the edition of Dr. Mill, with its thirty thousand various readings. The subject now assumed so serious an aspect, that the enemies of the truth stood in wishful expectation to see the very foundation of the church undermined, and the pious were turning themselves to God as their last refuge. As this subject, for a time, almost engrossed the attention of Christendom, it was pursued with the greatest ardour. The materials of this science have thus not only been greatly increased, but reduced to the order of a regular system, by the labours of Wetstein, Bengel, Semler, and especially of Griesbach. Although the various readings have been made to amount to no less than one hundred and fifty thousand, yet since it has been found, that rules or criteria could easily be determined upon, whose application would decide, in almost every important instance, which was the original reading, and that the vast majority of these discrepancies were of no importance, relating to mere differences of orthography, arrangement of words, or other trivial particulars, the hopes and fears of the enemies and the friends of the truth, have alike subsided, and the church with more confidence than ever can exclaim—*Verbum Dei manet in æternum*.*

It surely will not be considered an unreasonable requisition, that we review the course of this investigation, and follow the steps which have led to this delightful result; that we carefully consider the evidence, that the Bible we now have, is essentially the Bible which proceeded from the sacred writers. To lead us over this course, and exhibit this evidence, is the office of sacred criticism. As this is a subject of great interest and importance, it is also one of considerable extent, requiring,

1. As it regards the Old Testament, a history of the sacred text, through different periods, from its formation to the present day, including an account of the manner in which the several books were originally written, compiled, and preserved, and the various means devised for maintaining or restoring their purity.

The first point of interest on this subject, is the consideration of the question respecting the purity of the Hebrew text; and having come to the conclusion, now universally

* It should be stated, that these errors do not affect the integrity of the text. Because, in almost every instance, they are the mere mistakes of transcribers; and the *true reading*, though lost in one copy, is preserved in another.

admitted, that there is no such thing as a text immaculately pure, to inquire into the various sources of the errors found to exist, and to arrange them in their proper classes.

Our second object should be, the consideration of the means by which the purity of the text may be restored. This requires a knowledge of the sources whence its original state is to be learnt, such as ancient manuscripts, versions, and quotations.

With regard to manuscripts, we must learn the circumstances by which their comparative authority is to be determined; as, their antiquity, the care with which they have been written and preserved, and the particular family or class to which they belong.

The consideration of the ancient versions leads us into the extensive history of the LXX. Whether this version derived its name from the belief, that seventy-two persons were engaged in the translation, or from its being made under the sanction of the council of seventy elders, is uncertain. It is strongly recommended to our attention, by its high antiquity; by the authority it so long maintained, both in the Jewish and Christian church; by the influence it has had on the style of the New Testament; and its importance in ascertaining the ancient readings of the Old. The other versions of importance are, the Greek translations of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion—the ancient Latin, the Syriac, and the Chaldee Paraphrases, or Jewish Targums. Each of these versions is considered as in some measure exhibiting the text, at the period in which they were respectively made. In this connexion should be mentioned the Samaritan Pentateuch, which is the Hebrew text in the Samaritan character, and, as is generally supposed, the ancient Hebrew character. As this Pentateuch has come down through a channel entirely distinct from that by which the Jewish scriptures have been received, and as it has had considerable influence in regulating the course of sacred criticism, it becomes one of the most interesting documents connected with this subject. The principal quotations of importance from the Hebrew scriptures are to be found in the Jewish Talmuds. In addition to these sources of information, should be mentioned, the Masora, which contains the critical apparatus of the Jews, for restoring and preserving the purity of the text.

After attending to these various means of arriving at a knowledge of the original state of the Hebrew Scriptures, we are next to consider their relative value, and the rules

to be adopted in selecting from the various readings they afford.

And, finally, we are to review the history of the actual application of these means, to the restoration of the text, which involves an account of the early critical labours of the Jews, and the subsequent labours of Christians, which can only be given in an account of the various critical editions of the Hebrew Bible.

When we turn to the criticism of the New Testament, we meet a subject of far greater extent and importance, although we shall have the same general course to pursue: examining, first, the sources of the errors; secondly, the means of their correction; and thirdly, the history of the application of these means.

Most of the sources of error, which affected the Old Testament, have also operated on the New, and many of them to a much greater extent; because the New Testament was more widely diffused, more frequently and less carefully transcribed. The attention the Jews devoted to the correctness of their manuscripts, was carried to a superstitious extent. The rules which they prescribed to their transcribers, embraced the most minute particulars, such as the size and form of the letters, the number to be comprised in each line, their distance from each other, &c. This laborious attention, joined with the influence exerted by the predictions of the rabbins, as to the result of the least mistake, produced a degree of scrupulous care, which was never extended to the books of the New Testament. This circumstance, together with the great multiplication of the copies of the New Testament, would lead us to expect, that the discrepancies between these copies would be more serious than the various readings of the Old Testament. The means of correcting whatever errors really may exist, and of arriving at the knowledge of the original text, may again be referred to the several heads of manuscripts, versions, and quotations.

In estimating the value of manuscripts, we must, as before, attend to their antiquity; the care with which they were written; their purity, or freedom from corrections or interpolations; and the class to which they belong. This last subject rises into incalculable importance, from the fact, that critics do not hesitate to merge one hundred manuscripts into one testimony, and to make one counterbalance an hundred, according to the particular class to which they belong. In other words, in judging of any particular read-

ing, the number of individual manuscripts is hardly taken into the account; the only question is, by how many classes or recensions is it supported? as these only are considered as independent witnesses. For this, there is clearly important reason, since it would be as improper to adduce as separate testimony, the several transcripts of the same manuscript, as the several copies of the same edition of any printed work. But the difficulty lies in finding sufficient criteria for separating the several manuscripts into their distinct classes. There is certainly danger of exalting to the rank of independent witnesses, those which are not entitled to this authority. Bengel first proposed this principle of classification. He was followed by Semler, and afterwards by Griesbach. These critics, observing among the numerous various readings exhibited by existing manuscripts, that in characteristic readings many of them agreed, and that this coincidence was so marked, that it could not have been fortuitous; the manuscripts thus agreeing, they referred to the same class, family, or recension. And they still farther remarked, that those manuscripts which agree in their characteristic readings, came from the same country, and coincide with the several versions, and with the writings of the fathers which belong to their respective districts. Hence these recensions are called the Western; the Alexandrine, and the Byzantine, as prevailing in these several sections of the church. This is Griesbach's distribution. The manuscripts belonging to the two former of these classes, are extremely few, yet on the supposition that they are separate and independent witnesses, these few, in case of their coincidence, are made to outweigh the multitude which belong to the Byzantine division. It is on this coincidence that the authority of Griesbach's text is founded. It is plain, therefore, that this authority may be destroyed, either by shewing that there is no sufficient ground for thus separating manuscripts into distinct classes, which was the opinion of Matthæi, and other distinguished men, and which is the tendency of a great part of Dr. Laurence's Essay on this subject; or, admitting that there is good reason for this classification, by shewing that some of these witnesses are unworthy of credit. This, Mr. Nolan has attempted, in his work on the Integrity of the Greek Vulgate. His object was to prove, that the Byzantine text, which is that followed in the received text of the New Testament, is the only one which has come down uncorrupted, and supported by the uniform traditionary testimony of the

church. Instead of calling the first two classes Western and Alexandrine, he calls them Egyptian and Palestine, and gives (page 105) a satisfactory reason for the prevalence of the first in the Western church, and of the second in Alexandria. By thus changing the birth-place of these two recensions, he is enabled to give an historical account of their origin. The Egyptian text he ascribes to the revision of Hesychius, the Palestine to that of Eusebius. The Byzantine was edited by Lucianus. The last-mentioned editor, he supposes, published the then authorized text, without alteration; whereas both the others corrected their copies agreeably to their own views, and to the state of opinion in their respective countries, with which he shews they very strikingly correspond. In thus assigning to Griesbach's two most important classes a recent origin, and endeavouring to fix on them the charge of systematic corruption, he has attempted to undermine the authority of his principles for settling the text. How far he has succeeded in this attempt, must be left for others to decide: it may, however, be safely asserted, that enough has been accomplished, to make the friends of truth hesitate to acknowledge the exclusive authority of a text, which is the result of so questionable a system.

After the manuscripts, the next source of information is the early versions, of which the most important are, the Syriac, the old Latin or Italick, the Sahidic, and the Latin Vulgate. Each of these is made to contribute an important part in settling the sacred text. The history of each, therefore, calls for our serious attention.

Quotations from the New Testament in the early fathers, is the third source, and one which has given rise to much discussion, and exerted great influence on the theories of eminent critics. It is one, also, of peculiar difficulty, owing to the loose *memoriter* manner in which these quotations were frequently made.

After considering these sources of information as to the original state of the sacred text; we are next to attend to the rules by which we are to be governed in our choice of the various readings they afford.

To learn what has been done in attempting to restore the purity of the text, we must study the principles on which the most important editions of the New Testament were conducted, and their respective histories, especially those of Ximenes, Erasmus, Stephens, Mill, Wetstein, and Griesbach.

Such is a very imperfect outline of the first division of this subject. Before proceeding to say any thing on interpretation, I would mention two or three subjects, on which our minds should be previously made up, viz. the canonical authority, the genuineness, and the inspiration, of the sacred scriptures.

With respect to the first, it is evidently proper that we know what books are to be recognized as scripture, before we proceed to consider the principles on which the sacred writings are to be explained. The consideration of the second subject, is little more than the extension of the application of the principles of sacred criticism, ascending from the investigation of the genuineness of particular passages to the genuineness of entire books.

The reason for placing the inspiration of the sacred scriptures in this part of our course, is two-fold: 1st, that we may study them under the deep impression that they are the word of God; and 2dly, because it may be found that the divine origin of the scriptures should exert a considerable influence on the principles by which they are to be interpreted. It is one of the first principles of interpretation, that in explaining any work, respect is to be had to the character of its author. But if the doctrine of the plenary inspiration be true, God is the real author of the sacred scriptures. It is readily admitted, that this fact does not interfere with their having been written according to the common principles of language, which the object they were intended to answer rendered absolutely necessary. In translating the sacred writings, therefore, the principle in question may not exert any great influence; but when we come to explain them, it will be found of essential importance. The rules of interpretation, which arise out of the divine origin of the Bible, are as clearly ascertained, and as well founded, as those which arise from any other source, resting on the authority of the sacred writers themselves. It is from them we learn, that the old dispensation was preparatory to the new; that the law was "a shadow of good things to come," and is to be explained accordingly.

Before entering, therefore, on the second department of this subject, we should be convinced of the canonical authority, authenticity, and inspiration, of the sacred scriptures, that we may be able to take their divine authority as proved.

I am now to endeavour, briefly, to state the course to be pursued in the Interpretation of the Bible.

And in the first place, we may mention what is either essential, or highly important, in the interpreter himself; as, first, a knowledge of the languages in which the Bible was originally written. Any one who reads a work in a translation, reads it through a glass darkly. The words and phrases of no two languages exactly correspond; and the indescribable shades of meaning, which words derive from peculiar combinations, it is impossible a version should retain. Without dwelling on this subject, it is sufficient to appeal to the experience of every one acquainted with any two languages whatever. How would the ancient classics be estimated, if judged by a literal translation? He should also be acquainted with the character and history of the several sacred writers, with the state of opinion in the age in which they lived. This is of peculiar importance in regard to the New Testament, and includes a knowledge of the sects and opinions of the Jews, of the early Christian doctrines, and of the early heresies. He should also be acquainted with the manners and customs, the laws, character, and circumstances of the persons to whom the sacred writings were addressed, their civil history, with that of neighbouring nations, together with whatever light, geography, chronology, natural history, and philosophy, can cast on the sacred volume.

The interpreter of scripture should be discriminating and cautious; he should be humble and teachable, sensible of his need of divine teaching, and anxious to obtain it. Of all qualifications, the most important are, piety, and a firm conviction of the divine origin of the scriptures: without these we can never enter into the feelings and views of the sacred writers, nor have any proper impressions as to the design of the Bible, and therefore cannot be prepared to expound it. The first duty of an interpreter is to become acquainted with the meaning of words, the several classes into which they are naturally divided, and to become familiar with the general principles of language.

We must next attend to the common acceptation of words and phrases, and the sources of information on this subject: we should inquire into the circumstances by which the import of words and phrases is regulated in all languages; such as the opinions, laws, and customs of the people, the peculiar circumstances of this nature, which have influenced the language and modes of expression characteristic of the Bible. Especially we should attend to the peculiar phraseology of the New Testament, the sources whence it has been

derived; as the Hebrew origin of the sacred writings, their familiarity with the Septuagint; the influence of their religious sects; and their intercourse with neighbouring nations. We should study the means by which the language of the New Testament is to be illustrated; such as, the writings of co-temporary authors, the phraseology of the Old Testament, both in the Greek and Hebrew, and the general character of the eastern idiom.

Having considered these subjects, and fixed in our minds the general principles of interpretation, whether applicable to all writings, or peculiar to the sacred volume, we must attend to the interpretation of figurative language, the connexion between the literal and figurative meaning of words, the circumstances in which the latter is to be resorted to, &c. This will lead to the consideration of the principal figures of speech, such as metaphor and allegory, and especially the parables of our Saviour, which have been as often perverted as any part of the sacred volume. It is therefore necessary that we should have distinctly before us the rules by which these figures are to be explained.

These are only preliminary subjects, which lead to the more extensive principles of interpretation, applicable to whole departments of the word of God, as the rules for historical, doctrinal, typical, and prophetic interpretation. The two latter are peculiarly important. We should fix in our minds the precise definition of a type; learn what persons, institutions, and circumstances of the Old Testament are to be considered as typical; determine whether we are to confine this character to the particular instances specified in the New Testament, or are at liberty to extend it, and how far. With regard to prophecy, it is unnecessary to say that it will require much laborious study, including two of the most difficult subjects connected with this whole department, viz.—the doctrine of double sense, and the modes of quotation adopted by the sacred writers of the New Testament. And, finally, we must consider the systems of interpretation to which the whole Bible has been made to submit, as the cabbalistic; the allegorical; the mystical, which either deserts entirely the grammatical sense, or exalts some inward feeling above the word; the dogmatical, which makes any system of doctrine an authoritative rule of interpretation; as the Roman church, the system which they believe to have been handed down in their traditions; and the philosophical, which makes our preconceived opinions the rule of faith; which includes

the consideration of the proper office of reason in the interpretation of scripture. The history and claims of these several systems, and their respective influence on the church, open to us as instructive a field of investigation, as any which ecclesiastical history affords.

We may conclude the general outline of this department, by stating the most important and interesting of the duties it enjoins, viz. the immediate study of the word of God. With this we are to be occupied from the commencement to the close of our course. The object of Biblical Literature, is to enable us to do this with the best advantage. Not contented with prescribing rules of interpretation, and furnishing the various means for the illustration of the Bible, it is a great part of her duty to oversee our actual application of them. It is, therefore, to the delightful employment of studying the scriptures that she invites us. I have not forgotten, that the professed object of this Dissertation is to exhibit the importance of Biblical Literature. But I feel that I have already nearly completed the task assigned me, by shewing, as far as my knowledge of the subject would permit, what Biblical Literature is; because I conceive the feeblest statement of its nature is demonstrative of its importance. The importance of a course of study, whose object is to fix with certainty the sacred text, and exhibit the evidence that the Bible we now have, is the Bible which God delivered to his church; to assist us in discovering and exhibiting its meaning, by prescribing the principles by which it is to be explained, and bringing within our reach the various means of illustration; and, above all, which leads us so much to the immediate study of the word itself:—the importance of such a course, is surely a subject on which diversity of opinion is impossible. It is my intention, therefore, on a future occasion, to make some remarks, intended to impress on our minds the necessity of paying particular attention to this subject, the importance of which we must all admit.

[The above essay, with that which we hope soon to give in continuation of it, was delivered to a society, formed in the theological seminary in which its author is a tutor, for improvement in Biblical Literature, by dissertations on important subjects connected with it, and translations and expositions of sacred scripture, performed by the members in alphabetical order: a plan well worthy of imitation in our own country.—EDIT.]

REVIEW.

1. *Characteristics, in the Manner of Rochefoucault's Maxims.* Fcap. 8vo. pp. 156. London, 1823. Simpkin and Marshall.
2. *Outlines of Character: consisting of, the Great Character—the English Character—Characteristic Classes in Relation to Happiness—the Gentleman—External Indications of Character—Craniology—the Poet—the Orator—Literary Characters—the Periodical Critic—the Man of Genius.* By a Member of the Philomathic Institution. 8vo. pp. 320. London, 1823. Longman.

“It is not easy to write Essays like Montaigne, nor Maxims in the manner of the Duke de la Rochefoucault;” so runs the three hundred and seventy-eighth of the four hundred and twenty-four Characteristics in this volume; but it is strangely misplaced towards the close of the book, when it should have stood at the head, as a text, upon which we have a hundred and fifty pages of practical comment. Save, indeed, in a few particulars, better honoured in the breach than in the observance, nothing can conveniently be less “in the manner of Rochefoucault’s Maxims,” than these professed imitations of them. Of the style, and, as far as execution is concerned, the spirit of those celebrated productions, we have ever been as ardent admirers as the author before us can be, though despairing of seeing them equalled in their beauties, whilst their defects were avoided: To this rare excellence, he, however, ambitiously aspires, though confessedly aware of the difficulties of so bold a flight: “A thought,” says he in his preface, “must tell at once, or not at all;” and he observes with as accurate a taste, that in the construction of maxims, whilst “the style must be sententious and epigrammatic, it is equally necessary to avoid paradox or common-place.” By these canons of criticism he cannot object to be tried, for they are his own; yet strangely do we deceive ourselves, if, ere we have done with him, he is not most satisfactorily proved to have violated both. “Commencer par le commencement,” then, we can say little, either for the elegant or the epigrammatic turn of such expressions, as “want of confidence in themselves, which is upset and kicks the beam, if the smallest particle of praise is thrown into another’s scale;” nor does the following singular rope of metaphors, which

immediately follow the words just quoted, strike us as very axiomatic, or particularly *à la Rochefoucault*. "They are poor feeble insects, tottering on the road to fame, that are crushed by the shadow of opposition, or stopped by a whisper of rivalry." To our vulgar taste, and dull imaginations also, the idea and the expression seems equally unhappy, of a woman "throwing herself unblushingly at our heads," though some heads, by the way, would not be much injured by a far heavier concussion. Whether that might be the case with the author's, our readers must determine for themselves, as they proceed with our remarks upon this production.

The desire to say what he considers a smart thing, and to follow out a favourite thought through every possible ramification, frequently leads him into absurdity and paradox; as where, in the twenty-second maxim, to prove that envy is the most universal passion, he roundly asserts, that "we envy folly and conceit, nay, we go so far as to envy whatever confers distinction or notoriety, even vice and infamy." If this be true, we envy the lounging fops in Bond-street, whom every man of sense despises; and are almost willing to be hung and anatomized, to secure the notoriety of the perpetrators of the late horrid murder. In like manner, every day's experience contradicts an assertion, founded either upon this constant hunting after prettyisms and witticisms, or as certain rumours, hereafter to be stated, lead us to suspect, upon personal pique, "that if a man is disliked by one woman, he will succeed with none. The sex (one and all) have the same secret or free-masonry in judging of men." This is downright nonsense. Nor can we conceive of any thing so volatile and mercurial as our author must be, if he verifies, in his own versatility, the assertion of his sixtieth characteristic, that "we often bestow the most opprobrious epithets on our best friends, and retract them twenty times in the course of a day, while the man himself remains the same." Surely he must have drawn some at least of the views of human life and character from the interior of bedlam, for withoutside its walls, no one, who ought not to be within them, can act in this and several other respects, as he represents the whole human race to do. Other of his sketches satisfy us, indeed, that he must have kept strange company, or we never should have had a grave denunciation of associating with footmen, thus happily expressed, "Livery servants (I confess it) are the only people I do not like to sit in company

with. They offend not only by their own meanness, but by the ostentatious display of the pride of their own masters." What public-house the writer may be in the habit of frequenting, to smoke his pipe and take his glass, we know not; but it must have been in the tap-room, or some such place of low resort, that he could alone be subjected to this affront; and if he sought such company, he at least ought not to complain of their intrusion. We should, however, be astonished at no incongruity in the conduct, tastes, or associations of a man, who deliberately tells us, as the result of his observation of human character, "so that we excite a strong emotion in the breasts of others, we care little of what kind it is, or by what means we produce it;" so that it is a matter of perfect indifference, whether we excite the warmest and best founded admiration, or the strongest and most merited disgust, by the sublimest virtues on the one hand, or the most detestable vices on the other. The philanthropist and the murderer—the profoundest scholar, and the most dexterous thief,—Howard and Colonel Chartres, Milton and Bill Seames, are equally enviable, because equally successful in attaining the chief object of human pursuit in life; and, if there were any truth in the following farrago of nonsense, would be on the same common level at their deaths.

"People in the grasp of death wish all the evil they have done (as well as all the good) to be known, not to make atonement by confession, but to excite one more strong sensation before they die, and to leave their interests and passions a legacy to posterity, when they themselves are exempt from the consequences." [pp. 66, 67.]

Compared with such wretched morality, or rather gross immorality,—so complete a perversion of common sense, and caricature of the principles of human action,—as this, Mandeville, Rochefoucault, and Chesterfield, with all the cynicism, selfishness, and laxity of their systems of ethics, are writers who can do no harm.

The wish of generalizing—the aim at compressing all that can be said on any subject, into a nut-shell,—has led all maxim-makers and axiomatic writers, Rochefoucault by no means excepted, to lay down rules as universally applicable, which are but very partially so, and consequently require much modification and qualifying. Thus, when the author before us tells us, that "we are quite as apt to believe what we dread, as what we hope," every one who thinks at all must

see, in a moment, that this mainly depends upon constitutional temperament, some persons as habitually hoping even against hope, as others are sunk into the depth of despair by the slightest disappointment or uncertainty. The nerves, indeed, have often as much to do with our hopes and fears, as the character of the mind. We the rather wonder, too, at his overlooking this obvious fact, as in another part of his book, he accidentally gives to the nervous system a most fearful preponderance in the regulation of our conduct, where, in undertaking a new explanation of the classical confession of the obnoxious and unclassical doctrine of human depravity, "*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*," he, in the following sublimely unintelligible rant, says, of the generally received opinion, that we do from passion the things of which our reason disapproves,—

"Nothing like it. The course that persons in the situation of Medea pursue, has often as little to do with inclination as with judgment; but they are led astray by some object of a disturbed imagination, that shocks their feelings and staggers their belief, and they grasp the phantom, to put an end to this state of tormenting suspense, and to see whether it is human or not." [p. 58.]

A shaved head and a strait waistcoat would be the fittest regimen, at once for the author, and the subjects, of this new theory of morals.

In this species of writing, especially, brevity is the soul of wit; and we have often thought, that some of the latter maxims of Rochefoucault have been very faulty, from their wide departure from this rule; but a much larger proportion of those of his imitator are in the like dilemma, of losing most of whatever point and force they may possess, by their lengthiness. Of this, he would himself seem to be aware, for he has divided several of them into two, three, four, and even five separate maxims or characteristics, although they are so evidently consecutive parts of the same proposition, as to be commenced with an "or it often arises," "this negative system leads;" "others make;" "it does not render the person less contemptible;" "are we to infer from this?" "the foregoing maxim shews," &c.

In those maxims we are furnished with abundance of truisms, some of them as novel and instructive, as that a man cannot produce a fine picture, or solve an abstruse problem, by giving himself airs of importance; a discovery for which few, we apprehend, will hold themselves very deeply indebted to this new Rochefoucault.

Others are at once trifling, little-minded, useless, and absurd; e. g. "The expression of a Frenchman's face is often as melancholy when he is by himself, as it is lively in conversation. The instant he ceases to talk, he becomes 'quite chop-fallen.'" It would have been equally important and instructive to have recorded as an axiom, that "the appearance of an Hessian boot is often as dull, when it has been rained upon for an hour, as it is glossy when sent out of the maker's shop. The instant it has had a thorough soaking, it becomes as dull as though it never had a brush upon it."

Nor are we much more edified by the oracular assurance, that Russel could play nothing but Jerry Sneak; and that it was ridiculous to set up Mr. Kean as a rival to Mr. Kemble, a text, upon which we have a page of comment; or struck with astonishment, by the italic *prodigious* appended to the name of Liston, as an illustration of a characteristic, the burden of which is, that "comic actors have generally attempted tragedy parts, and have a hankering after it to the last."

Enough, however, of instances to prove, that this maker of maxims is no Rochefoucault, although he has succeeded in copying some of the faults, without having ability to imitate the beauties, of that agreeable writer. Thus drawing sketches of human character from the worst features of its worst specimens, they have, though with different degrees of talent and success, formed rules for the conduct of mankind, admirably calculated to render them what they represent them naturally to be, self-interested hypocrites. Such, for instance, are principles of morality like the following:—"It signifies little what we say of our acquaintances, so that we do not tell them what others say against them;" or in other words, it is unimportant whether we speak truth or falsehood. On the same system, we are told, that "mankind are a herd of knaves and fools. It is necessary to join the crowd, or get out of their way, in order not to be trampled to death by them." After such a sweeping condemnation of the whole race of which he is an individual, it can be no breach of charity to say, that the author of this characteristic must either be a fool or knave; and our perusal of his work would induce us to ask him, as some wit of the last century asked one of its anti-social philosophers, who had pronounced a somewhat similar libel upon his species, "Pray, sir, may not a man be both?" That he may, is indeed admitted, by another of these charac-

teristics, in which there is at once more truth and sense; "I am always afraid of a fool: one cannot be sure that he is not a knave as well;" and in compliance with this friendly caution, we shall take especial care to keep out of this author's way.

In another respect he resembles Rochefoucault; and those satirists who know little of women but the refuse of the sex; and hence attribute to the most chaste and virtuous the inclinations and vices of the most degraded—the necessity for disguising the one, and refraining from the other, constituting, according to their slanderous theory, the only difference between the modest woman and the shameless prostitute, the latter of whom has evidently this advantage, that she is no hypocrite. "Women," we are told, "never reason," and therefore, adds our astute logician, "they are comparatively seldom wrong." Yet other of his sketches of the sex, represent them as everlastingly talking about their dress; as neither consulting the head nor heart, but mere humour and fancy, in love, though with them it is "the great business of life," in which they constantly make mistakes, and yet, marvellous to say, only miss making profound discoveries, but "do not involve themselves in gross absurdities." These are paradoxes beyond our mean common sense to reconcile, or to solve; perhaps, however, that nameless qualification of the other sex, which is superior to reason, may enable them to do it more to their satisfaction, than we fear the following extracts from this work will be to the author's, if their approbation is among the varied objects of his singular ambition.

"Women have as little imagination as they have reason. They are pure egotists. They cannot go out of themselves. There is no instance of a woman having done any thing great in poetry or philosophy. They can act tragedy, because this depends very much on the physical expression of the passions—they can sing, for they have flexible throats and nice ears—they can write romances about love—and talk for ever about nothing.—Women are not philosophers or poets, patriots, moralists, or politicians—they are simply women." [p. 114.]

"Women have no speculative faculty or fortitude of mind, and wherever they exercise a continual and paramount sway, all must be soon laughed out of countenance, but the immediately intelligible and agreeable—but the shewy in religion, the lax in morals, and the superficial in philosophy. The texture of women's minds, as well as of their bodies, is softer than that of men's; but they have not the same strength of nerve, of understanding, or of moral purpose." [p. 115.]

"Women do not become abandoned with the mere loss of character. They only discover the vicious propensities, which they before were bound to conceal. They do not (all at once) part with their virtue, but throw aside the veil of affectation and prudery." [p. 131.]

But still more strongly do we protest against the anti-Christian, and worse than heathenish, cast of this work. Worse than heathenish, we deliberately repeat, for the philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome, unaided by the light of revelation which we enjoy, were too wise to have written, as this would-be philosopher writes: "Death is the greatest evil, because it cuts off hope." Now, if this means any thing—though we have often suspected the wretched school to which this writer evidently belongs, of having no meaning in a great part of what they say—it must mean, that death is annihilation; and happy would it be for them, could they prove it to be so; and that, consequently, death, whilst it cuts off hope, puts an end also to fear. But it is not thus that death acts either upon the wicked or the righteous; its approaches being to the one a fearful looking-for of judgment and of fiery indignation, to be revealed in the last day; to the other, a hope full of immortality. To the Christian, therefore, the arrival of death is not the greatest evil, but strongly as the ties of kindred, weeping friends, and beloved companions, may attach him to this life, it is yet the greatest good; not the end of hope, but the connecting link between its delightful, though lingering promises, and their full and rapturous fruition. To strive to believe a contrary doctrine, because the consciousness of a mispent life induces them to wish it were true, is a fearful illustration of one of the scripture characteristics of the wicked, that "they lay the flattering unction to their souls," quoted, in these characteristics, with the levity which marks the writings of scoffers at the truths of the Bible, of whose sublime and happy phraseology they frequently avail themselves, "to round a period, or adorn a tale." To the doctrines of that sacred volume, the writer before us not only shews a marked neglect, but an open hostility, disposing in a very summary way, in two of his characteristics, of original sin, as a "negative system of virtue, leading to a very low style of moral sentiment;" whereas it is one of the pillars on which the sublime morality of the scriptures rests. But of his polemical attainments, our readers will be able to form a correct judgment, from the following very satisfactory solution of all

the difficulties attending some of the nicest questions, that in all ages of the church have perplexed and divided the wisest and the best of men, and formed a Gordian knot, which it was reserved for the superior illumination of this new philosopher thus dexterously to untie.

“The theological doctrines of *Original Sin*, of *Grace*, and *Election*, admit of a moral and natural solution. Outward acts or events hardly reach the inward disposition, or fitness for good or evil. Humanity is to be met with in a den of robbers, nay, modesty in a brothel. Nature prevails, and vindicates its rights to the last.” [p. 131.]

Was ever such arrant unintelligible fustian put in print, since poor Mat. Lee, in one of his fits of lunacy, exclaimed,

“Arise, O Jupiter, and snuff the moon?”

If any of our readers can understand it, we do not envy them their understanding.

To avoid the very suspicion of prejudice, we will now, however, extract a few of the best of the maxims which this book contains.

“Popularity disarms envy in well-disposed minds. Those are ever the most ready to do justice to others, who feel that the world has done them justice. When success has not this effect in opening the mind, it is a sign that it has been ill-deserved.” [p. 4.]

“What passes in the world for talent, or dexterity, or enterprise, is often only a want of moral principle. We may succeed where others fail, not from a greater share of invention, but from not being nice in the choice of expedients.” [p. 42.]

“The truly proud man knows neither superiors nor inferiors. The first he does not admit of: the last he does not concern himself about.” [p. 50.]

“Animal spirits are continually taken for wit and fancy; and the want of them, for sense and judgment.” [p. 59.]

“In public speaking, we must appeal either to the prejudices of others, or to the love of truth and justice. If we think merely of displaying our own ability, we shall ruin every cause we undertake.” [Ibid.]

“A man’s reputation is not in his own keeping, but lies at the mercy on the profligacy of others. Calumny requires no proof. The throwing out malicious imputations against any character leaves a stain, which no after-refutation can wipe out. To create an unfavourable impression, it is not necessary that certain things should be *true*, but that they *have been said*. The imagination is of so delicate a texture, that even words wound it.” [pp. 75, 77.]

“Nothing gives such a blow to friendship as the detecting

another in an untruth. It strikes at the root of our confidence ever after." [p. 77.]

"People do not persist in their vices because they are not weary of them, but because they cannot leave them off. It is the nature of vice to leave us no resource but in itself." [p. 94.]

"Habitual liars invent falsehoods, not to gain any end, or even to deceive their hearers, but to amuse themselves. It is partly practice and partly habit. It requires an effort in them to speak truth." [p. 96.]

"Those only deserve a monument who do not need one; that is, who have raised themselves a monument in the minds and memories of men." [p. 139.]

"Those who can command themselves, command others." [p. 144.]

There is also much good sense in the following refutation of the leading principle of Rochefoucault's selfish system, although in form it is more like an essay than a maxim.

"It is ridiculous to say, that compassion, friendship, &c. are at bottom only selfishness in disguise, because it is *we* who feel pleasure or pain in the good or evil of others; for the meaning of self-love is not that it is I who love, but that I love myself. The motive is no more selfish because it is I who feel it, than the action is selfish, because it is I who perform it. To prove a man selfish, it is not surely enough to say, that it is *he who feels*, (this is a mere quibble,) but to shew that he does not feel *for another*; that is, that the idea of the suffering or welfare of others does not excite any feeling whatever of pleasure or pain in his mind, except from some reference to, or reflection on, himself. Self-love, or the love of self, means, that I have an immediate interest in the contemplation of my own good, and that this is a motive to action; and benevolence, or the love of others, means in like manner, that I have an immediate interest in the idea of the good or evil that may befall them, and a disposition to assist them, in consequence. Self-love, in a word, is sympathy with myself, that is, it is I who feel it, and I who am the object of it: in benevolence or compassion, it is I who still feel sympathy, but another (not myself) is the object of it. If I feel sympathy with others at all, it must be disinterested. The pleasure it may give me is the consequence, not the cause, of my feeling it. To insist that sympathy is self-love, because we cannot feel for others, without being ourselves affected pleasurable or painfully, is to make nonsense of the question: for it is to insist, that in order to feel for others properly and truly, we must in the first place feel nothing. *C'est une mauvaise plaisanterie*. That the feeling exists in the individual must be granted, and never admitted of a question: the only question is, how that feeling is caused, and what is its object—and it is to express the two opinions that may be entertained on

this subject, that the terms, *self-love* and *benevolence*, have been appropriated. Any other interpretation of them is an evident abuse of language, and a subterfuge in argument, which, driven from the fair field of fact and observation, takes shelter in verbal sophistry." [pp. 45- 47.]

Had the work contained many sentiments like these, we should have given a very different character of it; but inasmuch as it only overturns one false system of morality to set up another, (if any thing like a system it contains,) we should not have said so much as we have done about a book of very little value, but that it is generally attributed to a writer who has obtained a very extensive reputation, and who certainly possesses considerable talents, although they have been miserably misapplied. We allude to Mr. Hazlitt; and these characteristics contain internal evidence, which, though circumstantial, is abundantly sufficient to prove the correctness of this appropriation. He is one of the many literary characters of the present day, who, from their merit having been excessively overrated at their first appearance, have now sunk perhaps as much beneath their proper level; and he bears a degradation, for which he may in a great measure thank himself, with a very ill grace, repaying with contempt and abuse the public neglect of himself and his productions. "Nothing," he tells us, at the close of one of his characteristics, "is more unjust and capricious than public opinion;" and the next is but a reiteration of the same complaint, in the sweeping condemnation, that "the public have neither sense nor gratitude." For our own parts, we think very differently upon the subject; but if authors, on account of the real or supposed beauties of their compositions, because either with or without merit it was fashionable to admire them, have presumed upon this indulgence, and exacted undiminished admiration for whatever trash they chose to publish, they must not murmur at meeting with the fate which many a scornful beauty and coquettish flirt has bitterly but ineffectually lamented that she provoked, when she, in her turn, is neglected and despised.

Lord Byron was the first of those miserably mistaken men, who, intoxicated by praises too extravagant and indiscriminating to last, imagined themselves such favourites with the public, that they might do what they pleased. After they had borne, therefore, with quietness, the irreligious and misanthropic sentiments of *Childe Harold*, and others of his earlier productions, he presumed on their tole-

rating, with equal complacency, the senseless ribaldry of Don Juan, and the gross impiety and cold-blooded malignancy of his contributions to the Liberal. But this insult to public taste and feeling has deservedly recoiled upon himself, and, as an author, he has sunk—where, but for his own folly, no other man could have sunk him—beneath contempt. Thither the writer, now more immediately under our notice, is rapidly following him; and his only consolation in his merited degradation will be, that as he never rose so high, he cannot have so severe a fall, as the noble, yet most ignoble bard, who, in his animated, though vindictive satire on the colleagues of Mr. Hazlitt in the Edinburgh Review, seems prophetically, though most unintentionally, to have anticipated his own fate, when he indignantly asks,

“ Shall peers or princes tread pollution’s path,
And ’scape alike the law’s and muse’s wrath?
Nor blaze with guilty glare through future time,
Eternal beacons of consummate crime?”

But from Mr. Hazlitt, and his feeble imitation of the Characteristics of Rochefoucault, we gladly pass to another work, formed more upon the model of Theophrastus and La Bruyere, under the very modest and unassuming title of “*Outlines of Character, by a Member of the Philomathic Institution;*” though we are happy to find that its author has met with sufficient encouragement, in what would appear to be his first appearance before the public, to avow himself, in a second edition of his work, which bears upon its title-page the name of Mr. Robert Maugham, the secretary to the society. His outlines are sketched with a bold and masterly hand, in a style nervous, yet graceful, axiomatical, yet by no means devoid of eloquence, though sometimes verging on the bombastic. They are not indeed all of equal merit, though none of them are so devoid of interest as not to repay the trouble of perusing them, either by some new ideas which they contain, or by the apt, and frequently also the very novel and striking illustration of those which have no claims to originality. In that upon the English Character, (evidently drawn by an Englishman,) the opinion maintained by many writers of eminence, that the character and condition of nations chiefly depend upon the form of their government, is controverted with ability and success. From the very ingenious essay which follows, intitled, “*Characteristic Classes in Relation to Happiness,*” in which the man of talent and susceptibility—

the man of talent without susceptibility—the susceptible without talent—the common-place and the clods,—are successively passed in review before us, we select the following very fair specimen of the author's style, forming a part of his estimate of the share of happiness enjoyed by the dangerously gifted individuals of his first class:—

“ Let no man envy the occasional exultations, the few fleeting moments of renown and honour, which are snatched by the foremost few in the race of distinction. The purchase is made at the expense of a more solid, if a less brilliant satisfaction—of a more permanent, if a less elevated emotion. Could we witness the anxieties which precede and follow these ‘longings after fame,’ the possessors of the reward would deserve our pity, rather than our admiration. We see only the beauty of the fabric. The scaffolding is removed—the labour is not seen—the consuming care that formed the design; the health, the comfort, the hilarity, the portion even of *life*, that has been sacrificed to raise the wonder of a moment, is not the subject of human cognizance. We see the grandeur of the object, and may wish to have the merit of its creation; but will this idle envy, this ‘momentary buzz of vain renown,’ repay the sacrifice by which it has been purchased? The happiness of these individuals will, in truth, be proportioned to the measure of their intellect. However strong the feelings, if the mind still maintain its preponderance, the equanimity of the character may be preserved. Strong feelings are the general attendants of great talent; but, though strong and impetuous, they do not always lead to despondency, still less to despair. Among beings, however, of this order, the imaginative faculty is often predominant; and though it throws numberless charms around the dull realities of life, it increases the vividness of disappointed feeling, and adds new acuteness to the intensity of suffering.” [pp. 61—63.]

From “the Gentleman,” we give another short passage, worthy alike of commendation, from the correctness of its conceptions, and the spirit of its execution.

“ It is worth inquiring, whether a character, adapted for the highest display of heroic virtue, might not be perverted, and perhaps destroyed, by an attempt to graft upon it a stock of the graceful and ornamental qualities. There are also characters formed by nature or accident, or perhaps by the influence of both, which appear peculiarly adapted to acquire all that is brilliant in wit and fancy, and all that is fascinating in elegance and accomplishment. Are not these beings, however produced, by nature, accident, or habit, obviously of an opposite and uncongenial character, incapable of uniting in the same individual, without the

destruction of the principal qualities of each? The refinements of art destroy the dignity of nature—they aspire to charm only, not to exalt. The poet, whose excellence consists in the elegance and liveliness of his imagination—the painter, whose characteristics are delicacy of touch, and brilliancy of colouring—the musician, whose strains are only melting and harmonious—can never mount to the regions of *active* heroism. The appropriate scenes of their exploits, are the enamelled lawn, the margin of the rippling stream, the shady bower, and the luxurious abodes of wealth and indolence. Even the accomplished orator, from whose public exercise we might expect better things, is lost in the very refinement and polish of his art. Witness the vain and cowardly CICERO—the bribed and fugitive DEMOSTHENES! [pp. 82, 83.]

The essay on “External Indications of Character,” gives opportunity for the introduction of the author’s belief in the system once denominated Craniology, but now endeavouring to establish itself under the newer term of Phrenology. Of that system, Dr. Gall is well known to be the inventor, Dr. Spurzheim, the improver, and very zealous propagator, whilst, amongst their warmest and most devoted disciples, they need not be ashamed to rank the ingenious author of this volume, who closes a specious defence of their singular discovery, by the following very intelligible, though not peculiarly modest, statement of its high pretensions.

“To sum up,—it will be observed, that the general proposition advanced by the theory is,—that the moral qualities and intellectual powers of human beings can be ascertained by an inspection of the external form of the head. That the station of the perceptive faculties is in the region of the eye—of the superior faculties, on the summit of the brow—of the sentiments, on the crown of the head—and the propensities behind. That, as the organs of sense merely transmit impressions to the internal faculties, the discovery of those faculties is a step farther in tracing the nature of that wonderful essence—*the mind of man*. That the brain is the seat of all the powers, moral and intellectual. That the faculties are seated in peculiar portions of the brain, as the congeries of organs or instruments by which all mental phenomena are performed. That, on the state, and in proportion to the size and the activity of the brain, depend the perfection, the suspension, the derangement, or the annihilation of mind. That, the skull, being ductile till long after the brain is formed, becoming ossified by degrees, and constantly undergoing change and renovation, till a late stage of life, it is consequently modified and manifested in proportion to the degree of force, of energy, and of the continued action of the brain; and, in the result, these operations present a form of

head consistent with the mental and moral character of the individual.

“Such is the system, supported, it would seem, by the evidence of indisputable facts, exhibited in numerous instances, gathered from all parts of the globe. The living have been scrutinized in action, and the dead have been dissected. Collections have been formed of the skulls of all nations. The experience of men of science has testified in favour of the theory, and the reasonings of many able authors have successfully supported it.” [pp. 125, 126.]

Now all this is very satisfactory and conclusive, provided its assertions were proofs, though Mr. Maugham, who, we believe, is a lawyer, must be well aware of the useful distinction, which gives to the weakest evidence a decided superiority over the boldest declaration, unsupported by testimony or experience. In the first place, it has been very properly objected to the new system of our neighbours, that it has taken for granted, a point on which the ablest anatomists have been divided in opinion ever since their science was cultivated, and will, in all probability, remain so, (for the theory is not capable of demonstration,) until it shall cease to be numbered with the objects of human pursuit—namely, that the organs of intellect reside in the brain, and not in the nervous system, or some other part of the wonderfully complicated machinery of man. That it does not, can no more be proved, than that it does; and in the anatomical part of the theory, this difficulty stares those in the face, who bottom themselves entirely upon having given to the mental faculties an exclusive local habitation in the brain—that many persons have lost considerable portions of that organ, and, to use a familiar colloquial expression, have been none the worse for it, exhibiting, after such loss, no alteration, either in their mental, or what is equally fatal to the phrenologist, in their moral powers. Say they, that the common consent of mankind, with the exception of a few sceptical individuals, has established the seat of intellect for which they contend? We should be tempted to meet so unphilosophical an argument with the objection, that for the establishing such a superstructure as you intend to raise upon this foundation, we can have nothing to do with consents or admissions, or hypotheses, or opinions, but with the most conclusive and convincing demonstration. With another view we are willing, however, to wave the objection, and to say to the Craniologist, (we beg ten thousand pardons, we should have said, the Phrenologist,) conceding to you, on this

ground, the data of your theory of the mind, the very concession destroys the more novel and more important part of your system, that the brain is also the seat of all the moral powers, or, in the words of one of Mr. Maugham's explanatory notes, "of thought, of sensation, and vitality;" for by the same common consent of all mankind, with still fewer exceptions of the sceptical or perversely hypothetical, the latter are seated in the heart. To our author, who very properly settles the dispute upon the origin and diversity of language with "the scriptures have decided," (p. 295,) we may not improperly make another appeal, and ask, With this consent does not the revealed will of God accord? Is not its language, "The *heart* of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked," not the *head*. "Out of the *heart*," not, again, the *head*, "proceed all manner of evil speaking, lies, murder, theft, adultery," &c. "I will take away the *heart* of stone; a new heart will I give him," not a new *brain*, "saith the Lord." Throughout the Bible, in fact, though the understanding is to be enlightened, it is the *heart* that is to be changed; and whilst fully aware of the answer likely to be made to the remark,—that this language is uniformly figurative, or accommodating itself to the imperfect knowledge of mankind, and therefore a part is put for the whole; we in our turn must ask, whether, as the scriptures were written under the inspiration of the Almighty, it is not probable that the right part would have been used, when it was as easy to use it as the wrong, and no end could possibly have been answered by the misrepresentation? We are not of the number of those who appeal to the Bible as a book of minute scientific accuracy, for such it never pretended to be, as its object was more exalted than the sublimest speculations of mere human learning, when directed to the perishing interests and employments, rather than the eternal destiny, of man; but whilst we refer not to it, therefore, for anatomical or physiological facts, nothing short of actual demonstration can convince us of the inaccuracy of its language, when speaking figuratively and incidentally upon the structure of the creatures of His hand, by whose inspiration all scripture was given for our instruction. And even admitting that the uniform language of scripture, in speaking of the seat of the affections, the passions, the vices, and the virtues of mankind, is not to be prayed in aid of any argument tending to shew their real position in the human frame, we are but left where we were, in that uncertainty, as to the mysterious

union of the body and the soul,—this “vital spark of heavenly flame,” and the material elements which shall mingle into the dust from whence they sprung, when the spirit shall return to God who gave it—of materiality and immateriality, corruption and incorruption—in which we were left by our Creator, for this perhaps, amongst other reasons, that we might not bend the imperfect knowledge, the prejudices, and the pride, of finite and erring beings, to the formation of systems for judging our fellow-creatures, in opposition to, and derogation from, that judgment which belongeth alone to our maker and our God.

After these observations, our readers will not need to be informed, that we are no supporters of the new system of Craniology, or Phrenology, call it which you will; nor, though some of them are infinitely less objectionable, and more plausible, were we ever the advocates of physiognomy, palmistry, or that other *ology*, or *istry*, (whose distinctive appellation we have forgotten, if ever it had any,) which professes to determine the character of an individual by that of his hand-writing; a conclusion, by the way, which, if it could be established, would be highly gratifying to some of our very intimate friends, and indeed of our literary associates in this journal, who would then be fairly intitled at least to this distinction, that they were characters standing alone in the wide world, for as no one ever wrote, so no one could ever be, like them. To all of these ingenious speculations we have one objection, which, to our minds, has ever been conclusive as to the fallacy of their pretensions, namely, that if well-founded, and reduced to practice, they must be injurious to the happiness of man here, and fatal to his prospects for hereafter. To this we know it will be rejoined, that in our search after truth, we have nothing to do with its consequences, but are bound to follow wherever it may lead us; nor do we deny the correctness of the assertion:—but life is, unfortunately, too short for the attainment of all truth, men must therefore be satisfied with directing their attention to that which is most essential to the welfare of themselves and of their species in this world, and in the world to come. Those, therefore, who wish to make the best use of their time, which, with the longest liver, is but too short for the acquisition of knowledge really useful to its possessor, will do wisely to ask themselves the *cui bono* of every invention or pursuit presented to their investigation or adoption. To this we, for our own guidance, have long added another rule, of looking to

the consequences of the establishment of any new theory; and if we have found that these are detrimental to the best interests of our race, we have made up our minds, that it cannot be worth the pains of minutely examining its pretensions, as the time occupied in discovering and exposing its fallacies might be much better employed, both for ourselves and others.

Now, in applying these principles to Phrenology, the obvious answer to its *cui bono*, is, that it enables us to form a correct notion of the characters of men from the formation of their skulls; and were its pretensions well-founded, we should be furnished with a royal and easy road to the attainment of that grand arcanum of legislation, the prevention of crime; for, as all writers on political science and jurisprudence have agreed, that prevention, and not revenge, should be the object of human punishments, it would be at once a justifiable and beneficial course, to indict and convict men, not for murdering their fellow creatures, or despoiling them of their property, but for that they "in and upon the several back parts of the several heads of them, the said A. B. C. D. and E. F. severally had one bump, of the length of one inch, the breadth of half an inch, and the height of one-quarter of an inch, by reason of which said bump, called the organ of destructiveness, they the said A. B. C. D. and E. F. upon any provocation to them inconsiderately offered, were severally likely to murder, or attempt to murder, kill, and slay, the liege subjects of our lord the king, them so offending, to the great danger of all the lieges of our said lord the king, and also against his peace, his crown and dignity." Ludicrous as such a charge must now appear, could the new science for measuring and mapping out bumps and lumps on the head, as the only sure indications of character, be once reduced to that mathematical certainty, without which it is worse than useless—we should seriously recommend such a system of legislation, as the wisest and mildest that could be pursued. But startled perhaps at the absurdity which would result from following out their own principles to all its consequences, we question much whether the ablest and most confident amongst them would venture to hire a servant upon the mere conformity of the cranium with the gauge and gamut of his system, however uncharitably he might be disposed to exercise it upon those in whom he felt no other interest, than, at all risks to their characters and his own candour, to make them illustrations of its truth. Yet if they do not

much more than this, their boasted discovery can be productive of no real advantage to others or to themselves, and the time bestowed upon the study of it is time completely thrown away.

But we have charged it with something infinitely worse, as a reason why it should not be pursued,—i. e. a manifest tendency to injure the best interests of our race, for time, and for eternity. And this, if true, it must do, by barring the door to all repentance and change of heart, which is not evidenced by a correspondent change in the ossification of the head. What Christian, but from the records of the inspired volume—the express declaration of our Saviour—and his own observation in the world, but believes in that regeneration, or new formation of the character, (to avoid all disputation about terms, we say not change of head or heart,) by which the drunkard becomes sober—the lascivious chaste—the violent peaceable—the thief honest—the idle active—and even the miser benevolent, and the morose kind. This change frequently takes place, if not instantaneously, very suddenly; effected, as it often is, by the agency of some unexpected incident or momentary impression. Is that change then, we ask Phrenologists, of which the altered conduct of the man compels every one to take notice, accompanied by a correspondent change in the surface and protuberance of his head? If not, what becomes of the truth or value of their system? Yet that it is, what man in his senses can believe, or how will they undertake to demonstrate it? They will, therefore, be compelled to give the same character of the man thus singularly changed, the year after his conversion, and even down to the period when he shall close the witness of a good confession, though it be of the chief of sinners saved by grace, by a triumphant death, which they would have given of him the moment before that conversion, when he was indulging every wicked and sinful lust and passion of a depraved and unregenerated nature. Could we jest on such a subject, we would ask them, if, amongst their organs indicative of character, they have one indicative of that great change which divides the sinner from the saint? If not, wherever the abandoned and open profligate is turned from the error of his ways, their system must be worse than useless, for it is deceptive, mischievous, uncharitable, and false.

We have been led so far beyond our original intentions in discussing the merits of this new theory, that we shall

not be able to devote much space to the remaining contents of this interesting volume, the perusal of which brought that theory incidentally beneath our notice. In "the Orator," we meet with several judicious remarks on the comparative state of eloquence in ancient and modern times, and a very satisfactory reason for its declension at the bar, since the days in which Demosthenes and Cicero exhibited there the noblest triumphs of the art. We give the passage entire, as a specimen at once of the correctness of our author's reasoning, and the neatness of his style:—

"The style of oratory at the Bar is characteristic of the subjects on which it is exercised. It partakes of all the dryness which belongs to an intricate science, and all the subtlety which attaches to an abstruse art. The causes of the dearth of forensic oratory, are obvious on the surface. Unlike the pleaders of antiquity, those who exercise it are bound in the fetters of precedent. Instead of reason, they refer to authority; and the decisions of an ignorant age, become a standard for that which is enlightened. Wisdom and virtue are supposed to be *abstract*, not *relative*, qualities; and what was wise and good yesterday, must, on legislative authority, be so to-day, and for ever.

"Though all admire the display of eloquence, the forensic orator, however brilliant in speech, if ignorant of the subtleties of his profession, would in general remain neglected and unemployed. For, after all that the man of taste may say in favour of the ornamental, even he, when self-interest is importantly concerned, would prefer the useful and efficient. No man would relish the loss of his cause, and consequently of his property, and perhaps his life, for the sake of the most pathetic, the most brilliant, and the most sublime oration, that was ever pronounced by the genius of man.

"We need not be surprised, therefore, that what is not required or encouraged, should cease to exist. The ancient pleaders soon acquired a sufficient knowledge of the few simple principles of their municipal jurisprudence, and the rules of law and practice which existed in their days. The rest of their time was devoted to the study of eloquence, and to all those arts with which it is connected, and by which it might be advanced and adorned. Not so the forensic student of modern times. The professional education of a barrister, is decidedly opposed to the acquisition of oratorical graces. A whole life is insufficient to master the extensive range of our complicate system of jurisprudence: and, since it is more important to know the law, than to descant on it eloquently, the student prefers his duty and interest, to his gratification.

"The wide extent of legal controversy denies to the practitioner, in general, the leisure of studying to embellish his speeches. The interest, also, of forensic avocations, is diminished, by their

constant recurrence. They become mere matters of commonplace; and a legal advocate perhaps thinks no more of tropes and figures, tones and gestures, than a mechanic does of the line of beauty, or the standard and the principles of taste." [pp. 188—191.]

There is much severity of truth in Mr. Maugham's remarks on the literary character of the age, which he describes, we fear, but too correctly, as one of book-making and of books, though we doubt whether he has been sufficiently behind the curtain to know how the system of publishing and concocting is carried on in *the Row*, as, for brevity's sake, the street of bibliopolists, in which most of the leading houses in *the trade* have their establishments, is generally called. At least, it is not, as he suspects, by authors either reviewing their own works, or furnishing an outline of them, and selecting the passages which they think most favourable for quotation; though, of other modes of puffing, we doubt not there are enough in use. We are more inclined, however, to agree with him in the opinion which he thus gives, of the state and probable fate of literature amongst us.

"The inundation of books already exceeds all useful purposes. The supply will become too great for the demand; and the result must be, that authors, less liberally remunerated, will cease to labour. Such must ever be the case, when the article produced is out of all proportion superabundant. Neither will the decline be confined to the decrease of new productions. Those already written will accelerate the decline in value, and the fastidiousness of taste will fly from what is within the reach of the *odious vulgar*." [pp. 225, 226.]

He will hardly expect us, however, to extend our approbation to the next article, intitled, "the Periodical Critic," on whose labours he sets but very little store. We, however, naturally estimating them more highly, are determined not to devote to the defence of our fraternity, any portion of that time which might be more usefully directed to the discharge of their unpleasant, but important functions. Our author is of opinion, that nothing could be more serviceable to the cause of literature, "than the establishment of a work, which should annually review the reviewers, rejudge their decisions, and constitute, as it were, a court of literary appeal;" a suggestion which we cordially meet with a "Try the experiment, good sir, and right heartily do we wish you good speed." Commending also the entire article to the atten-

tive perusal of those who may be disposed to treat the tribe to which we belong, with as little reverence as our author, we in our turn take a very gentle vengeance upon him, for his presumptuous attack upon reviewers in general, by begging him to review his own composition, with a view to correct some errors in it, which he ought to be grateful, even to critics by profession, for pointing out. The following sentence, for instance, requires pruning of much of its somewhat incongruous exuberance, "Their *cacoëthes loquendi* is latent, and the hidden spring must be effectually touched, ere its stream can flow to the surface, or the gathering torrent pour forth its exuberance in the waters of eloquence." To the same judicious process, we would also commend "the stream of eloquence, which flowed and gathered in its progress the tears of the initiated ;"—"touch but those springs of action, those master-chords by which the human lyre is moved and agitated, and we produce all those effects which are the outward and visible signs of energy and genius ;"—"his soul is not attuned to the strings of sympathy, and he knows but few, if any, of the notes within the compass of the heart's melody."

On the whole, however, we have been so much pleased with these *Outlines*, that we dismiss them with our warm commendation, saying to our readers, *Legite, et nobiscum plaudite.*

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1. *Letters on the Importance, Duty and Advantages, of Early Rising. Addressed to Heads of Families, the Man of Business, the Lover of Nature, the Student, and the Christian.* Fourth Edition. F'cap. 8vo. pp. 210. London, 1822. Taylor and Hessey.
 2. *Early Rising recommended; a Tract, written immediately on Returning from an agreeable Morning Walk, in the Neighbourhood of London.* By the Rev. Jacob Snelgar. F'cap. 8vo. pp. 24. London, 1822. Westley.

We regret to say, that these two publications have laid upon our table, until the author of one of them has changed the scene at once of his ministerial labours, and his matin lucubrations ; whilst the writer of the other has passed into that better world, where we doubt not that he is reaping some of the fruits of the due employment of the comparatively short portion of time allotted to him in this the only scene of preparation for the blessedness or misery of an

eternal state. The delay has, on our parts, been unavoidable; but the dawning of spring after the commencement, at once of a new year, and a new series of our journal, has been considered a proper period for recommending to our readers the adoption of what we apprehend will, to many of them, be a new practice, that of early rising.

The first of the treatises enforcing so salutary and beneficial a habit, is the production of the late Mr. Alfred Cecil Buckland, a member of the inferior branch of the legal profession, who in early life, and in the midst of his usefulness, was taken from his labours to his rest, though not, we trust, before much good had been effected by the dispersion of four editions of a work, from which, we candidly confess, that we ourselves have experienced considerable practical benefit; and therefore do we the more earnestly commend it to the attentive perusal of others.

"Should he," says the ingenious author of letters, of which he modestly and unaffectedly expresses his conviction, "that his name is not of sufficient importance to give celebrity to his work, and conscious that his work will ever be too obscure to reflect lustre upon his name,"—"when mingling hereafter in society, ever have the happiness to hear one *parent* say, in allusion to these pages, 'By them I was first led to improve those hours which were formerly consumed in sleep, and thus I have not only been able to perform with ease the duties which before were often neglected, but I have also experienced the satisfaction of having set a good example to my children:'—Should he ever hear one *lover of nature* observe,—'To them I am indebted for the contemplation of scenes more lovely than I had ever beheld, and the pictures which creation now unfolds to my sight are more beautiful than those which poetic imagery once presented to my fancy:'—Should he ever hear one *student* remark, 'There was a time when my health was impaired in the same proportion as my knowledge increased, but they taught me to promote at once, the vigour of my body, and the improvement of my mind:'—but especially, should he ever hear one *Christian* declare, 'My devotions have never been so ardent, and my faith has never been so strong, as in those seasons which they persuaded me to snatch from oblivion,'—he will not consider his time mispent, or his labour ill-bestowed." [pp. ix.xi, xii.]

That he laboured not altogether in vain, we can testify; and if the new series of our work should smell less of the lamp than did the old one, to him will we gladly attribute the chief merit of the change, although he is now far beyond the influence of our insignificant acknowledgments.

We have too high an opinion of the good sense of our readers, to waste a moment of that time, for the improvement of which we are urgent advocates, by a statement of the evils of lying in bed to a late hour in the morning, where that habit is a mere indulgence. Scarcely need a child be told, that the hours wasted in needless sleep, are time lost, never to be recovered, yet, doubtless, to be accounted for hereafter, besides that the individual who so wastes them, is encouraging a habit that will steal imperceptibly upon him—is enervating his frame—enfeebling the powers of his mind—diminishing his usefulness, and, from the consciousness of laziness which all idle persons feel, is souring his temper; in fact is realizing the mischiefs enumerated by the author of the *Letters on Early Rising*, with a fidelity which even the pitiable victims of the indolence he deservedly reprobates must acknowledge.

“Each morning, instead of being commenced with sentiments of gratitude to that kind and paternal Being who has added another day to his former mercies, is accompanied with a bitter reflection on his again becoming the slave of a habit which he detests, but is unwilling to relinquish. A softness is thrown over the disposition, altogether inconsistent with the courage and strength which the daily concerns of business require. A dissatisfaction with self is produced, which sours the temper, and which is opposed to every thing amiable and pleasing. Every object that presents itself is veiled in a gloom, which invests it in a peculiar melancholy hue, and deprives it of the power of bestowing the pleasures that it may be really calculated to afford. The mutual endearments of the social circle are suspended; and very often the brows of the more aged are knit into a frown at the artless cheerfulness of the young, arising from an envy of their happiness, a near resemblance to which might have been enjoyed by themselves. The day thus commenced, cannot be expected to be spent with satisfaction, or to be finished with self-approbation.” [pp. 25, 26.]

That lying long in bed is injurious to the constitution, every medical man will tell us; and we fully agree with our author in referring that long train of indescribable maladies, so prevalent as well as fashionable in the times in which we live,—though scarcely known in the good old days of our robust forefathers, and which, in the absence of a more specific term, are ranked under the general and compassionating name of *nervous*,—to the inordinate portion of time spent in bed. On the effect of this habit on the constitution, our author judiciously gives us the following high professional authority.

“Nothing,” says Dr. Cheyne, “can be more prejudicial to tender constitutions, studious and contemplative persons, than lying long in bed, lolling and soaking in sheets after any one is distinctly awake, or has slept a due and reasonable time. It necessarily thickens the juices, enervates the solids, and weakens the constitution. A free open air is a kind of cold bath, especially after rising out of a warm bed, and consequently makes the circulation brisker and more complete, and braces up the solids, when lying in bed dissolves and soaks them in moisture. This is evident from the appetite and hunger those that rise early feel, beyond that which they get by lying long in bed.”—*Essay on Health and Long Life*, b. iii. s. 6. [p. 61.]

Of the medical skill of Mr. Wesley, spite of his *Primitive Physic*, we entertain a very low opinion, yet are we inclined to give much weight to the experience of so observant a man, who from the nervous weakness of his sight in early life, and its great strength to the close of an existence as actively passed, perhaps, as that of any of the sons of Adam; concludes, that sleeping, or lying too long in bed, is injurious to the eye-sight. Would that the advice of the doctor, and the experience of the divine, could induce some of our nervous females, those especially whose sight is affected by their disease, to try how much more their constitutions would be strengthened by exertion than indulgence, by early rising, than late lying in bed. We can assure them, that several instances have come to our knowledge, of the incalculable benefits of this very cheap substitute for anti-nervous pills, hartshorn, lavender, valerian, and sal-volatile, with the abundant use of which we have known headaches to be incessant, which a few breathings of pure morning air have speedily removed. To our own testimony, we add also a very striking one from the work now under review.

“As an instance of the good effects of the habits of early rising, even upon persons afflicted with the maladies which I have supposed the neglect of it to produce, I will relate to you the case of a young lady who had deeply felt their baneful influence. She was reduced to such extreme weakness, as to require assistance in walking across the room; and imagining so enfeebled a state required a larger portion of sleep, she generally lay eight or nine hours, but in the morning found herself as relaxed and fatigued as at night, and unable to dress without the relief of resting two or three times. On reading Wesley’s sermon on early rising, she was so perfectly convinced of the propriety of the reasoning, that by rising gradually earlier every morning, she soon lessened the time of sleep to six hours; her strength daily increased, and by persevering in

this practice, together with cold bathing and moderate exercise, the disorders which had so long afflicted her were removed; and deeply sensible of the great mental and bodily advantage of early rising, only regrets that the habit had not been formed at a much earlier period of her life." [pp. 63, 64.]

But the evils entailed by this criminal indulgence upon the body, bear no proportion to the injury done to the mind, that spark of immortal flame, which in the spirit shall return to God who gave it. Few persons, if any, can snatch from the ordinary avocations of life, the time they could wish to devote to its improvement; but every hour and every minute consumed unnecessarily in bed, is a portion of time which they might redeem for this most important purpose, and for the waste of which they must answer to their own conscience here, and hereafter must account at the bar of God. This responsibility every individual incurs, even those (if any such there be) whose slumbering away their time, but inconveniences and affects themselves. But to parents, masters, heads, and members of families, this inconvenience and responsibility will be alike increased. Lazy self-indulging masters and mistresses will make, and should not complain of, lazy and self-indulging servants; nor can the cook or housemaid of the family, where the breakfast things are put on the table at nine o'clock, and wait there until ten, and often to a much later hour, be scolded with a very good grace, for not getting up herself at six, or even for simultaneously opening her own eyes and the window-shutters of the house, after the clock has struck seven. Example, though a silent, is a most powerful teacher of bad habits, as well as of good ones; hence, where the heads of a family are late risers, the servants will seldom, if ever, be early ones; and it will be as vain as it is ridiculous, to preach to the nursery-maid the very admirable doctrine of the great importance of early rising, and walks before breakfast, to the health of children, while the sun has risen many hours of the fairest summer mornings, whilst papa and mamma are snoozing very comfortably in bed, depending altogether upon the veracity of their servants, for the time at which the children were taken to their morning's walk. Whilst too young to dress themselves, these children, contrary to express orders, but in accordance to the practice of their parents, may therefore, and frequently will, be deprived of one of the most essential requisites to the formation of a robust and hardy constitution, from the criminal negligence of their parents, in omitting, for their own indulgence, the

vigilant inspection of the execution of their orders. In infancy, when bracing of the frame is of the most importance,—and nothing contributes to it so essentially as the pure balm of the morning air, the sufferers,—from a deception as injurious as it is probable, cannot, and when they get older, will not, assist in its detection; and the parents will, we fear, in many instances, be further answerable for temptations to lying, prevarication, artifice, and concealment, both in their servants and their children, whose slothful indulgence is, after all, very far from going the full length of their own mischievous example. As the former grow up into life, is it not also reasonable to expect that they will do as their parents do or did, rather than as they say or said, and neglect those precepts on improving time, on which the practical waste of it, constantly before their eyes, is hourly reading so mischievous a comment. These plain hints may suffice for indolent lie-a-beds, but we are fully conscious of having a more difficult task to accomplish, in attempting to convince another class, who fancy they have a sufficient excuse, and who really have a very plausible one, for taking in the morning the rest of which they deprive themselves at night. We allude to studious and literary men, whose first slumber often commences but as the ploughman and the industrious labourer, at the dawn of day, hie them to their work, whistling full cheerily as they go, and who, by their early toil, have added largely to their stock of health and strength, ere the pale votary of learning has with much effort roused himself from his feverish and unrefreshing sleep. Many such have we known,—with several of them we are still living in habits of intimacy,—but recollections of a most painful nature crowd upon our minds, as we count the number of those who are not. Whilst lit up with the irradiations of fancy and genius,—whilst beaming with satisfaction at the conquest of difficulties long painfully pursued, and at length laboriously overcome,—we saw on their countenances the aspect of cheerfulness, we found from their conversation that their spirits were buoyant with hope, yet was there a worm preying at the heart, whose unobserved yet deadly gnawings were gradually undermining constitutions, the hardiest of which could struggle but for a few short years with an enemy, the more dangerous, in that its operations were slow, and were not seen. A continued and habitual indulgence in nocturnal studies, was, we doubt not, the worm which preyed upon—the worm which eventually destroyed their existence. Thus,

again, and again, and again, have we seen the fair vernal bud, which promised a lovely flower to the summer, and as rich fruit to the autumn, cut off and withered, not by the cold frosts of winter, but by one of those deadlier blights which often destroy the richest blossoms of the spring. Would from what we have seen and known,—would from what they themselves must at the least have read of the baneful effects of this too prevalent practice,—the votaries of science, happily for themselves, and for the world, who no sooner learn their worth, than they are called upon to deplore their loss,—would learn, that the avidity with which we pursue an object, frequently prevents the success, which slower, but more regular advances, seldom fail in securing. *Certe sed Sente*, is too important a maxim, to be confined to the motto of an armorial bearing, on a seal, or a carriage; it should be inscribed in letters of gold, over the study door of every man of genius. For want of attention to so useful a memento, many a young man of talent, whilst catching at the laurel, to form a wreath for his brow, has but encircled in a grasp that can never be unloosed, the cypress bough soon to be planted by his grave.

We are aware, that amongst the class of self-destroyers to whom we are addressing ourselves, many justify the means they employ, by the end they are wishing to attain. We would, however, remind them, that as the sacrifice was not the less sanguinary, because the victims were led to the altar bedecked with garlands and flowers; so their self-destruction is not the less criminal in them, or less afflicting to their friends, because it is made in the acquisition of knowledge, or the gaining to themselves an imperishable name. Many of them, again, we doubt not, will argue that, provided you take a sufficient portion of rest, it signifies not at what part of the twenty-four hours it is taken; and so once thought we: nature, however, has its proper season for every thing; and seed-time, and harvest-time, summer and winter, cannot be more appropriately confounded with each other, than in the use made of its hours, can night innocuously be turned into day. It is the natural season for rest; and during its darkness, its coolness, (for even during the heat of summer, it is infinitely cooler than the day,) and its quiet, sleep is more refreshing than it can be at any other time. We have known those who, at two or three and twenty, had for some years been in the habit of sitting up every alternate night, at the least to one, two, three, four, five, and even six o'clock in the morning, and one

who even had sat at his desk for seventy-two hours, with the intermission of six hours' repose; but at three-and-thirty, headaches, swimings in the head, unrefreshing sleep, disturbed by the buzz of countless noises in their ears, had taught them wisdom ere it was too late, and they now rise at the period when they not unfrequently went to rest.

Other reasons in favour of morning, rather than of nocturnal studies, are ably urged in Mr. Buckland's invaluable little book,—in the cheerfulness of disposition generally experienced then, ere the temper has been ruffled by the business and anxieties of the day, and the extraordinary power of the memory at that period, which every school-boy, who has conned over his task soon after rising from his bed, can well attest.

But example is judiciously quoted, to enforce these wholesome precepts, and we shall extract them for the benefit of our readers, in the author's words.

"Bishop Burnet, the author of 'The History of his Own Times,' was an habitual early riser. Whilst he was at college, his father used to arouse him to his studies every morning at four o'clock, and he continued the practice during the remainder of his life. It is to this habit that we are indebted to Dr. Doddridge for nearly the whole of his valuable works, who, notwithstanding his various labours, both as a minister and a tutor, has left us many proofs of his talents as an author.* Bishop Jewell regularly rose to study at four. Sir Thomas More usually rose at the same early hour, and yet he remarks, in his preface to the *Utopia*, that he had completed that work by stealing time from his sleep and his meals; and he appeared to be so well satisfied of the excellence of the habit, that he represents the Utopians as attending public lectures every morning before day-break.

"Dr. Parkhurst, the philologist, rose regularly at five in summer and winter, and in the latter season made his own fire. It is recorded of John, Lord Hervey, that 'in those early hours, when all around were hushed in sleep, he seized the opportunity of that quiet, as the most favourable season for study, and frequently spent an useful day, before others began to enjoy it.†

"Do you not remember Paley's account of the early part of his college life? 'I spent,' said he, when conversing with some of his friends, 'I spent the first two years of my under-graduateship happily, but unprofitably. I was constantly in society, where we were not immoral, but idle and rather expensive. At the commencement of my third year, however, after having left the usual

* Doddridge's *Family Expositor*. Note to Remarks, Rom. xiii. 13.

† Middleton's *Dedication to the Life of Cicero*.

party at rather a late hour in the evening, I was awakened at five in the morning by one of my companions, who stood at my bed-side, and said,—‘Paley, I have been thinking what a fool you are. I could do nothing probably, if I were to try, and can afford the life I lead: you could do every thing, and cannot afford it. I have had no sleep during the whole night on account of these reflections, and am now come solemnly to inform you, that if you persist in your indolence, I must renounce your society.’ ‘I was so struck,’ Dr. Paley continued, ‘with the visit and the visitor, that I lay in bed great part of the day, and formed my plan. I ordered my bed-maker to lay my fire every evening, in order that it might be lighted by myself. I arose at five, read during the whole of the day, except such hours as chapel and hall required, allotting to each portion of time its peculiar branch of study; and just before the closing of the gates (nine o'clock) I went to a neighbouring coffee-house, where I constantly regaled upon a mutton chop, and a dose of milk punch, and then, on taking my bachelor’s degree, I became senior wrangler.’*

“I might refer you to the opinions and practice of the famous Franklin, and Priestley, and many others; but you will, perhaps, prefer an example taken from one in your own profession. Sir Matthew Hale, that great and learned lawyer, and pious Christian, whilst at Lincoln’s Inn, preparing himself for the bar, studied sixteen hours in the day, rising very early every morning,” [pp. 125-128.]

To these, the names of John Wesley, and several other lights of the world, and benefactors of mankind, might be added; but we shall satisfy ourselves with the mention of Howard the philanthropist, who was seldom in bed after four in the morning. But greater examples than that of even Howard, though he perhaps was the most illustrious imitator of his divine Master, in going about doing good, that the records of the world exhibit since the apostolic age, are thus enumerated, for the imitation of the Christian, in the pages now under our review.

“Abraham ‘got up early in the morning.’† Isaac ‘rose up betimes in the morning.’‡ Jacob ‘rose up early in the morning.’§ Laban ‘rose up early in the morning.’|| Moses rose up early in the morning.¶ Job rose up early in the morning, and ‘thus did he continually.’** Gideon ‘rose up early in the morning.’†† Joshua ‘rose early in the morning.’‡‡ Samuel ‘rose early to

* Meadley’s Memoirs of Dr. Paley, p. 194, 5.

† Gen. xix. 27.; xxi. 14.; xxii. 3.

‡ Gen. xxvi. 31.

§ Gen. xxviii. 18. || Gen. xxxi. 55. ¶ Exod. xxiv. 4.; xxxiv. 4.

** Job i. 5.

†† Judges vi. 28, 38.

‡‡ Joshua iii. 1.; vi. 12.; vii. 16.; viii. 10.

meet Saul in the morning.* David: 'rose up early in the morning.'† Jeremiah continued in the habit of 'rising early and speaking' for twenty-three years.‡ Nehemiah and his fellow-labourers 'laboured from the rising of the morning till the stars appeared.'§ And our blessed Saviour is represented as having risen early, affording a practical illustration of his own precept, 'work whilst it is day.' It was 'at the break of day that he called to him his disciples, and chose of them twelve, whom he called apostles.¶ It was 'early in the morning that the people came to him in the temple to hear him.'¶ It was 'early in the morning that Jesus came into the temple, and all the people came unto him:** and it was 'in the morning, a great while before day, that he went out to a solitary place to pray.' †† [pp. 168-9.]

To the Christian, however, we surely need not say any thing on the sin of sloth, or the duty of improving to the utmost the short portion of time allotted for preparation for another, and an eternal state of existence. If, however, any arguments are necessary to prove the importance of early rising to those who profess "to work while it is called day," because "the night cometh wherein no man can work," they cannot be furnished with more cogent or convincing ones than are contained in the four last of the letters of Mr. Buckland, and in the very sensible little pamphlet of Mr. Snelgar, which, in the form of a tract, is a short but very judicious sermon on Psalm lxiii. 1. "*Early will I seek thee;*" in which the author very satisfactorily shews that there is a pleasure to be enjoyed in early rising, because it is refreshing to the body, cheering to the spirits, and an agreeable preparation for every succeeding event of the day. The design of the practice recommended from the example of David, is then stated as for purposes of piety; because of the serenity of the morning; and on account of the importance of religion: to which succeeds a brief statement of the advantages resulting from early rising—from its improving our temporal prosperity—advancing our spiritual welfare—being our best preparation for the public worship of God—indicative of personal religion,—and a good course, productive of the best termination.

With such motives before them as have been stated in the course of this article, who that regards his best interests,

* 1 Sam. ix. 26.; xv. 12.

† 1 Sam. xvii. 20. Psalms v. 3.; lv. 17.; lix. 16.; lxxxviii. 13.; xcii. 1, 2.; cxix. 147.; cxliii. 8.

‡ Jer. xxv. 3.; vii. 13.

§ Neh. iv. 21.

¶ Luke vi. 13.

¶ Luke xxi. 38.

** John viii. 2.

†† Mark i. 35.

for time and for eternity, but would wish to put the earnest recommendations of these two very useful writers into immediate practice. But how is this to be done, we may be asked, where a long course of indulgence, either in nocturnal studies or morning sluggishness, has engendered a habit of lying in bed, difficult, and, as those who have given way to it will think, impossible to overcome. The author of the *Letters on Early Rising* shall answer the question.

“*You must conquer by degrees.* Rise five minutes earlier every morning, till you have arrived at the hour which appears to you most eligible. You will thus accomplish the work which you are so anxious to effect. The daily subtraction from sleep will be so trifling, that it will not occasion that drowsiness on the succeeding morning, which the sudden change from rising at eight to five must necessarily produce. You will thus reach the object of your wishes, in the surest and easiest manner. You will be daily undermining a very injurious habit, and confirming a very useful one. A short period will make such a sensible difference in the time you have gained, that you will begin to feel the pleasure of victory, before you are scarcely conscious of having commenced the combat. The last day in each week will be half an hour longer than the first, and at the termination of a month you will become an early riser, with the additional advantage of having formed the habit in such a manner that there is little danger of its being relinquished.” [pp. 137-8.]

On the merits of this plan, we simply add our *probatum est*, and, having done so, unequivocally commend the work whence this excellent recipe for the cure of laziness is extracted, together with its humble, but still very useful and cheap companion, to the attentive perusal and deliberate consideration of our readers. Ere we close our remarks, we would just hint, however, to Mr. Snelgar, in the hope that his very useful little tract will soon go into another edition, that the braying of the ass might, we should think, be omitted, without injury to the thousand pleasing associations which gave to his early morning walks that peculiar and inexpressible interest, which we hope he will long continue to enjoy himself, whilst, through the press, he is the very useful instrument in imparting it to others.

The Modern Traveller. Palestine. Part I. 18mo. London, 1824. Duncan. pp. 180.

Few books are, perhaps, more generally interesting than voyages and travels; and no period of our literature has

been more productive of this species of rational and general entertainment than the present. Scientific, enterprising, and intelligent men, have visited every quarter of the globe; and the researches of such well-qualified tourists as Pallas, Clarke, Dodwell, Eustace, and Hughes, in Europe; Morier, Elphinstone, Buchanan, Fraser, Pottinger, Gore Ouseley, Kinneir, and Porter, in Asia; Belzoni, Lord Valentia, Burckhardt, Richardson, Joliffe, Denon, and Chateaubriand, in Egypt and the adjacent countries; Lewis, and Clarke, Pike, James, Franklin, and Humboldt, in America,—have furnished the most extensive and important additions to our geographical knowledge, to which also the labours of our missionaries, though devoted to much higher objects, have incidentally contributed no small share of curious and valuable information. But, alas, the knowledge of foreign climes, which most people feel a great and laudable curiosity to obtain, is procurable but by very few; as, of all books, (law-books perhaps alone excepted,) voyages and travels are the most costly, and consequently the most unattainable by the ordinary class of readers. To remedy this inconvenience, various plans have been hit upon, but hitherto without any very distinguished success. In the year 1800, Dr. Mavor published an abridgment of the most popular voyages and travels then extant, in twenty-eight volumes, in 18mo.; but at least fifty others, upon the same plan, would be requisite to bring down the collection to the present time. Pinkerton's more formidable and very heavy work, in seventeen quarto volumes, is also very considerably in arrear; and to make it complete, it would be placed still further beyond the reach of those for whose use such collections are most requisite, and that is altogether needless.

But independent of such well-founded objections to the bulk and expense of these collections, we have long been of opinion, that something more than the mere work of abridgment was necessary to give those, who have not the leisure or the means of consulting the multiplicity of ponderous and expensive quarto voyages, travels, and tours, which are constantly appearing in rapid succession, the means of knowing what discoveries are making in the world. We had therefore formed, in our own minds, a plan for a condensation of the most generally interesting and valuable intelligence, contained in these volumes, in the form of a regular narrative, though, as we are never likely to have leisure for carrying it into execution, we are very happy to

find, that a similar scheme has suggested itself to others; and that it is now in progress in such a style of excellence, literary and topographical, as to render any other attempt worse than superfluous. One principal ground of our objection to the existing collections of voyages and travels, is, that in mere abridgments of the narratives of travellers, who have taken the same route, and described the same scenery, repetition is inevitable; and conflicting accounts of the same things are repeatedly given, without any directions to the reader as to which is worthy of preference, or how far their discrepancies may be reconciled or accounted for. To obviate these difficulties, the present work proposes to give a complete description of the different countries, forming an accurate and sufficiently minute cosmographic view of their present actual state. This object is effected partly by adopting the details given by travellers, who have visited the different places, in their own language, and very frequently by a combination of their various accounts in the language of the editor; to whom, though we have not the slightest conception of who or what he is, this commendation at the least is due, that he has executed his task with great accuracy and judgment. But of this, we will enable our readers to form an opinion for themselves, by extracting a part of that account of Jerusalem, which, with its environs, occupies upwards of one hundred pages of the present portion of this most interesting work:—

“The Jerusalem of sacred history is, in fact, no more. Not a vestige remains of the capital of David and Solomon; not a monument of Jewish times is standing. The very course of the walls is changed, and the boundaries of the ancient city are become doubtful. The monks pretend to shew the sites of the sacred places; but neither Calvary, nor the Holy Sepulchre, much less the Dolorous Way, the house of Caiaphas, &c., have the slightest pretensions to even a probable identity with the real places to which the tradition refers. Dr. Clarke has the merit of being the first modern traveller who ventured to speak of the preposterous legends and clumsy forgeries of the priests, with the contempt which they merit. ‘To men interested in tracing, within the walls, antiquities referred to by the documents of sacred history, no spectacle,’ remarks the learned traveller, ‘can be more mortifying than the city in its present state. The mistaken piety of the early Christians, in attempting to preserve, has either confused or annihilated the memorials it was anxious to render conspicuous. Viewing the havoc thus made, it may now be regretted that the Holy Land was ever rescued from the dominion of Saracens, who were far less barbarous than their conquerors. The

absurdity, for example, of hewing the rocks of Judæa into shrines and chapels, and of disguising the face of nature with painted domes, and gilded marble coverings, by way of commemorating the scenes of our Saviour's life and death, is so evident and so lamentable, that even Sandys, with all his credulity, could not avoid a happy application of the reproof conveyed by the Roman satirist, against a similar violation of the Egerian fountain.'

"Dr. Clarke, however, though he discovers his sound judgment in these remarks, has contributed very little to the illustration of the topography of Jerusalem. His plan is extremely inaccurate, and his hypothesis respecting the site of the ancient Zion altogether baseless. It is quite evident that he trusted to his recollection in drawing up the account of Jerusalem, and that his memory has misled him. By far the best account which has been given of the sacred city, is that furnished by Dr Richardson, who, by virtue of his professional character as a physician,—a character esteemed sacred all over the east,—was permitted four times to enter, in company with some of the principal Turks in Jerusalem, the sacred enclosure of the Stoa Sakhara, the mosque of Omar. With the exception of Ali Bey, who passed for a Moslem, though really a Spaniard, Dr. R. is the only Frank whose feet have trodden the consecrated ground with impunity, since the days of the Crusades. A Jew or a Christian entering within its precincts, must, if discovered, forfeit either his religion or his life. Sir F. Henniker states, that a few days before he visited Jerusalem, a Greek Christian entered the mosque. 'He was a Turkish subject, and servant to a Turk: he was invited to change his religion; but refused, and was immediately murdered by the mob. His body remained exposed in the street; and a passing Mussulman, kicking up the head, exclaimed, 'That is the way I would serve all Christians.'" [pp. 75—77.]

Designed, and very properly so, rather for a popular and useful, than a scientific compilation, it is intended to admit into this work authentic anecdotes, serving to illustrate national character, and other details of amusing, whilst they are also of an instructive nature; though every attention is at the same time to be paid to topographical accuracy, and to an object, which we regret to say that there is much reason for never overlooking,—the rectifying those mistakes, which are to be found in great abundance, and sufficient grossness, in the most popular of our geographical works. Brief historical notices will also be prefixed to the description of every country, including its ancient geography, its supposed aborigines, and the principal revolutions of which it has been the theatre, whilst, with respect to the uncivilized portions of the habitable globe, this sketch will exhibit also the progress of discovery. In every case, the natural his-

tory, botany, geological features, volcanic phenomena, and other natural curiosities of the country; will, as far as possible, be fully described; together with the costume, physiognomy, and domestic habits of the natives; their traditions, religion, and literature; their public buildings, arts, and ancient monuments: in fact, all the multifarious information for which we are indebted to the indefatigable researches of modern travellers.

In the execution of this most judicious and comprehensive plan, biographical sketches of individuals who have, by remarkable actions, identified themselves with the history of the portions of the globe described, should not of course be omitted; and we doubt not, from the following brief, yet accurate notice of Djezzar Pasha, the remorseless tyrant of Acre, that this part of the work will receive a due portion of the editor's attention:—

“Dr. E. D. Clarke, who visited Palestine in the summer of 1801, landed at Acre, then under the dominion of the notorious Djezzar Pasha—an appellation explained by himself as signifying *the butcher*. This execrable tyrant, whose name carried terror with it over all the Holy Land, at one time, shut up in his fortress at Acre, defied the whole power of Turkey, deriding the menaces of the Capudan Pasha, though he affected to venerate the authority of the sultan. His real name was Achmed. He was a native of Bosnia, and spoke the Slavonian language better than any other. At an early period of his life, he sold himself to a slave-merchant in Constantinople, and being purchased by Ali Bey in Egypt, rose from the humble situation of a Mameluke slave to be governor of Cairo. In this situation, according to his own account given to Dr. Clarke, he distinguished himself by the most rigorous administration of justice; realizing the stories related of Oriental caliphs, by mingling in disguise with the inhabitants of the city, and thus making himself master of all that was said concerning himself, or transacted by his officers. So far back as 1784, when M. Volney visited the Holy Land, he was pasha of Siede (Sidon) and Acre.* At that time, his cavalry amounted to 900 Bosnian and Anauth horsemen; by sea, he had a frigate, two galiots, and a zebeck; and his revenue amounted to £400,000. At the time of Dr. Clarke's arrival, he was upwards of sixty years of age, and vain of the vigour which he still retained. Of forty-three pashas of three tails then living in the Turkish empire, he was, by

* Dr. Clarke says: “He has been improperly considered as pasha of Acre: his real pashalic was that of Seide, but at the time of our arrival, he was also lord of Damascus, Berytus, Tyre, and Sidon.” Burckhardt, however, represents the pashalic of Siede to be the same as that of Akka.

his own account, the senior. 'We found him,' says Dr. Clarke, 'seated on a mat, in a little chamber destitute of the meanest article of furniture, excepting a coarse, porous, earthenware vessel for cooling the water he occasionally drank. He was surrounded by persons maimed and disfigured,' some without a nose, others without an arm, with one ear only, or one eye; *marked men*, as he termed them—persons bearing signs of their having been instructed to serve their master with fidelity. 'He scarcely looked up to notice our entrance, but continued his employment of drawing upon the floor, for one of his engineers, a plan of some works he was then constructing. His form was athletic, and his long white beard entirely covered his breast. His habit was that of a common Arab, plain, but clean, consisting of a white camlet over a cotton cassock. His turban was also white. Neither cushion nor carpet decorated the naked boards of his divan. In his girdle he wore a poniard set with diamonds; but this he apologized for exhibiting, saying it was his badge of office as governor of Acre, and therefore could not be laid aside. Having ended his orders to the engineer, we were directed to sit upon the end of the divan; and Signor Bertocino, his dragoman, kneeling by his side, he prepared to hear the cause of our visit.'* [pp. 18—20.]

"Djezzar was the Herod of his day. At one period, having reason to suspect the fidelity of his wives, he put seven of them to death with his own hands. No person in Acre knew the number of his women, but from the circumstance of a certain number of covers being daily placed in a kind of wheel, or turning cylinder, so contrived as to convey dishes to the interior, without any possibility of observing the person who received them. If any of them died, the event was kept as secret as when he massacred them with his own hands. In his public works he aimed at magnificence. He built the mosque, the bazar, and an elegant public fountain at Acre, using the extensive remains of Cesarea as a quarry. In all these works he was himself both the engineer and the architect, he formed the plans, drew the designs, and superintended the execution. He was his own minister, chancellor, treasurer, and secretary; often his own cook and gardener; and not unfrequently both judge and executioner in the same instant. Such is the account given of this extraordinary man by Baron de Tott, Volney, and Dr. Clarke. Yet with the short-sighted and narrow-minded policy of an Oriental despot, he sacrificed to his avarice the permanent prosperity of the districts which he governed. During the latter years of his administration, more especially, towns that had once been flourishing, were reduced by his oppression to a few cottages, and luxuriant plains were abandoned to the wandering Arabs." [pp. 20, 21.]

Such is the outline of the undertaking, with which we are so much delighted, that we have not lost a moment in

* Travels in various Countries, part ii. § i. chap. 8.

commending it to the notice and cordial support of our readers.

Palestine has very properly been selected as the first country to be noticed; and when we inform our readers, that in the present part of the *Modern Traveller*, and that which will be published on the same day with our journal, —supposing it executed with equal spirit and fidelity as his specimen, as we have no reason to doubt that it will be,— they will have an account of the Holy Land, comprising all that is most curious, and generally interesting, in the travels of Maundrell, Pococke, Sandys, Hasselquist, Volney, Brown, Dr. Clarke, the pseudo Ali Bey, Chateaubriand, Burckhardt, Joliffe, Dr. Richardson, Buckingham, Irby Mangles, Sir F. Henniker, and others, through this most attractive region of the earth, at least in a Christian's eye, in a neat pocket volume, of between three and four hundred closely printed pages, at the low price of five shillings, we feel assured, that they will soon enable themselves to judge of the justice of our encomiums, which, though somewhat warmer perhaps than is our wont, have been excited by the uncommon merits of what we consider a *bijour* in the literary world. Yet warm as that commendation has been, and as we intended that it should be, it would be a gross injustice to close this review without noticing, in terms of the highest praise, the very superior merit of the typographical department of this work, which is from the very accurate press of Mr. Moyes, and in a style of neatness which we have seldom seen surpassed, even in the most expensive works. It is also illustrated by a very well executed view of Jerusalem, and a small but accurate map of Palestine, embellishments which we are happy to learn that it is the intention of the publisher to continue throughout the series, at the rate of a plate at the least to every part, and occasionally of more.

To the continuation of the series, we shall hereafter direct the attention of our readers, satisfied as we are, that if executed with the taste and spirit which has marked its commencement, it will be decidedly the best and most useful of those cabinet and pocket compilations, on which so much attention has been bestowed of late years by the booksellers, and so large a portion of patronage by the public. If, in that patronage, the *Modern Traveller*, so long as it is conducted as it is begun, does not very largely participate, the fault will be with the public, upon whose taste we shall consider the neglect of its very superior claims no light imputation.

A Letter to the Editor of the British Review, occasioned by the Notice of "No Fiction," and "Martha," in the last Number of that Work. By Andrew Reed. 8vo. London, 1824. Westley. pp. 80.

IN our early attention to this Pamphlet, it is by no means our purpose to enter into the merits of the case between the author and our brethren of the British Review, the latter of whom we leave to fight their own battles, as we doubt not that they are quite able to do, though we say not with what success against an antagonist like Mr. Reed, who has advanced very serious charges of misrepresentation and prejudice against them, supported by evidence, which, to say the least of it, makes out a very strong *prima facie* case on his behalf. Nor shall we touch upon that part of his address which relates to the second of his publications, as we have not yet had leisure to notice "Martha," although we hope it will not long lay amongst the heap of neglected books, which have for some time, though unavoidably, accumulated on our table. But we do think it due, in justice to Mr. Reed, to our readers, and to ourselves, not to defer to a more convenient opportunity, an examination of the charges which have long been in general circulation against him, for the publication of "No Fiction," a work which appearing anonymously at first, was very properly avowed by its author, the moment that avowal seemed likely to involve him in danger and difficulty. Those charges have been divided with sufficient accuracy for our purpose, into the following heads:—1st. That the credulity of the public has been imposed upon; 2dly. That Mr. Barnett, (the hero of the tale) has been injured; and 3dly. That the author has sought to eulogize himself and family.

The first of the charges imputes to Mr. Reed, the imposition upon the public, as a "narrative founded on recent and interesting facts;" of a collection of fictions, and gross distortions, and exaggerations, for which there was but slender foundation in the real occurrences, whence its author professed to draw his materials. To this Mr. Reed opposes the following statement, on the correctness of which, as well from our knowledge of his character, as the acquaintance we have elsewhere obtained, with the principal facts to which he appeals, we place the firmest reliance.

"It is true, that the acquaintance between Lefevre and Douglas began as is described. It is true, that their friendship was car-

ried forward by means and incidents similar to those introduced. It is true, that they made an excursion to a distant part of the country on a visit to Mrs. Lefevre, who was what she is represented to be. It is true, that Lefevre held a place in an office in London, and resided with Mr. and Mrs. Russell; and that he was happy while he continued in the paths of usefulness and religion. It is true, that he and Douglas separated; and that afterwards he began to decline from his former pursuits and pleasures. It is true, that the Russells and Douglasses often remonstrated as they are represented; and that the correspondence from Plymouth on an alleged 'impropriety' really existed. It is true, that Lefevre contended with many resolves to retrace his steps, but that he overcame them, forsook his religious connexions, and was gradually drawn into the paths of worldly pleasure. It is true, that he became entangled in debt; the conversation on this subject is almost literally given: and it is true, though he never knew it, that Douglas became bound, in word and honour, for the largest amount he ever owed. It is true, that Lefevre left the Russells similarly to the way described, and very much for the reasons given. It is true, that he formed an attachment, that it had a beneficial influence on his mind and conduct, and that he sought his friend Douglas, and made him acquainted with his prospects. It is true, that when Douglas was expecting to hear of his settlement, and to see its good effects, he was aroused at midnight to receive Lefevre in the state described; that he voluntarily confessed, that what he had formerly denied was actually true; that he had been subject to rebuke in one office, that his accounts had been unexpectedly called for elsewhere, and he was not then prepared to render them; and that the connexion to which he had been looking, was broken off for ever. It is true, that Douglas did every thing to tranquillize him; and in the morning awakened him, and induced him to say he would return to his duties; but that he went home, and remained in a similar state of mind for some time. It is true, that he eloped from his friends; rambled in a state of mental desperation in the environs of Rochester, was advertised, and at last found, and brought home by Mr. Perry. It is true, that his mother and Douglas found him as described, that he remained in this state till he again forsook his home, and was not heard of, after the most anxious inquiry. It is true, that he wandered far away, enlisted in the army, and went over to Canada; that he became the subject of reflection; that he fell in with an excellent missionary, who was of great use to him; and that he wrote home to his friends penitential and pleasing letters. It is true, that his relative procured his discharge, that he returned home, and though differently received by his different friends, he was joyfully received by them all. It is true, that Wilson was influenced by Lefevre's example, and that his state of mind, in his last affliction, was similar to what is given.

“Much, very much besides what this hasty sketch includes, is equally true. The letters and conversations; though not literally rendered, are, with few exceptions, *substantially true*; while the contents of a letter have sometimes been thrown into a dialogue, and the body of many conversations reduced to a letter. The spirit is generally true, where the form of representation is most affected by variety. Even the sketches from nature are mostly from memory; and those few parts of the work, which are of the nature of episode, are commonly real incidents, though first founded in union with other circumstances.” [pp. 13—16.]

To every candid mind, this statement must present an abundantly sufficient refutation of the charge of imposition on the public credulity, though it does not by any means free its author from the more tenable, and more important ones, of improperly publishing facts relating to another, which he ought not in prudence or delicacy to have so used; and that is the charge to which, in our notice of his work,* we distinctly alluded, as a very serious one, extending even to the honour and honesty of the author, though in favour of them, we then decided, on the strength of the assurance contained in his advertisement to the third edition of this work, that the true key to it “was then in his possession—that it had never been in the power of any other person—and that it never should be, while the existing reasons continued for withholding it.” A more minute statement of those facts is now published, and we are therefore anxious to review a judgment pronounced upon partial evidence, which we are now fully in possession of the means of confirming, modifying, or reversing, as full and authentic admissions and testimony upon the subject, may call upon us to do.

It now stands admitted on all hands, that Lefevre, the hero of “No Fiction,” is Mr. Barnett, once an intimate friend of Mr. Reed, who performed towards him, in its general outline, the kind part attributed, in the narrative, to Douglas;—that between them the correspondence inserted in, or interwoven with, the work, substantially took place, though the letters are not exactly copied, or always used even in the epistolary form;—that the work was published without Mr. Barnett’s consent, or any application to him for it, though substantially containing the chief incidents of his eventful history, and his correspondence with the author, who believed him at that time to be residing within two hundred miles from him. Now, upon this plain statement of

admitted facts, we should apprehend, that not even the most prejudiced friend of Mr. Reed can conscientiously acquit him of indelicacy and imprudence.

To these charges he pleads, 1st, that the narrative, though unquestionably founded on facts, and substantially true in all its principal details, was purposely so altered in dates, places, and minor connecting circumstances, as to secure his design of concealing from the public the real hero of the piece. That he intended this course to produce the effect he states, we do not for a moment doubt; yet,—where some of the leading facts must have been known to many besides himself, being of public notoriety in the circle in which the then friendly, but now contending parties, moved,—how he could so deceive himself as to believe he should succeed in his object, is to us a matter of unfeigned astonishment. Nor could he long remain in so unaccountable a delusion, as the book had scarcely issued from the press, ere the key to its interpretation was furnished to every one who associated with the religious part of the population of the metropolis, whence it spread in a very short time to the same class of persons in the larger towns of the kingdom. To this natural, yet, as the author assures us, to him most unlooked-for event, many circumstances, speedily to be noticed, contributed; though the one just stated would, in our estimation, have been quite enough to produce it, in a degree sufficiently injurious alike to the author and his hero.

The second plea upon the record is, that before he determined upon publishing, he sought a conference with the latter, but failed in procuring it. How and why he so failed, he has not informed us, but we conclude it must have been merely from his not being able to meet with Mr. Barnett; for, if any degree of coldness between him and Mr. Reed prevented the interview, the publication of this narrative under such circumstances, was unjustifiable and unpardonable in the extreme; as, in our view of the subject, nothing can be offered in palliation of the want, not only of caution, but of proper feeling, exhibited in giving to the world the details of a confidential friendship of a peculiarly delicate nature, without the full consent of all parties concerned in it, than the honest conviction of the individual who so published it, that its appearance would not at least be disagreeable to his friend; and that Mr. Reed himself must, at one time, have been of this latter opinion, his mere intention to apply for permission to print his narrative very

plainly proves. Why then did he not obtain, or, at the least, solicit it? "When he did determine on the publication, Mr. B." he tells us, "was, to the best of his knowledge, residing two hundred miles from London." And what then? we ask; was there no post to convey a letter to him, and in four or five days to bring back his assent to, or dissent from, the proposed publication of his history? Unquestionably there must have been; and his not having availed himself of this ordinary mode of communication between friends separated by distance, forces upon our minds the unwelcome and painful suspicion, that at this period Mr. Reed and Mr. Barnett could not have been on terms of cordiality, or even of intimacy, in which case nothing could justify the publication of "No Fiction" at such a time. Respecting Mr. Reed, however, highly as we do, it will afford us great satisfaction to learn, that our suspicions are without foundation, and to be furnished with a more satisfactory elucidation of a mystery which we are unable otherwise to solve.

His third plea is, that being disappointed in obtaining a conference with his friend, his determination to print was not formed till "he had distinctly taken the opinion of friends of discreet and matured judgment on the question, Whether there was any delicacy in submitting a body of facts so concealed, to the public eye." "The opinion," he adds, "of course was, in each case, such as authorized the step I afterwards took." That it was so, we cannot for a moment doubt, when Mr. Reed so unequivocally asserts the fact; but that it should be so, we can never cease to marvel, provided (which, from our unfeigned respect for Mr. Reed, we predicate to have been the fact) the case was fairly stated to them. If it was, let them never set up for teachers in Israel, "of discreet and matured judgment," who did not counsel him, that the publication he contemplated was in the highest degree indiscreet and indelicate, unless he had Mr. Barnett's permission for it, which might and ought to be applied for by the very next post.

Mr. Reed concludes this branch of his defence, by saying to the Reviewer, to whom he addresses it, "Prudence, perhaps, Sir, could do little more than this:" to which we answer, It could do, and ought to have done, a great deal more, and we need not recapitulate in what; satisfied as we are, that most men of correct feeling will be of opinion with us, that the publication of information with respect to another, obtained in the course of an intimate friendship,

without his express permission, even where the facts stated are preeminently and unequivocally honourable to his character, is a breach of confidence altogether incautious, injudicious, and unwarrantable. We have spoken strongly on this point, much more so indeed than our regard for Mr. Reed would have permitted us to do, but in the faithful discharge of a public duty, in which we know neither friend nor foe. But that his error was a mere error of judgment, we are as fully convinced, as we are of that error having been committed; and hence we as unreservedly acquit him of the slightest intention of injuring any one, still less a friend for whom he has done so much.

This naturally brings us to the second part of the charge; the injury inflicted upon Mr. Barnett, and the blame attaching itself to Mr. Reed for that infliction.—And first, we would inquire what is the injury done? We admit, at the outset, that every person has a just ground of complaint, whose private history is laid open to the public, either by friend or foe, without his permission first had and obtained for such a disclosure; and *a fortiori* has he so, where that disclosure is made in violation of the confidence of friendship. That Mr. Barnett might, therefore, very reasonably complain of this publication, few unprejudiced persons can, we apprehend, be disposed to question; but on the other hand, he alone can determine whether his feelings or interests have been so affected, as to give him any ground of complaint for a real injury sustained. The act done was, as we contend, unjustifiable by the individual who did it; but it does not, therefore, follow that it was injurious to any one; whilst, by assenting to it afterwards, the party who might otherwise most justly have complained of it, in as far as he was concerned, supplied the deficiency of a previous application for his permission; and, as against himself, put the thing upon precisely the same footing as though he, by his consent, had originally been a party to the publication; leaving, however, the other party still open to the charge of indelicacy and precipitancy, in proceeding without that assent. This, then, we conceive to be precisely the situation in which Mr. Reed and Mr. Barnett stand. The former has precipitately and incautiously done that, which, as a minister of the gospel, and a gentleman, he ought not to have done; but the latter has deprived himself of the right of complaining of this misconduct, in that he deliberately and advisedly sanctioned the measure the moment he was aware of its adoption. That he did so,

fully and unreservedly, admits not of a moment's doubt; for he notoriously introduced himself, and suffered himself to be introduced, into circles in which he had not previously moved, as the Lefevre of *No Fiction*; conceiving, and we still think, not erroneously conceiving, that the character was on the whole more honourable to him than disadvantageous. Long, therefore, after the appearance of the work, and his own adoption of the principal character in it, he lived on terms of renewed intimacy with the friend by whom that character was sketched, and himself widely circulated the key to it, which he and the author alone possessed, so completely, as to apply all its characters and events to the real history of their intercourse. During the whole of this period, and it was not a short one, it is self-evident, therefore, that he never dreamt of an injury having been done him by the publication, but, on the contrary, uniformly considered it a benefit; and even had he subsequently discovered that this impression upon the subject had been erroneous, he could have no more right to complain of the publication, than he would have had in the event of his permission having been previously and properly obtained; for, as we have already intimated, his subsequent, deliberate, and long-continued assent, was, at the very least, fully tantamount to a previous free consent; and if the latter, he must necessarily have taken, without murmuring, all the consequences. The evidence in this case not only negatives the infliction of any injury upon Mr. Barnett by the publication, but proves that, on the contrary, it was highly advantageous to him; although, we regret to add, that his own subsequent misconduct has rendered that advantage unavailing. It is well known, we doubt not, to many of our readers, that subsequent to the publication in question, and his own ready adoption of the leading character in it, this gentleman obtained a situation in the London Orphan Asylum, of which his friend Mr. Reed has long been the very active secretary. How that situation was obtained, and lost, it is but justice to the latter gentleman to permit him to state at length.

“Another head of injury to which your reviewer refers, is connected with Mr. B.'s introduction to the London Orphan Asylum, and which he thus expresses:—

“‘When he offered himself as a candidate for the office of assistant-secretary, it was objected to him, that he was the hero of *No Fiction*; that he had so misconducted himself in the Post-office, that he was in danger of dismissal; that he had embez-

zled the money of his employers, and that in all respects he was a most immoral character.'

"Now, it is necessary for me to meet this statement with the plain and bold assertion, that it is *false*, and, as I shall shew, most *ungenerously false*.

"When the situation in question became vacant, Mr. Barnett applied for my advice in offering himself for it.—'It would,' he said, 'take him from his brother's, where he was exposed to temptation—it would restore him to his best connexions—it would be all he desired.'

"I apprized him, that the ground was already occupied by a very eligible candidate—that I had no doubt, if he ventured to compete with him, all his former life would be inquired into, and brought forward—that I thought, with steadiness of conduct, he would be the more suitable of the two candidates—and that, with this conviction, waving my own feelings, I should regard myself bound to forward the object to the utmost, should he continue to think it so desirable. I begged him to take time to consider it; and having done so, he resolved to face whatever difficulties might arise, and become a candidate. I immediately did what I have not done before or since, I wrote separately in his behalf to the members of the Board, and gave him every assistance in his own personal canvass.

"The night of election came. A gentleman who supported the other candidate, from his knowledge of his excellent character, but who did not know that such a book as *No Fiction* was in existence, stated he had heard, (it was the common report when Mr. B. eloped,) that he had been very unsteady, that he had left his duty and his country, and that he had even embezzled money to a large amount belonging to the Post-office. Another gentleman, to whom Mr. B. had *introduced himself* indiscreetly as the Lefevre of *No Fiction*, took occasion to say, there might possibly be some ground for a part of such reports, as he had been given to understand, from *good authority*, that there were some allusions to him in an anonymous work he had lately seen.

"I was, of course, the only person who could meet these charges, and vindicate his character. I maintained, without knowing of Mr. B.'s admissions, that no one was authorized in concluding any thing for or against a living individual, from the work referred to; and that, in relation to the reports which had been named, they were partly true, and partly false. I allowed that there had been some irregularities: but I insisted, that the report of dishonesty and embezzlement was wholly unfounded; that I could prove this by testimonials, which I read; that I was willing to be one of his sureties to any amount; and that I sincerely believed he deeply regretted whatever might have been amiss in his past conduct.

"The effect of this statement was, that Mr. B. was allowed to go to the ballot *immediately and unanimously*; and the issue of the

election was his *final appointment*, notwithstanding his antagonists had no weak points of conduct to be exposed, and had made considerable interest before he began; and the situation to which he was thus appointed, was worth nearly double that of any one he had ever possessed!

“ Now, sir, what is the state of the case here? Mr. B. after forsaking his connexions, seeks once more to be comfortably settled; his reported irregularities are, as was expected, brought forward by a person who had not seen *No Fiction*, mixed, as they are sure to be, with great exaggerations. His friend stands up alone, and meets all the heat of feeling which an election to a valuable place commonly generates, and earnestly vindicates conduct, which it was difficult entirely to elucidate. This vindication is so successful, that he is admitted, *without even a motion to the contrary*, to go to the ballot, and is elected to a situation *better every way*, than any one he had possessed in his best days. More than this; this situation he would most certainly have lost, had it not been for the favourable impressions produced on the minds of many who voted, by his having announced himself, or been announced by others, as the Lefevre of *No Fiction*!

“ This situation Mr. B. might have held to the present hour, with the greatest comfort and respectability; and painful as it may be, I am perhaps bound to throw some light on the circumstances attending his removal from it, as some strange and heavy insinuations have been made respecting it, and your reviewer seems anxious to receive them. The effort has been to cast the blame of losing an excellent appointment on me; and that blame I ought not to endure.

“ For some months after the election, Mr. B. performed the duties of his office admirably, and cheerfully rendered me all the relief in his power; and so long as this was the case, he felt himself useful and happy. Afterwards he allowed himself indulgences unfavourable to health, and ultimately fell into a state of mental derangement.

“ I was the first person he called for. I saw him; every attention, medical and otherwise, was given to him; his state was treated with the greatest tenderness and delicacy; I attended in his place, and discharged all his duties till he recovered, that no one might complain; and when he did recover, and I was made aware, by those who lived with him, of the causes of this distressing affliction, I wrote an affectionate and faithful letter to him. He acknowledged it with tears of gratitude, and assured me, that he would do honour to whatever my friendship had led me to say in his favour.

“ For about three months he kept to his resolutions, and assisted greatly to promote the interests of the Charity. Then he relapsed into a similar state; and it became necessary for him to send in his resignation. That resignation was accepted without

remark; and the Board unanimously approved of testimonials which were drawn up by my own hand; and which are the best he possesses. I was, and am still sensible, that this delicate conduct on their part was observed very much in respect to my feelings; and I shall always be grateful for it, exercised as it was, under circumstances which gave me so much concern and mortification.

“ During the whole term of his continuance, an unkind word was not addressed to him; whatever was omitted, I did, and uttered no reproach; and I have his own acknowledgment in a casual note, when leaving the situation—‘ That he had only himself to blame for it;’ and the only feeling I had, or have on the subject, is that of deep regret, that he so little fulfilled the expectations raised concerning him, and frustrated no inconsiderable efforts made to help and bless him.” [pp. 30—35.]

On this statement, few of our readers will, we apprehend, come to any other conclusion, than that at which we have arrived,—that the conduct of the author of *No Fiction* towards the hero of his work, was, in this transaction at the least, so far from injurious, that it was kind, friendly, and considerate, in the extreme; nor, through the whole of their connexion, does there appear the slightest reason to suspect that it was ever intentionally otherwise. We believe, as fully as the warmest friend of Mr. Reed, and even Mr. Reed himself, can do, that the character of Lefevre was never sketched, or published, with a malignant hand or view, but, on the contrary, with a kind intention towards its original; for whom, until he strangely thrust himself forward, under circumstances far less creditable to him than those in which his friend had placed and left him, the general impression was decidedly, if not universally, of the most favourable kind. By his friends, by the public, and even by himself, he was considered an example of the power of religion in reclaiming the victim of those strong temptations, to which he was not singularly exposed, from the error of his ways; and an example so delineated as to be beneficial to others, whilst it was not discreditable to him, at least in the estimation of those, whose judgment of human character and actions is formed upon, and guided by, the word of God. The misfortune of this well-meant attempt has been, not that it failed in the latter, but the former part of its object, by prematurely presenting a living instance of the power of divine grace in changing the heart and life, ere the sincerity of that repentance, and amelioration of conduct, which is the evidence of this regenerating change, had stood the test of time; a failure which will, we

hope, deter others from the dangerous, and very improper practice, of giving us examples of the sovereign power of God, in this his mightiest work, from men still exposed, from the trials and temptations of life, at least to the liability of making shipwreck of their faith, and bringing disgrace upon the Christian name.

In this view of the subject, we are aware of having argued the case as between religious men, looking mainly, if not solely, to the approbation of the religious public, and the view which they are likely to take of their characters and conduct; and inasmuch as both the litigant parties, either form, or profess to form, a part of this division of the public, we apprehend, that in doing so, we have not done either of them wrong. But if Mr. Barnett, shifting the ground which he has long occupied, and which we suppose him anxious still to occupy, chooses now to say, —I appeal from the judgment of the sanctuary, to that of the exchange,—from the people of God, to the men and the maxims of the world—he then unquestionably may have been injured by the publication of his history; seeing that by such a tribunal, and such judges, as he will thus have chosen, the vices of his character will alone be considered, whilst the regenerating influence of the Spirit of God upon it, (a redeeming quality, in the estimation of the Christian, above all comparison or price) is treated as mere hypocrisy and cant. Nor will he there be judged for mere follies and dissipations, on which little, if any, censure would be passed; for the work most undoubtedly contains some charges, which no man of honour, or of business, can look at, but with abhorrence; and it has been urged against Mr. Reed, that one of these amounts to felony. To this imputation, however, he gives the following direct denial.

“ I distinctly assert, *that there is no such charge in the whole work.* Lefevre is indeed said to have employed a small sum, which he held for other purposes, to meet some passing claim on him; but he is stated to have done this, ‘in the integrity of his heart,’ and with the full design and prospect of restoring it before he should have occasion to account for it. Now the object was not to shew that this was a dishonest practice, but to warn youth against it as a dangerous habit. To have called it necessarily, and in every case dishonest, would have been absurd, as multitudes act on the principle, whose uprightness of intention cannot be questioned; and even the danger is not in the thing itself, but in the liability to an inconsiderate use of such monies, and, from the

possible difficulty of returning the trifle so borrowed, in the ultimate exposure of one's integrity to temptation. This is all I designed to convey by the paragraph in question; and if any word or sentence of mine really imports more, (which I cannot perceive,) I freely acknowledge that it expresses more than I intended." [pp. 27, 28.]

Of the intentions here expressed, we entertain not the shadow of a doubt; but in executing them, Mr. Reed has proved that he is at least a better divine than a lawyer; for, adding to his statement the trifling fact, which, according to our recollection of the history of the transaction given in *No Fiction*, is there stated,—that this money was intrusted to Mr. Barnett, as a confidential servant, by his employer, and we have such a felony made out, as we have ourselves known many a clerk convicted for, under the embezzlement act.

Having gone through the two first and more serious of the charges against Mr. Reed, and shewn, as we flatter ourselves, that he is guilty but of imprudence, in the original publication of Mr. Barnett's history without his permission, we come now to the more venial one of vanity, in eulogizing himself and his family. Neither with himself nor his family has the writer of this article the slightest personal acquaintance; he therefore is unable to form any judgment of the resemblance between them and certain characters in *No Fiction*; yet has he every reason to believe, from the information of others well qualified to determine the point, that, as far as his parents are concerned, this resemblance is striking and minute. On the same authority, we should say the same thing as to the general features of character in Douglas and Mr. Reed himself; and the general assent of his friends would bear out the appropriation of this twin-hero of his story. He, however, distinctly disclaims all intention of having drawn this character from himself; we must therefore take the resemblance to have been accidental, or rather unintentional. Yet surely it would be "passing strange," that whilst giving, in the guise of fiction, the history of a most intimate friendship of many years, he should draw the character of his friend so very faithfully that no one can mistake it, and yet avoid all resemblance to his own. Throughout his laboured repudiation of such resemblance, we observe, indeed, that Mr. Reed carefully abstains from every thing like an assertion, that, in as far as he knows himself, Douglas is in every respect an opposite character to his own:

and doing, as he undoubtedly did, what he represents Douglas to have done, some such explicit declaration—some strong points of difference, familiar at least to his familiar friends, should be given, ere the world (and from them we wish not to be severed) can be chargeable with uncharitableness, in ranking this unintentional resemblance with the unintentional improprieties and indecorums, with which alone we consider the author of *No Fiction* to be chargeable.

This is the result of our honest and unbiassed judgment upon the subject; and regretting, as we unfeignedly should do, the mode in which we have expressed it giving any uneasiness to Mr. Reed, whom we believe to be a highly honourable man, we close our notice of his pamphlet, by extracting from it, a defence of fiction, as a mode of inculcating moral and religious truths, by far the most masterly that we ever read.

“The fault of a tale, in my view, is not that it is a *tale*, but that it is *immoral* or *irreligious*. Let it be wisely devoted to the illustration of good habits, good opinions, and good principles, and I see in it no evil, but much benefit. Indeed, most of those who are disposed, from limited reading or unexamined prejudices, to complain of the thing, *apart from its admitted abuses*, are not aware how far their objection reaches. You, yourself, Sir, from whatever cause, seem to have fallen into the same inconsistency. In that number of the *Review* where you sanction remarks against fictitious works, you give your sanction and your praise to two considerable poems! Is it to be said, that they are not *exactly* the same thing? I reply, *exactly* so; excepting only that they are in *metre*. The poem and the novel are precisely of the same class, and are to be approved or condemned, on the very same principles; and there is quite as much to censure, under the alluring dress of rhyme, as beneath the plainer garb of prose.

“If this point be admitted, and I will venture to pronounce it incontestable, it will at once clear the way to the real question, and enable us to look at it in all its magnitude. That question is—whether works of fiction, *as such*, are, or are not, a laudable and happy medium of illuminating the public mind? By works of fiction, I understand all such works as profess to illustrate moral and natural truth by the aid of the imagination; and it is distinctly to be observed, that it is no part of the inquiry, whether they are in metre or out of it; whether they are historic, dramatic, descriptive, or allegorical; whether they discover talent or not; whether they have, or have not, *individually*, a good or evil tendency. We have nothing to do with the *execution* of any one work; but with the *simple principle* on which all works of this class necessarily depend.

“It is apparent, then, that before this question can be answered in the *negative*, we must be prepared to sacrifice the very best and most harmless of prose fictions. Æsop, who has so long been considered an innocent inmate of our nurseries; ‘The Village Dialogues,’ which are well adapted to those for whom they are designed; ‘Hervey’s Meditations,’ which, with whatever faults of style, are still a fine specimen of piety and talent; ‘Rasselas,’ not the least production of a mighty mind; ‘Robinson Crusoe,’ which is so true to nature, though not to particular fact, that we can never think of it as a fiction; ‘The Pilgrim’s Progress,’ which has gained to itself applause from the philosophical and imaginative, the illiterate and the critical, the young and the old—which has established itself in almost every dwelling, and is second only in circulation to the Bible, and Book of Common Prayer;—these must all be sacrificed, before works of fiction, as such, can be condemned, for they are all fictitious, they are all novels.

“On the same principle it will be, as we have intimated, indispensable that we should abandon at once, and for ever, all the walks of poetry. All poetry is fiction; and our finest poems are novels in verse, though, in most cases, resting on facts. Our Virgil, Homer, and Milton, therefore, must be shut, to be opened no more; and we must cease to learn the lessons of wisdom or piety from Pope and Addison, Cowper and Montgomery, Young, Milman, and Wordsworth. All, ‘from the diverting story of John Gilpin,’ to the most sublime productions of human genius, must pass under a common sentence of reprobation, before *any one tale* can, *because it is a tale*, be condemned.

“More than this:—If this question is to be decided in the *negative*, I would ask, what is to become of the fine arts generally? Music, painting, sculpture, what would these be without the imagination? They all rest on the sounds, and figures, and scenes of nature; but they all depend essentially on the *imagination*, for those combinations which impart to them their interest and sublimity. It is this power, that intuitively rejecting what is discordant, feeble, or deformed, and as quickly suggesting what is beautiful, grand, or affecting, presents us with a living type, or that ideal perfection which it has conceived; and without it, these arts, and all their affinities, would be prostrated in the dust—would be a mere mechanical exercise, in which there could be no place for the movements and inspirations of a mind, dilated by its own divine inventions. Yet, so far as the imagination is concerned in them, they are manifestly fictitious; and if fiction must not be *written*, it must not be *delineated*; and the finest works of Raphael, of Phidias, and of Handel, must be proscribed; and those arts which contribute so largely, and, under due restraints, so innocently to our intellectual enjoyment, and national civilization, must be permitted to expire, or be reduced to a state worse than extinction.

“Again; I have most seriously to ask, if the question before us is to receive an unfavourable answer, how we are to dispose of those portions of the holy Scriptures which must be affected by it? They contain fables, poetry, and parables; these, we have been inclined to think, add materially to the beauty and pathos of the divine word; but this opinion must necessarily be influenced by the way in which we determine on the principle—that truth may be lawfully presented to the mind by means of fiction—for they are evidently fictitious. Not to refer to the poetry, which dwells on the whole face of scripture like a sacred halo; the fables of Jotham and Nathan are beautiful fictions, insinuating to the mind important moral truth; and the parables of our Lord are exactly of the same class. These admirable parables may have been, in many cases, suggested by real occurrences, but who would think it necessary that they should simply state fact, and describe living individuals? The affecting parable of the prodigal, for instance, it is not unlikely, was intimated to the mind of the Saviour, by what he had observed in human life, and without doubt it would describe the leading follies of many a youth, who lived in his time; yet, before this sketch can be justified, must it be shewn that the representation applies to a particular individual, and a particular family? and must it be condemned, on finding any discrepancies between it and the living example? I reply, Certainly not; it was never meant that these sacred compositions should be brought to such a standard. It is not needful to shew that there was a Dives, a Lazarus, and a Prodigal, to justify these parables; the characters were meant to be fictitious, while they were modelled after the finest and truest conceptions of human nature. Yet this can *only* be maintained by allowing *that truth may be represented by means of fiction*; and those who reject this proposition, must be prepared as they can, to answer for a virtual, but undoubted, rejection of no very inconsiderable portion of revelation.

“Finally, I desire to ask, if the imagination may not be employed for these and similar purposes, why was the imagination given? This noble faculty is possessed by us all; it is of its very nature to be employed in fictitious and inventive combinations; and its creations are without end. All that the orator has expressed, or the artist delineated, or the author written of its conceptions, are as nothing, compared with those countless formations, which inhabit the deep recesses of thought, and which never see the light. But why should this power, the most active and ethereal we know, be bestowed, if not for good? And how can it be for good, if its most natural exercises are evil? And they must necessarily be evil, if fictitious combinations are to be condemned; for the very element in which it lives is fiction, as much as reason is the element of the understanding, and love of the affections. On the principle we are considering, it is no ques-

tion, whether this power is liable to abuse, nor whether its conceptions are bodied forth in description. If they are improper to be *expressed*, then they are improper to be *imagined*; and the *faculty*, for its own sake, must come under reprehension.

“In arriving at the conclusion, from these premises, I am really ashamed, sir, formally to inquire, to which side of the question you now determine. It should seem an insult to the understanding of any man, to ask, whether in contending against the lawfulness of fictitious productions, he is disposed to resist the use of the imagination altogether, and, of course, to implicate the utility and benefit of its very existence. Yet I see no other alternative. The plain and incontestable conclusion is—That, before any one fiction can be censured, *because it is a fiction*, all that is imaginative in our best writers and artists, all that is imaginative in the holy scriptures, and the very nature of the imagination in man, must be submitted to condemnation! Indeed, the conclusion, though so greatly resisted, is so strong, and so much a part of the principle for which I am pleading, that to give them a separate existence almost involves a paradox;—it is nearly saying, that fiction cannot be condemned while fiction is approved. And if I have taken time to come to such a conclusion, the blame must not be referred to me, but to those who have attempted to divide things so essentially united.

“Many benevolent and pious persons, in their jealousy for the safety and welfare of youth, have formed wrong opinions on this subject, under the impulse of fear. Anxious to save the unsuspecting from the snare of some fictitious writings, as well they might be, they have hastily exclaimed against *all* productions of the same class; and such persons would now be disposed eagerly to inquire—If we once admit, that works of fiction are lawful and good, what means have we of protecting the reading community from that large mass of licentious novels, which would affect the whole of it like contagion? I reply, Let them be condemned, severely condemned; yet let them be condemned not as fictions, but on their own separate offences. If they are extravagant or silly; if they encourage morbid feeling or false sentiment; if they apologize for vice, while they compliment virtue; if they sophisticate the plain maxims of morality, or trifle with and impugn the sacred principles of religion; let the head of offending be shewn, and let them suffer for the crimes of which they are guilty.

“This, as it is the *just* mode of procedure, is also the *safe* one. Let a parent tell a child, that he objects to all novels or tales, because they are fictions, and therefore bad; and he will at once hazard the success of his most anxious desires. He will ask too much, and be in danger of obtaining nothing. The child will soon fall in with some fiction, to which no reasonable objection can be made; or he will soon have sense to know that his Virgil and Homer are as much fictions or novels as any writings can be; and

this will destroy his respect for an opinion which he has revered, but has found inconsistent. From having regarded an injudicious opinion, he will be tempted unduly to despise it; and it is well, if he does not satisfy himself for what he considers needless restraint, by giving his uncurbed attention to works he would never have read, had he not thought them unjustly censured.

“As this is the safe mode of proceeding, so it is of more extensive application. He who adopts it, will not be driven to make weak and irrational distinctions, where, if there are great accidental differences, there can be no *essential* ones. He will not excuse a tale, and censure a novel; he will not justify a poem, and arraign a story, or withhold his imprimatur from a historical romance. Admitting the principle without limitation, that no work of imagination is to be condemned because it is imaginative, we shall at once bring all works of imagination, whether of the pencil, the chisel, or the pen, to a higher standard, and try each of them by its own peculiar claims and character. To do less than this, is to betray the cause we would defend, by our fears and inconsistency; to attempt more, would be to reject a poem, a statue, or a tale, because it is such, and to expose our want of wisdom and of taste to those whom we would influence by our opinion.

“And, surely, if works of imagination must be accepted as legitimate, it is most unwise in the friends of religion, to relinquish this province of letters to the worldly and profane. They have been disposed to *condemn* it; and, in their haste to do so, they have not taken the most tenable position the subject affords. It is readily admitted, that there is much, very much, as the case now is, to condemn; but may it not be fairly inquired, whether this evil has not greatly arisen from the line of conduct pursued by those who are so earnest to censure? They have abandoned this department of literature: and, *therefore*, statuary has been too often indelicate, painting too often luscious, and fictitious writings, whether in rhyme or prose, have produced, in rank and unchecked luxuriance, all the poisonous weeds of vice and licentiousness. Their hope undoubtedly was, by withholding their influence from this branch of letters, that it would wither and die; but the effect has been only to leave its fruits to grow wild and noisome.

“This error has remained the longer, and acted the more powerfully, because it has been sustained by another; what has been condemned has likewise been *despised*. Certainly no disposition is less adapted to the subject than that of contempt. Corrupted as this portion of our literature unquestionably is, it still contains more of genius, and of philosophy too, than any other; and, from the popular character of its productions, it has exerted and will exert, beyond any other, an influence on the general mind. It is of the last importance, therefore, to a people, that the character of their polite literature should be salutary and good. The mass of a nation will neither be moral nor religious, till its literature be-

come so! and its literature can never be sanative or pious, while scorned and abandoned by the friends of religion and purity.

"Let, then, the mistakes which have been held on the subject be renounced. They have had a most disastrous tendency, and they will work much more extensive mischief if persisted in. We have risen high in the scale of civilization; the polite arts have much more of popular notice and admiration than ever; the tastes and imagination of the people are extensively excited; they are eagerly demanding to be fed, and woe be to us, if we give them a scorpion instead of bread! It must not be said at this time of day, that these are unwholesome appetites, and that other faculties must be fostered. No—they must *all* be fed. Poetry cannot die; fiction cannot die; the imitative arts cannot die; unless invention and imagination should first expire!

"Let then the friends of religion and of mankind grant what is due to this branch of knowledge. Let them not put literature and religion in most dangerous and unnatural opposition; let them feel the importance of having polite learning on their side, in their array against lax morals and bad principles. Let them move in a larger circle than they have hitherto described; let them not be too fastidious about means; let them employ every talent, and commend every effort, to render works addressed to the imagination as beneficial as they are influential. Let them not exact conformity in every particular, before they will acknowledge an auxiliary in any. He that is not against good sense and right feeling, is for them, whatever the field of his labour or the gifts of his mind.

"Yet, if somewhat like complaint is raised against the course pursued by the serious and the good, it must be received with considerable qualification. There have always been many of their number, who have thought it neither wise nor safe to leave so important a power as the imagination, in the hands of infidelity and vice; and by their pen, their pencil, or their sanction, they have done what they could to neutralize an evil which they were not able to prevent. Their example has been as useful as their labours. Numbers were induced to follow in their steps; and recently those numbers have been happily accumulating. No mean division of the more serious part of the community, have taken a decided interest in the cause of refined literature; they have entered a protest against its monopoly by the frivolous and licentious; and they have demanded, that its productions should be so amended as to become a medium of delight and improvement to the most innocent and unwary.

"Already we have seen the good effects of this conduct, partial as it has been. The public taste has been purified; the tone of opinion has been strengthened; and vice has been put out of countenance by the steady frown of virtue. Those authors, whose only wish, perhaps, was to please, have been compelled to shift their ground, if they would afford pleasure. Painting has become

more chaste; poetry has been, in some degree, restored to her native and dignified position; and prose fiction has received a new, a better, if not an unexceptionable, character. And if any one has dared to pass the bounds of decorum, and has sought to wound the public virtue, it has not been possible for him to escape, though the most gifted of mortals, without suffering a deeper wound in his own reputation.

“ Besides—amongst the advocates of right sentiment and good principles themselves, a band of persons have sprung up, who, imbued with the importance of the undertaking, have determined to employ works of imagination in favour of just morals and devotional affections. They have had not only to labour, but to fight; and have been called not merely to contend with their enemies, but with their allies. However, their efforts have not been in vain; and ultimately they shall be duly appreciated. It is by such efforts, sustained by irrepressible hope, that they shall become the censors of the literary republic, and shall purify and invigorate the streams of literature, till they shall carry refreshment, life, and healing, to the most distant parts of the land. And when this shall be accomplished, we shall have little to desire; the finer arts and deeper sciences shall follow in the illustrious train of piety and truth, and ‘every imagination,’ as well as every thought, shall be brought ‘into captivity to Christ!’ ” [pp. 60—76.]

For an extract so very much longer than any we are in the habit of making, we should think an apology most justly due both to its author and our readers, but that we entertain a well-grounded expectation, that both the one and the other will rather thank than blame us, for extracting a passage so highly creditable to the taste and talent of its author, and so likely to interest all who peruse it, from a work, which, being altogether a matter of personal altercation, is not likely to get into general circulation. To divide it was impossible, without altogether destroying its effect; and that, we apprehend, is so likely to be beneficial to the best interests of religion and of literature, as abundantly to warrant a deviation from our usual apportionment of quotations, of which we are persuaded that our readers will admit us to be rarely guilty. We intend also to make this defence of a species of writing, which no one is better calculated rightly to employ than its author, the basis of a notice of some half dozen works of Fiction, now piled upon our table; and therefore we insert it, an entire piece in our pages, rather as a separate essay, than an extract in a review.

POETRY.

THE SMILE THAT WE LOVE IN OUR OWN DEAR HOME.

*Addressed to a Young Lady at * * * * **

WHEN the business of life compels us to roam
 From the smile that we love in our own dear home,
 From husband or wife, from brother or friend,
 More distancing still, as our footsteps bend ;
 Oh ! is it not sweet, for the eye to trace
 That welcoming smile on a stranger's face,
 And, sweet to the heart the encouraging tone,
 That assures us we are not quite alone ;
 For that friends, though formed but of yesterday,
 Will try every art that can wile away
 The grief we must feel, when compelled to roam
 From the smile that we love in our own dear home.

Such welcoming smile, such encouraging tone,
 'Twas mine to trace—to feel—shall be mine to own :
 For when hither, from southern plains I came,
 A stranger—known only at least by name,—
 I found—how kindly found, from yours and you,
 Welcome warm-hearted, unaffected, true.
 And often since then, as the Queen of the Night
 Thrice waxes and wanes in her silvery light,
 My round returns—I return but to find
 A kindness, that well might dispel from the mind
 The grief we must feel, when compelled to roam
 From the smile that we love in our own dear home.

And for kindness like this, what thanks I pray,
 Fair lady, can recreant minstrel pay ?
 A minstrel, Oh yes ! I must love the name,
 Though years have rolled by since the minstrel flame,
 So dimly that burned in the morning of life,
 Was quenched in the turmoils of legal strife.
 I can but try my rude hand to fling
 Across my forsaken harp's breaking string,
 To wake for thee, fair one, a parting strain,
 From chords that my finger may touch not again ;
 For sad would their notes be, while their master must roam
 From the smile that he loves in his own dear home.

And but faintly they wake, whilst endeavouring to give
 Words to the wish, in his heart that must live,
 Whilst vibrates its pulse—that for yours and for you,
 Kind sylphs (if there be such), or angels may strew
 A pathway of flowers:—as cloudless a sky,
 'Twere vain that I wished; may the clouds swiftly pass by,
 And the sun shine in splendour, though tempered its ray,
 Bright—brightening still, to the perfection of day.
 Whilst for yours, and for you, and for all that you love,
 May the wish of the minstrel prophetic prove,
 For the kindest of welcomes, whenever you roam
 From the smile that you love in your own dear home.

B.

LINES WRITTEN IN WALES.

Mouldering thy once honoured bard's flying finger,
 Cambria! thy wild mountain harp I would wake;
 If yet around thee one spirit should linger,
 Blest be that spirit—that harp for thy sake.

Torrents of foam to the summer-sun gleaming,
 Valleys of shade to that harp have replied,
 When thy bold prophets had burst from their dreaming,
 And hurled the bold music o'er those that had died.

Years have rolled by since the breath of false glory,
 With war's sullen trumpet, has startled thy glen;
 Long may it be ere thy record of story
 Is hung with the cypress of murder again.

I passed by thy once splendid castle,* where title
 And beauty, and mirth held their festal—but o'er
 Its gate hung the funeral scutcheon—and idle,
 The echo that flung back the anthem of yore.

I passed by thy Abbey;† the cowl and the mitre
 Had mingled their dust with the haughty ones there;
 But its time-fretted arch in the sunset grew brighter,
 And the chill weed of ruin swayed sweetly in air.

I passed by thy pillar,‡ firm-planted to waken
 Late memory of friends who in battle had sunk;
 But its rooting the visit of thunders had shaken,
 And a voice of the mountains had shattered its trunk.

* Chirk Castle. † Abbey Valle Crucis. ‡ Pillar of Eliseg.

I crossed in its gladness thy Dee's druid water,
 All fresh in the fulness of years it flowed on;
 But the hearts that once worshipped were perished in slaughter,
 The patriot—the chieftain—the harper were gone.

Too like the lone column, worn, blank, and degraded,
 Which proudly to Heaven raised its rich sculptured head;
 Man blossoms to-day, and to-morrow lies faded,
 All blasted, his triumphs, his glories all fled.

Alone, in unchangeable bloom o'er his ashes,
 Wild nature lives on,—undeprest and elate;
 Yet the mountain still towers,—yet the broad river dashes,
 Unsullied by storms, and unstooping to fate.

But countless and pure as the rain-drop that gathers
 On thy hills, when the red sheet of lightnings is furled,
 Thy sons shall inspire the renown of their fathers,
 And be all that their fathers have been to the world.

W.

GRATITUDE.

LINES WRITTEN ON PLANTING SLIPS OF GERANIUM AND CONSTANCY, NEAR
 THE GRAVE OF A VENERABLE FRIEND.

From "Moral Pieces, in Prose and Verse, by LYDIA HUNTLEY," of *Hartford,*
Connecticut.

Little plant of slender form,
 Fair, and shrinking from the storm,
 Lift thou here thine infant head,
 Bloom in this uncultured bed.
 Thou, of firmer spirit too,
 Stronger texture, deeper hue,
 Dreading not the winds that cast
 Cold snows o'er the frozen waste,
 Rise, and shield it from the blast.

Shrink not from the awful shade,
 Where the bones of men are laid:
 Short like thine their transient date,
 Keen has been the scythe of fate.
 Forth like plants in glory drest
 They came upon the green earth's breast,
 Sent forth their roots to reach the stream,
 Their buds to meet the rising beam,
 They drank the morning's balmy breath,
 And sunk at eve in withering death.

Rest here, meek plants, for few intrude
To trouble this deep solitude ;
But should the giddy footstep tread
Upon the ashes of the dead,
Still let the hand of rashness spare
These little plants of love to tear,
Since fond affection with a tear,
Has placed them for an offering here.
Adorn the grave of her who sleeps
Unconscious, while remembrance weeps,
Though ever, ever did she feel,
And mourn those pangs she could not heal.

Seven times the sun, with swift career,
Has marked the circle of the year,
Since first she pressed her lowly bier ;
And seven times, sorrowing have I come,
Alone, and wandering through the gloom,
To pour my lays upon her tomb :
And I have sighed to see her bed
With brambles and with thorns o'erspread.

For surely round her place of rest,
I should not let the coarse weed twine,
Who so the couch of pain has blest,
The path of want so freely drest,
And scattered such perfumes on mine.
It is not meet that she should be
Forgotten or unblest by me.

Ye plants, that in your hallowed beds,
Like strangers, lift your trembling heads,
Drink the pure dew that evening sheds,
And meet the morning's earliest ray,
And catch the sunbeams as they play ;
And when your buds are moist with rain,
Oh shed those drops in tears again ;
And if the blast that sweeps the heath,
Too rudely o'er your leaves should breathe
Then sigh for her ; and when you bloom,
Scatter your fragrance on her tomb.

But should you, smit with terror, cast
Your infant foliage on the blast,
Or faint beneath the vertic heat,
Or shrink when wintry tempests beat
There is a plant of constant bloom,
And it shall deck this lowly tomb,

Not blanced with frost, or drowned with rain,
Or by the breath of winter slain ;
Or by the sweeping gale annoyed,
Or by the giddy hand destroyed,
But every morn its buds renewed,
Are by the dops of evening dewed,
This is the plant of *Gratitude*.

ANECDOTE.

INDIAN WIT AND GENEROSITY.

Not many years after the county of Litchfield began to be settled by the English, a stranger Indian came one day into an inn, in the dusk of the evening, and requested the hostess to furnish him with some drink and a supper. At the same time he observed, that he could pay for neither, as he had had no success in hunting ; but promised payment as soon as he should meet with better fortune. The hostess refused him both the drink and the supper ; called him a lazy, drunken, good-for-nothing fellow ; and told him, that she did not work so hard herself, to throw away her earnings upon such creatures as he was. A man who sat by, and observed that the Indian, then turning about to leave so inhospitable a place, shewed by his countenance that he was suffering very severely from want and weariness, directed the hostess to supply him with what he wished, and engaged to pay the bill himself. She did so. When the Indian had finished his supper, he turned to his benefactor, thanked him, and assured him that he should remember his kindness, and, whenever he was able, would faithfully recompense it. For the present, he observed, he could only reward him with a story, which, if the hostess would give him leave, he wished to tell. The hostess, whose complacency had been recalled by the prospect of payment, consented. The Indian, then addressing himself to his benefactor, said, "I suppose you read the Bible." The man assented. "Well," said the Indian, "the Bible say, God made the world, and then he took him, and looked on him, and say, 'It's all very good.' Then he made light, and took him, and looked on him, and say, 'It's all very good.' Then he made dry land and water, and sun and moon, and grass and trees, and took him, and looked on him, and say, 'It's all very good.' Then he made beasts, and birds, and fishes, and took him, and looked on him, and say, 'It's all very good.' Then he made man, and took him, and looked on him, and say, 'It's all very good.' Then he made woman, and took him, and looked on him, and he no dare say one such word." The Indian having told his story, withdrew.

A few years after, the man who had befriended him, had occasion to go some distance into the wilderness between Litchfield (then a frontier settlement) and Albany, where he was taken prisoner by an Indian scout, and carried to Canada. When he arrived at the principal settlement of the tribe, on the southern border of the St. Lawrence, it was proposed by some of the captors that he should be put to death. During the consultation, an old woman demanded

that he should be given up to her, that she might adopt him in the place of a son, whom she had lost in the war. He was accordingly given to her, and lived through the succeeding winter in her family, experiencing the customary effects of savage hospitality. The following summer, as he was at work in the forest alone, an unknown Indian came up to him, and asked him to meet him at a place which he pointed out, upon a given day. The prisoner agreed to the proposal, but not without some apprehensions that mischief was intended him. During the interval, these apprehensions increased to such a degree, as to dissuade him effectually from fulfilling his engagement. Soon after, the same person found him at his work again, and very gravely reproved him for not performing his promise. The man apologized awkwardly enough, but in the best manner in his power. The Indian told him, that he should be satisfied if he would meet him at the same place on a future day, which he named. The man promised to meet him, and fulfilled his promise. When he arrived at the spot, he found the Indian provided with two muskets, ammunition for them, and two knapsacks. The Indian ordered him to take one of each, and follow him. The direction of their march was to the south. The man followed without the least knowledge of what he was to do, or whither he was going; but concluded, that if his conductor intended him harm, he would have despatched him at the beginning; and that at the worst, he was as safe where he was, as he could be in any other place. Within a short time, therefore, his fears subsided, although the Indian observed a profound and mysterious silence concerning the object of the expedition. In the day-time they shot such game as came in their way, and at night kindled a fire, by which they slept. After a tedious journey of many days, they came one morning to the top of an eminence, presenting a prospect of a cultivated country, in which was a number of houses. The Indian asked his companion whether he knew the ground. He replied eagerly, that it was Litchfield. His guide, then, after reminding him that he had so many years before relieved the wants of a famishing Indian, at an inn in that town, subjoined, "I that Indian! now I pay you! go home." Having said this, he bade him adieu, and the man joyfully returned to his own house.

AMERICAN LITERATURE AND INTELLIGENCE.

WE have received from New-York some pamphlets in defence of Bishop Hobart; but as they are not complete, we defer noticing them until our next Number, especially as it would be impossible to do justice to the subject now, from the distance of the final editor from London rendering it necessary to publish the work with a somewhat smaller quantity of matter than usual, rather than risk a delay in its regular appearance, by the transmission of proofs nearly 500 miles.

The Investigator.

JULY, 1824.

MEMOIR of the late Miss JANE BURY, of Stockport.

[Though the subject of the following Memoir was unknown but in the circles of private life, the knowledge which some of the editors of this work possessed of her talents, her virtues, and her piety, induce them most readily to comply with the wishes of her friends, to give a place in their pages to a memorial of her worth, which will, they flatter themselves, be instructive to the rising generation of the female sex, whilst it is not uninteresting to their readers of every age and class.—EDIT.]

“The mind was well-informed, the passions held
Subordinate, and diligence was choice.” COWPER.

THE biographer of Kirke White elegantly observes, that “just at the age when the painter would have wished to fix his likeness, and the lover of poetry would delight to contemplate him,—in the morning of his virtues, the full spring blossom of his hopes,—just at that age hath death set the seal of eternity upon him, and the beautiful hath been made permanent.” Without asserting, that the excellent young lady, whose moral and intellectual worth it is the object of the following record to exhibit, was equal to that celebrated youth, it may be affirmed, that the passage just quoted is truly applicable to her, and that there was a striking similarity between both the individuals, in sobriety of judgment, vigilant application, and substantial piety.

Miss JANE BURY was born at Hopehill, near Stockport, in Cheshire, October 26, 1801. The days of childhood furnished none of those romantic events, and marvellous occurrences, which have been so frequently and injudiciously published to the world as facts. It may suffice to remark, that she furnished occasion for rejoicing, not only in the possession of considerable energy of character, but, more especially, as manifesting, with advancing maturity, those amiable features of disposition, which indicated, by their development, the principles of spiritual life. The natural reservedness of Miss Bury's temper, together with a nervous timidity, led to an habitual silence in company, and at the same time render it impossible to delineate, with desirable accuracy, the process of her mental improvement and religious experience. This deficiency, though for some reasons

to be deplored, clothes her memory with additional interest, by giving to her feminine excellency a polish, sacred in its character, and impressive in its effects. Instead of manifesting a disposition to forwardness and tattling, or any thing approaching to Mrs. More's happy delineation of the "Borderers," there was about Miss Bury a tact of delicacy which prevented obtrusion, and a devotion to intellectual pursuits, which gave to her faith a more vigorous exercise, while it received illustration and daily increase, by the actings of a spirit eminently meek and quiet.

The memorial of her juvenile days, embracing a faithful sketch of her general character and attainments, will be best exhibited in the language of one who intimately knew her. "At a very early period," the narrative states, "she discovered a strong bias for mental culture. This taste was seconded by uncommon industry and perseverance. No pursuit undertaken by her, was relinquished on account of its difficulty. When a child, she took great pleasure in committing to memory long extracts from various authors; and at the age of ten or eleven voluntarily learned, during her play hours, the whole of the third book of Milton's *Paradise Lost*. They who had the charge of instructing her at this period well know how solicitous she was that no lesson should be omitted, whether of a serious nature, or of lighter accomplishment. She seemed, indeed, to act intuitively, upon the principle which so many learn only by experience, and which Butler, among others, has so beautifully illustrated in his 'Analogy'—that the neglect and omission of one season of our lives, however trivial, will necessarily and invariably involve their respective consequences and regret in a succeeding. The solidity of her judgment was remarkable, and to her early conviction of the necessity of restraining the imagination in its undue exercise, may be attributed much of the useful and substantial knowledge she acquired. She did not, perhaps, possess much originality of thought, and of this she was aware, but her mind was constantly active, and her understanding was clear, comprehensive, and unprejudiced. Works addressed specifically to the imagination were by her rarely perused. Thus, though in disposition affectionate and susceptible, she gradually acquired a masculine vigour, free, on the one hand, from false sentiment, and on the other, from vain delusions."

"Previous to going to school, she occasionally enjoyed the company of sensible and intelligent ministers; and the interest which, though so young, she took in their conver-

sation, was evinced by an animated countenance, and by frequent recurrence, even in the last year of her life, to sentiments and facts which, at those seasons, had been stated."

"At school her ambition to excel, was universally remarked; and such was her ardour in the pursuit of knowledge, as sometimes to double, and even treble the appointed lessons. The biographical memoir of Mrs. Ramsay was now perused, and it appears to have materially influenced her future habits. She frequently alluded with admiration to the mental exertions of that excellent woman, and to her peculiar felicity in being able to support health with only four hours sleep. It was Jane's ambition to imitate her, as far as circumstances would allow; and during one winter especially, she was usually engaged at her studies as early as four or five o'clock.

"During the last four years and a half of her life, she was assiduously employed as an instructor; but the hours set apart for recreation, were still devoted to the increase of her own stores, and existing memorials shew how well they were occupied. These consist of voluminous extracts from various authors, of which the historical works of Gibbon, Robertson, Rollin, &c. form a large proportion. Her extracts from Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, Miss Aikin's *Memoirs of the Court of Queen Elizabeth*, Southey's *Life of Wesley*, and other biographies, are occasionally interspersed with remarks, which shew how well the sentiments were weighed. Indeed, no hint calculated to facilitate improvement was lost, and the earliest opportunity was seized for reducing it to practice. She was much attached to natural philosophy and botany, and her papers testify steady exertions for impressing upon her memory every fact connected with those subjects. At the age of nineteen she was so much interested in an article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, on Intellectual Education, as to abridge it for more easy use. Nor were the numerous extracts thus made, treated as useless, but at stated periods were diligently reviewed; and thus the impressions first made were strengthened. Her very ready recollection of events has been attributed by those who were unacquainted with her habits, to a remarkably retentive memory; but those to whom she was best known, more justly assigned it principally to unwearied application. During the last year of her life, she was engaged in reading Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, the first volume of which she finished by devoting a short time before breakfast to its perusal: of this work she

wrote an analysis. Never satisfied with present acquirements, she was continually looking forward, and she considered that time as lost, which was not diligently and duly appropriated. Thus the moments of social intercourse were devoted to the needle; and it has been remarked by visitors, that she was never unemployed. By the same habits she acquired a competent knowledge of the Italian language, and translated into the French several essays, which remain specimens alike of taste and skill."

"Her superior attainments in music will not be easily forgotten, especially by those who know how very little time she thought it right to devote to its charms. Her execution, though not rapid, was clear and pleasing, and her touch exquisitely light and graceful."*

The reader's attention shall now be directed to Miss Bury's MSS.

It was in the year 1819, that her propensities to self-cultivation were more explicitly made known, as will be manifest from the following letters. They were addressed to one of her relatives, and, while unfolding the writer's mind, will furnish no uninteresting specimen of her habits of thinking.

" May 13, 1819.

"I can assure you, my dear —, that I never sat down to write with so much satisfaction as at present; your proposal gave me much pleasure. I had long wished to have some friend, to whom I could communicate my thoughts, and whose advice I might be favoured with. I sometimes think I could tell you every thing, but have afterwards been deterred by the idea that it would have too much the appearance of egotism, and that love of self which is inherent in our nature; yet when reflecting that I am writing to —, who loves me 'with all my faults,' this difficulty partly vanishes, though I cannot say it is entirely removed.

"I should be glad if you would recommend to me some plan for improving the little time which may be called *my own*. I am sensible of great difficulty in things which are of importance to my station, and often regret that a deep sense of the value of instruction, and of that time which was entirely devoted to it, had not been earlier impressed on my mind; but now that season is past, there is no one to blame but myself.

"It has frequently occurred to me, as not being quite right to inculcate so strenuously upon young people, that the desire to obtain knowledge is laudable, and will even

* Account of Miss Bury, in a letter to a Friend. — Orig. MS.

meet with encouragement. This opinion is seldom found suitable to those who are in the middle or lower ranks of society, for if they fulfil the various duties of their station in a conscientious manner, the cultivation of their minds will, of course, be neglected, and that considered of least, which was before maintained to be of the greatest importance. Would it not be better to give them an accurate view of the subject, according to the situation they are to fill?

“ I should like to know how far it is wrong to indulge a taste for some particular studies which are not absolutely necessary to be acquired.

“ I often wonder how it is that some people are so entirely engrossed in the trivial occurrences which pass every day, as to think and talk of nothing else; for if it is urged, by way of excuse, that trifles become of consequence when connected with the concerns of life, yet surely a small portion of time might be spent profitably, in discoursing upon subjects that are worthy the attention of a rational creature.

“ I hope you will excuse all defects, and write a few lines soon to

Your ever affectionate,

JANE.”

It is impossible not to be struck with the good sense and judicious observations embodied in the foregoing letter. Nor can that part of it which regards education be impressed too forcibly upon persons so engaged, whether as instructors or as parents. To the one class it furnishes a useful hint, to the other a safe guide. When will the managers of Sunday and day schools sufficiently comprehend its propriety?

“ June 9, 1820.

“ My very dear,—I have just finished reading a very interesting work, Sir W. Forbes’ ‘ Life of Dr. Beattie,’ and have made some extracts from it, which if you have not read, you will like to see. They will give you some idea of the character of this great and good man. Perhaps you will think, as I do sometimes, that I read too many books to derive any lasting benefit from them; but really it is very difficult to resist the temptation, when a work of this kind comes in the way. I hope it has not been perused without some profit.

“ I never before heard of the ‘ Minstrel.’ It is highly spoken of, and I should like much to compare the poet and the philosopher. The union, considering their distinguishing characteristics, seems almost incompatible. That the author of an *Essay on Truth*, and other philosophical works, should, at the same time, possess those creative powers of imagina-

tion which constitute some of the requisite qualities of a good poet, is to me a striking proof of the wonderful versatility of some minds.

“It has often struck me, that the frequent perusal of poetry (though of the best kind) must produce much the same effects as novels and romances, the larger portion being addressed to the imagination. Imagination is evidently an indispensable qualification in true poetry; for without it the most harmonious verse would soon lose its effect, and the ear be tired with the dull uniformity of rhyming syllables. Those poets, therefore, whose warm and lively fancies can bring forth abundant and diversified imagery, and paint the beautiful or the sublime in the most glowing colours, will be the objects of most interest. This is my conjecture. Though I have read but little, and cannot attempt to argue on comparative merits, yet I think Dr. Beattie confirms the opinion when he says, ‘the end of true poetry is to give pleasure rather than to convey instruction,’ and that ‘a poet must do a great deal for the sake of pleasure only; for if he fail to please, he may deserve praise on other accounts, but *as a poet* he has done nothing.’ He shews also that poetry exhibits a state of things somewhat different from what they really are. If so, will it not often mislead the judgment, and produce a disrelish for plain and sober realities? In this manner many erroneous ideas are formed, and the mind is perplexed, and often led astray, when searching after truth.

“But I do not wish to depreciate the value of poetry, which has always been a source of gratification to me, only to suggest what I conceive to be the consequences of too great a love for it. My ideas upon this subject are but imperfect, yet such as they are, I submit them to your inspection, and remain your ever affectionate and sincere friend,
“JANE.”

From this period more particularly, may be dated the visible expansion of Miss Bury’s mind; her character was, in fact, formed, and all her powers had received a direction susceptible of pleasure from that only which was suited to mental vigour, and to promote her best interests.

The art of self-cultivation seems to have been now attempted with increased assiduity; and her observations on every thing connected with personal improvement henceforth testify alike the soundness of her judgment, and the accuracy of her taste. She was taught too, we trust, by the holy Spirit, “the vanity of man as mortal,” the insufficiency

of even human learning to furnish happiness, and the fearful state of the heart by reason of transgression. Thus the following extracts, instead of occasioning surprise, may serve the twofold purpose of confirming scripture testimony, and exhibiting, in a spirit of humility, the foundation of that beautiful superstructure which was gradually advancing to perfection.

To a careful perusal of the memoirs of Miss Hamilton, and it is probable also of Miss Elizabeth Smith, may be traced many of the succeeding observations.

“There appears to me,” she writes, “to be very little difficulty in convincing ourselves of the poverty of our understandings, and of the scanty supplies of knowledge with which our minds are furnished. If we reflect on the vast depths of knowledge, they will be found illimitable to our capacities; if we endeavour to range through the world of science, they will appear immense and endless; but let us only take a survey of one little spot, and it will discover to our astonished view, stores apparently inexhaustible, and amply sufficient to employ all our faculties during the period of our earthly existence. But what are the effects which such a contemplation should produce? Should we be so overwhelmed with the boundless perspective, as to imagine every attempt futile; and be contented, because we cannot know every thing, to know nothing? Rather, let it excite in us proper sentiments with respect to our own ignorance, and stimulate to fresh exertion.”

Almost immediately afterwards it is added: “To the mind which is ever ready to receive instruction, innumerable sources are opened, which were once barren and neglected; as in the world of nature every thing teems with life, and affords full scope for philosophical research, so we may derive instruction from the meanest object. This is well calculated to inspire sentiments of wonder and admiration at the wisdom, power, and goodness of our all-wise Creator. But if these are so fully displayed in the works of his hands, how much more so in the effects of his governing power. It is impossible to read the history of a nation, without being convinced of this truth; and while we are often struck with the surprising and unforeseen events which take their rise from causes apparently remote and unconnected, we must admit that they only furnish new and striking proofs of a superintending Providence, while they form another link in that grand chain of wonders which will one day be disclosed to our astonished view?”

“ With these reflections,” she proceeds, “ we may advantageously open the pages of history, but in no other way will they afford any real satisfaction. We shall often be left in darkness and perplexity, unless we accept willingly the light of revelation. The glare of human reason is an *ignis fatuus*; it leads astray into labyrinths of error; the more we follow it, the more we recede from the path of truth.”

In the preceding remarks, we perceive a visible contrariety to the natural course of mankind. Man, like the demoniac who dwelt among the tombs, is prone to reverse the sentiments thus expressed. Instead of depreciating his own powers, and subjecting his reason to the control of revelation, he calls his reason, which is very darkness, *light*; and the oracles of truth, the only illuminated path to heaven, *darkness*. And it is only as the mind is influenced by divine grace, that a restoration to sanity and spiritual vigour is effected. Then only is it that divine effects are visible, and that the happy recipient will sit “at the feet of Jesus” clothed, and “in his right mind.” How impressive is the inducement for all, in youth especially, to seek transforming influence, and to the eternal renunciation of every deceitful gleam, to lift up the earnest supplication,—“ *Oh! that my ways were directed to keep thy statutes.*” “ If,” says Dr. Manton, “ men were more sensible of their obligation, we should have more prayers of the kind.”

Mrs. More’s *Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education*, particularly chap. vii. vol. i. seem to have been read with special attention, and no inconsiderable part was, with some variations, transcribed.

In 1820 Miss Bury commenced a series of memoranda, entitled, “ *Extracts and Observations.*” The title sufficiently designates their object, and a perusal of the whole amply discovers a combination of enviable qualities. The following selection is characteristic: it originated in the *Life of Wesley*, then recently published. Having freely commented on several particulars, both as to the author and his subject, she thus proceeds:—

“ Southey says, that no conqueror or poet was ever more ambitious than Mr. Wesley. This was certainly true, but his ambition was very different to that which influences conquerors or poets. It was a true and laudable ambition, which made him devote all his time and talents to the service of God, and for the good of his fellow creatures, without expecting or hoping for the applause of the world; he looked to a higher recompense. Such ambition was worthy of

an *immortal* creature; and it would be well for mankind, if more were actuated by its powerful claims. They, like him, would then seek to promote God's glory in the salvation of souls."

"We should be particularly careful," she proceeds, "how we judge of the motives which influence those who are engaged in public life. Actions may be weighed and censured, but their secret springs ought to be held sacred, as known only to him who is acquainted with the heart."

We now return to the journal, and select a few extracts almost at random.

"*May 14, 1821.*—The author of Miss Hamilton's Memoirs relates, that Miss H. considered herself as having received an education superior to what is usually allotted to young persons of her sex and station, since she had learned to *think*. The want of this appears to be one of the great defects in the modern system of education. Young persons are taught all necessary outward accomplishments, and many which are superfluous and useless, but very few there are who have learned to employ their reasoning faculties so as to fulfil any of the great ends for which they were designed; few attain that knowledge which, as Miss More emphatically expresses it, 'is burnt in.'"

"*June 18, 1821.*—I have just begun to read Bennett on the Gospel Dispensation, and hope that, by prayer and meditation, the work may be of great benefit to me. The author shews, that the whole of revelation is a moral plan for exercising the natural powers. It is remarked, that in almost every view which can be taken of God's revealing his will, unbridled vanity might conceive of great possible additions to, and emendations of, what is actually found in the inspired volume. It cannot be doubted, that if God had seen fit, he could easily have revealed divine truths, and have exhibited the blessings of salvation in such a manner, as would irresistibly have instructed men to believe and embrace them. And in our self-flattering imagination, how ready are we to exclaim, What a complication of unpleasant and painful circumstances might thus have been prevented! What facilities to the acquisition of knowledge, what subsidiary means to the full assurance of understanding in the mysteries of the gospel, might thus have been afforded. What harmony of views, what uniformity of system, what unison of hearts in the possession of religious truth, might have been secured! But the Author of revelation has disposed otherwise; and it was evidently in the exercise of his

wisdom that he adopted this mode of procedure towards intelligent creatures, though sunk in ignorance, guilt, and wretchedness, because he saw it most consistent with their rational nature, and eventually best adapted to the wise ends of his moral government."

"In this view the gospel dispensation, which includes the whole revelation of God's will to sinful man, together with the outward means which he has appointed for them to wait upon him in, is a moral plan of exercising their natural powers, and is closely connected with his moral government of intelligent, accountable creatures; the principles of which are equity and wisdom, and the subjects of which must be dealt with as *moral agents*, not impelled by necessity even to a right mode of acting, or rendered incapable of acting otherwise, but instructed and invited to a proper mode of acting by suitable means and motives, or moral considerations of duty and interest prescribed through the medium of the understanding. Thus arises a proper ground of responsibility."

Again she writes: "Oct. 26, 1821.—This day I enter upon my 21st year, and am, therefore, led to make some reflections. I cannot but notice, with serious consideration, the rapidity with which the different portions of my time [move on] and mark my progress to the end of my days.

"It seems as if the last two or three years of my life had rolled on with greater speed than any of the former; but this may perhaps be accounted for, from the uniform tenor of my life, and the nature of my employments, which leave not an hour unoccupied.

"I am now arrived at a period which, some years ago, I should have thought the utmost boundary of my prospect into futurity, and probably at that time anticipated that I should be hardly the same being. But how vain are the speculations of childhood and youth! Instead of finding myself arrived at that maturity of judgment which I expected, instead of having those fixed and steady principles which I hoped to attain, truth compels me to acknowledge that I am yet very ignorant of many things which I ought to know, relating to the affairs of the present life, and that my mind is filled with doubts and fears concerning the important realities of a never-ending state of existence hereafter. Surely it becomes me to inquire how I have spent the past, since so large a portion of these fleeting shadows have disappeared, and I know not how many remain. I fear I have not fulfilled the end of my being, in living to the glory of

God, and making preparation for an eternal state; I desire, therefore, to enter upon *this* year with more solemn considerations than I have ever yet had, and to make religion my chief concern. I have reason to be thankful, if I have, in some degree, been made sensible of my danger, and of the evil of my heart, but want to feel that deep humiliation on account of sin, which leads to sincere and genuine repentance, and that fear of falling into sin, which arises from a knowledge of its dreadful nature.

“May the great searcher of hearts make me more and more acquainted with the wickedness of my heart; and that I may daily and hourly supplicate the direction and assistance of the holy Spirit, without which I can do nothing. May the Spirit of truth guide me into all truth, that I may no longer walk in darkness, ignorance, and error, but as I grow in years, grow in grace, and in the knowledge of my God and Saviour Jesus Christ, to whom I desire to commit all I have and hope for, through time and eternity. Amen.”

The next extract may be read with profit, and its recognition of principle furnishes a valuable clue to the writer's state of mind.

“*Feb. 7, 1822.*—Having accidentally overheard a question proposed, What is the distinction to be made between the amusements of the theatre and card-table, and those of drawing and music, I have been led to consider the answer that I should give to this question; and how I would make it appear, that a professing Christian may be justified in pursuing the latter, and rejecting the former. I intend to confine myself entirely to what may arise in my own mind, without referring to the opinion of any author; because I wish afterwards to ascertain if my own reasonings are sufficiently forcible to produce a conviction, or, at least, to silence the objections of those who would endeavour to bring against me the charge of inconsistency.—

“I shall begin with theatrical amusements, and consider their use, design, and evil tendency. To trace the progress of improvement in the stage, from the first actor, who, mounted on a cart, performed in the streets of Athens, would be foreign to the purpose; and were it not so, would sufficiently attest my incompetency for the task. It is sufficient to consider the *end* that was originally intended by these public exhibitions, and whether there is the same reason to justify their continuance.

“If we attentively observe the customs and manners of the ancients, as recorded in history, it will be seen that their

habits took a tincture from their national character, and even their amusements may be traced up to the same source. Were they a warlike people? Their delight was in martial spectacles, and in those hardy and vigorous exercises which fit the body for trials and danger. Were they peaceful? Agriculture was their chief employment; and rural sports their chief amusements. Were they possessed of inventive genius? The arts were cultivated with eagerness, and every thing tending to promote their advancement was looked up to as of primary importance. Thus the Athenians were particularly addicted to learning and sciences, and became thereby the most polished state of Greece.

“ In order to contribute to the advancement of learning, they justly paid particular attention to the improvement of their language, and oratory was held in high estimation.

“ To this cause may be ascribed the invention of theatrical amusements, which were, at first, mere exhibitions of oratorical power, accompanied by such a modulation of voice and gesture as was calculated to impress the sentiments more forcibly upon the hearers.

“ The subjects of such harangues were the more adapted to excite attention, being generally drawn from human life; they were designed eloquently to set forth the advantages of virtue, the duty of patriotism, and endeavouring to contribute to its welfare and happiness; while, on the contrary, vice was painted in the most glowing colours, and depraved habits and principles were so exposed, as that by becoming just subjects of abhorrence, feelings of disgust and detestation might be excited.

“ If such were the causes and the design of theatrical representations, it is surely necessary, before we advocate them on the same principles, to endeavour to prove how far they can be applied to the present times. I have heard it alleged, that it is very useful to attend the theatre, for the purpose of acquiring a taste for good oratory, of forming the ear to a correct pronounciation and a just delivery, and that it is a mean of preserving our language from corruptions and innovations. But this argument appears so weak as hardly to require refutation. Were we destitute of every other mean of preventing such consequences, this might be resorted to as an expedient; but while we can bring forward other claims of a superior nature, we contend that it should give place to them.

“ Let those who desire to obtain a taste for good oratory, listen to our legislators standing forth as champions in

defence of their country, proclaiming her freedom, and contending for her rights; armed, not with martial weapons, but with the persuasive eloquence of truth, a patriotic zeal glowing in their hearts. Let them go and hear our advocates pleading the cause of the injured and defenceless; or let them direct their steps to the sanctuary, and hear the ministers of our holy religion engaged in a more glorious theme, and pleading a far nobler cause, with all the eloquence which language can command, and all the force of the majesty of truth proclaiming to a ruined world, Jesus Christ and him crucified.

“ But supposing it justifiable on the grounds above mentioned, to attend theatrical amusements, a mind at all influenced by religious principles would find objections sufficient to outweigh every other consideration. The theatre is one of the haunts of vice and immorality. This ought to influence those who are instructed by the volume of inspiration, not ‘ to enter into the path of the wicked, nor to go in the way of evil men, but to avoid it, to pass by it, to turn from it and pass away.’

“ It may be urged, that it is possible to attend the theatre without associating with the gay and thoughtless, and without witnessing the licentious scenes which take place in this abode of impiety. Granting the possibility, is it not enough to *know* that all kinds of wickedness are encouraged secretly, if not exhibited openly? And, *knowing* this, is it not sanctioning such practices to frequent the place of their resort; or at least, is it not declaring to the world that vice and immorality are not held in their just abhorrence? But for the sake of argument, let us concede all the objections which have been brought forward, and suppose that theatres were conducted on the best possible plan for the preservation of the public morals, and were even deemed unexceptionable with respect to deviation from public virtue, they would not then be fit places for the disciple of Jesus. The dissipation and vanity the Christian would there meet, but ill accord with that devotional spirit which he should cherish. How would he afterwards be fitted for retirement and self-examination, when the world and its concerns should be shut out, and he must seek for satisfaction and enjoyment in higher pursuits? Our blessed Saviour exhorted his disciples *not to love the world, nor the things of the world*. In public places of amusement, every thing is calculated to cherish and increase that love. All that can please the eye and charm the ear, all that can captivate the senses and produce admira-

tion and delight, is exhibited, and contributes to entrance the soul, and make it forgetful of its immortal nature, to cause the Christian to overlook his condition as a pilgrim and a stranger upon earth, seeking a better country.

“ We would here draw a line of demarcation, and attempt to establish the opinion, that those amusements may be indulged in, which have not a tendency to increase a love of the world, and consequently to cause a disrelish for spiritual engagements, but which are rather calculated to raise the affections to the gracious Author of all good, and to quicken and promote a spirit of devotion and praise; in short, those which do not stand opposed to the highest interests of an immortal creature, but elevate his mind to more noble pursuits than the passing scenes of time, and can, without regret, be exchanged for the awful realities of eternity.

“ With respect to the card-table, little need be added, as many of the arguments before advanced may be applied to this amusement, and facts are not wanting to render the application forcible. But its votaries, who will contend that their favourite pleasure is an innocent one, I would ask, ‘ Can *that* be innocent, which wastes the most precious gift bestowed upon us? And to those who have no better reason to bring forward, than that they engage in it to fill up their time, I would appeal, ‘ Are there no regions in the world of nature yet unexplored, no wonders that remain to be unfolded, no stores apparently inexhaustible, and which are well calculated to fill the mind with more exalted thoughts of that incomprehensible Being who made all things, and to awaken towards him feelings of adoration and reverence?’ ”

“ While such subjects as these claim attention, can any feel justified in spending a moment in shuffling about painted paper? One would almost imagine that the title of reasonable creature had been abandoned, before such an outrage could be committed—even against reason!

“ But it may be urged, that this amusement is only resorted to in company where it would be impossible to introduce subjects of a literary nature, and where you must either join the party, or remain unemployed, and probably give offence, not to say induce the charge of singularity.—Were this the case, it would be better to remain unemployed, than to sanction that which serves only to kill time: no one, however, has occasion so to plead, but those who are afraid to look into their own hearts, who never watch their thoughts, and scrutinize their actions, in order to ascertain the motives which give rise to them.

“ The fear of giving offence, or of being accounted singular, is an argument which can only influence weak minds, and if we allow it any force in one instance, the same may certainly be admitted in others, and it will at once justify conformity to all the maxims of the world.

“ It now remains to consider, what distinction is to be made between these amusements, and those of drawing and music? And here it may be observed, that the exception is only granted, provided the subjects of it are not carried to excess.

“ We know it may be objected, that too great a love of music has been attended with effects as pernicious as by those amusements which we have condemned; and we perfectly agree with those who deem the oratorio as improper a place for the Christian as the theatre.

“ But why should it be inferred, that because a good thing is abused, it becomes criminal. It is the *abuse* of it, from whence arises the criminality. Who will affirm, that what the great Creator has deigned to employ as a mean of imparting pleasure to his rational creatures, and as tending to elevate their views of his infinite goodness and perfection, has any thing improper in its *nature*? Yet however strong the assertion may appear, we must tacitly acquiesce in it, if we disallow of music and drawing on account of the impropriety of the amusements objected to. If we see no beauty in the various appearances of nature, the rich colouring of the sky, the exquisite tints and delicate shades of a flower, or the different objects combined in the finished landscape; if we derive no pleasure in listening to the music of some sweet songster, whose melodious notes seem to be the voice of gratitude and praise, let us be contented to resign the accomplishments of drawing and music, for they will then cease to afford us innocent gratification. If the pleasure derived from their pursuit, arise from no nobler cause than ambition, or a vain desire to obtain the praise and approbation of men, it ought not to be cherished, but abandoned, as springing from a sensual and impure source. But if our ear is indeed tuned to the harmony of creation, and our sight is ever ready to contemplate the wonders it displays, we may, without injury to ourselves, cultivate these sources of rational enjoyment, so far as they interfere not with higher duties and the great business of life. If on a review of the feelings that have been excited while indulging in these amusements, we find that they have not diminished, but rather increased our love to God and to his ser-

vice, that they have awakened zeal, and quickened a spirit of devotion, we may affirm that the time occupied has not been spent in vain."

Not only do the preceding pages manifest the superior capacity and attainments of Miss Bury, but they also discover, as we have just seen, an habitual regard to higher principles than those of ambition, or literary fame. The tenor of her remarks, as already quoted, shew a state of feeling, and a conviction, too refined, and too spiritual, to be conceived of apart from religious excellence. It is true, there is among her papers no distinctive narration of a "new birth unto righteousness;" but it may be observed, that when an individual has been early inured to habits of mental culture, not to say, trained up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, it is commonly no easy matter, and, indeed, frequently as impossible, to detail the all-important process, as it is to define the progress of natural light, or to mark, with accuracy and distinctness, the exact boundary between night and day. However, there is safety and wisdom in ascending from effects to their causes, not only to satisfy the inquiries of curiosity, but to judge correctly, especially in things pertaining to the heavenly kingdom. "By their fruits," said our Lord, "shall ye know them."—"Miss Bury," observes one who knew her well, "from infancy was of a delicate constitution, possessing more than common irascibility of temper, arising, perhaps, principally from much nervous irritability; but this, even before the years of childhood were past, was considerably overcome by her natural good sense, seconding the restraints of education. And, it is remarked by her mother, were there no other evidence that in after years she became the subject of a change of heart, than the *entire subjugation* of this besetting sin, it would be quite satisfactory."

Where a change of heart has been wrought, the mighty event represented in scripture, as a "new creation," cannot, with the appearance of rationality or piety, be ascribed to any other influence than that which is *divine*. Nor can a better or more infallible evidence be required, than "the fruits of righteousness." Instead, therefore, of pronouncing a certain course of feeling, or a conformity to certain accredited modes of expression or experience, indispensable to furnish ground for the hopes of charity, let the inspired standard be adhered to with unvarying steadfastness. Thus will be dispelled, as with a ray of brightness, all the mist, and confusion, and error, which arise from elevating the

experience of one as a standard for all, or attempting to define, with precision, that which being necessarily mysterious is best explained, as it is best discoverable—by its operations. “*The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit.*”

The Christianity of Miss Bury will be most fully manifested, in addition to the uniform excellence of her deportment, by some further selections from her journal. With these, therefore, we proceed.

“How much,” she writes, April 2d, “have I reason to deplore the hardness and insensibility of my heart. I know that nothing but divine grace can enable me to do what is right, yet how backward am I in seeking assistance to my weak and vain endeavours. The truths that strike my mind forcibly, and rouse my attention, are, by the most trivial occurrence, forgotten; or, at least, deprived of their full weight and importance. Such is the hardening nature of sin. Conscience is sometimes awakened, but the evil propensities of a corrupt nature prevail in lulling it into its former state, and endeavour to stifle those vain regrets which the heart, when converted, cannot suppress. If we could become, for a time, abstracted from sensible objects, there would be some reason to hope that good impressions, when once received, would not be so soon effaced; we should be enabled to collect all the arguments that might be brought forward in order to strengthen and confirm the wavering resolution; and then, perhaps, we need not complain that our goodness was as the morning cloud and as the early dew that passeth away. But as it is impossible to be totally disengaged from the objects which are continually surrounding us, there is greater occasion for constant *watchfulness*, that while our minds are engaged with earthly cares, we may not lose sight of those important concerns which involve the eternal interests of the soul! It is not only the outward actions that must be severely scrutinized, but the thoughts and desires of our hearts; which, as they are only known to Him who searcheth the heart, must be judged by the word of truth, in order to ascertain whether they are pure in his sight. In this difficult task, we have more especial need for divine assistance, than in the regulation of the outward conduct; for while the latter may be influenced by a desire to appear fair before men, the former can only proceed from the fear of God, and a desire to do his will in all things. Our prayer should be—*Let the words of my mouth, and*

the meditations of my heart, be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord ;' and, if offered up with sincerity, we might hope for that delightful consolation which the psalmist experienced, when he said, ' In the multitude of my thoughts, &c.' "*

Shortly afterwards she writes,—“ Another awful providence has occurred, which may well awaken serious reflections. Am I prepared for death, should it come thus sudden and unexpected? Should I soon be called off the stage of life, can I hope for admission into the heavenly kingdom? Is not the fear of death an intimation that all is not right? But what can take away this fear; what can deprive the enemy of his deadly sting, and cause him to be viewed as a peaceful messenger? The apostle says, that the sting of death is sin. It is then sin which causes death to be looked at as an object of terror, and sin must be removed ere it will be disarmed. We must have a living faith in the merits and atonement of our Saviour, placing our whole dependence on him *who hath loved us, and washed away our sins in his blood.*”

The following record gives a still more especial prominence to those sentiments which are dear to the heart of a Christian, and, when fully realized, indicate no unenviable state of religious attainment.

“ Surely there is no occasion to complain, that opportunities are wanting that may serve to break down the stubborn pride of the heart, and to warn us of the importance of cultivating that first of Christian graces—humility. Yet how frequently have we to deplore that these opportunities affect us so little; or, if the impression be at first strong, it is only momentary, and has no abiding influence on our future conduct: we return insensibly to the obdurate course which was so lately condemned. This perhaps arises from our humility being only a conviction of the understanding, and not of the heart; and if it be so, it will avail us little. For our minds may be so far enlightened by an acquaintance with scripture, and by the experience which results from observation, and a comparison made with others, as to make us feel sensible of our many deficiencies, and ready enough to allow the existence of evil; yet if this knowledge be not practically applied, if it do not so influence as to make us

* Miss Bury has here recognized an important fact, worthy of the maturest consideration. The active exercise of Christian principles is adapted to the present state: these ill accord with monastic seclusion, and going out of the world. It is the overcoming believer, not the coward, who will receive the crown.

aim after a growing conformity to the Christian character in all things; if it do not humble us before our heavenly Father, it will be of no use,—but rather serve to our condemnation. How much do we need the continual influence of divine grace, to subdue in us all vain confidence, and to instruct us in the knowledge of ourselves, that we may learn the vanity of trusting in our own endeavours:—*in the Lord alone is there either righteousness or strength.* But such is the corruption of our evil nature, that we are continually bringing forward some new claim to merit, and our foolish hearts are continually suggesting some weak pretension to unmerited favours. These frail supports may sustain for a short time, but they will be found insufficient in the hour of temptation.”

“Genuine humility will influence our behaviour towards our fellow-creatures, and teach us that we are nothing, can do nothing, and have nothing to hope for, but through the free and sovereign grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord and Saviour.”

How impressive too are the following observations:

“It is a truth admitted by the wise and experienced, but seldom practised even by those who are most forward to maintain its just claims,—that were persons, who call themselves the disciples of Christ, more anxious to become thoroughly acquainted with their own hearts, than to condemn others, there would not be so many who are merely professing Christians, and who exemplify so little of the power of religion in their daily conduct and conversation. The reason of which is obvious: when viewing the exterior conduct of others with a severe and scrutinizing eye, we are apt to draw comparisons which are sure to terminate to our own advantage, and thus we become blind to ourselves, or, as the emphatical language of our Saviour expresses it, *we view the mote in our brother's eye, without considering the beam that is in our own.* In fact, it is the want of our turning our thoughts within, that is the cause of our remaining so ignorant and deceived with respect to our true characters. Were we to keep in constant review the vain and foolish thoughts which have so frequently arisen, and the temptations which we have so often suffered ourselves to fall into, we should be less liable to censure others for what we ourselves are guilty of, and it would tend to break down that sinful vanity which will often persuade us that we are wiser or better than they. So prone is the human heart to deceive itself, and so unwilling to acknowledge the deception,

that it is continually advancing some new claim to superiority. But instead of observing others with a design to form a comparison which may terminate to our own advantage, if we only determine to view ourselves by the word of truth, and submit to the decision of the holy scriptures, as a perfect standard by which we must hereafter be judged, we shall find sufficient evidence that we have nothing to boast of. "*The thoughts and imaginations of man's heart are evil, and that continually.*" Experience testifies the truth of this assertion; and conscience, as a faithful witness, confirms the charge, though pride is unwilling to acknowledge it."

Again she observes: "I have reason to be ashamed, and to feel humbled at the consideration, that within these last few days I have many times, on very trifling occasions, given way to wrong tempers, and indulged in sinful anger. Though, perhaps, imperceptible to others, it was not less culpable, and served to awaken the bad passions of the soul, and to create discord and tumult, instead of that peace and serenity which are so desirable. When I was a child, my wicked temper used to break forth on every sacrifice of my will, and rendered me disobedient to my parents, quarrelsome and unkind to my sisters, and unamiable in all my conduct. Now, to all outward appearance, the fury of my temper is subdued, my angry passions have lost that ascendancy which they once had, but they still lurk within, and are ready, when occasion calls them forth, to prove that they have yet dominion over me, and can exercise it to the injury of my peace. If we would endeavour to ascertain the cause which restrains our evil tempers from breaking out in visible acts, it will mostly be found to proceed from pride—the source of every sinful passion—and not from a dread of the consequences which might ensue. We find, therefore, that when the restraint is not necessary, (in our opinion,) and we can act without fear of injuring our characters with those whose esteem we wish to obtain, it is not often practised. But how seldom do we reflect, that by such deception, we must sin against our heavenly Father, and grieve his holy Spirit. Oh! that I could feel more deeply the dreadful consequences of offending a Being so great and holy. I have just cause for humiliation, when I consider how continually I am transgressing his commandments, and doing what is evil in his sight. May this be my constant and fervent petition to a throne of grace—"*Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me!*"

On commencing the last year of her earthly existence, the record is full, and, in connexion with the approaching, though quite unforeseen event, will furnish materials for interesting and beneficial reflection.

"Owing," she writes, "to the bustle occasioned by a removal of our habitation, and a variety of other circumstances which have tended to dissipate my mind, and render it unfit for serious reflection, I have neither found time nor inclination to pursue my usual plan of setting down my thoughts. Thus I have suffered an important season to pass, and another stage of my life to begin, without taking notice of it, though so calculated to excite meditation, and to call for strict and faithful self-examination. In reviewing the events of the past year, I have reason to exclaim, that goodness and mercy have followed me. While so many have been awfully snatched away by death; while so many families have been deprived of their principal support, or have had to mourn over the graves of those who are cut off in early youth, and by their removal have blighted the prospects of their fond parents through life, I desire to record, with gratitude, the preservation of my friends and connexions, and the continuance of every earthly comfort. Oh! that these undeserved mercies may not be any longer passed over in forgetfulness and unconcern. May they awaken in my heart feelings of devout thankfulness to the great Author of every good and perfect gift; and may I be enabled to shew forth his praise by a life devoted to his service!

"But while I recount these mercies, I would not forget the uncertain tenure on which I hold every blessing. Another year may deprive me of some earthly comfort, or I myself may be called into an eternal state. Of how much importance is it, then, that I should seek an interest in those things which can alone support me in the hour of trial. How earnestly should I seek to fulfil the great end of my existence, to live to the glory of God! Oh! may it be my chief concern, henceforth, for I have too long neglected it, and lived after the flesh. May the Spirit lead me to the true and saving knowledge of Him, whose I am, and whom I am bound to serve."

The next effort of her pen was to note the engagements of the Christian sabbath. Instead of pursuing vanity, or esteeming the sacred hours "*a weariness*," she writes thus of its occupations.

"Last sabbath day I enjoyed a great privilege, which I trust was not thrown away. I heard two excellent sermons,

from one of the faithful ministers of the gospel of Jesus Christ. As I have so seldom, of late, listened to the truth as it is in Jesus, delivered from the pulpit, they were enjoyed with a superior relish, and I shall endeavour to recall some of the leading sentiments conveyed in them."

"The morning discourse was founded upon the 19th verse of the sixth chapter of the epistle to the Ephesians, 'Take the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.' Mr. R. observed, that the Christian's warfare was a spiritual one. Hence the apostle exhorts the followers of Christ to put on the whole armour of God, and closes his exhortation by the words of the text."

"He considered—First, Why the word of God is compared to a sword?—1st. Because, as the sword of the warrior, it serves to keep off the distant attacks of the enemy. The Christian will often find himself engaged in this species of combat by those who dare not come to a closer engagement, but who, by secret insinuations, or artful suspicions, seek to undermine his faith, and make him distrust the promises of God. But the word of God is a shield, and a sure weapon of defence, by which he may put to flight these distant foes, and parry off the blows which are aimed from afar. 2dly. As a sword, it is also effectual in close combat. When our judgments are called in question, our faith condemned, and the hope of the gospel, in which we trust, is the subject of contempt and ridicule, we must not use retaliation, but apply to the word of God for refuge; and with its blessed truths confound and disperse our most daring enemies. We have the example of our blessed Redeemer to encourage us, who, when he was tempted by the great adversary of souls, replied always in the words of the scriptures. 3dly. As a sword, the word of God is not only a defensive but an offensive weapon, and is found effectual in cutting down all our foes. The apostle says, 'the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword,' &c. With this weapon in our hands, we must war against all our carnal and spiritual enemies, our lusts and passions which rise up against us to disturb our peace, and especially, when assailed by doubts and temptations, which the great enemy of souls suggested, in order to lead us into sin."

"Secondly. Consider why the word of God is called the sword of the Spirit.—1st. Because it is a spiritual weapon: it came from God; or, to use the metaphor, it was sent from the armoury of heaven, and is the workmanship of God. The

prophets and apostles were inspired by the holy Spirit, when they wrote, and went on their mission, or the former could not have predicted events which occurred in succeeding ages, nor the latter have confirmed their divine commission by the miracles which they wrought. The word of God is the sword of the Spirit, because without the influence of the divine Spirit, even this heavenly warfare will become of no effect. To establish this fact, a reference was made to the first missionaries to Greenland, and the South Sea islands, whose labours were for many years unsuccessful—though they possessed this spiritual weapon—till it was wielded by the almighty arm of God; when it became irresistible. It is the same with individuals who sit under the sound of the gospel; they derive no spiritual benefit from it till it is blessed by the resistless energy of the holy Spirit. It is then that the word of God is powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, for it pierces the conscience; it lays open the inward parts; it pierces the stony heart, and brings it to the Saviour: it breaks down the strong holds of Satan, and brings every thought into captivity unto the obedience of Christ. 2nd. What is meant by taking this sword? It implies that we have it in our possession. Christians of the present day ought to be sensible of the blessings they enjoy, in having the word of God so readily obtained, when they remember that their ancestors only enjoyed this privilege by the payment of a very large sum; yet so much was the Bible valued among the primitive Christians, that they would rather have parted with the whole of their property, than have given up those portions of the scriptures which they possessed. 3rd. To take this sword, implies also that it is in use. It will be of no avail if we have the Bible in our possession, and yet neglect to study its contents. We must bring into constant and daily use, and endeavour to store our minds with select portions of it, which may be profitably applied when occasion requires: for the holy scriptures contain all things necessary for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works. But we must study the blessed word of God with humility and earnest prayer for the illumination of the holy Spirit, without which we shall derive no real benefit from it. We must earnestly seek to be taught of God, that his word may be made effectual to our complete salvation."

The other discourse was from Romans, chap. i. 19. *The*

just shall live by faith. The Mosaic and the Christian dispensations are substantially the same. The law was a shadow of good things to come. Hence our Saviour and his apostles, in their ministry, continually referred to the law and the prophets, as bearing testimony to the things which they declared. Thus Paul makes the same reference in the verse from which the text is taken, *As it is written, the just shall live by faith.* 1st. Consider the character of a just person. He is one that is free from condemnation; our first parents before their transgression were entitled to this character, and, consequently, could lay claim to everlasting happiness, but no individual since their fall is able to make the same claim, because no one was ever able to fulfil the requisitions of the divine law; for this law demands perfect obedience, and he that is guilty of one offence, is liable to the penalty denounced against all offenders—eternal death. A just person, therefore, is one who is become dead to the law, and who relies for salvation on the atoning sacrifice which was once offered up—even the Lamb of God, who was slain before the foundation of the world.

2nd. Consider the life that he leads. Sinners are said to be dead in trespasses and sins, but the true believer is renewed to a spiritual life in Christ Jesus. He lives a life of peace. The apostle, in the fifth chapter of this epistle, says, *Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.* The Christian believer enjoys peace of conscience, arising from a sense of the pardon of his sins through the blood of Jesus, and he feels an inward satisfaction in having obtained the favour of God, and being adopted into his family—which is the peace that passeth understanding, which the world can neither give nor take away.

3rd. Consider how this spiritual life is maintained and supported by faith. It is that true and living faith which purifies the heart, and works by love. It is this faith which causes the true believer to abound in good works, not because he attaches any thing like merit to them, or supposes them necessary to his salvation, but they arise from a pure principle of love to God, and a holy desire to promote his glory in the world. It is thus that Abraham was justified by works, when he offered up his son Isaac. It is necessary to observe, that the faith of the believer is not always the same—from a variety of causes—but this does not make his salvation less sure. It is his own conscience which justifies him in his own eyes. It is good works which render him just in the eyes

of the world; and faith that makes him just in the sight of heaven. Being clothed in the righteousness of Christ, he becomes 'a new creature,' and lives a life of peace, of holiness, and of anticipation, which fits him for the inheritance of the saints in life eternal."

Such was Miss Bury's attention to the preaching of the gospel; and her regard to the influence of it was not less evident. Her attachment to divine things, kindled in her bosom that charity which extends to others destitute of like advantages. In a conversation held only a few weeks before her death, on the propriety of taking measures for the benefit of the neighbourhood into which the family had recently removed, it was objected, that, in prudence, a more intimate knowledge of the inhabitants should be previously obtained. She replied with some warmth, and as if under a presentiment of early dissolution, that she "did not like the idea of any time being lost." "Can we not," said she, "make a beginning, if it is only by the distribution of a few tracts?" and added, "that she had thought so much of a plan of visiting the poor, to converse with them for their good, that for the two or three last nights, it had prevented her from sleeping."

Her diligence as a Sunday-school teacher was most exemplary; and to aid in its engagements, she early and regularly walked, irrespective of change of weather, two miles on the sabbath morning. She obtained the affections of the children; and when removed from the scene of those labours to some distance, one of them said she would any day walk nine miles, "if it were only to look at her;" a free and hearty utterance of feeling alike creditable to both parties. Nor can the writer omit to state in this connexion, that the father of a little girl, whose employment was that of a gardener, presented to Miss Bury a choice plant, of careful rearing, in a manner expressive of gratitude and esteem.

Her regard to the holy scriptures deserves especial notice. "It was," observes a near relative, "visible, and strongly marked. She was frequently found reading the Bible, when it was supposed she had retired to rest. She also committed large portions of it to memory. The last time she walked to Grosvenor-street chapel,* she commenced a conversation, by commenting on those interesting words, "If the truth of God have more abounded through my lie, unto his glory, why yet am I also judged as a sinner?" She then also remarked, that the epistle to the Romans was a favour-

* Manchester.

rite part of inspiration. Indeed, the whole of it was engraven upon her memory, and, in compliance with request, she proceeded to repeat several chapters. The manner in which she discoursed, the facility with which she referred to various branches of the apostle's argument, and the clear view she seemed to have of the whole arrangement, discovered how much it had been the object of study. She had proceeded a considerable way in learning the Apocalypse, when death arrested her progress."

Miss Bury diligently and punctually traversed the neighbourhood of her residence several miles in circumference, as a collector, for the distribution of the book of God. The excellence of the last entry in her journal, will render any apology for its introduction needless.

"Having heard it related of a young person, that there was little ground of hope for her on a dying bed, since she was not self-dedicated, I have been led to apply the subject to myself, and inquire, Am I self-dedicated unto God? Do I desire to devote my time and talents unto his service? Alas! I fear I have too long substituted a form of godliness for its power, and neglected his reasonable service. What would be my condition, if I were called to give an account of my stewardship? Perhaps similar to that of the young female, whose awful state I heard related in such feeling terms. I too, like her, have lived under the sound of the gospel, and, though I have been prevented from mixing in the gaieties of the world, as she did, has not my heart continued in an unconverted state? Have I not remained experimentally ignorant of the truths of the gospel, and, therefore, been incapable of applying them as a rule of faith and practice? Does not my heart continue hard and insensible to a just view of the dreadful consequences of sin, with the wrath of an offended God? I desire to be thankful that I am brought to see my need of an atoning sacrifice, and my utter inability to perform any good thing. But I want to feel more deeply such a hatred of sin, as will make me abhor that which is evil, and cleave to that which is good, and render me more earnest in my entreaties at the throne of grace, for the influence of the holy Spirit, which can alone subdue the reigning corruptions of my heart."

Of Miss Bury it may now be remarked, as of the patriarch Israel: "The time drew nigh that she must die." A short illness only preceded the event. She was in usual health, and a lifeless corpse in five days; thus furnishing a striking illustration of the uncertainty and rapid flight of oppor-

tunities; a topic with which, in health, her mind had been deeply impressed.

The solemn process of dissolution will be best described by one of her most intimate and beloved relatives.—“Completely did divine grace triumph throughout her last indisposition; not a murmur, nor an impatient expression, escaped. Though much in pain and weariness, from total deprivation of rest, all was peace and tranquillity; thankfulness and calm serenity presided over her words and actions; her mind was superior to suffering, and while prescribed remedies were ineffectually applied, she read, conversed, and repeated, with uninterrupted activity.

“On the Saturday before her death, it was observed to her, that pain and sickness ‘are not joyous, but grievous,’ yet if sanctified, they frequently ‘yield the peaceable fruits of righteousness.’ She replied, ‘I have earnestly prayed that this affliction might be sanctified, that should I recover, I may more than ever devote myself to God. You know, mamma, I have not had much illness, never such an one as this.’ ‘No, my dear Jane, you have not had those severe pains and sufferings which many pass through, and this calls for thankfulness.’ ‘O yes, I know I ought to be thankful, and I hope I am very thankful.’

“On the same Saturday, speaking of the value of pure water, she remarked, ‘what innumerable blessings are held out in scripture under that emblem,’ and proceeded to repeat many texts to the purpose. That night, to the sister who sat up with her, similar observations were made, and she added, ‘I do not think I shall ever get better, but I am not fit to die.’

“Being reminded that our fitness is of Christ, she quickly rejoined, ‘O yes, I know that; but I mean, I want to have an assurance that my sins are forgiven me, and I do not think that without this, it is possible to get above the fear of death.’

“From several allusions made as to the uncertainty of her recovery, it should seem she was more fully aware of the danger of her situation, than the too sanguine friends around her. These allusions did not discover any visible emotion, probably because, in a season of health, she had not shrunk from the frequent contemplation of death.

“Observing her mother’s anxiety to relieve her, she said, with an earnest look, and peculiar emphasis—‘My dear mamma, don’t be anxious; put your trust in the Lord, and he will support you: yes, he will.’

“Being exhorted to look to Jesus for salvation, her

answer was, 'To whom should I go? there is no other name under heaven by which we can be saved.' Do you believe, my dear, that he is able to save you? 'I do believe; but I want an assurance that he has pardoned all my sins. Pray with me.' Her request was complied with, and a hymn sung. 'Sing to me,' she would say, 'it soothes me,' and the hymn beginning

'When sickness and disease invade
This trembling house of clay,'

seemed much to please her.

'Sweet in the confidence of faith,
To trust his firm decrees,
Sweet to lie passive in his hands,
And know no will but his.'

"It is conjectured, from her intense looks, the peculiar manner which accompanied some of her actions, and the earnestness with which she requested that every one would hasten to leave the room, but the sister who was to sit up with her, that she had intended to say something more pointed on the subject of her approaching change. Probably, too, her increased illness, and the extreme delicacy she had manifested during her indisposition not to offend the feelings of others, checked the expression of her own.

"The family had retired to rest,—but the restlessness of death was on her, and every five minutes some change in her position was made. 'Oh! that I could sleep; but no more sleep for me.' No sooner was she aware that every one had quitted the room, than she renewed her requests: 'Now repeat.' A line or two, or a text, was repeated at intervals, accompanied by entreaties that she would endeavour to compose herself, and cease to think. The following lines were then recited,

'There is a land of pure delight,
Where saints immortal reign.'

"In a low tone, she said, 'Pray for me.' I do pray, I have prayed, and I know that my prayers are heard.—Yes, Jane, though he should lead you through the dark valley, he will be there to protect you.' The 23d Psalm was then repeated; soon after which her mother was called, when she asked with some anxiety—'But, mamma, do you think my sins are forgiven me?' Yes, my dear child, I know they are. 'Christ came into the world to be made a sacrifice for sin, that all who believe in him might have everlasting life.' 'Yes, mamma, but not for me. Oh, I am a poor

miserable sinner.' For you, for all that come unto him, believing in him. *Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world.* She now broke out into a prayer for faith, the fervour of which none can conceive, but those who can correctly imagine the awful realities of such an hour. It was mingled with several texts of scripture relating to faith—such as, 'Faith is the gift of God'—'He that believeth on him shall never die'—'Lord, give me faith'—'O Lord, have mercy upon my poor soul;' and concluded—'Let me not be ashamed when I come into thy presence: Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost.' Amen.

"Memory fails to recall most of what passed, only such expressions are committed to paper, as can be verbally remembered. The convulsive struggle of death succeeded, during which the enemy was permitted to exercise his last power, and several doubts were suggested, such as, 'It is too late now'—'I have neglected it too long.' But in less than ten minutes all was again calm, and in a quarter of an hour she breathed her spirit into the hands of her Saviour, so gently, that her final close was scarcely susceptible.

"She sleeps in Jesus, and we sorrow not as those who have no hope. We have planted her remains in the grave, in the sure expectation that she shall, through the merits of her Redeemer, spring again to blossom in immortal verdure."

This event took place, April 2d, 1823, in the 24th year of her age. Its improvement from the pulpit furnished additional evidence of the affectionate regards of her associates, and also of high estimation by those who, in the school, had received her instructions.

Many observations, in addition to those already noticed, stand connected with a life like that before us. We are taught the unsatisfactory nature of even the most admired pursuits—the importance of having the affections regulated by celestial light—that the greater the degree of illumination, the more will they be elevated to things above—and that in proportion as the fleeting circumstances of earthly objects are realized, the more distinct will be our perception of the glories of the Saviour, and the attractions of the invisible state.

But the remarks most naturally associated with the preceding narrative, bear upon the value of time, and its right improvement. It was truly affirmed of Miss Bury, that "those who knew her most intimately, would find it difficult to say, that, in the course of years, she was ever seen

to trifle away an hour." Her indefatigable ardour in the pursuit of knowledge, discovers an instinctive observance of the apostolic exhortation, "Be not children in understanding;"—and attention to *that*, can consist only with persevering industry, and an habitual redemption of time.

An eminent modern writer has suggested hints, in connexion with this subject, which cannot be too maturely weighed. "Very early rising—a systematic division of time—abstinence from reading, writing, or even thinking, on modern politics—and, above all, never permitting a bit or scrap of time to be unemployed, have supplied an abundance of literary hours. His literary acquisitions," continues Mr. Butler, referring as a reminiscence to his own acquirements, "whatever they are, may, perhaps, be principally owing to the rigid performance of four rules:—to direct his attention to one literary object only at a time—to read the best book upon it, consulting others as little as possible—where the subject was contentious, to read the best book on each side—to find out men of information, and when in their society, to listen, not to talk."* Such intimations, while peculiarly gratifying to an ardent student, are capable of an easy adaptation to the varied circumstances and pursuits of all mankind. Nor should it be forgotten, that, to such a course as this, Bacon, and Doddridge, Watts, and Miss Smith, with a host of the learned, while benefiting the public, gave a zest to their own existence, which is unknown to trifling indolence.

A course of activity and labour, it is true, will require vigilant constancy: but the Christian will anxiously recollect that for time—the most precious talent—he must account. He will observe the order of the most High in creation; six days labour, and then rest: nor will it escape notice, that 'the season for repose,' as expressed in the moral law, is deduced from preceding toil. The present life is *designed* for action; the world to come, for the tranquillity of perfect knowledge and everlasting bliss.

Nor has any thing, it may be added, such a direct tendency to produce a course like this, as an ever-abiding conviction of the uncertainty, as well as brevity, of our abode on earth.

"Time is dealt out by particles, and each,
Ere mingled with the streaming sands of life,
By fate's inviolable oath is sworn
Deep silence,—where Eternity begins." YOUNG.

* Reminiscences, by C. Butler, Esq. 8vo. 1822. p. 3.

What a scene, observes Mrs. More, will open upon us, when from our eternal state we shall look back on the use we have made of time! What a revolution will be wrought in our opinions! What a contrast will be exhibited, when we shall take a clear retrospect of all we have done, and all we ought to have done!*

J. B. W

HORÆ JURIDICÆ.—No. II.

On the Punishment of Defamation amongst the Hindus and Chinese.

HAVING, in a former essay, travelled the route to which Mr. Holt's introductory chapter may be considered a mere road-book directory,—the whole of his observations upon the Jewish, Persian, and Lydian codes, being comprised in about fourteen lines,—now we must, for a while, part company, and strike into a new and unfrequented path, which we are not aware that the footsteps of any legal antiquary has yet trodden, in his endeavours to trace the history of the Law of Libel and Defamation from remote ages to the present time, and to point out the different features which it has assumed, according to the circumstances of different ages and nations of the world. We allude to the laws of some of the Oriental nations, with which, though of far higher antiquity than any whose provisions are still extant, our acquaintance is comparatively of modern date.

The first of these is the code of Menu, the great fountain of Hindu law, believed by the eastern pundits to have been immediately revealed by Brahma to his son, whose name it bears; and which is beyond all doubt one of the most ancient of the writings that we possess. And amidst all the gross and ludicrous absurdity of the rites which it so minutely prescribes, and the singular and most unequal punishments which it inflicts, that code contains many very sound principles of morality, and several provisions well calculated to promote the happiness of individuals, and to preserve the peace of society. Amongst these are various enactments against defamation, but they are so strangely mingled with precise directions, to shun with equal care, in oblations to the gods, a housebreaker—a giver of poison—a seller of the moon-plant—a navigator of the ocean—a poetical encomiast, an oilman, and a suborner of perjury;—to avoid looking

* Christian Morals, Works, vol. xv. p. 181.

at your wife while she is eating, sneezing, or yawning—and other offences of like prodigious enormity, which will sink an Hindu into one-and-twenty successive hells, or cause his re-appearance upon earth in the shape of one-and-twenty different beasts, in turn to devour and to be devoured—that it has given us no small trouble to ascertain their nature and extent.

One of the general directions of their legislator to the Brahmins for the government of their conduct, in the fourth section of this singular code, bearing for its title “On Economics and Private Morals,” is, (addressing them individually) “Let him keep in subjection his speech, his arm, and his appetite;”—whence we may infer, that the injuries occasioned by a neglect of either of these directions to his creatures, more especially to his immediate priests, was considered equally culpable in the eye of Brahma. But that those wounds which might be inflicted upon the happiness of individuals and the peace of society, by not attending to the first of these precepts, were distinctly contemplated by the compiler of this code, whoever he may have been, is still more evident, from an express direction in a preceding part of this very chapter.* “Let him say what is true, but let him say what is pleasing; let him speak no disagreeable truth, nor let him speak disagreeable falsehood.” And would the libellers of modern days but keep this “primal rule of the Hindu law” in their constant remembrance, they need not fear the *ex-officio* informations of the attorney-general, nor actions upon the case for damages sustained in consequence of their defaming any of his majesty’s liege and peaceful subjects, of “good name, fame, and reputation.” “Let him not,” says the code of Menu to every Brahman, as the common and statute law of England in fact say to every libeller, “be flippant in his speech, nor intelligent in doing mischief. Let him walk in the path of good men; while he moves in that path, he can give no offence.”† In this system of Hindu law, the duty of bridling the tongue, and abstaining from defamation, or speaking ill of another, is strongly inculcated upon all classes and conditions of men. To the pupil it says, “In whatever place, either a true but censorious, or false and defamatory discourse, is held concerning his teacher; let him there cover his ears, or remove to another place. By censuring his preceptor, though justly, he will be born an ass; by falsely defaming him, a dog.‡”

* §. 138.

† Ib. §. 177, 8.

‡ Chap. ii. §. 200, 201.

To the king himself it addresses this admonition: "Battery, defamation, and injury to property, let him always consider the three most heinous (vices) in the set which arises from wrath;"* whilst the very Brahmins, whom the code of the son of their supreme god ranks far above kings and princes, are exhorted, when they have retired from its active scenes, to prepare for their final departure from this world, to "bear a reproachful word with patience," and to "speak reproachfully to no man."†

Such are the *precepts* of Menu; but as his laws have declared *punishment* to be the perfection of justice, in the opinion of the wise, we cannot but devote a few minutes of our time, to those punishments which he has provided for the prevention of slander, which, coupled with assault, constitutes the eleventh and twelfth of the eighteen principal titles of the Hindu code of legislation. These punishments differ, as in the code of such a people we must naturally expect they would do, according to the rank or caste of the person defaming, and of the person defamed. A soldier defaming a priest, is to be fined a hundred *panas*; a priest slandering a soldier, five hundred; whilst the punishment of mutual abuse by men of these classes is to be at the discretion of the king, "the lowest on the priest, and the middlemost on the soldier." A merchant abusing a priest, is to be fined an hundred and fifty, or two hundred *panas*; but being slandered in return, is to receive but twenty-five. For slandering a man of the servile class, a priest is condemned to a fine of twelve *panas*; but should *he*, in *his* turn, give a similar license to his tongue, "as a once born man, who insults the twice born" with gross invectives, let him," says the righteous Menu, "have his tongue slit; for he is sprung from the lowest part of Brahma;" a sufficient reason in his estimation for a punishment, which, unlike most others, that may be commuted, is declared to be "a fixed rule." But this is not the worst. If he mentions their names and classes with contumely, as if he say, 'Oh, *Devadatta*, thou refuse of Brahmins,' an iron style, ten fingers long, shall be thrust red-hot into his mouth. Should he, through pride, give instructions to priests, concerning their duty,—“let the king,” says Menu, “order some hot oil to be dropped into his mouth and his ear.” Defamation of a father, a mother, a son, or a preceptor, is subjected to a fine of an hundred *panas*; whilst *he* is compelled to pay double that sum "who falsely decries, through insolence, the sacred

* Chap. vii. § 51.

† Chap. viii. § 232.

knowledge, the country, the class, or the corporeal investiture of a man equal in rank" with himself. False and malignant imputations upon the chastity of an unmarried female, are also fineable in an hundred *panas*, provided the person who makes them cannot prove the truth of his assertion.* In this case, the *truth* of the charge would seem to be a sufficient defence of the party accused of making it; but it is the only one discoverable in the whole of the Hindu code, and a subsequent part of the law of defamation, as there laid down, clearly proves, that the contrary doctrine of truth itself being in some cases a libel, is by no means peculiar to the age or country in which we live. "If a man call another blind with one eye," say the laws of the son of Brahma, "or lame, or defective in any similar way, he shall pay the small fine of one pana, *even though he speak truth*." And this provision is the more remarkable, in that these blemishes, so far from being considered, as among us, misfortunes to be commiserated, are expressly declared in this very code, to be marks of Divine vengeance for crimes committed in that previous state of mortal existence, from which those who bear them must have transmigrated.

"Such is the law," declared by Menu, "for the punishment of defamatory speech."† That this was considered a very serious offence, the severity of its punishment, when compared with that of crimes which have generally been held to assume a much blacker dye, is in itself sufficient to evince. But the rank which it held in the scale of offences proscribed by this singular code, is a matter not left to mere deduction, since we find it expressly classed with those which it is the *first* duty of a sovereign to banish from his empire. "That king," says the Hindu legislator, "in whose realm lives no thief, no adulterer, no *defamer*, no man guilty of atrocious violence, and no committer of assaults, attains the mansions of Sacra. By suppressing these five in his dominions, he gains royalty paramount over men of the same kingly rank, and spreads his fame through the world."‡ "In all cases of violence, of theft and adultery, of *defamation* and assault," the king, says a previous section of the same chapter of the institutes,§ "must not examine too minutely the competence of witnesses."

It cannot, we should imagine, but strike the mind of every attentive reader of the preceding statement, as a somewhat singular circumstance, that these legal provisions for the

* Chap. vii. § 225.

† Chap. viii. § 266—278.

‡ Ib. § 386, 7.

§ Ib. § 72.

prevention and punishment of slander, which have more of the characteristics of a systematic arrangement, than those of any other of the ancient nations, should be found in the legislative enactments of a people, amongst whom we should be least disposed to look for them. Difficult, however, as it may at first sight appear, this problem may perhaps easily be solved; at least, a few hints shall be offered for its solution. It is self-evident, that this code of Indian law, whatever may have been the period of its composition, or the name of its author, must have been the work of a priest, or, more probably, the joint production of a body of men of the sacerdotal order. It was, therefore, their principal object to secure their own aggrandisement, and to obtain an unlimited dominion over the consciences and conduct of men, by impressing their minds with blind veneration for the commands of the superior deity, whom they artfully represented as the immediate author of the code which they promulgated in his name. The unlettered and superstitious Hindus were accordingly told, in the name of Menu, the son of Brahma, their god, that "a Brahmin, whether learned or ignorant, is a powerful divinity, even as fire is a powerful divinity, whether consecrated or popular. Thus, although Brahmins employ themselves in all sorts of mean occupations, they must invariably be honoured; for they are *something transcendently divine*."* Hence the ecclesiastical immunity, that sure test for the discovery of unhallowed priestcraft in the composition of human laws: "Never shall the king slay a Brahmin, though convicted of all possible crimes;—let him banish him from his realm, but with all his property secure and his body unhurt."† It could only have been in an age of gross superstition and ignorance, that claims like these could have been successfully advanced;—but then, the priests by whom they were advanced, as in the instance of the popes and monks of the dark ages of Europe, must have possessed a cunning and foresight perfectly consistent with a degree of learning and information very limited in its extent, though powerful in its operation, from its exclusive and zealous devotion to one grand object of personal and self-interested ambition. Whilst therefore they endeavoured, by every possible means, to prevent the general diffusion of knowledge, which must, they knew, be destructive of their influence, they sought in some measure to arm themselves against its effects, by imposing, in anticipation, the severest penalties on those who should presume to apply

* Chap. ix. § 317, 319.

† Chap. viii. § 380.

it, to expose the impudence of their pretensions, which they would readily interpret into a defamation of their sacred characters, and, in their persons, a most outrageous insult to the majesty of heaven. Hence then were the iron style, the boiling oil, and the slitting of the tongue, prepared for those who spoke with contumely of a priest, or presumed to instruct him in any part of his duty, in other words, who should venture to say or write any thing either of him or his office, which was not perfectly agreeable to his own feelings. They were, however, fully aware of the importance of securing the protection of that powerful class, who, by following the profession of arms, would at all times render their favour desirable, and their enmity much to be dreaded. Whilst, therefore, they protected themselves as effectually as they could against a power which they feared, by superadding to the general terrors of a future punishment, most liberally denounced against the oppressors and despisers of the priests of Brahma, an express provision that—"of a military man, who raises his arm violently on all occasions against the priestly class, the priest himself shall be the chastiser,"—their military pride was flattered by their being placed, though at a sufficiently respectful distance, the next in rank to the superiors of kings, the divinities of this lower world. Last of the three twice-born classes, the rights of the merchants received from this priestly code the degree of protection necessary to enable them to procure those riches, upon which the wants of the Brahmins would always have the first and the most sacred claims. Their characters were, therefore, protected from defamation by the inferior castes, by the same punishment as was to protect the soldiery from the license which the populace might otherwise give to their tongues, by way of revenging themselves for that inferiority, which, in spite of their systematic training to bear it with patience, as an irreversible decree of heaven, they could not but feel to be irksome and degrading. As they were far inferior, however, both in rank and importance, to the military, they were subjected to a double fine for abusing a Brahmin; and as the priests were infinitely less anxious to secure their good will, they reserved to themselves a right to abuse them whenever they should see fit, on payment of little more than twice the sum in which they were by law amerced for defaming one of the lowest classes, but which was not a fortieth part of the sum imposed upon their own order for slandering one of the military cast. Thus did the precautions taken by these ecclesiastical legislators, to pre-

vent the exposure of their own self-interested views, their vices, their follies, and their ambition, become the means of introducing into the code of laws which they promulgated, a prohibition of defamation far more general in its objects, more precise in its definitions, and more severe in its punishments, than any of ancient date, whose provisions have survived the wreck of ages, and very probably of any that ever had existence. As the fire, which was their favourite symbol, and in some measure an object of their worship, if not properly confined, will consume in its fury every thing opposed to its destructive ravages, they knew that a disposition to scandal and defamation, if not checked on its very first appearance, would in time treat with but little reverence the *sanctum sanctorum* of the priestly character.

The revolution of fifteen hundred years will introduce great alterations into the habits, manners, and opinions of a people, even as blindly attached to the tenets and customs of their forefathers as are the nations of Hindostan. The progress of improvement, by the secret extension of more liberal notions, must, with such a race of beings, be too slow and silent to be traced; yet its effects may be evident, where its causes are enveloped in uncertainty. That such an improvement has taken place, we may easily satisfy ourselves, by referring to the code of Gentoo laws, compiled from that of Menu and nineteen other more modern treatises of the Hindu lawyers, by the most celebrated pundits of the East, by order of Warren Hastings, when governor-general of India, and translated into English under his direction, by that learned but eccentric writer, Mr. Bransley Malhed. We shall there find, that the gross disproportion still suffered to exist in the punishment of defamation, according to the rank or caste of the persons defamed and defaming, is comparatively but little influenced by their belonging to the sacerdotal order, provided they are members of one of the three principal and only, honourable classes—the priestly, the military, and the mercantile. For such is the natural tendency of commerce to elevate in the ranks of society, those who, by successfully engaging in its pursuits, acquire riches and influence, that a merchant is so far from being placed, in the scale of punishment for defaming the character of a priest, nearly on a level with a soodah, or man of the servile caste; that the discipline, of running a red-hot iron into the mouth of the defamer, reserved by Menu for the reviler, or presumptuous instructor of the Brahmans, is by the later institutes of the Hindu

law, indifferently awarded to the slanderer of either of the other superior castes, with the further punishment of the entire loss of the tongue, where the calumny excites a suspicion of the person, of whom it is propagated, having been guilty of either of the offences in the three principal classes of scandalous crimes. Those crimes are specified with a degree of heterogeneous preciseness, which would force a smile from the most rigid stoic, in the first section of the chapter of the code, (or digest, for that would have been a far more appropriate appellation) of the Gentoo laws, which bears for its title, "Of scandalous and bitter expressions," i. e. such expressions as it is a crime to utter. Here we have three distinctions of the crime of false accusation, strangely jumbling together in the same class of moral guilt, Incest, and robbing a Brahmin; murdering a friend, and eating the victuals of a washerwoman's caste; killing a woman, and killing a cow; injuring a Brahmin and striking a man where schoolboys, whilst flogging was in fashion, occasionally felt the rod. For using any expression, in consequence of which a man becomes suspected of either of these crimes, particular punishments are provided and apportioned with great nicety to the particular offence of which he may be suspected, and the caste and abilities of the accuser and the accused; persons slandering their inferiors in both these respects, being most righteously fined in but half the penalty in which a man abusing his equal is amerced, and only in one fourth of that levied upon those who falsely cause their superiors to be suspected of any of those enormous offences. It is a curious circumstance, however, and one we should least expect to meet with in an oriental code of laws, that the fine for falsely accusing a woman of any of these crimes, or causing her to be suspected of them, is visited by the highest pecuniary punishment which the law inflicts in cases of defamation. In this, as in all its enactments, the digest of the Hindu law of libel, or, more technically speaking, of defamation, carries with it evident marks of modern arrangement, and reduction to a systematic form; which, however opposed to justice and the principles of sound reason, is perfectly consistent with itself, and complete in all its parts. Thus the fine originally directed by Menu to be imposed upon those who should reproach persons disfigured, by being deficient in certain limbs, or in any of the sensual organs, or possessing them in but an imperfect state, is expressly extended to those, who by ironical praise give additional keenness to the wound

they seek to inflict. Thus, too, a fine is imposed upon those who maliciously attempt to undervalue the skill of another in his profession or calling, though measured by the singular gradation of guilt which we have already noticed. In the same spirit of a more regular jurisprudence, it is provided, that "if a man speaks reproachfully of any country, the magistrates shall fine him two hundred puns of cowries;" that where two persons mutually abuse or utter false accusations against each other, the magistrate shall take an equal fine from both parties; and that if a man should have spoken reproachfully of another, or should have abused him, and afterwards says, "I spoke inconsiderately, or in a jest, and I will not utter such expressions in future," the magistrate shall take from him half the fine that had been specified for such fault. It is not, therefore, in the principle, but in the mode of punishing the crime of defamation, that the Hindu law has experienced that change, which is always attendant upon a general improvement in the habits and manners of a nation, however slow may be its movements. It does not appear to be less criminal in the modern digest of the Gen-too laws, than it does in the more ancient code of Menu: but the punishment is more systematically apportioned, and adapted to the existing state of society, amongst the singular people whose conduct it is meant to regulate. In some respects that punishment is considerably aggravated, by the imposition of additional pains and inconveniences on those who shall be found guilty, or even accused of slandering another. They are forbidden, for instance, to appear by vakeel, or attorney, but are compelled to make answer in person, and that *instantly*, to the accusation preferred against them;—being placed in this respect on a level with murderers, robbers, adulterers, and some others, whose offences we shall not name. If convicted, they are also rendered incapable of becoming witnesses, as much as a man who had committed murder, theft, adultery, and other crimes deemed infamous in the eye of the law.

From the laws of Hindostan, we are naturally led to make a few remarks upon those of China. What were the ancient provisions of this singular race, who seem to be as it were perfect aborigines in all their habits and institutions, we have no means of ascertaining, though there can be little doubt but that with a people holding in such profound reverence the opinions and customs of their forefathers, the spirit of those provisions is very deeply infused into the more modern of their legislative enactments. The "Tsing

Leu Lee," or penal code of China, for a translation of which we are indebted to the learning and extraordinary perseverance of Sir George Staunton, has a book of one of its divisions,* entirely devoted to the laws against abusive language: and we are informed in one of the translator's notes, that it is observed in the Chinese commentary, "that abusive and insulting language, having naturally a tendency to produce quarrels and affrays, this book of the laws is expressly provided for its prevention and punishment." (p. 354.) And it is worthy of remark, that the punishment so provided, being entirely of a corporal nature, can have been awarded upon no other ground than that of the injury which the indulgence of that propensity is likely to occasion to the public peace; the very principle upon which our own law proceeds, in authorizing private individuals, when slandered by others, to proceed by way of indictment at the suit of the king, for the breach of the peace, of which he is the legal guardian, whenever they think proper to waive their claim for pecuniary compensation for the injury they themselves may have sustained from the promulgation of the scandal complained of. "In ordinary cases," says the section of the Chinese laws which bears for its title, 'On abusive language between equals,' "all persons guilty of employing abusive language shall be liable to a punishment of ten blows; and persons abusing each other, shall be punished with ten blows respectively." In the case of abuse addressed to an officer of government, civil or military, or to a magistrate, the punishment is increased to sixty, seventy, or one hundred fold, according to the rank he occupies; whilst the officers of the tribunals themselves are subject to a fine of from thirty to sixty blows for abusing each other, and of from fifty to eighty for abusing their president, when in the discharge of their respective duties. Slaves and hired servants addressing abusive language to their masters' relations, are liable to a punishment of from forty to one hundred blows, according to the degree of relationship. The punishment of the slave is, in all cases, heavier, however, by twenty blows than that of the servant; and to the eighty which he is to receive for abusing his master's relations in the first degree, is added two years' banishment,—a punishment inflicted upon the servant but in the instance of his abusing his master; an offence which the poor slave is condemned by law to expiate with his life, "by being strangled at the usual period." The abuse of one relation

* Book iv. div. 6.

by another, is also prohibited under penalty of a gradation of blows, regulated with the precision which distinguishes the Chinese punishments, by the degree of affinity between the parties, provided the person abused is himself the complainant. The child, grandchild, or wife, who shall address abusive language to a parent,—a paternal grandfather or grandmother, or to those of the husband,—“shall,” says the Chinese code, “in every case suffer death; provided always,” adds, however, this singular law, “that the persons abused themselves complain thereof to the magistrates, and had themselves heard the abusive language which has been addressed to them.” It is, we should imagine, to this, and the other more severe enactments of the code, where, on account of the particular relation in which the offender may stand to him, the mere verbal abuse of another is raised into a capital offence, that Sir George Staunton refers in the note, in which he says, “It is not, however, to be supposed, that laws of this nature are often very strictly enforced.” (p. 355.) For the credit of humanity, it is to be hoped they are not; but in the laws of China, as, it is painful to add, is but too much the case in our own, the sentence of death is but a bugbear, which the very offenders, upon whom it is for mere form’s sake pronounced, know may be commuted for a certain number of blows with the bamboo, or by the payment of so many ounces, and decimals of an ounce, of silver; as with us it is changed into a certain *quantum* of imprisonment, and, in the more atrocious cases, into a given period of transportation. The requisition, that in order to convict a person of defamation, it is necessary that the individual defamed should himself have heard the slander, is not peculiar to the section of the Chinese law on abusive language, from which we have quoted it; but applies equally to all the others, excepting, as it would seem, (for even here the point is somewhat doubtful,) to the ordinary cases. This is an additional confirmation of the position before advanced, that the Chinese consider defamation to be a public injury, from its tendency to produce quarrels, ill-will, and a consequent breach of the peace. Whether their civil institutions give any pecuniary compensation for the injury sustained by the individual whose reputation may have been unwarrantably attacked; we have no means of satisfying ourselves;—but certain it is, that the penal sanctions of their laws are so far from acting upon this principle, that however numerous the assembly in whose hearing the slander may have been pronounced, it is never visited by any punishment, at least in

those cases in which it is aggravated by the rank or relation of the person defamed, unless, from having heard it himself, he might, in the heat of passion, have been tempted to become the avenger of his own wrongs. The peculiar severity of these punishments may be referred to the genius of the government, and the people, whose laws and manners were alike moulded on the patriarchal plan, with the addition of such stretches of an arbitrary power, as a military government would impose upon an abject people,—and which accordingly impressed upon children the most submissive respect for their parents,—upon wives the most absolute obedience to their husbands, upon servants an entire dependence on the will of their masters; and upon all, an habitual reverence for the emperor, as the great parent of the state. Still the object was the public good, without any reference to a reparation for the private wrong. 6.

“ On the Standard of Taste.” An Essay intended to compete for a Prize, given by the university of Glasgow. By the late WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT.—PART II.

IF the process of generalization already described, were wholly unchecked by any corrective influence, the consequences would certainly be inconvenient, and would, perhaps, be fatal to the interests of our species. Objects so numerous, are connected by points of individual resemblance; and indeed, analogies so numberless are discovered by the ingenuity, or invented by the fancy, of mankind, that if the principle to which we have adverted were employed without restriction in the classification of objects, the vocabulary of man would soon be contracted within a very narrow compass, and yet each part of it would be filled with ambiguity and confusion. It seems, then, evident that some counter-acting power is in operation, to restrain, or rather to subdue, that which is exerted in a contrary direction. Nor need we go far to discover the obstacle which serves entirely to prevent the progress of generalization. When a word is, in ordinary language, either metaphorically, or transitively, applied to objects which have no property in common, one of two results necessarily follows. If the inconvenience of ambiguity be so apparent as to press itself on the attention of mankind, some attempt is immediately made to remove it. The most obvious, and the most ordinary remedy, is, the invention of a new word to designate the one class of objects; and the appropriation to the other, of that which

was once indiscriminately applied to either. In other cases, however, little inconvenience arises from the double meaning of the word: those different ideas which are designated by the same arbitrary sign, are so widely removed from each other, and so rarely found in a state of proximity, that the connexion of the term is almost always sufficient to indicate its real meaning, and to preclude the possibility of misconstruction.

Thus, no new term is invented, because the danger of ambiguity is not apparent: the ends of language are, on the whole, answered, and no great solicitude is experienced about the symmetry of its several parts. This one word, however, is not at any one time so used as to include objects essentially distinct from each other. It may here designate one class of ideas, and in another place it may be the sign of ideas totally different: but it cannot, in the same connexion, and at the same time, stand to denote things which have in common nothing but their name. To the substance of this statement, I should not have imagined that any objection could have been offered.

Mr. Stewart has, however, noticed what he conceives to be a different procedure, and conducted on different principles. I shall quote his own words; both because I do not feel myself qualified to do justice to his reasonings, and because the passage I am about to cite, states, with great simplicity and beauty, *some* of the facts to which I have just alluded. "I shall only add at present on this preliminary topic," says this elegant and ingenious philosopher, "that according to the different degrees of intimacy and of strength, in the associations on which the transitions of language are founded, very different effects may be expected to arise. Where the association is slight and casual, the several meanings will remain distinct from each other; and will often, in process of time, assume the appearance of capricious varieties in the use of the same arbitrary sign. Where the transition is so natural and habitual as to become virtually indissoluble, the transitive meanings will coalesce into one complex conception; and every new transition will become a more comprehensive generalization of the term in question."* The reader will be good enough to keep in mind that illustration which I quoted in the preceding part of this essay, and by means of which Mr. Stewart professes that he has been "attempting to convey" his ideas on this subject. On referring to that illustration, it does most evidently appear that the different

* Stewart's *Phil. Essays*, part ii. essay i. chap. 1.

objects of the series have no common property, and no mutual relation. True it is, that A and C have a mutual relation to B,—B and D, to C—C and E, to D : but it is equally true, that the extremes of the series are totally disconnected from each other, and from some of its intermediate portions. Not only have they no common property, but they have not even that slenderer bond of union, which a mutual relation would supply ; because the very force of the illustration depends on the circumstance that the concatenation of the series does not imply connexion between any two of its parts, where they are separated by the intervention of a third. Mr. Stewart has in this very passage assured us, that “where the association is slight and casual, the several meanings will remain distinct from each other ;” and, therefore, may we not conclude, *à fortiori*, that the same effects will arise where there is no association at all ? Yet on what, let me ask, can an association be founded, where there is no property in common between the objects associated, and where they are not mutually related to any other object ? I am fully aware of the answer which may be given to an argument like that which has just been urged.

Mr. Stewart, it will be said, is engaged in combating the supposition, that a common name implies a common quality in the several objects to which that name is applied. To shew the incorrectness of this hypothesis, he professes his intention to “select a few of the cases in which the principle now in question appears most obviously and completely to fail :”* and, in pursuance of the plan he has laid down, adduces as a *single fact*, illustrative of what he conceives to be a general truth, the case to which you have just alluded. It is, then, unfair to conclude that, because the existence of an indissoluble association is inconsistent with the circumstances of this particular fact, therefore it cannot be consistent with an analogous process, which may, nevertheless, be distinguished by some minute differences from that which has just been under consideration. To these observations, I reply, in the first place, that this illustration, however apparently qualified by the sentence which immediately precedes it, is evidently afterwards considered not merely as a specimen of one, out of many methods, by which the same results may be produced, but as itself conveying the precise idea which we are to attach to the epithet transitive. Immediately after the use of this illustration, Mr. Stewart adverts to the distinction “pointed out by Mr. Knight, in

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay i. chap. 1.

his analytical inquiry into the principles of taste, between the transitive and metaphorical meanings of a word." "The distinction," proceeds Mr. Stewart, "seems to me equally just and important; and as the epithet *transitive* expresses clearly and happily the idea which I have been attempting to convey by the preceding illustration, I shall make no scruple to adopt it, &c."* As this clearly *identifies* the idea attached to the epithet "transitive," with that which is conveyed by the preceding illustration, I am surely justified when I take from that very illustration, the notion which I attach to the term it is intended to elucidate; and in arguing against the possibility of an indissoluble association between "transitive meanings," found my opinion on the circumstance that the very process, by which the transition is supposed to be effected, is inconsistent with the supposition, that such an association can take place between the different ideas which are said thus to coalesce into "one complex conception." Should we, however, even allow it to be possible for an indissoluble association to exist, its existence necessarily implies some associating circumstance. Whatever that circumstance may be—whether a common property, or a common relation—it must be, I apprehend, something in which each of the associated objects participates. Where this common circumstance exists, therefore, is it not more than probable, that the common designation is intended to point out that particular in which there is an agreement between all the objects to which this designation is given; and that, whenever it is employed, we are led to view the object to which it is applied in relation to the circumstance, in which that object participates with the other individuals that the same term is used to denote?

My intention, however, as I have before remarked, is not to take those general views which present themselves in connexion with our subject; but to confine myself to such observations as are absolutely essential to its elucidation. Whatever, then, may be the decision of the general question, I shall be perfectly content, if I can make it appear, that the word to which our attention is at present directed—has a definite, a precise, and an assignable meaning. Those illustrations which are intended to shew, that this intimate association may take place in cases where the application of the word has been thus transitively extended, and that, consequently, "the several transitive meanings" may "coalesce into one complex conception"—seem to me to

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay ii. chap. 2.

point out a circumstance sufficiently important of itself to justify the common appellation. This subject will demand a rather lengthened discussion, because it is intimately connected with the conclusions at which we wish to arrive. Some observations of Mr. Stewart,—and his observations are invaluable, even when we dissent from the opinion founded on them,—will be our best guides in the prosecution of the inquiry. The investigation may, perhaps, ultimately lead us to imagine, that, at least in this particular instance, the common appellation is not bestowed on objects totally unconnected by any circumstance of agreement. “In this enlargement, too, of the signification of the word,” the transitive application of the word beauty to forms and motion, “it is particularly worthy of remark, that it is not in consequence of the discovery of any quality belonging in common to forms and to motion, *considered abstractly*, that the same word is now applied to them indiscriminately. They, all indeed agree in this, that they give pleasure to the spectator; but there cannot, I think, be a doubt that they please on principles essentially different; and that the transference of the word ‘beauty,’ from the first to the last, arises solely from their undistinguishable co-operation in producing the same agreeable effect, in consequence of their being perceived by the same organ, and at the same time.”* I am quite ready to admit, that the objects of taste have, considered abstractly, no common quality. The theory before us, however, remains unproved, should it be found that there is some one circumstance in which they all agree.

A natural, and probably a correct, inference will be, that in this agreement the common name originated; and that whenever that name is used, we view the object, in connexion with that circumstance by which the class is characterized. In the instance immediately before us, Mr. Stewart admits, that “they all agree in this, that they give pleasure to the spectator;” and speaks of “their indistinguishable co-operation in producing the same agreeable effect.” Here, then, is a common effect; and it is, I should imagine, in consequence of this common effect, that the common name is applied to these different objects. Instead, therefore, of saying that the term “beauty” is employed with regard to each of them in a different sense from that in which it is applied to any of the others, or that the several ideas designated by the appellation, coalesce into one complex conception; I should rather imagine that one and the same

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay i, p. 1. chap. ii.

meaning is attached to the word in each of its several applications. When I denominate a colour beautiful—I mean, if this opinion be correct—that it produces, or contributes to produce, a peculiar state of mental feeling. If I apply the same appellation to form, I do, in fact, only make, in relation to it, the same assertion which I formerly made in relation to colour. The same reasoning may be applied to motion, and to all those other qualities of which these are, in the present instance, adduced as representatives. In some cases, all these qualities co-operate in the production of one simultaneous effect; while they are, at other times, presented, both separately, and in every state of varied combination. I am aware, that when united, they may be denominated beautiful, when, if disjoined, each would be excluded from any claim to the appellation; that in a disjoined state, each may be beautiful, when combination would produce positive ugliness; and that, therefore, neither union, nor separation, is in every case necessary to the result. This admission, however, does not in the least affect the argument, unless it can also be shewn that the *emotions* which *each*, when out of combination, produces, are essentially different from those which are in other cases produced, when *many* simple elements are combined. But “they please,” it is said, “on principles essentially different.” Be it so—I can have no objection to the concession. The word “beauty” is, we assert, intended to denote, not any common property in the objects to which it is applied—not the identity in each several case, if the principle on which the pleasure they occasion is founded—but the general similarity of result. Perhaps I cannot better explain myself than by referring to the terms “*pleasing* and *pleasantness*,” as illustrative of my meaning.

Although no man would talk of *the pleasing* in objects, as philosophers have talked of *the beautiful*, yet the cases are sufficiently analogous for our present purpose. The words before us are susceptible of application co-extensive with the range of our pleasurable feelings. Every thing in nature, or in art, that is capable of ministering to our gratification—whether it be the poetry of Milton—the sculpture of Praxiteles—or the lowest object of mere animal appetite—may be denominated pleasing. Now, though the sources of delight are infinitely varied—though pleasures differ from each other, not only in the mode of their production, but in their several distinguishing characteristics,—yet no man would, I think, be bold enough to assert that there is not

something, however incapable we may be of defining it, which distinguishes agreeable sensations or emotions from any other class of feelings. The word *pleasing*, when it is applied, not to the feeling itself, but to the object by which feeling is excited, has one simple and easily assignable signification. It stands to denote the connexion which somehow exists between the object to which it is applied, and a certain peculiar state of mind. Here there is no transitive application of the word. The propriety of its use depends indeed not on any thing in the object "considered abstractly," but on the connexion of that object with the state of mind produced by it. This word, therefore, has in every situation a single, and a simple meaning. Whether it be applied to colours, to sounds, to motion, to relishes, to odours, or to any of those thousand objects which gratify our senses, or administer intellectual and moral enjoyments, the only meaning it conveys is, that which I have pointed out—the connexion between these objects, and feelings of a peculiar order. If I wish to give a more accurate idea of the effects which any of them produces, I add some words of limitation,—as, that it is pleasing to the touch, to the taste, to the smell, to the affections,—and thus restrict the meaning of the more general term; but that general term, wherever and however employed, conveys the same idea. In the same way, then, do I conceive that objects denominated *beautiful*, have all one circumstance in common, in consequence of their all producing emotions, which, however varied, yet possess some general characteristic sufficient to distinguish them from feelings of any other order. Any object may in an individual instance be beautiful, just as any object may, perhaps, under certain conceivable circumstances, be pleasing; but those objects only are ordinarily denominated beautiful, which, in a majority of cases, produce that peculiar class of emotions which we denominate the sentiment of beauty—just as the epithet "pleasing" is usually applied to those objects alone which are calculated to administer pleasure to the great mass of mankind.

Before we proceed, it may not be improper to review the ground over which we have already passed.

We are at present attempting to ascertain the sense in which the epithet *correct* is applied to the emotions of taste. Our first object was distinctly to mark the difference between sensation and emotion, and to shew that the latter depends for its existence on a previous intellectual process. Thence we deduced the inference, that correctness is, in

strictness, predicable, not of the emotion, but of the preceding intellectual process. The inquiry here presented itself—What is the nature of this intellectual process? and what is meant by its correctness? Here there is a preliminary discussion for the sake of ascertaining the object, or rather, perhaps, the exciting cause of the intellectual operation. Beauty and sublimity seem to afford a natural answer to our inquiries. A collateral investigation into the nature of sublimity and beauty was thus rendered necessary. We were, then, obliged to notice some reasonings and conclusions, which would, if admitted, preclude all hope of a successful termination to our labours. In the course of these speculations, we have been led to infer, that beauty in objects is nothing more than the power of occasioning sentiments of a peculiar nature. Similar reasoning may be applied to sublimity. It remains, therefore, that we ascertain the nature of these sentiments; and, consequently, the nature of the peculiarity by which they are characterized.

We have already adverted to one great distinction, among the feelings of which we are susceptible. These feelings are either sensations—in other words, the immediate sequences of an impression on some external organ—or they are emotions: in other words—the immediate sequences of a process strictly intellectual. Emotions again may be subdivided according to the causes by which they are produced, or rather by which the mental operation, in which their existence originated, is occasioned. This train of thought may be only the natural continuation of previous reflection; and although it is probable, that every such train might be ultimately traced up to some sensation by which the commencement of the series was suggested, yet the existence of this association, it is often not easy, and it is sometimes impossible, to ascertain. Frequently, however, the connexion of the sensation with the thought productive of emotion, is so closely established—the suggestion so immediate—the succession of ideas so obvious,—and the emotion so directly consequent on the organic impression, that, neglecting the intermediate links, we learn to look on the sensation as the immediate antecedent,—on the emotion, as the immediate sequence,—on the former, as a cause—on the latter, as one of its effects.

On these remarks, then, we may, perhaps, found some definition of beauty, and be able to trace the meaning of the word from that attached to it in its simplest and primary

acceptation, to that more extended sense in which it is at present received.

Beauty and sublimity then, in their primary signification, I conceive to exist, when the intellectual operation intervening between sensation felt or remembered, and *pleasing* emotion, is so rapidly conducted,—or is, at any rate, so intimately connected with the organic impression, or with the recalled idea of that impression—that the association between perception present or recalled, and emotion, is immediately obvious to the individual by whom they both are experienced.

There is, I am aware, some difference in the phraseology employed; but it will, I trust, on the whole be found that the opinions here expressed are nearly, although not perhaps entirely, coincident with the conclusions of Mr. Alison. —When I have marked the progressive extension of meaning, and have arrived at the ultimate acceptation of the word, this coincidence will be, I trust, more apparent. I shall, however, endeavour to assign my reasons for differing on some minor points from so high an authority,—because, if to dissent from its decisions border on presumption,—to assign no reasons for that dissent, so far from protecting my conduct from censure, would surely be a circumstance of aggravation. I am the more willing to enter on the discussion, because it will, at the same time, give us the fairest opportunity for marking the progressively extended application of the words in question. Mr. Alison conceives the emotion of beauty to be of a complex nature. According to him, it necessarily involves, “1st. The production of some simple emotion, or the exercise of some moral affection. 2dly. The consequent excitement of a peculiar exercise of the imagination.”* Under the head of simple emotions, he enumerates,—“cheerfulness, tenderness, melancholy, solemnity, elevation, terror, &c.”† and, in the same chapter, gives what may be considered an exposition of the notion which he attaches to the phrase “complex emotion.” To settle the meaning of terms, apparently so simple, may to some appear unnecessary, or even absurd. Those, however, who are best acquainted with the great importance of fairly ascertaining the grounds of difference before we argue, will, I think, agree with me in deeming it desirable to take the author’s own statement of the meaning he attaches to his own phraseology. I quote, therefore, his words,—“In the case of those trains of thought, on the contrary, which are

* Alison’s Essays, Introd.

† Ibid. essay i. chap. ii. sec. 2.

suggested by objects either of sublimity or beauty, I apprehend it will be found, that they are in all cases composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or emotion; and that not only the whole succession is accompanied with that peculiar emotion which we call the emotion of beauty or sublimity, but that every individual idea of such a succession is in itself productive of some simple emotion or other.* Now, if while "the whole succession is accompanied with that peculiar emotion which we call the emotion of beauty or sublimity," "every individual idea of such a succession is in itself productive of some simple emotion or other,"—we are naturally led to imagine that the complex emotion can be nothing other than a succession of these simple emotions. Indeed, Mr. Alison's own statements afford abundant evidence of his belief that the emotion of beauty involves just such a succession. He first informs us, that the emotion of beauty involves "a peculiar exercise of imagination,"† which exercise is consequent on the production of some simple emotion. The second chapter is professedly devoted to the "Analysis of this exercise of Imagination."‡ This exercise of imagination, we are informed,§ "consists in the indulgence of a train of thought." The author, whose professed object it is to analyze this exercise of imagination, selects two points for particular consideration. After remarking, that there must be about these successions of thought something in which they differ from the mind's more ordinary operations, he observes, that "this difference consists in two things: 1st. in the nature of the ideas or conceptions which compose such trains; and 2dly. in the nature or law of their succession."|| He then informs us, in the passage before cited, that "every individual idea of such a succession, is itself productive of some simple emotion or other, and immediately after, thus expresses himself:—"In every case, where the emotions of Taste are felt, I conceive it will be found that the train of thought which is excited is distinguished by some character, of emotion and that it is by this means distinguished from our common or ordinary successions of thought. To prevent a very tedious circumlocution, such ideas may, perhaps, without any impropriety, be termed ideas of emotion."¶ After having thus assigned a determinate meaning to this last phrase, he goes on to say, "The first circum-

* Alison's Essays, essay i. chap. ii. sect. 1.

† Ibid. Introd.

‡ Ibid. essay i. chap. ii.

§ Ibid. chap. ii. sect. I.

|| Ibid.

¶ Ibid.

stance, then, which seems to distinguish those trains of thought which are produced by objects either of sublimity or beauty, is, that the conceptions of which they are composed are ideas of emotion."* I ought, perhaps, to apologize for such copious extracts. I feel, however, that I am so exposed to the suspicion of that involuntary mistatement which arises from a want of comprehension, that I do not venture to argue against the conclusions of so considerable a writer, without giving, in his own words, those propositions of which I may have been led to question the actual correctness, or at least the philosophical accuracy. It will not then be forgotten, that, according to Mr. Alison, the emotion of Taste involves, among its other elements, a peculiar exercise of the imagination. A chapter is devoted to the "analysis of this exercise of imagination." That exercise is there asserted to consist "in the indulgence of a train of thought." We are afterwards assured, that the ideas, or "conceptions of which" these trains "are composed, are ideas of emotion,"—and we are previously informed, that "every individual idea of such a succession is, in itself, productive of some simple emotion or other." From this we gather, that an idea of emotion is an idea "productive of some simple emotion;" and that the exercise of imagination, being made up of ideas, each productive of some simple emotion, involves a succession of simple emotions. As, therefore, a succession of simple emotions must have had a commencement in some one simple emotion—where is the philosophical propriety of severing from the chain its first link, and of dissociating from a continuous series that which forms an important part of it? On this ground, therefore, I justify what might otherwise be considered an omission, and have no hesitation in looking upon this train of thought and emotion as an effect traceable to one cause, without the intervention of any idea or feeling deserving separate consideration. There may be, and I believe are, reasons of convenience that have prompted the arrangement to which I have ventured to object. With these, I have, however, nothing to do, since I have entered into the discussion, only for the purpose of shewing, that where I have deviated from the line marked out by this distinguished writer, it has not been without at least imagined cause.

Another, and a more important peculiarity of my statement is to be found in the rank which I have assigned to sensation, as the exciting cause of those trains of thought

* Alison's *Essays*, essay i. chap. ii. sect. 1.

by which the emotions of beauty and sublimity are occasioned. I have already hinted, that while the principles that have been laid down, are, as I conceive, fundamentally correct, they are capable of an extension, of which they do not, at first view, appear to be susceptible. Memory is, as far it goes, the exact transcript of our past feelings. Of course, therefore, those ideas which are suggested by an actual impression, will be suggested by the conception of that impression, when it is called up by the help of memory. The similarity of result will have an exact proportion to the accuracy and vividness of the recollection; in other words, to the degree of resemblance which exists between the original impression, and the recalled idea of that impression. If, therefore, any particular sensation be so associated with certain ideas of emotion, as to give rise to thought and feeling—that sensation will, when recalled by memory, produce similar results. This similarity of both cause and consequence, is obviously sufficient to justify the application of the epithets, *beautiful* and *sublime*, to those works of genius which are fitted to call up the conceptions of such sensations as are themselves associated with certain “ideas of emotion.” I, therefore, included the remembered as well as the present sensation. There are, however, certain kinds of beauty to which I frankly confess that this statement will not in strictness apply. If, indeed, we remember how dependent mind is on the information of the senses, and how much of our attention is necessarily engrossed by the impressions which we are so constituted as to receive from merely sensible qualities—we shall probably find, that the emotions of Taste are, in a majority of cases, traceable to some sensation either felt or recollected. I am not, however, prepared, for the sake of preserving symmetrical uniformity of system, to push this theory beyond the bounds which fact prescribes to it. The statements which have been made, may account for the use of these terms in relation to the fervid imagery of an oration, or of a poem,—but I do not see how they can justify its application to the reasoning of the mathematician, to the heroism of the warrior, or to the magnanimous self-devotion of the saint. Yet how often do we speak of the beauty of reasoning, and of the moral sublimity of undaunted firmness and inflexible integrity? Some philosophers would, perhaps, denominate this a metaphorical use of the terms in question. I am, however, rather unwilling to give such an answer to the inquiry,—both because the obscurity in which the subject

is involved does not seem to be much relieved by this reply; and because the word *metaphorical*, although of rather indefinite meaning, does not seem to convey the exact idea which the slight degree of attention I have been able to pay this subject has led me to form.

It has already been observed, that beauty and sublimity exist in the object, not abstractly considered, but considered in relation to the trains of thought and feeling which the sensible properties of that object are calculated indirectly to excite. All our sensations, whether actually present or recollected, do not give birth to such trains of thought; and indeed, such trains of thought rarely, if ever, originate, except in impressions received by means of one or two particular organs. As this then is the case,—as, amid the infinite variety, there is yet what Mr. Burke denominates “a chain in our sensations;”^{*}—and as this proposition, which may, perhaps, in its most extensive sense be true, is evidently correct with regard to the impressions of every particular organ—is it not probable, that where there is a general resemblance, amid a vast variety of different yet similar causes, there will be an analogous resemblance in the several results flowing from these similar causes? and that, if some one general feature characterize the former, there will be some one general feature characteristic of the latter also? A presumption in favour of this supposition arises from the very existence of the phrases,—*the emotions of beauty*, and *the emotions of sublimity*. This is the universally received division of those emotions, which are denominated the emotions of Taste. For the present, it matters not what we conceive to be the line of distinction between the sentiments of beauty and those of sublimity. The fact is, that such a line has been drawn; and this fact seems to prove, that some principle of classification has been discovered; for classification has actually taken place. Our former reasoning only went to prove, that the emotions of Taste are the apparently immediate consequences of sensation, either felt or remembered; and we endeavoured to shew in what way, and by means of what intermediate links, the preceding is connected with the subsequent event. We have now proceeded a step farther, and, assuming the correctness of our former statements, find that the emotions thus produced are all reducible to two distinct classes. We find then, that emotions produced in the way that I have attempted to point out, are denominated *emotions of Taste*:

^{*} Sub. and Beaut. p. 3. § 24.

and we subsequently find, that all the emotions of Taste are reducible under two general heads. Now, although all the emotions produced in the way to which we have adverted, may be characterized by certain peculiarities, of which we may, perhaps, before we close, discover the cause; and although they are evidently susceptible of another and inferior distribution into the classes which have been already noticed, it does not follow that emotions similar in kind, may not, occasionally, originate in dissimilar causes.

Ideas are so associated, that a thousand circumstances may suggest the very same train of thought, and consequently, of emotion; which may be in other cases suggested by present sensation. If there be then any peculiarity of emotion, in the latter case, there will be exactly the same peculiarity in the former; and the sentiments will themselves be characterized by no distinctive circumstance, whatever may be the dissimilarity of their exciting causes. These objects, therefore, which excite the former class of feeling, like those which occasion the latter, are called *beautiful*, or *sublime*; and the pleasure is in either case ranked amongst the pleasures of Taste.

Here I cannot but anticipate an inquiry, which certainly deserves attention:—What, after all, do you mean by the primary acceptation of the words *beauty* and *sublimity*? You acknowledge, that they have subsequently obtained a more extensive signification; and what propriety is there in restricting that signification at all, if it be thus susceptible of enlargement?—Perhaps it ought, in fairness, to be acknowledged, that this view of the subject appeared to present great facilities for the statement of my opinions; and that I was led to the arrangement by the current of my own thoughts, which, whenever it is my wish to form some distinct conception of the nature of beauty, revert almost imperceptibly to that description of beauty which exists in sensible objects. Independently, however, of this convenience, or of these impressions, it does appear to me that there are valid philosophical reasons for pursuing the course which has been adopted. In the earlier periods of society, the analysis and classification of our feelings are necessarily imperfect. It happens, however, that certain sensations, in consequence of the laws of our mental constitution co-operating with circumstances over which we may have no control, are associated with certain consequent emotions. We, in an advanced state of society, are accustomed to conduct lengthened trains of thought, and to encourage those sentimental reveries which are ultimately productive of

pleasing emotion.—The sentiment of beauty becomes an object of attention. We place ourselves in circumstances which are likely to contribute to its excitement; we not unfrequently labour to obtain the information necessary to its reception; and we even analyze its composition, and discover its elements. All this must naturally, and, we would think, inevitably, lead us to discern the dependence of feeling on thought, and the utter impropriety of considering the emotions of Taste as *immediately* consequent on the perception of their appropriate objects. Yet such is the force of early association, that philosophers, even in modern times, seem to have overlooked this mass of evidence; and, by the introduction of internal senses, either to have rejected the intervention of thought, or to have introduced it in a way altogether unintelligible. But to our lengthened trains of thought—to our sentimental reveries—to our studious search for the beautiful and sublime—the men of earlier ages were total strangers. They were not indeed strangers to the sentiments of sublimity, or of beauty; for of these sentiments, human nature cannot, perhaps, entirely divest itself. If, however, we abstract all those sources of refined delight which are peculiar to civilized man, we shall so circumscribe the range of these sentiments, that their existence will prove to be, in almost every instance, ascribable to sensation, either present or recalled. To the beauty of language, primitive man must have been insensible; because language possessed no polish, and attracted no regard. Where mankind was conversant with the external world alone—unused to attend to the phenomena of consciousness, and destitute of any acquaintance with those abstract sciences by which the human race is elevated in the scale of intellectual being—the beauty of thought must have entirely consisted in agreeable combinations of recollected sensation. Those sentiments also which are excited by the perception of design, contrivance, adaptation, and utility, would, although not entirely excluded, arise with comparative infrequency.

Few objects would present themselves, calculated to excite the emotion; and, where there was any thing like complexity of design, the undisciplined mind would be unable to comprehend; and, therefore, incapable of feeling. In such a state of society, thought must have been much more exclusively conversant with the sensible qualities of things than it is at present. The sentiments of beauty, or of sublimity, therefore, must have been almost uniformly traceable to some suggesting sensation; and the very circumstance,

that it was possible to trace them, implies the proximity of the two different states of mind, and the absence of that long intervening process of abstract thought, which is but rarely experienced by uncivilized man. Can we, therefore, wonder, if the occasion of the feeling was mistaken for its cause—the more remote for the immediate antecedent? At such a period, when the emotions of beauty must almost always have appeared to be the immediate sequences of some organic feeling, the materials for comparison and induction would have been absent, could we even suppose metaphysical analysis to have attracted the attention of mankind. Unacquainted with those processes of thought through which the mind of civilized man is sometimes conducted, for the purpose of enabling him to seize that association, on which is dependent a long train of ideas and feelings, and accustomed to experience emotion in a state of apparently immediate connexion with some impression on the external organ,—it is difficult to conceive how mankind could at all have discovered the intervention of thought. Those who are accustomed to this kind of investigation, know how difficult it sometimes is to detect an intellectual process; where, nevertheless, no doubt of its actual existence can, in the present state of the science, be entertained. How often are we reduced to the necessity of reasoning analogically, and of thus supplying by inference the deficiencies of experience? In the case which has been described, however, the possibility of such reasoning would be almost precluded—unless, indeed, we can attribute to uninstructed man, a comprehensiveness of intellect, and a patience of research, with which even philosophers have not often shewn themselves to be endowed. In cases, therefore, where the association was so intimate, and the succession of ideas so instantaneous, as to escape detection, what would be the natural procedure of the human mind? Here are sensations and emotions widely differing from each other in their nature; but apparently ascribable to the same external cause. Certain impressions on the organ are followed, if not as invariably, yet, to all appearance, as immediately by feelings of the one class, as by those of the other. No unnatural conclusion certainly would be, that they are in each case attributable to some quality in *the object*; and that the same admirable mechanism, by means of which sensations are received from the external world, is employed in the transmission of feelings, in kind different, but similar in their origin, and in the mode of their communication.

The same train of reasoning would, if pursued, carry the human mind still farther. From causes which have been, or which will be mentioned, it does so happen, that those trains of pleasing emotion, which are thus rapidly consequent on the organic impression, are all characterized by certain circumstances of similarity. This, which would tend to confirm the erroneous opinion already imbibed, would also induce mankind to ascribe to the imagined causes of these feelings, some correspondent peculiarity. As, therefore, all smells, however different, are produced by effluvia—all sounds by vibrations—and as we unavoidably attribute similarity of sensation to similarity in the qualities by which it is communicated, all these emotions would, in the spirit of unphilosophical generalization, be attributed to some one property existing in each several object, which might chance to be the occasion of their excitement. To the objects supposed to possess this property, some generic appellation was almost unavoidably applied; and an abstract term was invented, to express that quality in which they were imagined to agree. If these emotions were supposed to be at once distinguishable in their nature from our ordinary sensations, yet immediately attributable to the same cause in which sensation originates, the most ordinary notions of convenience must have suggested the necessity of some such classification as that which actually exists. The universal propensity to consider beauty in relation to the sensible qualities of objects, is generally observable; and is strongly confirmatory of the opinions which have just been advanced. One celebrated genius of the present age resolves the sentiment of beauty—if, indeed, his theory reduce it not at once to the rank of a sensation—into “relaxation of the fibres.” Till very lately, philosophers have been inclined to search for some one quality to which the emotions of beauty, or of sublimity, might in every case be ascribed. All these erroneous opinions mark the process through which the human mind has passed; and seem to point out that primary signification with which our first associations are connected; and to which our thoughts are always prepared to revert.

If, therefore, to the terms in question, we assign the meaning, which, from a consideration of the early situation of man, we have been led to consider as originally belonging to them—we can, I think, easily trace that progressive extension, by means of which they have now become susceptible of a far less restricted application. If this peculiar

notion prove to be founded in mistake—our conclusion may be correct, should the steps, by means of which our progress has been effected, appear to be objectionable. While, therefore, I am naturally partial to the views which have been here brought forward, the more extended signification which we ultimately attach to the words, must be judged of by its apparent coincidence with fact.

Before concluding my remarks on this part of the subject, I shall beg leave to notice another point, with regard to which there is some apparent difference between the statements hazarded above, and the sentiments expressed by Mr. Alison. On those sentiments I have already said; that my own opinions are formed; and I may, perhaps, now be allowed to premise, that the difference is here only apparent. The writer, to whom we have just alluded, assures us, that “in those trains which are suggested by objects of sublimity or beauty, however slight the connexion of individual thoughts may be, it will be found that there is always some general principle of connexion, which pervades the whole, and gives them some certain and definite character.”⁴ The question will naturally present itself—why, if this be the case, have you not marked a fact of so much importance? Was it that all the reasoning employed to establish it, left you unconvinced? or did you keep it in the back ground, lest it should turn out to be inconsistent with some arbitrary definition of your own? By neither of these motives am I conscious of having been actuated. I am convinced, that the fact is as has been stated; and that the admission, so far from impugning, is favourable to the views which have now been offered. But, then, it appears to me to have been less a part of the idea which the epithet *beautiful* was originally invented to express, than a peculiarity necessarily resulting from the nature of those trains which are excited by the objects of Taste. I may be allowed once more to advert to the primary meaning I have assigned to the words *beauty and sublimity*. The original application of these words, I have restricted to those objects which are capable of giving rise to such trains of pleasing emotion, as obviously have, for their exciting cause, sensation either felt or recollected. Now, whenever this is the case, it is evident that the emotions produced must have some leading characteristic—“some general principle of connexion which pervades the whole.” All these emotions must have some points of resemblance, because correspondent as they are

⁴ Alison's Essays, essay i. chap. ii. sect. 2.

in their nature to the ideas of which they are the consequences, a similarity will naturally prevail among them, while those ideas have all an obvious relation to the sensation by which they are suggested. True it is, that trains of varied and desultory thought may arise in consequence of this suggestion. In such a case, however, there will soon cease to be any connexion between the suggesting sensation and the suggested idea. Where, with the same sensation, ideas themselves essentially different, and productive of dissimilar emotions, are associated—where it suggests, at different times, different trains of thought, which, although they are dissimilar, yet agree in giving rise to the sentiments of beauty—or where, in the same way, a number of simpler elements are blended in one delightful complex feeling—we conclude that the object from which the impression is received is possessed of beauties, various, or, as we not unfrequently express ourselves, unnumbered. Each species of beauty is, however, conceived of as distinct from the rest; and although we may, in the moment of passion, talk about “the provoking charm of Cælia altogether,”* we never, I believe, soberly and seriously think of this “provoking charm” as an indivisible whole, unsusceptible of analysis. I do not certainly intend to assert that the case of female beauty affords an exactly fair parallel to that which is more immediately under consideration. I only mean to say, that where a sensation suggests either distinct or complex trains of thought, and of pleasing emotion—each of these trains is characterized by some predominant feature; and is popularly ascribed to some peculiar beauty possessed by that object which occasioned the original impression. At any rate, where the suggested emotions are totally dissimilar in their general character, they will never constitute such a train of harmonious and delightful feelings, as attracts and fixes our attention.

“When,” says Mr. Stewart, “a train of thought takes its rise from an idea or conception, the first idea soon disappears, and a series of others succeeds, which are gradually less and less related to that with which the train commenced; but, in the case of perception, the existing cause remains steadily before us; and all the thoughts and feelings which have any relation to it, crowd into the mind in rapid succession, strengthening each other’s effects, and all conspiring in the same general impression.”† They would

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay i. part i. chap. 6.

† Philosophy of the Human Mind, chap. 5. part i. sect. 1.

not, however, "conspire in the same general impression," and "strengthen each other's effects," if they could at once stand in this common relation "to that with which the train commenced;" and yet themselves be entirely destitute of similarity or coincidence. This uniformity of character, therefore, being necessarily inherent in those trains of thought and emotion, to the external exciting causes of which the term *beauty* was at first applied—the signification of that term is subsequently extended to nothing which does not excite trains distinguished by similar uniformity. I have not, therefore, taken earlier notice of this circumstance, because I conceive it to be rather a necessary inference from what has been already stated, than a part of that idea which the term *beauty* was originally invented to express. I have thus stated my notions on this important subject. For the great leading principles, I am chiefly indebted to Mr. Alison's elegant and philosophical writings; and to those writings I must refer for the elucidation and establishment of these principles. As I have little time to spare on the discussion of a question, which, although important, is collateral, or, at best, preliminary—I have taken these principles for granted; and have confined myself to the consideration of those points which, not being defended by the authority or by the reasonings on which I have in other cases depended—stand in need of argument for their illustration and support.

BEAUTY, then, in its most extensive sense, I conceive to be nothing more than the power of occasioning ideas productive of pleasing emotions—all of which are possessed of a general uniformity of character. The word *beauty* is, however, restricted to those cases in which these emotions are of the less violent order; and are not calculated to produce any considerable degree of mental agitation.

SUBLIMITY appears to differ from beauty, in the character of the emotions excited by a contemplation of the objects in which it exists. All these emotions are of a violent nature, and the train of thought which is accompanied by them, is of such a kind as to be productive of great mental agitation. This I prefer to that theory which considers the sublime as a modification of the terrible. That the emotions which accompany a sense of danger are the most violent of which the human constitution is susceptible, I am ready to admit: but I do not see sufficient reason to believe that these emotions always enter into the feeling of sublimity. It occasionally requires, at all events, great ingenuity

to discover this ingredient; and the more comprehensive, therefore, appears the preferable definition. This, however, I merely mention in passing, without attaching to it any great degree of importance.*

After this long, but necessary digression, we propose to proceed to the more immediate consideration of our subject. Our present object, it will be remembered, is to ascertain the sense in which Taste can be justly termed correct. After having attempted to shew that the emotions of Taste are preceded by an intellectual operation, and that beauty and sublimity in objects are nothing more than the power of suggesting particular trains of thought, which are productive of certain peculiar emotions—we shall prosecute, with regard to these previous trains of thought, the inquiry that has presented itself; and notice some of those difficulties which attend the investigation.

CALENDAR OF THE JEWS.

AN APPENDIX

TO THE

Essay on the Agriculture of the Israelites.

THE first idea of the following Calendar was taken from one in Mr. Bickersteth's excellent *Scripture Help*, in which it occupies four duodecimo pages, or rather *two leaves*, consisting of *two opposite pages each*, divided into seven columns, five being in the first page, and two in the second. The first five in Mr. B's. contain the same heads as the first five in the following, and the other two are in the second page. But, as it was an object with the compiler of the following, to get as much space as possible for the subjects connected with his Essay on Agriculture, the *weather, productions, &c.* he thought that, by making the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th columns narrower, he might get the 6th into the first page, leaving

* In the following passage, Mr. Burke expresses an opinion, apparently coincident with the sentiments which are offered above. "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger—that is to say, whatever is, in any sort, terrible, convenient about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling." (See Sub. and Beaut. part i. sect. vii.)

the whole of the second page to the agricultural matters; and likewise, by putting only three months into a page, or leaf, instead of six, it would again double the space for those, and likewise allow more for the *festivals*, &c. Another alteration has been made in the second column. Mr. B. has represented our months as corresponding exactly with the Jewish months, as *September* to *Tisri*, *Marchesvan* to *October*, and so on; whereas we are informed, that it is the latter part of September and beginning of October which answer to *Tisri*. To point this out, therefore, the horizontal lines of division in the second column do not correspond with those in the first, but the line in the second column is placed against the middle of the month in the first column, and is only *dotted*, to distinguish it from the former.

The notices of *festivals*, &c. are enlarged from a calendar given by Calmet at the end of his Dictionary of the Bible; and from one given by Mr. Horne, taken from that, and Father Lamy's Apparatus Biblicus, in the third volume of his very valuable Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, 2d edition, p. 174.

The notices of the *weather*, *productions*, &c. are enlarged from Buhle's Calendar of Palestine, in the Fragments added to Calmet's Dictionary, (the source whence Mr. Bickersteth professes to have taken his,) Dr. Clarke's Travels, and other sources.

Since first drawing up the Calendar (in March, 1822,) the writer finds, from the Investigator, No. viii. vol. iv. p. 379, that Mr. Allen, in his book on Modern Judaism, has controverted the hitherto established notion, that the Jews kept *two* reckonings of the year, one of the *civil*, beginning in September, the other of the *ecclesiastical* year, beginning in March. This he has done with much force of argument. But, as the other is the usually received mode, he has not thought proper to alter it, but to make this remark, that the question may be borne in mind; and the beginning of the year at *Tisri*, or in *September*, suits best with the *agricultural* year, which usually is considered as beginning with *Michaelmas* or *sowing-time*, and ending with the *ingathering* or *harvest*.

*The CALENDAR of the JEWS, shewing the Seasons of the Year,
the Time of the Public Festivals,—*

| JEWISH MONTHS. | Answering the Moons of | Months: civil yr. | Months: sacred yr. | Seasons. Gen. viii. 24. | FESTIVALS, &c. |
|--|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Tisri, or Ethanim. | September. | 1st. | 7th. | Hot season | 1. New Moon, the beginning of the civil year. The Feast of Trumpets, Levit. xxiii. 24, 25. Numb. xxix. 1. |
| 1 Kings viii. 2. 2 Chron. v. 3. | | | | | 10. Day of Atonement, or Fast of Ashura, Leviticus xvi. 29—31. xxiii. 27—32. |
| | October. | | | | 15. Feast of Tabernacles, or of Ingathering. First-fruits of wine and oil offered, Levit. xxiii. 34—42. |
| | | | | | 22. Last day of the feast. |
| Marchesvan, or Bul. | | 2nd. | 8th. | | 19. Fast to expiate the crimes committed on account of the Feast of Tabernacles. |
| 1 Kings vi. 38. | | | | Seed time. | In this month the Jews prayed for the rain, which they call <i>Jore</i> , or the autumnal rain, which was very necessary for their seed. |
| | November. | | | | |
| Kisleu, or Chisleu, or Casleu. | | 3d. | 9th. | | 25. The Feast of Dedication, or renewing of the Temple, or Feast of Lights, 1 Maccab. iv. 52, 59. 2 Maccab. i. 18. ii. 16. x. 5—8. John x. 22. Lasted eight days. |
| Zech. vii. 1. Neh. i. 1. 1 Macc. iv. 52, 59. | December. | | | Winter. | |

The State of the Weather, and some of the Productions of the Earth, in Palestine.

WEATHER, PRODUCTIONS, &c.

In September the mercury is about the same (according to Russel, at Aleppo,) as at the latter end of August, 85° or 86°, except that in the afternoon it rises higher. In rainy weather it falls 3° or 4°, till it gets down to 65°.; but the variation of one day does not exceed 3° or 4°; and, when it rains, 1° or 2°.

Great heat in the day, and nights cold.

Rain frequently falls at the latter end of this month.

There are abundance of grapes ripe, and citrons and oranges, pomegranates, pears, and plums.

Cotton is gathered ripe.

They begin to plow and sow.

In October, the Mercury in the morning stands, for the most part, before the rainy days, at 72°. It does not rise in the afternoon above 6° or 6°. After the rains, it descends gradually to 60°. The variation of one day seldom, on rainy days never, exceeds 3° or 4°.

Sometimes the rainy season, (called the *early* or *former* rain, Deut. xi. 14. Hosea vi. 3. Joel ii. 23. James v. 7.)

The extreme heat is now abated.

The dew is more plentiful than with us.

Wheat and barley are sown.

The latter grapes are gathered.

In November, as the month advances, the mercury gradually falls from 60° to 50°. The variation of one day is not more than from 2° to 5°.

If the rainy season has not begun, it certainly commences this month.

The heat of the sun is considerable in the day, but the nights are very cold.

General sowing of corn in this month.

316 *The Calendar of the Jews:—Seasons, Festivals,*

| JEWISH MONTHS. | Answering the Moons of | Months: civil yr. | Months: sacr'd yr. | Seasons. | FESTIVALS, &c. |
|--|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------|--|
| Thebet, or Tebeth. | December. | | | | |
| Esth. ii. 16. | | 4th. | 10th | Winter. | |
| | January. | | | | |
| Sebat, or Shebeth. | | | | | |
| Zech. i. 7. | | 5th. | 11th | | 15. The beginning of the year of Trees. They then begin to count the four years, during which the trees were judged unclean, from the time of their planting, Levit. xix. 23—25. Some place the beginning of these four years on the first day of the month. |
| | February. | | | | |
| Adar. | | | | | 13. A Fast. Esth. iv. 16. 14 and 15. The Feast of Purim, or Lots. Esth. ix. 17—21. |
| 1 Ezra vi. 15. Esther iii. 7. | | 6th. | 12th | Cold season | 15. The collectors of the half shekel paid by every Israelite, Exod. xxx. 13, received it on Adar 15, in the cities; and on the 25th in the temple. |
| Ve-adar, or the second Adar, comes in here, when an additional month is wanted. | March. | | | | 23. Dedication of the temple of Zerubabel. Ezr. vi. 16. |

WEATHER, PRODUCTIONS, &c.

In December, the mercury usually stands all the month at about 46°. It frequently gets up in the afternoon, if there is no rain, 3°.

Rain falls in this month.

Frost and snow. The cold is sometimes very piercing, so that persons have sometimes perished from it. The snow seldom remains all day upon the ground. When the sun shines, and there is a calm, the atmosphere is hot.

Corn and pulse are sown. Grass and herbs spring up after the rain.

Flocks brought from the mountains into the plains.

In January, at 9 A. M. the mercury between 40° and 46° does not rise above 3° or 4° in the afternoon. On rainy or cloudy days it seldom exceeds 1° or 2°, and frequently does not rise at all.

There is snow on the mountains, but near Jericho the cold is hardly felt. The winter is chiefly remarkable for frequent showers, which fall more at night than in the day. By these the brooks, rivers, &c. swell; and especially the river Jordan and the Dead Sea.

The cold is never so severe as to prevent the farmers sowing their lands. All kinds of corn sown. Towards the middle of the month, when the sky is clear, it is so hot, that travellers with difficulty prosecute their journey.

Most trees are in leaf before those of the preceding year are entirely fallen off. The winter fig is still found on the trees, though stripped of leaves. The almond tree in blossom.

Beans in blossom.

In February, for the first fourteen days, the mercury usually stands between 42° and 47°; afterwards, except the weather should become cold, it rises gradually to 50°.

Chiefly remarkable for rain. Towards the middle of the month the snows and winter colds cease.

Barley sometimes sown at Aleppo, till the beginning of this month.

The peach tree and early apple in blossom.

Cauliflowers at Aleppo in great plenty.

318 *The Calendar of the Jews:—Seasons, Festivals,*

| JEWISH MONTHS. | Answering the Moons of | Months: civil yr. | Months: sacr'd yr | Seasons. | FESTIVALS, &c. |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|---|
| Nisan, or Abib. | March. | 7th. | 1st. | Cold. | 10. The Israelites passed over Jordan which was then overflowed. On this day every one provided himself a lamb or a kid for the passover. 14. In the evening, the Paschal Lamb killed. Put away all leavened bread. 15. The Passover, Feast of unleavened bread. After sun-set they gathered a sheaf of Barley, which they brought into the Temple. 16. The Sheaf of Barley, as the first-fruits of the harvest, offered. The beginning of Harvest. From this day they begin to count 50 days, to the Feast of Pentecost. 21. The end of the Passover and unleavened Bread. The Jews in this month prayed for the latter rain. |
| Exod. xii. xiii. 4. Neh. ii. 1. Esth. iii. 7. | April. | | | | |
| Ijar, or Zif. | | 8th. | 2nd. | | 6. They fasted three days for excesses committed during the Feast of the Passover, that is, on Monday, Thursday, and the Monday following. |
| 1 Kings vi. 1. | | | | Harvest. | 14. The Second Passover (Numb. ix. 10, 11.) in favour of those who could not, or were not suffered to celebrate the Passover the last month. |
| Sivan. | May. | 9th. | 3d. | | 6. Pentecost, or the Feast of Weeks. The first-fruits of the Wheat Harvest were presented in two Loaves made with fine flour and leaven. |
| Esther viii. 9. | June. | | | Summer. | |

WEATHER, PRODUCTIONS, &c.

In March, in the middle of the month, the mercury stands at 52°, towards the latter end, between 56° and 58°. In the beginning of the month, it does not rise in the afternoon above 5°; towards the end 8° or 9°.

Ewes year their lambs.

Rain, called *the latter rain*, Deut. xi. 14. Zech. x. 1.) which prepares for the harvest, and makes the grain swell. The rivers swell from the rain, and thawing of the snow.

Great heat in the plains of Jericho; persons have died through the heat of the sun.

Barley ripe at Jericho; and the wheat is in the ear, and beginning to ripen.

The fig-tree blossoms even while the winter fig is on the tree.

The vine produces the first clusters; about Sidon they have a triple produce in the year.

Oranges ripe.

In April the mercury rises gradually from 60° to 66°. In the afternoon, when the sky is clear, rises 8° or 10°.

Frequent rains. Heat excessive near Jericho. Grass very high.

The harvest depends on the duration of the rainy season.

Barley generally cut down this month.

Wheat begins to ripen.

Locusts appear.

In May, at the beginning of the month, the mercury reaches 70°, then it rises gradually from 76° to 80°. In the afternoon it rises 6° or 9°. The snow on Libanus thaws rapidly.

The grass and herbs have grown in some places above a yard high. Hay probably made now—and sheep-shearing.

Barley sometimes not all cut down till this month. Wheat is cut. Dr. Clarke, (vol. ii. 4to. p. 464,) near Tiberias, says, “the harvest of wheat and barley ended in June; but the oats were still standing.”

Early apples ripe.

Excessive heat sometimes renders the earth barren, as a sharp winter does with us.—North and east winds increase heat. West wind decreases it at Aleppo.

| JEWISH MONTHS. | Answering the Moons of | Months: civil yr. | Months: sacred yr. | Seasons. | FESTIVALS, &c. |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------|---|
| Tham- muz, or Tammuz. | June. | 10th | 4th. | Sum- mer. | 17. A Fast in memory of the Tables of the Law broken by Moses. Exod. xxxii. 19. |
| | | | | | |
| Ab, or Lous. | July. | 11th | 5th. | | 9. A Fast of the 5th month, in memory of God's declaring to Moses on this day that none of the murmuring Israelites should enter the Land of Promise. Numb. xiv. 29—31. On the same day the Temple was taken and burnt: Solomon's Temple first, by the Chaldeans; Herod's afterwards, by the Romans. |
| | | | | | 14th. The Xylophory, or Festival of bringing Wood to the Temple. |
| Elul. | August. | 12th | 6th. | Hot season | 17. A Fast for the Death of the Spies who brought an evil report of the Land of Promise. Numb. xiv. 26, 27. |
| Neh. vi. 16. | | | | | 20. This is the last day of the month on which the Jews reckoned up the beasts that had been born, the tenths of which belonged to God. They chose this day to do it in, because the first day of the month Tisri was a festival, and therefore they could not tithe a flock on that day. |
| | Septem- ber. | | | | |

WEATHER, PRODUCTIONS, &c.

In June, as the month advances, the mercury gradually rises in the morning from 76° to 80°. In the afternoon it stands between 84° and 92°.

Between Cana and Hatti, in the middle of the day, July 5, Dr. Clarke says, "The mercury, in a gloomy recess under ground, perfectly shaded, while the scale was placed so as not to touch the rock, remained at 100° of Fahrenheit. The same afternoon it was 102½ in the shade."—Thermometer same day in London, 70° two P. M.

Not cold even at night. The inhabitants pass their nights on the roofs of their houses. Silkworms on trees at night.

Rain is now very rare.

July 7, Dr. Clarke saw the richest pasture on the plain of Esdraelon, (vol. ii. p. 497,) and on the 10th on the plain of Jericho, (583.)

"We observed plantations of tobacco then in bloom; of Indian corn; of millet, which was still green; of melons, pumpkins, and cucumbers."—Ib. p. 464.—Rice and early figs ripen.

In July, the mercury usually stands in the beginning of the month at 80°; towards the end at 85° or 86°. It rises in the afternoon about 8° or 10°.

The heat is still more intense. Libanus is, for the most part, freed from snow, except in places not exposed to the sun. Anti-Libanus is always covered with snow.

The cactus ficus-Indicus ripe.—Dr. Clarke, vol. ii. p. 401.

Dates ripe at Jericho.

In August, at Aleppo, according to Russel, the weather is the same during the first twenty days as in the preceding month; afterwards white clouds, commonly called *niliacæ*, larger than those which are observed in the early part of the summer, rise, for the most part, till the end of the month. Dew falls now; but not in any great quantity.

The mercury, until those days when the clouds rise, continues the same as in the last month; afterwards it falls 4° or 5°.

The heat is extreme.

Ripe figs at Jerusalem,—and ripe olives near Jericho.

Pomegranates ripe.

Grapes ripe, and the clusters very large.

REVIEW.

An Authentic Copy of the Minutes of Evidence, on the Trial of John Smith, a Missionary, in Demerara; held at the Colony House, in George Town, Demerara, on Monday, the 13th day of October, 1823, and 27 following days; on a Charge of exciting the Negroes to Rebellion; copied verbatim, from a Report ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 22d of March, 1824. With an Appendix, including the Affidavit of Mrs. Jane Smith; the Petition presented to the House of Commons, from the Directors of the London Missionary Society; Letters of Mr. John Smith; and other interesting Documents. London, 1824. Burton. 8vo. pp. 179

2. *The London Missionary Society's Report of the Proceedings against the late Rev. J. Smith, of Demerara, Minister of the Gospel, who was tried under the Martial Law, and condemned to Death, on a Charge of aiding and assisting in a Rebellion of the Negro Slaves; from a full and correct Copy, transmitted to England, by Mr. Smith's Counsel, and including the Documentary Evidence omitted in the Parliamentary Copy: with an Appendix, containing the Letters and Statements of Mr. and Mrs. Smith, Mrs. Elliot, Mr. Arrindell, &c.; and, also, the Society's Petition to the House of Commons. The whole Published under the Authority of the Directors of the said Society. London, 1824. Westley. 8vo. p. 211.*

THE interest excited by the trial and death of Mr. Smith, the late excellent and justly lamented missionary of the London Missionary Society, to the island of Demerara, has been so deep and universal, that we are assured of standing more than excused with our readers, for devoting a considerable portion of our journal to an examination of the proceedings against him. Those proceedings are so perfectly anomalous, and involve in them so many infractions of the very first principles of justice, that wishing, as we do, most fully to expose their illegality, we know not that we shall have space left for any remarks upon the atrocity of the conduct of those, whose narrow policy, short-sighted self-interest, and bitter hostility to real religion, has converted *them* into some of the most lawless persecutors—and their injured, yet innocent victim, into one of the most lamented martyrs, of modern times. At all events, these remarks, if we can find opportunity to make them, must be reserved for

the close of an article which we rather wish to distinguish by legal investigation, and accurate examination of facts, than by the strong expressions of indignant feeling, which we doubt not that the heart of every reader will spontaneously and abundantly supply.

The following, then, is a copy of the charges upon which those proceedings are founded; extracted from the Minutes of Evidence, on the Trial, as laid before the House of Commons.

“First Charge.—For that he, the said John Smith, long previous to, and up to the time of a certain revolt and rebellion, which broke out in this colony, on or about the 18th of August now last past, did promote, as far as in him lay, discontent and dissatisfaction in the minds of the negro slaves towards their lawful masters, managers, and overseers, he, the said John Smith, thereby intending to excite the said negroes to break out in such open revolt and rebellion against the authority of their lawful masters, managers, and overseers, contrary to his allegiance, and against the peace of our sovereign lord the king, his crown and dignity.

“Second Charge.—For that he, the said John Smith, having, about the 17th day of August last, and on divers other days and times theretofore preceding, advised, consulted, and corresponded with a certain negro named Quamina, touching and concerning a certain intended revolt and rebellion of the negro slaves within these colonies of Demerara and Essequibo; and further, after such revolt and rebellion had actually commenced, and was in a course of prosecution, he, the said John Smith, did further aid and assist in such rebellion, by advising, consulting, and corresponding, touching the same, with the said negro Quamina; to wit, on the 19th and 20th August last past, he, the said John Smith, then well knowing such revolt and rebellion to be in progress, and the said negro Quamina to be an insurgent engaged therein.

“Third Charge.—For that he, the said John Smith, on the 17th August last past, and for a certain period of time thereto preceding, having come to the knowledge of a certain revolt and rebellion, intended to take place within this colony, did not make known the same to the proper authorities, which revolt and rebellion did subsequently take place; to wit, on or about the 18th of August now last past.

“Fourth Charge.—For that he, the said John Smith, after such revolt and rebellion had taken place, and during the existence thereof, to wit, on or about Tuesday and Wednesday, the 19th and 20th of August now last past, was at plantation Le Resouvenir in presence of and held communication with Quamina, a negro of plantation Success, he, the said John Smith, then well knowing the said Quamina to be an insurgent engaged therein, and that he, the said John Smith, did not use his utmost endeavours to sup-

press the same, by securing or detaining the said insurgent Quamina, as a prisoner, or by giving information to the proper authorities, but, on the contrary, permitted the said insurgent Quamina to go at large and depart, without attempting to seize and detain him, and without giving any information respecting him to the proper authorities, against the peace of our sovereign lord the king, his crown and dignity, and against the laws in force in this colony, and in defiance of the proclamation of martial-law issued by his excellency, the lieutenant-governor." [p. 6, 7.]

To collect from a document so ill drawn, the precise legal description of the offences charged against the prisoner, is a task to which, we undertake to say, no lawyer in Westminster-hall is equal. The first—if it be any thing—is a misdemeanour only; for we have yet to learn that to excite negro slaves to *open revolt and rebellion against the authority of their lawful masters, managers, and overseers*, has any thing in it legally approximating to treason against the king, and against his government; an actual and overt attempt by force and violence to overturn which, alone constitutes this species of the highest offence known to the English law, which has provided, with most rigorous and unwonted caution, against the constructive extension of that offence, to crimes of another character, and a less enormous guilt. The second would certainly savour of a misprision of this great offence, were there any thing like a definite description of the *revolt and rebellion of the negro slaves* referred to, which if not expressly laid to be against the king, and to overthrow his government, is, as a charge of treason, to all intents and purposes, void. Those rules of construction which must be familiar to every one who has learnt his grammar, nay, common sense itself indeed, would rather lead to a contrary conclusion, that the revolt and rebellion charged in the second count, is the same strange nondescript offence stated in the first; and that, as we have already shewn, can be but a misdemeanour, though, to this, upon the principles of our common law, it would, we apprehend, amount, as we are far from contending for the propriety or legality of such instigations, where a state of slavery is by law permitted to exist. The third charge is, however, clearly a piece of waste paper, inasmuch as it merely imputes to the accused a knowledge of an intention in certain parties to commit a crime, without averring that he did any thing to promote that intention, or neglected to do every thing in his power to dissuade the conspirators from the execution of it. Not to make known the intention of another, where no overt act

in pursuance of that intention, has been committed, has not yet been held an offence within the cognizance of any of our courts, that most arbitrary, unconstitutional, and tyrannical one, the star-chamber, not excepted. The last of these notable charges is also an offence of a very equivocal description; as the indictment of a private individual, not bound by his office, or under any command from a person so bound to assist him, for not doing his utmost to take an offender, would, at least, be a proceeding in our English courts, not warranted by the practice of modern times, though we admit that our old text writers treat such a non-feazance as a misdemeanour at common law, punishable with fine and imprisonment. Beyond a misdemeanour, at all events, no English lawyer could, at the very furthest, attempt to rank it.

Making, therefore, every allowance for the difference in precision between charges preferred before a court-martial, and an indictment in our ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction, it will be evident that by no stretch of ingenuity can any offence, cognizable in the latter, beyond a misdemeanour, be extracted from the two last charges; whilst even the two former, from the mode in which they are framed, really amount to nothing more. We presume, however, that they were meant by the legal adviser who drew them, (and well is it for his reputation as a lawyer, that his name is not attached to them) for misprisions of treason; and as imputing such a charge, we are willing to examine them, and the proceedings of which they were the foundation.

But we shall first inquire a little into the constitution and jurisdiction of the court. It was avowedly a *general court-martial*, which, in its ordinary jurisdiction, and in quiet times, has not, and cannot have, any authority to try others than soldiers; nor them, but for offences relative to their conduct and discipline as such. True it is, indeed, that in times of actual revolt and rebellion, the legislature has been in the habit of having recourse to insurrection acts, and other proceedings of extraordinary rigour, always viewed with the extremest jealousy, and justifiable but upon the emergency of the case, whereby the ordinary course of justice has, for a while, been superseded, by the proclamation of martial law in the insurgent districts. By this course, the whole population of those districts is, for the time, treated as soldiers; subjected to the laws by which they are governed, and, therefore, rendered amenable to what Blackstone very properly describes, "as a vast and

most important trust, an unlimited power, to create crimes, and annex to them any punishment not extending to life and death.' In capital cases, it must, however, be remembered, that the crown has no such power of creating offences which, even on an *ex post facto* law, might be visited by death. Those higher offences are thus specified in the mutiny act, annually passed for the regulation of the army, making, as we do, our quotation from the 4th Geo. IV. c. xiii., the one passed on the 24th of March, 1823, and under the authority of which, this court must have been convened. "If any person who is or shall be commissioned, or in pay as an officer, or who is or shall be commissioned, or in pay, as a non-commissioned officer or soldier, shall at any time, during the continuance of this act, begin, create, cause, or join, in any mutiny, or sedition, in his majesty's land or marine forces, or shall not use his utmost endeavour to suppress the same, or, coming to the knowledge of any mutiny or intended mutiny, shall not without delay give information thereof to his commanding officer; or shall misbehave himself before the enemy, or shall shamefully abandon, or deliver up any garrison, fortress, post, or guard, committed to his charge, or which he shall be commanded to defend, or shall compel the governor, or commanding officer, of any garrison, fortress, or post, to deliver up to the enemy, or to abandon the same, or shall speak words, or use any other means, to induce such governor, or commanding officer, or others, to misbehave before the enemy, or shamefully to abandon or deliver up any garrison, fortress, post, or guard, committed to their respective charge, or which he or they shall be commanded to defend; or shall leave his post before relieved, or shall be found sleeping on his post; or shall hold correspondence with, or give advice or intelligence to, any rebel, or enemy of his majesty, either by letters, messages, signs, or tokens, in any manner or way whatever, or shall treat, or enter into any terms, with such rebel or enemy, without his majesty's license, or those of his general or chief commander; or shall strike or use any violence against his superior officer, being in the execution of his office; or shall disobey any lawful command of his superior officer; or shall desert his majesty's service: all and every person so offending in any of the matters before mentioned, whether such offences shall be committed within this realm, or in any other of his majesty's dominions, or in foreign parts, or upon land or upon the sea, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as, by a court martial, shall be awarded." Supposing,

therefore, that the prisoner had been a soldier, instead of a missionary, it is evident, that, at least, on the second, and, perhaps, on the fourth of these charges, he would be amenable to capital punishment under the mutiny act, as he would also be upon the other two, provided the population of the island had previously been duly called out as soldiers, on account of the insurrection there, in the course of which martial law had duly been proclaimed. But the latter had not been done in Demarara, nor could it be; for if the governor there seeks to justify himself, as he is understood to do, by the provisions of the mutiny act, annually past by the British parliament, for the regulation of the land-forces of the empire, whether employed in the colonies or at home, he must shew a legislative authority for subjecting the civil population of the island to the severe operation of the military code, as, what the king could not do by his own prerogative here, it is not to be supposed that his representative can do in a distant dependency of the empire. As a conquered colony, Demarara may be, and, perhaps is, subject but to its own laws, under the immediate direction of the king in council, rather than of the British parliament in its three estates. If this be insisted upon, the mutiny bill is quite out of the question; and some act of the colonial legislature—some proclamation of the king in council here—or some provision of the Dutch laws, still in force there, must be adduced, to justify the proceedings of a court, which otherwise had no jurisdiction over the person whom, or the matter which, they tried. To neither of these, however, was the slightest allusion made during the course of the proceedings, which were obviously founded upon the English mutiny act alone; but it was reserved for the learning and ingenuity of a member of the English bar, for whose opinion we, in common with the rest of his friends, entertain the highest respect, to discover a justification, of which no one before had ever dreamed. In his maiden speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Tindal, after admitting unequivocally,—as a lawyer, of attainments so rare, as ere long to place him at the head of his profession, could not fail to do,—that this court-martial had no jurisdiction by the English law—cited the authority of the *Institutes Novellæ* and *Pandects*, with half a dozen heavy Batavian and German commentators upon them, to prove, that by the civil law, the mere concealment of an intended treasonable insurrection; in which you were to take no part, was a capital offence; and that therefore, as the civil law was the basis of the Dutch law, and the

Dutch law the basis of the colonial law of Demerara, such concealment must be a misprision of treason there, though in England it would be no offence at all, or if any, one of the very lowest and lightest grade. Unfortunately, however, for the ingenuity and research, which we have often seen more effectually exerted by the same individual in a desperate cause, the code to which he appealed, as a justification of those who professed not to act under its authority, knows nothing of martial-law; and therefore, unless the accused had been tried by the ordinary courts of the colony, that code was as grossly outraged and set at naught, as was confessedly the case with the English law. From the equal and total want of jurisdiction in either case, it necessarily follows therefore, that had the governor ventured to carry into execution the sentence which they pronounced, he himself, and every member of the court which he illegally appointed, would, in the eye of the law, have been a murderer, and, as such, have been subjected to the punishment of death, which they illegally pronounced upon another. That this would have been their situation, had their temerity carried them so far, no lawyer can, we are satisfied, for a moment doubt, as it is expressly laid down by Lord Coke, and other law writers of the first authority, that the putting a man to death by martial-law in time of peace, is murder; and that the colony was perfectly tranquil when Mr. Smith was tried and sentenced, and for weeks and months before, has never been denied.

In ordinary cases, therefore, this want of jurisdiction (to which, by the way, Mr. Smith was most improperly deprived of all opportunity of effectually objecting, by being required to plead before counsel was assigned him, and thereby admitting the authority of the court, and inadvertently, and in ignorance of the forms of law, waving all objection to its jurisdiction,) would put an end to the inquiry. But we wish not so to get rid of the fullest investigation into the guilt or innocence of Mr. Smith,—yet ere we pass on to the evidence adduced against him, and the manner in which it was met, we must say a word or two upon the defence offered by the advocates of his persecutors, for not sending him to trial before the proper civil tribunal; namely, that a court-martial was the only court before which he could hope for a fair trial. If this was the case, (and, alas! there is no reason to doubt that his chance of a fair trial at all, in Demerara, was abundantly small enough,) what a melancholy picture does it exhibit of the administration of justice there! But

still this cannot excuse the sending him before a military commission, to which he was not amenable, and thus depriving him of the advantages he would have been entitled to by the judicial proceedings of the civil courts. The latter are notoriously more formal, precise, and slow, in their operations, than are the former, which, in times of insurrection especially, more nearly resemble the forced marches with which its judges are familiar, or even the hasty and disorderly retreats which they must at least have witnessed, than the solemn and decorous proceedings of those sages of the law, who sit in judgment of life and limb upon their fellow-creatures. Before the latter, such an ill-drawn, vague, and uncertain instrument, as the charges against Mr. Smith, could never have been sustained; as, could even a jury have been found thick-headed or prejudiced enough to have convicted him capitally upon it, or one like unto it—it would clearly have been quashed upon a motion in arrest of judgment: but with the former, any thing imputing guilt was held a sufficient description of an offence, for which was awarded the extreme punishment of the law. This might have been expected from the lieutenant-colonel, six captains, four lieutenants, and three second-lieutenants, the military men composing it; but, for the credit of the profession, it is to be hoped, that it did not do so without earnest remonstrance from Mr. Wray, the chief-justice of the colony, clapt as a lieutenant colonel upon the militia staff, for no other purpose, that we can discover, but by making him, as such, a member of the court-martial, to deprive the prisoners tried before it, of the appeal, which, by the laws of Demarara, it is said, that they would otherwise have had, to him, as the chief judicial officer of the island. Should it be pretended that he was made a military man, to give the advantage of his legal knowledge to a court which could possess none, we hesitate not to say, that never was a comparatively good intention so completely frustrated, by the incapacity or criminal inertness of the agent selected for its accomplishment—for never did country squire, just come of age, and acting for the first time as a justice of the peace, even in his zeal to convict a poacher, admit such gross violations of the very A B C of the law of evidence, as disgraces this mock trial of Mr. Smith. Of Mr. Wray we know nothing but by report, yet, deducting from the eulogium pronounced upon him by Mr. Scarlett, the percentage to which whatever that gentleman advances upon West India affairs is

fairly subjected; from his Jamaica birth, connexions, and property, we fearlessly affirm, that it is impossible for Mr. Wray, as a lawyer, to have sat upon this extraordinary commission, without being repeatedly left in a minority, whilst vainly endeavouring to teach his military colleagues a little respect for, and compliance with, the wholesome forms of law; or else he must have disgraced at once the post he fills, and the gown he wears, by conduct, which we will not believe it possible for him, or any English barrister, to have pursued.

But the course adopted towards Mr. Smith in this selection of the tribunal before which he was to be brought, was productive of still greater injustice to him, than would have been this ousting of his right of appeal to the chief-justice of the colony, even had he been the best, the ablest, and most impartial judge that ever sat upon the bench; for it deprived him of his appeal to the king in council, where it is not matter of speculation, but of certainty, that such a sentence as was pronounced upon him, would have been indignantly reversed. It is now matter of equal notoriety also, that had it not been for the indecorous precipitancy evinced in Demerara, to bring that injured individual to trial where every possible prejudice was in full operation against him, the order very properly despatched by our government for sending him home, might have been obeyed; and then the disgrace of these proceedings would have been saved, and he might have been alive, with every imputation upon his conduct satisfactorily removed, by the ready and unanimous verdict of a jury of his country, if, indeed, the law-officers of the crown could here have discovered any offence for which he was amenable.

From the constitution and jurisdiction of the court, pass we on to a subject intimately connected with it, and forming, indeed, a part of its former branch—the conduct of the judge-advocate, and the nature of his office. The character he sustains is a singular one; for, half public prosecutor, and half judge, as his very official style and title obviously imports, if there be one office more than another which requires the exercise of unusual caution, temper, and discretion, unquestionably it is his. In our ordinary courts, the counsel for the prosecution, at least on all capital and serious cases, habitually refrains,—and, if he did not do so from a correct knowledge of his duty, the judge would take care to confine him within its strictest lines—from any thing which can have the slightest tendency to prejudice the accused—

and, satisfying himself with a condensed but correct outline of what he expects to prove by legal evidence, he carefully avoids every topic of aggravation against him—and is bound as invariably to give him the benefit of every the minutest circumstance that operates in his favour. Should he, however, fail in discharging his duty, the judge is proverbially the prisoner's friend : to the side of mercy he is bound to lean, and in his charges to the jury, his decisions upon points of evidence and of law, he must, and does, allow the slightest hesitation upon his mind, to turn the scale on the prisoner's side. As performing, therefore, in a manner, the double duty of counsel for the prosecution, and of the judge charging the jury upon the evidence, it especially becomes a judge advocate to act upon this twofold merciful provision of our English law, as administered in its ordinary courts; and such, we believe, is the course uniformly observed at home. But instead of it, what is the conduct of the advocate-general, Victor Amadius Heliger, and his assistant, Mr. Smith, who, from the indisposition of his principal, discharged the more important and delicate part of his functions, in the reply, or charge, for it may be characterized as either, and is, in fact, a combination of both? The former, instead of giving in his opening speech a brief but accurate outline of the evidence he should adduce in detail—instead of informing the court of the character of his witnesses, and cautioning them, as he was bound to do, of the strong suspicion to which the testimony of the principal of them was exposed, from their having been themselves actors in the insurrection, which they now came forward to charge Mr. Smith with exciting, and that therefore they were, by law, unworthy of credit, unless they were confirmed, in some important part of their story by other and more credible witnesses,—instead of this, he merely states to them in a speech, which it would take him, at the utmost, five minutes to deliver, the circumstances which he should prove, as indicative of the prisoner's guilt; one half of which he should have known, if he has any thing about him of a lawyer but the name, could be no legal evidence in the case. We give the speech entire, as well for the purpose of enabling our readers to compare the offences stated, with those attempted to be proved, and averred by the court, to have been so, as to shew how utterly destitute it was of that information, as to the nature and character of the testimony and witnesses to be produced, which can alone render the address of a public prosecutor serviceable to a court.

and jury on the one hand, or the prisoner on the other. By it the former ought to be informed of the points to which their attention should be particularly directed, in connecting the chain of evidence by which the guilt of the accused is sought to be established, and in determining how far that evidence is credible or admissible in point of law, (for what cannot legally be proved, according to the strictest rules of evidence, must never be adduced in statement;) whilst the latter is so far apprised of who and what are to be sworn against him, as that he may be the better able to manage his defence. But that which was wanting in statement at the beginning of the trial, was superabundantly made up for at the close, where nothing but what was strictly proved should have been summed up in the reply of the advocate, whilst all that was doubtful or contradicted should have been laid aside. That this was not done, but that, on the contrary, every thing that could aggravate the prisoner's crime, all that could inflame, irritate, and mislead his judges, was dexterously, but most unjustly and unprofessionally, reserved for a stage of the proceedings at which the mouth of the accused was closed, and he could have no opportunity of exposing or commenting upon the falsehood of his prosecutors' statements, his misrepresentations of the evidence, or the injustice and unfairness of his deductions from it, we undertake to prove, when the more convenient period for doing so shall have arrived. At present we but transcribe the opening speech of the judge-advocate, as given in the parliamentary report:—

“ ‘ May it please the Court:

“ ‘ Previous to my proceeding to the proof of the charges which have been preferred by me against the prisoner, I feel it necessary to make a brief statement of the case, in order to facilitate the proving of the charges so preferred. I shall first adduce in evidence, that the prisoner, even from the beginning of his arrival in this colony, has begun to interfere with the complaints of the different negroes upon the estates in the district where he has been admitted as a regular missionary. I shall further adduce evidence, that this interference has not only related to the negro population and their management, but also with regard to the acts and deeds of the constituted authorities of this our country; that this kind of interference has created discontent and dissatisfaction amongst that part, viz. the negro population of this colony; that even his opinion of the oppression under which they labour brought him to that point, that he considered it necessary to expound to them such parts of the gospel entirely relative to the oppressed state in which he considered them to be. It shall further appear to you in evi-

dence, that this has led at last to the tearing asunder the tie which formerly united master and slave; and that open revolt was the consequence of this state of discontent in which they had been brought. It will also appear, that before the revolt broke out, the prisoner was aware, not only of the intended rebellion to take place, not only several days before, but also on the day immediately preceding the breaking out of the revolt. It shall be proved, that it was not only a bare knowledge of the intended revolt, but he even did consult and advise as to the difficulties they would have to encounter from his majesty's troops, and from the white inhabitants of the colony. It shall be proved, that, with this knowledge upon his mind, he never attempted to give any information hereof to the constituted authorities; that even on the day of the revolt, which took place in the evening, the prisoner was in town, but that he left town without having made that disclosure, which, as a faithful and loyal subject, he was bound to do: not only this, but it shall also be proved, that during the prosecution of the revolt, not only no attempt was made of any disclosure on his side, but even that immediately after the beginning of the revolt, on the first and second day, the prisoner did correspond with one of the insurgents, at a time when he well knew that that insurgent was in open rebellion; not only that he did correspond with him, but he even did not attempt to secure that insurgent, or to give such notice to the constituted authorities by which that insurgent could have been laid hold of; that though, perhaps, the prisoner at the moment might have found some difficulty in conveying this intelligence to the proper authority, that obstruction or difficulty was entirely taken away on the following day, when a detachment of militia arrived at the dwelling of the prisoner, and by which he was enabled to give such information as a loyal subject he was obliged to do. This, gentlemen, is a brief statement of the case, and according to the course which, in calling of the evidence, I intend to pursue." [Ibid. pp. 7, 8.]

With respect to the first head of evidence, that which went to prove the general conduct of Mr. Smith towards the negro population, from the day of his commencing his functions amongst them as a missionary downward, no one possessing the slightest acquaintance with the proceedings of our courts, can surely need to be reminded, that it could not be evidence at all. By the laws of England, a man must be brought to trial for a specific offence, of which the indictment or written charge against him is to inform him, with all the accuracy of time and place which the nature of the case will admit of; but it is not to be endured, that he is to be called upon to answer for the conduct of his whole life, or even for any portion of it beyond that occupied in the distinct offence with which he is definitely charged.

Even on an indictment for conspiracy, that drag-net of the law so often resorted to by skilful practitioners, where all other modes of securing a conviction fail, the evidence must be confined to acts done in prosecution of the individual purpose charged; and in these proceedings all the legal requisites of a conspiracy are wanting alike in substance as in form. Were it not thus, no man could be safe, for who amongst us, when suddenly called upon, and at a moment too which our accusers would have the opportunity of selecting, because we were then the least prepared, could adduce witnesses to speak to the whole course and conduct of his life—a responsibility from which the best might shrink—a difficulty which the wariest would be unable to surmount. Were it otherwise, the difficulty of bringing home a particular felony or other crime to an individual, might readily be obviated by proving him habitually a thief, a libeller, &c. instead of which, such is the proper jealousy of our law of mixing up any thing prejudicial to a prisoner with the accusation for which he is upon trial, that no previous bad character or dishonest transaction, not even conviction after conviction, is allowed to be given in evidence against him. All this, we need scarcely remark, is put but by way of illustrating the shameful inattention to the first principles of jurisprudence displayed upon this trial, not from any apprehension that the character and conduct of Mr. Smith would not stand the severest scrutiny which his enemies might choose to institute; yet such a scrutiny was, we repeat, highly improper and illegal before such a court, whilst sitting in judgment upon such a charge. It was also subject to another objection, equally fatal to its legality, namely, that it had relation entirely to circumstances occurring previous to the proclamation of martial law, whilst the court had not even the shadow of an authority to sit in judgment, but on offences committed subsequent to such proclamation, whence only could its jurisdiction, such as it was, by any possibility arise. But to this point we shall have occasion to refer again.

The next point in order, is the extraordinary piece of evidence adduced, to support this sweeping condemnation of the general conduct of the accused, in his private journal, commencing in March, 1817, an extract from which, made on the last day of that month and year, was received in evidence of an abetting a revolt of the negroes of the island in August, 1823. This most barefaced subversion of every principle of justice contains in it so many flagrant

perversions of the very first principles of the law of evidence, that we know not how to express our astonishment at its having been permitted in a court, in which men calling themselves lawyers conducted the prosecution, and an English barrister, who, the leading member of his profession in England, vouches to be a lawyer, and therefore, we believe, sat as a judge. Besides what, as a lawyer, he must have known, had he even been the merest tyro,—the greatest booby, in his profession,—that no man can be answerable in law for the contents of any writing which he has not in some way published to others, (for whilst in his own custody, and submitted to no eye but his, it can do no more harm than would have been done, had the record of his thoughts been impressed but on his memory,) surely no member of the court, who had received the education of a gentleman, could be ignorant of the gross injustice done to Algernon Sidney, under the auspices of the blood-thirsty and tyrannical Jefferies, in producing as evidence against him, some manuscript discourses on government, taken, as was Mr. Smith's journal, from among his private papers,—written, as was the greater part of that book, for his private amusement,—and, as was the case here, never having been communicated to a single person, not even to his wife. "The execution of Sidney," says the high-prerogative historian Hume, "is regarded as one of the greatest blemishes of *this* reign. The evidence against him, it must be confessed, was not legal, and the jury who condemned him were for that reason very blameable." And what he has said of the reign of the second Charles, and those who illegally condemned the gallant Sidney, will in far less measured terms of condemnation be applied by every one who knows aught of the legal institutions of his country, and the rights of its citizens, to the island in which, and the judges by whom, the persecuted Smith was condemned to as hard and unmerited a fate.

They went, however, far beyond the hardihood of Jefferies, and the obedient ministers of his diabolical purposes; for, admitting, for the sake of argument, the legality of the evidence of this journal, it is not a clearer proposition in mathematics, that two and two make four, than it is an acknowledged principle of the law of evidence, that when a written document is put in, it must be read entire, and not in garbled extracts, which, detached from each other, may, as every one knows, be made to convey sentiments as opposite to those of the writer, as is light to darkness. By such a procedure,

the bible itself may, indeed, be converted into the most blasphemous of books; and that "there is no God," may be sent forth into the world as the declaration of holy writ, if you detach it from its connexion, as the impious declaration of the boasting fool. Why the whole journal was not read, it is not difficult to guess, as, from the tone of what has been selected, it must be evident, that it contained much offensive truth, coming but too closely home, there is every reason to suppose, to the business and the bosoms of those who were its author's prosecutors or his judges.

Protesting therefore, in the strongest terms, against the striking perversion of every principle of justice exhibited in the production of these mere private memoranda against the individual who made them, we yet shrink not from the examination of them as proofs, not of what they were selected for, the guilt of Mr. Smith, but of his innocence—unless, indeed, it be a crime in a man to feel for the miseries of his fellow men, to burn with indignation when he sees them treated with more cruel indignity than the brutes which perish, and to long, and hope, and pray for the arrival of that happy period, when the negro shall be delivered from his fetters, and walk abroad in the full and erect dignity of man. And if this be a crime,—rather would we suffer for it the death of Mr. Smith, than endure hereafter the self-upbraiding torments of those, whose wishes and whose hopes (for pray assuredly they dare not) are breathed and formed but for the continuation of a system of tyranny, and contumely, and wrong, worthy but of fiends instead of men. The first offence with which he is charged in this strange record of his sins, is that of preventing the negro members of his flock from living in a state of adultery, and reconciling them by the force of his christian admonition to each other. Is this, we ask, treason even against the state of Demarara? Assuredly it is not, but rather the quiet and unostentatious performance of one of the most obvious duties of a minister of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Another accusation is, that when some of the negroes had complained to him of very severe treatment, he told one of their overseers that he thought he would work them to death; and the record of his humane remonstrance, for his private use, is, at a distance of six years, gravely adduced by the public prosecutor of the colony, as a proof of treasonable intentions against the king and government. Never sure was such a perversion of justice and common sense exhibited in any court since the days of Jeffries and the

Popish plot. But in the present case it is not singular in illegality or absurdity, as, among other of the judge advocate's notable proofs of treason, selected with great care from the private repository of the offender's thoughts, are the following opinions on the state of slavery in the island, as daily exhibited before his eyes, and which, in spite of Mr. Fiscal Victor Amadius Heliger's denunciation of them, we hesitate not to pronounce alike honourable to their writer's head and heart.

“ ‘September 13, 1817, page 17.—This evening a negro belonging to ———, came to me, saying, the manager was so cruel to him that he could not bear it. According to the man's account, some time back, (two or three years,) he, with a few others, made complaints of the same thing to the fiscal, on which account the manager has taken a great dislike to him, and scarcely ever meets him without cursing him as he passes by: the punishment which he inflicts upon him, dreadfully severe; for every little thing he flogs him. I believe Ned to be a quiet harmless man; I think he does his work very well. A manager told me himself, that he had punished many negroes, merely to spite Mr. Wray. I believe the laws of justice, which relate to negroes, are only known by name; for while I am writing this, the driver is flogging the people, and neither manager nor overseer near.’ ” [Ibid. p. 9.]

“ ‘Sunday, 19th July, 1818.—I felt my spirit move within me at the prayer meeting, by hearing one of the negroes pray most affectionately that God would overrule the opposition which the planters make to religion, for his own glory; in such an unaffected strain he breathed out his pious complaint, and descended to so many particulars relative to the various arts which are employed to keep them from the house of God, and to punish them for their firmness in religion, that I could not help thinking that the time is not far distant, when the Lord will make it manifest by some signal judgment, that he hath heard the cry of the oppressed. Ex. iii. 7, 8.’ ”

“ ‘March 22d, 1819.—While writing this, my very heart flutters at hearing the almost incessant cracking of the whip. Having just finished reading Mr. Walker's Letters on the West Indies, I have thought much of the treatment of the negroes, and likewise the state of their minds. It appears to me very probable, that ere long they will resent the injuries done to them. I should think it my duty to state my opinion respecting this, to some of the rulers of the colony, but am fearful, from the conduct of the fiscal in this late affair, of the negroes being worked on Sunday, that they would be more solicitous to silence me, by requiring me to criminate some individual, than to redress the wrongs done to the slaves, by diligently watching the conduct of the planters themselves, and bringing them to justice (without the intervention of missionaries,) when they detect such abuses of the law as so frequently take place.’ ”

“ ‘17th November 1821.—Yesterday evening we had not more than fifty at the chapel; indeed, I cannot expect many more till the coffee and cotton are gathered in; the people have scarcely any time to eat their food; they have none to cook it—eating, for the most part, raw yellow plantains: this would be bearable for a time, but to work at that rate, and to be perpetually flogged, astonishes me that they submit to it.’ ” [Ibid. p. 10.]

“ ‘July 15. 1823.—Mrs. de Florimont and her two daughters called to take leave of us; they are going to Holland. Mrs. de F. says, she is uncertain as to her return to the colony. Hamilton, the manager, came in with them. His conversation immediately turned upon the new regulations which are expected to be in force; he declared, that if he was prevented flogging the women, he would keep them in solitary confinement without food, if they were not punctual with their work; he, however, comforted himself in the belief, that the project of Mr. Canning will never be carried into effect; and in this I certainly agree with him. The rigours of negro slavery, I believe, can never be mitigated; the system must be abolished.’ ” [Ibid. p. 12.]

Now, bearing always in mind that this journal was the mere private depository of his thoughts and reflections on what he saw, may we not safely ask, whether it were possible for any man of common humanity, whose feelings were unbrutalized by a long residence in a land of slavery, to express himself with more moderation upon the cruelties which he daily saw, than does Mr. Smith. Who could see negro drivers flogging negro slaves (the women, perhaps, as is often the case, because they would not submit to their brutal lusts) in the absence both of manager and overseer, without being convinced, from these repeated infractions of the colonial law, that justice to the negroes was here but a name? As to the opinion, that, if the West India planters continue the system of tyranny, which they have long adopted towards their wretched slaves; if they deny them the opportunities of religious instruction, and have them flogged for attending church or reading the word of God, the period will arrive, when that God will take a fearful vengeance for the insults offered to his holy name, and the outrages committed on the intelligent creatures of his hand;—as to that opinion, we may also unhesitatingly ask, Is it peculiar to Mr. Smith? So far from its being so, the powerful eloquence of the advocates for the abolition of slavery, as well as of the slave-trade, has again and again thundered the sentiment and the denunciation in the ears of the assembled legislature of the land; and we ourselves are of the number of the thousands and millions of our

countrymen, who entertain the same opinion as to the result of an obstinate perseverance in the present system of West Indian slavery. It astonishes us, as it astonished him, that the negroes will submit to it; and if they are not restrained by the operation of those very precepts which the planters madly take such pains to prevent their imbibing, we doubt not but the period will too speedily arrive, when they will become the avengers of their own accumulated wrongs. We believe, with Mr. Smith, we believe with every real Christian, that the "rigours of negro slavery can never be mitigated; the system must be abolished." Yet the thinking thus—for the recording of his thoughts in a journal never submitted to the inspection of a single eye, was no more culpable towards the public, than had he only thought in the recesses of his mind,—is made an evidence of treasonable intentions in Mr. Smith; whilst we, and all his countrymen at home, may publish in the streets and upon the house-tops,—may circulate through the medium of the press, to the utmost and most distant region of the earth, where the English language is known and read,—this, and a thousand bitterer truths, offensive to the feelings, and therefore, according to this new version of our colonial law, treasonable against the majesty, of the planters of Demerara.

But if these records of his thoughts are indicative of that right feeling in Mr. Smith, which every man ought to cherish with respect to his fellow-man, and we challenge a contradiction of their being so, we have quoted passages from the journal, as given in evidence against him, which so clearly prove his innocence of all intention to instigate the negroes to revolt, that we are almost tempted to suspect, that Mr. Fiscal and judge-advocate Victor Amadius Heliger, must have been either mad or drunk when he selected them as evidences of his guilt. Of this nature is the extract of March 22, 1819, in which Mr. Smith records his wish to have intimated to the rulers of the colony, what he knew of the irritated state of the minds of the negroes near three years and a half before the revolt broke out, arising from that "almost incessant cracking of the whip," at which his heart well might flutter, but that he was restrained from doing so from a fear, founded on past experience, that his information would be used in a manner necessarily destructive of his influence as a missionary, in which character he had alike to conciliate the master and the slave; and rendering also equally unserviceable to the government of the colony, any private information which his station might

enable him to procure. A better reason could not therefore have been urged, for not having given information of the intentions of the insurgents, even had he known them, than his own journal furnishes, especially when it is evident, from the whole case, that he exerted all his influence to suppress every feeling of hostility to the established government, in the minds of his negro flock. The first of the expression of his feelings upon this subject having been recorded in a private journal more than three years before any insurrectionary movement was contemplated, must, in every candid mind, weigh infinitely more in his favour than any thing he could say in his defence; and thus, as on other parts of the case, as we shall shew immediately, the avidity of his persecutors to procure the conviction of this injured man at any rate, has had the contrary effect of establishing his innocence, by more unquestionable evidence than it was in his power to have adduced.

One of the charges of the advocate-general in his opening speech, is, that Mr. Smith's opinion of the oppression under which the negroes laboured, "brought him to that point, that he thought it necessary to expound them such parts of the holy gospel entirely relative to the oppressed state in which he considered them to be." We cannot make good English of this Anglo-Dutch lawyer's foolish accusation, but the completest refutation to it is furnished by himself in the following extract, read by him in evidence, from the journal of the accused:—

"The next passage is of Friday, August the 8th, 1817, and runs as follows:

"A great number of people at chapel. From Genesis xv. 1. Having passed over the latter part of chapter 13, as containing a promise of *deliverance from* [these two words partly erased, but perfectly legible] the land of Canaan, I was apprehensive the negroes might put such a construction upon it as I would not wish; for I tell them that some of the promises, &c. which are made to Abraham and others, will apply to the Christian state. It is easier to make a wrong impression upon their minds, than a right one." [Ibid. p. 9.]

He is accused also of having so interfered with the acts and deeds of the constituted authorities, as to have excited the negroes to rebellion against them; and the proof of it adduced, and relied upon by the prosecutor, is, that when the governor arbitrarily and unreasonably required the negroes going to the mission chapels, to be furnished with passes from their masters, which those masters might give

or refuse at pleasure, and which were not required for negroes going elsewhere upon the sabbath, he was guilty of the treasonable act of thus writing down in his private journal his advice to them, to submit, as Christians, even to these harsh and illegal commands of their superiors.

“ ‘ While at breakfast this morning, I received a communication from the burgher-captain, enclosing a printed circular from the governor, containing on one side an extract from a letter of Lord Liverpool, as secretary of state for the colonies, to governor Benthick, dated 15th of October, 1811, and on the other side a comment written by the colonial secretary, in the name of governor Murray, explaining it to their own taste. The substance of this comment is to persuade the planters not to allow the slaves to attend the chapel on Sundays without a pass, and in an indirect manner, not to allow them to come at all in the evening, and even on a Sunday to send an overseer with the slaves, as judges of the doctrine we preach. The circular appears to me designed to throw an impediment in the way of the slaves receiving instruction, under colour of a desire to meet the wishes, or rather, complying with the commands, of his majesty’s government.’ ”

“ ‘ June 9th, 1823.—Several whites were present, professedly as spies.’ ”

“ ‘ 22d June, 1823.—Isaac, of Triumph, came in to ask whether the governor’s new law, as he called it, forbad the slaves meeting together on the estate to which they belong, of an evening, for the purpose of learning the catechism. Their manager, he said, had threatened to punish them if they held any meeting. I informed him, that the law gave the manager no such power, and that it had nothing to do with that subject; still I advised them to give it up, rather than give offence and be punished, and to take care to ask for their passes early on Sunday mornings, and come to the chapel to be catechised.’ ” [Ibid. p. 11.]

And this, in Demarara, is inciting to rebellion, and teaching disobedience to constituted authorities! We say nothing on such law and logic, but that in this generation, and in that island, there are who call light darkness and darkness light. Could any injustice or absurdity surprise us in the proceedings of such men, it would assuredly be the arrant folly of committing a flagrant violation of the very first principles of the law of evidence, to produce, as proofs of the guilty intentions of the accused, those very passages in his journal which his counsel would most have wished to be read as the strongest proofs of his innocency, could they legally have been adduced as evidence in his behalf. Such precisely is the character of the quotations last made, to which we add another passage from the same journal,

quoted by Mr. Smith in his defence, and which ought, in common fairness and honesty, to have been given in evidence by the prosecution, by whom indeed, as we have already intimated, the whole and every part of this private document ought to have been read. We give the passage of the prisoner's address, in which it is referred to entire, because to us it appears an unanswerable proof of his innocence of that intention, whose guilt was the principal object for which, in his own strong language, "that journal has been dragged forth from the privacy in which it was buried."

"It is not, however, necessary to have recourse to subtleties or specious arguments, to disprove that I have interfered in the treatment of the negroes; there has been no evidence adduced in support of this assertion of the prosecutor; nay, my own journal, under date, 21st March, 1819, ought to be sufficient evidence on my behalf: 'I wish the negroes would say nothing to me of their troubles, which arise from the severe usage of their managers, &c. as it is not my business to interfere in such concerns, and only obliges me to treat such conduct with apparent indifference, and behave with coolness to those who relate it.' In corroboration, Bristol, one of the deacons, a constant attendant of the chapel, and continually present at the services, swears 'that some people complained of being licked for not doing the work on a sabbath; they might have complained to Mr. Smith for something else, but I do not know it. The prisoner does not listen to the complaints of the negroes, only when they come to complain of what I have just spoken. He said, if there was any such thing, (i. e. flogging the negroes for coming to chapel,) he, the negro, must go to the fiscal or governor.' Some of the planters have referred the quarrels of the negroes to me to be settled." [Ibid. pp. 58, 59.]

But before we turn from this written evidence, so illegally produced, yet serving so very different a purpose to that for which the law was so grossly violated in its production, we will, in fairness, quote one passage, which would, we admit, under certain circumstances, have exposed the writer to prosecution and to punishment, even in an English court of justice. We refer to the following remarks upon the governor, who had thrown every possible impediment in the way of Mr. Smith's availing himself of a grant of land by a liberal planter, for the erection of a chapel.

"October 21st, 1822.—Just returned from another fruitless journey; have been for the answer to my petition, but was again told, by the governor's secretary, that his excellency had not given any order upon it, but that I might expect it to-morrow. I imagine the governor knows not how to refuse with any colour of

ason, but is determined to give me as much trouble as possible, with the hope that I shall weary of applying, and so let it drop; but a puny opposition shall not succeed in *that way*, nor in any other ultimately, if I can help it. Oh, that this colony should be governed by a man who sets his face against the moral and religious improvement of the negro slave! but he himself is a party concerned, and no doubt solicitous to perpetuate the *present* cruel system, and to that end, probably adopts the common, though *not* [most] false notion, that the slaves must be kept in brutal ignorance. Were the slaves generally enlightened, they must, and would, be better treated." [Ibid. p. 10.]

We have said, that this might have been punishable in our courts, but it would not be as a private paper, indicative of treasonable conduct in the writer, though if it had been published, instead of being locked up in a desk for his own use, it might have been held to be a libel, and not the less so that it appears to have been true. We much doubt, however, whether his excellency would have ventured, in such a case, to appeal to a jury of his country against a man, to whom, on his introduction to him as missionary to the negroes under his government, he communicated, with far more freedom than courtesy, his liberal and enlightened views of ruling them, in the threat, worthy of a barbarian chieftain, "If ever I know you teach the slaves to read, I will banish you from the colony." The man who publicly acts thus, has no very great reason to be astonished, if, on breaking open private depositories of the papers of those to whom his intentions have authoritatively been communicated, the remarks upon his conduct should not be quite so adulatory as he might wish.

This irrelevant and illegal charge of general misconduct, was also attempted to be supported by the evidence of a carpenter named Bond, who deposed to a desultory conversation with respect to slavery, in which Mr. Smith took part, a year previous to the time at which the witness was called to speak to it. In the nature of things, therefore, his recollection of it must have been very imperfect; and it proved so entirely vague and uncertain, that he remembered nothing about the conversation, but that it was generally about slavery. What Mr. Smith said, he knew not, except that negroes would do as well in the West Indies without the whites; (and who doubts that they might readily dispense with such white people as are most of the flogging lanterns of Demerara?) that he added something about St. Domingo, but what he had forgotten; and something more

upon the subject, of which he remembered neither form nor substance, save that Mr. Smith appeared to be confounded. This loose evidence, which no counsel at the English bar would have ventured to offer, and which, if he had offered it, no judge would have received, is then attempted to be patched up by the recollections of Mr. Mc Wait, an overseer of a plantation, who seems to be but little more accurate in his memory than his friend Mr. Bond, though he does admit, that the prisoner, in alluding to the bettering of the condition of the slaves in the colony, by something similar to what had taken place in St. Domingo, expressly stated, that the influence of the missionaries and of the gospel would prevent such scenes as were acted there. But let the conversation have been what it might, it is evident that there was nothing of an insurrectionary nature in it, as those who heard it took no notice of it for a whole twelvemonth, though evidently ill enough disposed towards the individual against whom a few isolated sentences of a dialogue occupying a considerable time, were now adduced. But in the first place, they were not evidence at all, because of their irrelevancy, and the distance of time at which they were spoken; secondly, if admissible, they were too loosely recollected to be relied on; and, thirdly, if accurately remembered, they are no proof of any crime.

We have also a long examination of a Mr. or Doctor Michael Mc Turk,—for he is a gentleman filling so many offices in the colony, *tam Mercurio quam Marte*, that we know not what to call him—as to an alleged disobedience of an order of His Honor Mr. First Fiscal Heliger, (the judge-advocate general on the present trial,) and the said Mr. or Doctor, in his combined character of medical attendant to the plantation on which Mr. Smith was a resident missionary, a captain of militia, and a burgher-captain, an officer whose duties, in his own language, it is difficult to tell,—interdicting the attendance of any of the negroes of other estates at the mission-chapel, on account of the small-pox having broken out amongst the slaves on the plantation on which it was situated. In as much, however, as this disobedience, if any was committed, occurred in December, 1819, we might well be excused taking notice of it among the proofs given of an excitement of the negroes of the island to rebellion in August 1823, with which it has no more to do than would a questioning of captain Mc Turk's medical skill, or doctor Mc Turk's military tactics, at any period of his active and chequered life. Yet as the

same luckless fatality attaches to this, as to every other part of the evidence adduced by his fellow-sufferer, in the indignity offered to his authority, namely, that it proves every thing but what it was meant to prove, we will waste a word or two upon this most irrelevant and unimportant investigation. Mr. Smith's defence is, that, conscious that this prohibition was a mere pretext for keeping the slaves from chapel, he was anxious to get it removed as soon as possible, and, therefore, wrote to Dr. Mc Turk for his certificate of all danger of the infection having ceased. This was refused, on the ground, that though the negroes, who had all along been kept in a house at the back of the estate, were so completely recovered as to be sent back again,—the house itself, in which they had been separated from the rest, having previously been burnt by Dr. Mc Turk himself—he thought the disease might still be latent, from finding that two negroes, who had been infected with it, had not been reported to him. But Mr. Hamilton, the manager of the estate, swears that they were duly reported, and also deposes to the truth of his representations in a letter addressed to Dr. Mc Turk himself, on the 19th of Dec. 1819, that there was no attendance by any negroes from the neighbouring estates at the chapel, until the small-pox was considered by him, (the doctor,) by the manager, and by every person on the estate, as demolished; and though Dr. Mc Turk denies all this, in a letter as full of the self-importance of a man dressed in a little brief authority, as we ever recollect to have met with, he must excuse us for giving at the least as much credit to the oath of Mr. Hamilton, as to his; especially as it appears, not only from his own conduct, and the way in which he gave his evidence, but from express testimony upon the subject, that he and Mr. Smith had long lived upon the most indifferent terms. On a cross-examination by that gentleman, he was asked, whether, in a conversation, of which he had given every part that could operate against the prisoner, down to his having used all kinds of language to hurt his (the doctor's) feelings, he had ridiculed and sneered at the idea of the negroes being instructed in religion; but that question was most improperly, illegally, and partially rejected by the court: yet no unprejudiced person can for a moment doubt that the construction put upon this prohibition, in an extract from Mr. Smith's journal, given in evidence by the advocate-general, that it was part of the system of the planters, eagerly to lay hold of any thing to prevent their slaves at-

tending upon the ordinances of religion, is the correct one. That it was so, is, indeed, self-evident from the conduct of this military medical practitioner himself, who, whilst strictly enforcing the prohibition of slaves from other estates, visiting the mission chapel, lest they should catch the infection there, left them at perfect liberty to visit, for any other purpose, the estate on which the slaves attending it were at large, and never prohibited any of the negroes of that estate from going to other plantations whenever they had occasion to do so. Either, therefore, Dr. Mc Turk is as ignorant or negligent a practitioner as was ever sent to a West India island to physic slaves, or he lent himself at least to the hostility to missionary exertions in the instruction of slaves, which the great body of planters there avowedly entertain. That such aversion is carried to an extent that would shock not merely every Christian, but every person of common humanity, Dr. Mc Turk cannot possibly deny, for he can scarcely fail to have heard of many proofs of it occurring in Demerara, of a nature little less conclusive than is afforded in an anecdote which has reached England, of a certain burgher-captain there, though what was the precise nature of the other offices which he sustained, is not so clearly ascertained. A negro slave was, whilst quite a lad, accused by this military hero of having stolen some trifling article; but he denied the charge, and, on its being persisted in, said with great earnestness, "Indeed, massa, I did not take it, God knows I did not." At this adjuration, the orthodox Christian captain, swearing a most tremendous oath, exclaimed, "God knows? what the d—l do you know about God!" "O yes, massa," said the lad mildly, "there is a God atop, he know every thing: he know I did not steal it." The captain, turning to one of his negroes, ordered him to spur the young rascal round the room; adding, whilst he did so, "I'll teach you to talk to me about God, you ——, what business have you to know any thing about God?" When his humane commands had been obeyed with sufficient strictness, he completed his equitable punishment, by taking the soap from the shaving-box which he was using, and making the poor boy eat it before his face. Whether this was one of the instances of West Indian oppression recorded in Mr. Smith's journal, as making his flesh creep, and his blood boil within him, captain Mc Turk, and those who have had the inspection of his journal, alone can tell; but if it is, or if it was known in the island that its writer was cognizant of such fiendish cruelty, as we have every reason

to believe it was, it is easy to conceive what very impartial witnesses its burgher-captains, slave owners, doctors, and overseers were likely to make upon this trial.

But from such testimony we pass to that of slaves themselves; for whilst, in most of our West India islands, their evidence is so completely excluded from our courts, that, as we have shewn in a former number of our work, if a planter, manager, or overseer, were to select an opportunity, when no white person was present, he might, with impunity, whip to death, or otherwise murder, as many blacks as he pleased; their testimony was fully admitted and mainly relied upon in this court-martial, though, from a passage in Mr. Smith's defence, which was doubtless prepared with the assistance of his counsel, we should be inclined to conclude, in the absence of all knowledge upon the subject, that it is not admissible in the ordinary courts of Demerara. Far, very far be it from us, to contend for the rejection of a man's testimony, because his skin happens to be of a deeper dye than ours; for, on the contrary, we hold his incapacity by law to give evidence, one of the principal defects in our wretched system of colonial jurisprudence, with regard to the greater part of which we now feel a stronger disposition than ever to say, that justice is but its name. We are, nevertheless, satisfied, that until the slaves are generally instructed in the truths of religion, and the sacred obligations of an oath, the greatest caution is necessary in probing the truth of what they say. Competency to give evidence is, as every lawyer knows, a very different thing from the credibility of the evidence when given; and in their present state of degradation and ignorance, negroes in the West Indies must be treated as are children here, and not be allowed to swear to facts in court, unless it is evident that they fully understand the obligation to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, imposed upon them by the oath they take. With us we examine not men and women of full age, or even boys and girls of ten or twelve, upon this point on the *voire dire*; but in the West Indies it should invariably be done most strictly, and not for form's sake only, as the presumption there is as strong against the proffered witness knowing what he is about, as it is the other way with us. Admitting also, though this is conceding much, that they act under the known and understood obligation of an oath, their narrow capacities, their limited knowledge, their imperfect acquaintance with our language,—all conspire to point out the necessity of placing less stress on what they

say, than we should do on similar testimony from a well-educated person, be he black or white. This will obviously be the case too, in a stronger degree, where they undertake to repeat conversations, or give their impressions of what others may have said to them. This latter observation applies with peculiar force to the case before us, and will be very strongly illustrated by the accounts given of Mr. Smith's conversations and sermons by the slaves produced against him,—the main, and well nigh the only thing they were called to prove. We have thought it right to make these remarks at the outset of our examination of their testimony; though at present we confine ourselves to that part of it which relates to his general conduct as a missionary among them. They proved, then, that he preached about Saul's driving David into the bush, because, if he went into the house, he would get trouble; and about the children of Israel in the Red Sea; and the Lord's making darkness and thunder between the king of *Israel* and Moses; Pharaoh's being drowned in the sea, and Moses, when he had got over it, building a temple, and praying to the Lord:—and by doing this he was, forsooth, stirring up rebellion against the king and the constituted authorities, although the same witnesses positively swear, that he did not draw any comparison between the persecuted Israelites and the slaves of Demerara. The court, however, seemed to think the mere mention of this part of sacred history, in the hearing of a black, so enormous an offence, that they examined particularly as to the number of occasions on which he had done so. Another crime, of like treasonable enormity, was the teaching the slaves that it was wrong to work on the sabbath-day. Whether it is so by the laws of God, no one acquainted with the Bible, which is part and parcel of the laws of his country, can for a moment doubt. Mr. Smith was prepared to shew this upon his trial, by the quotation of many passages of scripture; but the moment he announced his intention of doing so, he was informed by the half-pay lieutenant-colonel, who acted as president of the court, that this could not be allowed, as every member of the court could, if he pleased, read the scriptures at home; and,—monstrous to relate of any court pretending to be a court of justice, especially a British one!—although witness after witness had been examined, as to his perversions of scripture, as one of the strongest proofs of his traitorous intentions, he was not allowed to quote and comment on any portion of the sacred volume in his defence! Of the following able, manly, and

Christian answer to the charge, the whole of the passages marked with inverted commas, from the Missionary Society's copy of the trial, were omitted by the arbitrary and illegal direction of the court, and were afterwards struck out by its express order, by the judge-advocate-general.

"That I have taught the negroes that it was sinful to work or traffic on the sabbath.

"Every member of the court will, I am sure, allow, that, in doing so, I taught one of the first precepts inculcated in that holy book, on which they have sworn to do justice. To set this subject in the clearest possible light, I will read a few extracts from the sacred scriptures,* relative to the obligation of men, of every condition of life, to abstain from labour on the sabbath, and to keep it in a religious manner:—Exodus, ch. xx. v. 8, 11. "Remember the sabbath-day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work: But the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor the stranger that is within thy gates: For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath-day, and hallowed it."—Jeremiah, ch. xvii. v. 21 and 22. "Thus saith the Lord, Take heed unto yourselves, and bear no burden on the sabbath day, nor bring it in by the gates of Jerusalem: neither carry forth a burden out of your houses on the sabbath-day. Neither do ye any work; but hallow ye the sabbath-day, as I commanded your fathers."—Nehemiah, ch. xiii. v. 15, 18. "In those days saw I in Judah, some treading wine-presses on the sabbath, and bringing in sheaves, and lading asses: as also wine, grapes, and figs, and all manner of burdens, which they brought into Jerusalem on the sabbath-day: and I testified against them on the day wherein they sold victuals. There dwelt men of Tyre also therein, which brought fish, and all manner of ware, and sold on the sabbath unto the children of Judah and Jerusalem. Then I contended with the nobles of Judah, and said unto them, what evil thing is this that ye do, and profane the sabbath-day? Did not your fathers thus, and did not our God bring all this evil upon us, and upon this city? Yet ye bring more wrath upon Israel by profaning the sabbath."—Ezek. ch. xx. v. 12 and 13. "Moreover also, I gave them my sab-

* While reading this sentence, I was stopped by the president, who said, it was quite unnecessary. Every member of the court could, if he chose, read the scriptures at home. I replied, that I was accused of perverting the scriptures, and that I had no other way of disproving it, than by shewing, from scripture, that the doctrines I taught were plainly inculcated in the bible. The president answered, 'You have heard the determination, and nothing farther can be said on the subject.'

“baths, to be a sign between me and them, that they might know
 “that I am the Lord that sanctifieth them. But the house of Israel
 “rebelled against me in the wilderness: they walked not in my
 “statutes, and they despised my judgments, (which if a man do,
 “he shall live in them;) and my sabbaths they greatly polluted:
 “then I said, I would pour out my fury upon them in the wilder-
 “ness, to consume them.”—*Isa.* ch. lviii. v. 13, 14.—“If thou turn
 “away thy foot from the sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my
 “holy-day: and call the sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord,
 “honourable; and shalt honour him, not doing thine own ways,
 “nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words;
 “then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee
 “to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the
 “heritage of Jacob thy father; for the mouth of the Lord hath
 “spoken it.”—*Luke*, ch. xxiii. v. 54 and 56. “And that day was
 “the preparation, and the sabbath drew on. And the women also,
 “which came with him from Galilee, followed after, and beheld the
 “sepulchre, and how his body was laid. And they returned, and
 “prepared spices and ointments; and rested the sabbath-day,
 “according to the commandment.”

“From many passages, which might be quoted,* it is obvious, that the violation of the sabbath by voluntary labour, which is not absolutely necessary, is regarded by our Maker as a heinous sin; and, on the contrary, the keeping of it in a religious manner is considered a virtue, and accepted as such, through the merits of the Redeemer. In the face of so many precepts, could I tell the negroes there was no harm in working their ground, or in going to market on the sabbath? was it for me to dispense with the commandments of God? Surely not. Voluntary and unnecessary labour on the sabbath, I disallowed. I considered it a sin, and told them so; and if they are properly provided, by their owners, with the necessaries of life, as is asserted by all the planters, they can have no absolute necessity for going to market on the sabbath. One of the witnesses has stated, that he heard me say, ‘If your master has any work for you to do on a Sunday, it is your duty to tell him that Sunday is God’s day,’ and that I said it ‘often.’ Even admitting this to be true,† which I by no means do, I would ask what crime have I committed? Are their masters greater than God? The very reverse is the case: Romeo and Bristol abundantly prove, that I taught the negroes to obey their masters, if they were

* The original was, “From all these, and many more passages, which might be quoted,” &c.; but upon the court’s ordering all the quotations to be struck out, this passage was altered to its present state.

† The laws of the colony secure to the slaves an exemption from involuntary labour on the sabbath. If a planter makes his slaves work on a Sunday, he is liable to a penalty of 600 guilders for every slave so worked. I never heard of its being enforced, unless the case of Mr. Benny, mentioned to me by the fiscal, is to be considered an instance.

commanded to work even on a Sunday. Azor has sworn that I told the negroes, that if half a row was left, it was not right to finish it on a Sunday; and, upon cross-examination proved, that I did not tell them not to finish the half row, but merely said it was not right: And who is there present that can truly say I was not justified in this remark?" [Mis. Rep. pp. 72—74.]

What such a set of judges would have said in answer to this challenge, we neither know nor care; for really the opinion of men who could act upon the arrant absurdity, to say nothing of the gross injustice, of this suppression of a most legitimate line of the prisoner's defence, is beneath contempt. What Mr. Wray—a fellow of an English college—a barrister—the chief-justice of a colony—can think of, or say for himself, in concurring in such a decision, (for, as he did not instantly and indignantly leave the court, as he ought long before to have done, he must be taken to have concurred,) we are utterly at a loss to guess. He at least must have been aware, if his colleagues could be ignorant of it, which we doubt, that a judge is presumed to be acquainted with every act of parliament in the statute book; and yet would not every one condemn as the arrantest fool that ever walked the earth without a keeper, that one of their venerable body, who should forbid the quoting and commenting upon any particular act, on account of this presumption, and that he might, if he chose, refresh his memory by looking at it at home. Yet such was the ridiculous and tyrannical conduct of the court-martial at Demerara before which Mr. Smith was tried, though the chief-justice of the island was a member of it. But that which is the law of the bible, is also the law of England, where every one knows that the profanation of the sabbath by secular employments is a statutable offence, not often punished, it is true, though that is not the fault of the law, but of those who ought to execute it. It is the law, moreover, of the colony, and where its provisions subject a planter, compelling his slaves to work against their will on the sabbath, to a fine of six hundred guilders for every slave whom he so works, surely that man is a meritorious supporter, instead of an incendiary breaker of the law, who teaches the slaves, that, as the colonial legislature had itself taken care to protect them against being compelled to violate the sabbath, by punishing the master who should be guilty of such compulsion, it would be an offence in them, for which God will call them to account, voluntarily to deprive themselves of the benefit of this protection.

But the different manner in which the witnesses repeat these instructions, proves at once the spirit in which they were given, and the impossibility of placing any reliance upon the correctness of a negro's recollection of conversations. One and the same witness, Azor, (upon whose testimony the prosecutor mainly rests this part of his charge,) gives the expression as "it was hard to work," "it was not fit to be worked," and "it was not right to work," but nowhere proves any thing like a direction to them not to work, though, if he did, we have already shewn that Mr. Smith was but furthering the intentions of those very colonial laws which he is accused of seeking to overturn. True it is, that he represents him as saying, "they were fools for working on Sunday for the sake of a few lashes." That this expression could never have been used, must, however, we think, be apparent, from the following brief considerations. In the first place, the language is not such as was likely to have been used by a person in Mr. Smith's situation when conversing with a slave. In the second place, the very slave who represents it as having been used to him, negatives the possibility of its having been so, as he expressly swears that the prisoner always advised the negroes, from the pulpit and otherwise, to do their work, and obey their masters, and all in authority under them. Thirdly, the advice, not to mind a few lashes, and the manner in which they are spoken of, is utterly at variance with the very strong expressions which he constantly uses in his journal, to denote his abhorrence of this cruel and degrading punishment. Those extracts were selected by the prosecutor, to shew that Mr. Smith was exciting dissatisfaction in the minds of the slaves, by speaking in terms of strong and unmeasured reprehension of the discipline of flogging, to which they were subjected; yet this witness charges him with speaking of that same punishment as a thing so light as to be scarcely worthy of a moment's consideration. Both these accusations cannot be true, and we have no doubt as to which every candid reader will credit. We may remark also, in the fourth and last place, and as applicable also to the charge of forbidding the negroes to work on a sabbath in general, that had the prisoner been disposed to excite opposition to the masters on this account, a far more effectual way was open to him than any he is alleged to have pursued, in inducing them to make a formal complaint of an offence which the fiscal seems disposed to have prosecuted. A man wishing to annoy the planters, would have

taken a course not only destructive of their authority by proving it to be illegal, but annoying them to a further degree by aiming at their pockets. This would have been at once a more treasonable, and a more reasonable attack upon their dignity, than advising their slaves quietly to be flogged, for what their masters were punishable for doing; and as he could have done this with impunity, we may safely conclude, that he might have used the expressions sworn to by Azor, though we do not believe them, without subjecting himself by law to any punishment, not even an hour's imprisonment, or a fine of a single farthing.

But the whole evidence of the other negroes called by the judge-advocate, and examined by him and his assistants, by the aid of every leading, and, therefore, illegal question, that could be put, in order to procure a confirmation of this evidence of Azor's, most completely proves, that all Mr. Smith said or did on the subject of the slaves working upon Sunday, was, in substance, that it was wrong in their masters to compel them to do so, but that it was a sin for which they must answer, not the negroes, who must do as they told them; but would be answerable hereafter, and excluded from the sacrament here, if they did any work for themselves, or for their benefit, of their own accord, works of necessity alone excepted. This is evident from the following testimony of Romeo, Manuel, and Bristol.

ROMEO.

"He said, if the water-dams break, to be sure you must attend to your master's duty; or fire; if they force you to do it, you must do it, and your master will answer for it: you must not grieve, or be angry, if your master forces you, but you must do it.

"What kind of work did the prisoner say you were to do on a Sunday, if your master forced you?—Any work: but if he does not give you work, you must attend to church regularly.

"You have stated that you were present when Mr. Smith reproached some of the members for absenting themselves from chapel on a Sunday. Did you upon that occasion hear Mr. Smith say that they were fools for working on a Sunday for the sake of a few lashes?—No, I did not hear that; but I heard him say, that if their masters gave them work, they must do it patiently, and if they punish you for a wrong cause, you must not grieve for it." [House of Com. Rep. p. 15, 16.]

MANUEL.

"The parson said, if your master has any work for you on Sunday, it is your duty to tell him Sunday is God's day; that if the water-dam broke, on Sunday, it was our duty to go and stop it; that if the boat was to ground on the sand bank on a Sunday, it

it was our duty to shove it off; and that if people get drunk on Sunday, it was right of their masters to make them work, to prevent them walking about, and doing mischief.

“Did the prisoner say nothing else about working on a Sunday than what you have already stated?—I cannot remember any thing else. I now recollect the parson said, if any member of the church has work given to him by his master, he, the parson, won't say any thing; but if any member of the church did any work of his own accord on a Sunday, he should not be allowed to sit among them as a member for one month.

“Did not many of the members go to work their grounds on a Sunday, and also go to market?—Yes, a number of them did so.

“Were those that did so excluded from the chapel?—No, they were not.

“Were they suspended from the communion?—They were not allowed to take it the same day, but they might the next.

“Who was present when the parson said, that if your master had any work for you to do on Sunday, to tell him that Sunday is God's day?—Joseph was, Jack of Dochfour, Bristol and them; also Bill, and many others.

“(Question by the Court.)—Was it once only, or often, you heard the parson say, that if your master gave you work on a Sunday, you were to tell him it is God's day?—He told us this often.” [House of Com. Rep. pp. 18, 19.]

BRISTOL.

“I have heard the prisoner speak about working on a Sunday. He said, that if our master gave us work on a Sunday, we must do it, because we could not help it; and that we must not break the sabbath in doing our own work, because we must keep holy the sabbath day, which is a command of God. Mr Smith said that God would punish us for working our own ground on a Sunday.” [House of Com. Rep. pp. 21, 22.]

“In the latter examination, the emphatic words “that is all,” are inserted after “a command of God,” in the report of the trial published by the Missionary Society, from the minutes of Mr. Arrindell, the counsel for Mr. Smith, to which we may hereafter have occasion to refer, for supplying several most important and disgraceful omissions in the official minutes. When called by the prisoner as his witness, this negro gave the following evidence upon the same subject.

“Did you, at any time, hear the prisoner say, “if your master has any work for you to do on a Sunday, it is your duty to tell him Sunday is God's day?—He did not tell us so; he told us if our master gave us any thing to do on a Sunday, we must do it; he never told us not to do it.” [House of Com. Rep. p. 99.]

To the same effect, also, is the evidence of Jason, a free negro, called by the prisoner.

“What were the doctrines and duties which the prisoner taught the people that used to go to the chapel?—The catechism for one. When we came to the chapel, the parson told us we were to believe in God, and that *we were to obey our masters in all things*; that we were not to steal, nor to lie, as it was a great evil; that *whatever our masters commanded us to do, we were to do it without speaking again.*” [House of Com. Rep. pp. 103, 104.]

“(Question by the Prosecutor.)—Can you recollect the time when the prisoner told you what you have stated about obeying your master?—He told me that at all times, and frequently.” [Ib. p. 105.]

We should not have thought it necessary to have made these extracts or comments, had our object merely been to shew Mr. Smith's innocence of any crime cognizable by the law; but as we are satisfied that the martyred missionary was most exemplary in the discharge of his duty, as a minister of the gospel to the heathen, we have adduced this evidence from the people of his flock, when called for the most part as witnesses against him,—that it was obedience, not anarchy—fear, not revenge—a patient endurance of injury, not violent measures to redress it, which he uniformly taught in his ministrations amongst these the most degraded, suffering, and injured of the creatures of the same common race. Into the course of these ministrations a large portion of the time of the court was occupied, by inquiries so minute in their nature, and so extensive in the period which they covered, that we know not whether surprise at their absurdity, or indignation at their irrelevancy, preponderates in our minds. At all events, we should assuredly have passed them by with the contempt they merit, did they not, like all the other gross irregularities of this most irregular and illegal trial, issue in the complete exculpation of the persecuted missionary, whose guilt they were meant to prove.

One of the advocate-general's most extraordinary charges against Mr. Smith, of selecting passages from scripture, applicable to the distressed state of his negro auditors, has already been partially examined. His answer to this charge is contained in the following plain unvarnished statement of his defence:

“With this view of the subject I commenced, about the middle of 1820, a regular course of historical reading and expositions, taking the Old Testament for the morning service, and the New Testament

for the evening. I began in the Old Testament with Genesis, and in the New Testament with the gospel of St. Matthew. The Old Testament I read in order, with the omission of such chapters as appeared to me liable to be misinterpreted by the negroes. The passage which has been read from the journal, under date '8th August, 1817,' says, that I *omitted* to read or to expound to the negroes a passage of scripture (latter part of Genesis xiii.) which I apprehended they might misconstrue. It contains a promise of the land of Canaan to Abraham's posterity. The journal adds the reason why I omitted the passage; viz. that I was fearful it might make a wrong impression on their minds, as I tell them some of the promises, &c. which were made to Abraham, &c. will apply to the Christian state. This proves that I was very cautious *not to apply to the negroes* those parts of scripture which relate to temporal possessions, and were peculiar to the patriarchs. That some of the promises and precepts made to them apply to the Christian state, is evident from the New Testament: compare Romans c. iv. ver. 23, to the end. The apostle, speaking of Abraham's faith being imputed to him for righteousness, says, 'Now it was not written for his sake alone, that it was imputed to him, but for us also,' &c.

"Great stress has been laid on my reading of the deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt. Had that part of holy writ been omitted, the history of the church of God could not have been understood. The mercy, the power, and the providence of God are signally displayed in that part of sacred history, and cannot fail to impress with a sense of religious fear and trust even the stupid mind of a negro. For this reason, I suppose, the apostle Paul, in 1st Cor. c. x. ver. 1 to 11. presses upon our particular attention this very portion of the scriptures: 'Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples; and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come.' In reading the portions of scripture partially related by the witnesses, care was always taken to guard against perversion or misapplication; such reflections only being made at the end of the chapter, as were of a moral and religious nature. Even those witnesses for the prosecution, whose memories were so very tenacious on the subject of Moses and Pharaoh, and the children of Israel, though it is two years since I have read to them about these persons, have stated that they never heard me apply the history of the Israelites to the condition of the negroes. If they themselves read the bible, and so applied it, the fault must be charged upon their ignorance, and shews the necessity of their having more instruction. It is to the ignorance of men that the apostle Peter imputes the perversion of the scriptures. In his second Epistle, c. iii. v. 16. where speaking of Paul's epistles, he says, 'In which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, to their own destruction.'" [House of Com. Rep. p. 55, 56.]

And rests this upon his statement merely? By no means; it is abundantly confirmed by the testimony of every one of his auditors, called, or by the prosecutor, or himself, as the following extracts will evince:

ANOR.

"When the prisoner talked or explained to you about the children of Israel, did he say that the situation of the negroes was like that of the children of Israel, or words to that effect?—No." [House of Com. Rep. p. 14.]

ROMEO.

"Divine service is performed at the chapel twice on a Sunday, at seven and eleven o'clock: the service at seven o'clock is, he reads in the Old Testament, and then he prays, then he begins to teach: he begins from Genesis, till he goes through: he used to read the 2d Kings. The last time I heard him was 2d Kings, but I cannot recollect the chapter." [Ib. p. 15.]

MANUEL.

"The prisoner reads a chapter concerning Moses sometimes. When Moses was born in Egypt, in that place where Pharaoh was a king, when he was born, the king gave orders that if any boy-child was born, they should put him to death: if it was a girl-child, let her live. After that Moses was about three weeks old, they took him and put him in a small box, and they put him in a river where the king's daughter was washing. God commanded Moses to take the children of Israel into the land of Canaan, because he did not wish they should be made slaves. God gave Moses a painted rod to make the king afraid. God commanded Moses that the king's heart was hardened; and Moses said to the king, What is the reason that you cannot take God's advice? After that, the king gave up Moses, and let them go in the promised land. After that, the king wanted to follow them again and bring them back, and then the king was drowned in there, in the sea. He read something after the death of Moses; he read Joshua; I cannot recollect what chapter. He read about David. He read about God calling Samuel to make him rule the people; after that, they wanted Samuel to put a king to rule them; and Samuel told them to believe in the Lord, that He was the king. God sent and put words in Samuel's mouth, and said, Look at Saul, the son of Kish, put him to be ruler over the people of Israel. David ran away from Saul, and went into the country where Goliath was born; and by David's discourse they discovered that he was the man who killed Goliath; and when they asked David if he was not the man, he feigned to be mad, and ran away. David ran to the bush, and got into the wood, because he was afraid that he would put another man into trouble. I don't know how he was to put another man into trouble, he only told me that." [Ib. p. 17.]

"(Questions by the Court.)—You have said that the prisoner, at

morning service, read about Moses, Joshua, and David: did he read of any one else?—Yes: I cannot remember the names of any other: he read about Elisha.

“Do you mean to say, that he read only the Old Testament at the morning prayer?—Formerly he used to read the New Testament; but for two years past he has only read the Old Testament.

“Did he read it straight through, or did he pass over any part of it?—He read it regularly through.” [Ib. p. 19.]

BRISTOL.

“I have heard some of the boys who read the Bible, speak about the Israelites and the Jews, about the fighting of the Israelites when they go to war; when the prisoner read about the fighting of the Israelites, after they went home and read it again, I heard them speak about it: they said the people of Israel used to go warring against the enemies; then I explained the meaning of ‘the enemy,’ and told them it was the people who would not believe the word of God when Moses used to preach to them; the people applied the story of the Israelites and the Jews, and put it on themselves; when they read it, then they begin to discourse about it; they said that this thing in the bible applied to us just as well as to the people of Israel; I cannot tell what made the negroes apply it to themselves.” [Ib. p. 23.]

From this latter evidence, as reported in the minutes printed by the House of Commons, the natural inference is, that the witness had no idea why this application was made, clearly negating, therefore, every presumption of its arising from any parallel drawn by the prisoner in his discourses; but the question and answer, as actually given and reported in the other copy of the minutes, is still more conclusive in his favour, and the suppression of it in the official notes of the trial, is, therefore, doubly disgraceful in those who were guilty of it.

“What made the people say, in reading the bible, that the history of the Jews applied to themselves?—I can’t tell—*Because they read it, and their own hearts make them say so; and their ignorance, that made them not understand it.*” [Missionary Society’s Rep. p. 26.]

We resume, however, his examination, and that of other negroes, further confirmatory of Mr. Smith’s defence.

“Do you know any thing about Peter, or the first epistle general of Peter?—I have heard it read, but I don’t remember it.

“How long ago is it since you heard the general epistle of Peter read?—I cannot remember rightly.

“How long is it since Mr. Smith read to you about Moses and the children of Israel, and about Pharaoh and his soldiers?—About two or three months before the rising took place, or longer.

“ Did Mr. Smith, when he was reading the bible, begin the next time at the place he last left off at?—Yes; he explains what he read the Sunday before, and then goes on to the next chapter.

“ How do you know that he began at the very next chapter to the one he last read?—Because he named the chapter he read the last Sunday, and then named the one he was going to read.

“ You have said you cannot read; are you sure Mr. Smith never missed any chapters?—Sometimes when he is going to read he tells us he passes over a chapter.” [House of Commons’ Report, p. 25.]

“ Have you ever heard the prisoner apply the history of the Jews or Israelites to the negroes?—No.

“ Can you give no reason at all why the people, when they read about the history of the Jews or Israelites applied it to themselves?—No.” [Ib. p. 26.]

MARY CHISHOLM.

“ Did you hear the prisoner read about Moses delivering the children of Israel from Egypt?—I have heard Mr. Smith read it some time back, not long ago, but I cannot remember the time.

“ Can you form any idea how long ago it is since you heard him read about Moses delivering the children of Israel from Pharaoh and Egypt?—No, I cannot rightly say.

“ Is it a month, or two months, or a year, or longer or shorter than a year?—I cannot rightly say how long it is.

“ What did you last hear the prisoner read about?—To my best knowledge, I think he read Luke, the Sunday before the rebellion.

“ Did you hear the prisoner read the history of David?—Yes.

“ Do you remember what he read about David?—He read about when Saul pursued after David. One night Saul dropped asleep, and David came over to him with his men, and they took away his spear, and his water-cruise; and when Saul rose up, David hallooed to the men of Saul to come for the spear. Another time, David cut the skirt of Saul’s coat; then the men of David said they must slay Saul, and David said, God forbid that they should put their hands upon the Lord’s anointed.

“ Were there any comments, remarks, or reflections made by the prisoner on what he read; if yea, what were they?—Yes; he remarked what a good man David was, not to revenge upon Saul; when he had it in his power to take his life, he would not do it. On one of the members observing to the prisoner, why David did not slay him, the prisoner replied, ‘it was better to leave him to God’s mercy, to do with him as he pleased.’

“ How long is it ago since the prisoner read about David and Saul?—Not very long; I cannot say, exactly.

“ Did you ever hear the prisoner read about any thing else, if yea, what?—Yes; I remember a man had a piece of land, and the king wanted it; he wanted to exchange the land, or buy it for money; the man would not sell it; and the king’s wife bor-

reared the king's seal, and sent to his officers, saying, put a guard over such a man; and to say that the man had blasphemed God and cursed the king: and then he was stoned to death for so doing. And his wife said, rise and take possession of the land, for the man who would not sell it was dead; and when the prophet met with the king going to take possession of the land, he inquired of him, 'have you killed, and are you now going to take possession?' and the king said unto the prophet, 'my enemy, have you found me out?'

"How did the prisoner apply this story?—He read it, and then we asked for remarks upon it. Mr. Smith said, if we did any thing bad, God would always find us out; and that God sent this prophet to tell the king that he would punish him for taking away the man's land: and that if we did any thing bad, if we did not suffer for it ourselves, our children, or our grand-children, would suffer." [Ib. p. 105, 106.]

LONDON.

"Have you a Bible; and if yea, do you use it in chapel?—I have, and use it in chapel.

"Can you follow the parson as he reads the Bible from the pulpit; if yea, were you in the habit of doing so?—Yes, I can, and am in the habit of doing so.

"Do you remember the prisoner reading about Moses delivering the children of Israel from Pharaoh, at the morning service?—I heard him, but very long ago, about two years.

"What books of the Bible did he read last year, at the morning service?—He began with Leviticus, until Numbers, and then Deuteronomy.

"What books did he read this year?—He read Kings, Samuel, Judges; he had not finished Kings.

"Does Mr. Smith at the morning service read straight on, or does he ever turn back to read chapters over again which he had read before?—He reads it straight forward; he does not come back; he goes on before." [Ib. p. 113.]

"(Questions by the Prosecutor.)—Did not the prisoner read Exodus to you a few Sundays before the revolt?—No.

"Did he read Joshua to you?—Yes, a little, long before the revolt began, at the morning service.

"What did you hear read in Joshua?—When Moses was dead, Joshua took his place, and God Almighty put him over these people.

"Look at the eighth chapter, and state if he read that?—I did not hear him read the eighth chapter of Joshua.

"Now look at the seventh chapter, and state if he read that?—No, I did not hear him.

"Have you never read the eighth chapter of Joshua before to-day?—No, I did not, but I may have seen it, looking through the book." [Ib. p. 113, 114.]

BILL.

"In what order did Mr. Smith read the Bible at the Sunday

morning services?—He reads a chapter, and then stops: next Sunday, he reads another chapter: sometimes, the succeeding chapter, and sometimes from another place.

“Did he keep going forward, or did he go backward?—Forwards.” [Ib. p. 115.]

With respect to this last evidence, the Missionary Society's report contains a minute as to the form in which the question respecting the order of reading should be put, which of the ignorance it displays, on the part of the president of the court, was real, proves that he had not sufficient skill—if it was affected, that he was grossly deficient in impartiality for the office which he filled. Whichever alternative is adopted, his conduct amalgamated, however, so entirely with that of his colleagues, that it is not worth while singling him out from a set of judges, to the like of whom we hope the life and liberty of no man will hereafter be entrusted, at least, till they are better instructed in their judicial duties, as they ought most assuredly to have been, by the judge in name and title, who so singularly, and worse than uselessly, took his seat upon their bench. We return, however, to the evidence, and boldly challenge any one to disprove from it that Mr. Smith's mode of reading the scriptures, and of preaching from them, so far from being calculated to lead the negroes to misapply any portion of the word of God to their own degraded condition, was not studiously and scrupulously adapted to prevent the possibility of such a mistake. The seventh and eighth chapters of Joshua seem to have been peculiarly unpalatable to the legal authorities and planters of Demerara; why, we know not, as they merely relate the discomfiture of the Israelites before Ai, on account of the sin of Achan, and the subsequent capture and destruction of that city, and the slaughter of its inhabitants, for causes, and in the progress of a war, which had no more to do with slaves, or slavery, than has the birth of Adam, the death of Abel, the anointing of David, or any other portion of the Old Testament, the whole of which, it appears, is of too dangerous a tendency for the attitude and longitude of Demerara. This, however, we have been enabled to discover, by the aid of an almanack and a prayer-book,—that of the half of the twenty-four chapters of the book of Joshua, which the church of England has directed to be used in the regular course of her daily lessons, the seventh and the eighth are two; the former being appointed for the first lesson at evening service on the 13th, and the latter as the first lesson at morning prayer on the

fourteenth of March; whilst, moreover, it does so happen, that in the very year of our Lord in which we live, the said fourteenth day of March happened on a Sunday, and therefore this most mischievous and treasonable chapter must then have been read in the hearing of all the slaves of Demerara, who were sufficiently orthodox to attend divine worship in the episcopal church of St. George, unless, indeed, the planters of that colony are so supreme in causes and matters ecclesiastical, as well as civil, as to have dispensed with it. If, then, Mr. Smith was guilty of treason or any minor offence against the peace or dignity of the white inhabitants of Demerara, by reading this obnoxious chapter in its regular course, that very offence must have been more recently committed by the officiating minister of the establishment there, under the sanction, and by the express direction, of the rubric of that church which is part and parcel of the state.

Mr. Smith was accused in the written charges preferred against him, of promoting, as far as in him lay, "discontent and dissatisfaction, in the minds of the negro slaves, towards their lawful masters, managers, and overseers," and it was to prove this charge, that the extensive range of his whole ministerial conduct, to which we have already reverted, was illegally inquired into by the prosecutor. The result of this examination, as far as the alleged charge of teaching the slaves to disobey the commands of their masters by not working upon the sabbath-day is concerned, has already been stated, and the further examination of the account given by the negroes, selected by those who had every opportunity and every disposition to make the most favourable selection for their purpose, of the general conduct of their pastor, will still deepen the conviction of his entire innocence of every intention of the kind so falsely imputed to him, which we strangely deceive ourselves if the statement of the evidence on that point must not have made on every unprejudiced mind. The following witnesses incontestably prove, that so far from unduly interfering between the master and the slaves, he always taught from the pulpit; and in his private conversations with them, that it was their duty to yield implicit obedience to their commands.

BRISTOL.

"I never heard the prisoner say any thing about the treatment of slaves: sometimes, when the people come to complain, or when they are hindered from coming to the chapel, and some of them get licked, then he tells them, 'Well, I cannot help that; but it is not

right for your masters to lick you, and hinder you from coming to chapel only: when the people come with such complaints as I have just now spoken of, the prisoner listens to them. The prisoner has advised me and others what to do, when we had such complaints, to go to the fiscal or the governor: sometimes the people run away or so, and he says, 'when you run away, you must not let them catch you again, for they will punish you.' [House of Com. Rep. p. 21.]

The latter part of this evidence was not given, it should be remarked, until the prisoner had finished his answer to the question proposed to him by the judge-advocate, "Did he never advise you or others what to do in case you had any complaint?" a leading question, enough, in all conscience; but having failed to get out what the prosecutor wanted, it was followed by a refresher of his memory of "any thing else;" to which the answer given in the Society's report, containing the questions most improperly omitted in the official copy of the proceedings, is, "That if the people run away, they must not let them catch them again." This expression Mr. Smith afterwards asked the witness to explain; but the court, with its wonted contempt, or ignorance, of all rules of evidence, and every principle of justice, would not permit it to be done. But that it either could have been satisfactorily explained, or was not used at all, is manifest; not only from the evidence which will hereafter be adduced of Mr. Smith having excluded negroes from the communion for this very offence, but from the whole tenor of this man's testimony, from which we proceed to make some further extracts:

"I remember when the governor's proclamation respecting the negroes going to church, was read to the head people on the estate by the burgher-captain of the district, I heard the prisoner speak about that proclamation: he said there was an order for all the people to come to church, and nobody was to hinder them. The owners were to give every one of them a pass to come to chapel, and the overseer with them, and when they had done at the chapel, the overseer was to go back with them, and take them home, so far I heard. Mr. Smith said, this was a good law. Mr. Smith said, in this country we cannot attend chapel as we wish, as they could in a free country, and in this we are slaves, and that we must pray to God to help us, that we may be enabled to attend as far as we can." [Id. p. 21.]

The former part of this statement is of considerable importance, inasmuch as it shews, that even while he had good reason to suppose that the masters were resorting to every

possible pretext and expedient, to keep their slaves from chapel, he was so far from communicating to those slaves the unfavourable impression of their conduct, which the extracts from his private journal, given in evidence against him, prove him to have entertained, that he puts the best possible construction upon it, and does all in his power to induce a ready submission to a restriction, which, as a man, an Englishman, and a minister, he unequivocally condemned. Yet this is a preacher of sedition, and a man perpetually going out of his way to create dissatisfaction in the minds of the slaves against their masters! The latter intimation, that they were slaves, and therefore could not do as could freemen, in attending on the means of grace, seems to have given great offence to the great men of Demerara; yet surely it was but a work of supererogation, in telling them what they must full well have known, a truth, indeed, exhibited every day before their eyes, in the contrast, which existed in this respect, between themselves and their black brethren who had obtained their freedom, to say not a syllable of the whites. Accompanied also as it was by a strong recommendation to pray to God to enable them to do their duty in the station in which they were placed, we care little whether the expression was used, or whether it was inaccurately reported, as other evidence, and even other parts of Bristol's own testimony, leaves abundant reason to conclude that it must have been. And that this was the habitual lesson of his ministrations amongst the degraded and half-instructed objects of his labours of benevolence, cannot be more strongly evinced than by the following evidence of this same witness, upon whose testimony it is clear that the prosecutor mainly relied for the conviction of the accused.

“ At our prayer-meetings we prayed to God to help us and to bless us all, that we may be enabled to seek after him more and more, and that he would bless our masters, and the governor and the fiscal; that we might make good servants unto them, and they might be good masters unto us; and to give us health and strength to do that which it might be our duty to do, and to bless all our brothers and sisters; we pray about our master's hearts, we pray to the Lord to bless and change our hearts, and change our master's hearts likewise.” [Ib. p. 23.]

Whether the humane, virtuous, and most religious planters, managers, overseers, and slave-drivers of Demerara may think it a libellous, and even treasonable imputation upon their characters, for a slave, or any one to pray for that change of heart, which a suppliant well may ask at

the throne of His grace, who has declared that "the heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked," and who has expressly commanded us to pray that "a new heart" may be put within us—we pause not to inquire, but satisfied that no real Christian can agree with them in their pharisaical opinion, we pass on to extract other parts of the evidence of this deacon of a church, whose worship was so evangelical, and truly catholic in its spirit.

"When you instruct the negroes in the meaning of the Ordinance, what do you tell them?—I tell them to consider what they are going about, and that they must pray to God, and prepare their minds, and that they must not thereafter commit sin again; that we must look to God to help us at any time, and we must consider well what we hear read in the bible every day, because, if we do partake of the Ordinance, and commit sin again, we have a greater account to give when we die." [Ib. p. 24.]

"What did the people complain they were licked for?—Some of them complained of having been licked because they did not attend to the work given them on the sabbath.

"Did they complain to Mr. Smith that they were licked for any thing else?—They might have done so, but I do not know of it.

"Did Mr. Smith ever encourage any negroes or negro to run away?—I never heard he did." [Ib. p. 25.]

"Did the prisoner ever punish the negroes, who were members of his congregation, for running away from their masters?—Yes; if they happened to be members of the church, they would not be allowed to come to the table any more.

"Did the prisoner ever give you or the people any advice concerning your spending money at funerals?—Yes; he said if any body died, he told us that we must not buy hogs or fowls, but rather to use our money to buy mourning.

"Did the prisoner ever say any thing to you about getting drunk at funerals?—Yes; he said we must not buy so much rum and other liquors, to make people drunk when they come to funerals.

"Do you remember the small-pox being on Le Resouvenir?—Yes.

"What day was it that you first heard of its being there?—I cannot remember the day rightly now.

"Was it on a Sunday?—I cannot tell.

"Do you ever remember being turned away from the chapel, and not being allowed to remain in the service?—Yes.

"On what occasion did this happen, and what was told you on that occasion, and by whom?—On account of the small-pox; Mr. Smith, the prisoner, told us that the doctor said that the small-pox was there, and that we must not come.

"Did you ever see any negro punished by the prisoner for running away from his master?—Yes.

"Who?—I saw York, of Success, for one; he is the only member

I have seen punished; the rest are Christians; I can't remember their names; some Christians from Mahaica-side; can't remember their names.

"How long ago was this?—It is almost a year now.

"(Question by the Court:)—How are they punished?—York is a member, and he would not allow him to come to the ordinance any more; the others, he said if they ran away they must not come to chapel.—[Ibid. p. 99.]

Such is the evidence of this negro, adduced to criminate Mr. Smith, by proving the seditious nature of his instructions to the negroes, instead of which, it proves directly the reverse; as we might safely defy any man, placed in his circumstances, to have acted with more prudence than he is here shewn to have uniformly displayed. A few sentences in the last extract furnishes also a proof of his readiness to comply with the orders of government, even when conveyed by such meddling consequential jacks in office, as Mr. Burgher-master Doctor Mc. Turk, (the very counterpart of his gallant and most officious namesake, in the tale of St. Roman's Well,) whose inveterate prejudices against the accused this testimony of Bristol serves to confirm. But we here quit his testimony, for that of the negroes called by the prisoner, who have this advantage over those produced by the prosecutor, that they were for the most part no longer slaves, and were altogether free from any participation in the insurrection which Mr. Smith was charged with exciting. We simply make our extracts in the order of the evidence, for commentary they cannot need.

PHILIP, (Free.)

"Did you ever, on any occasion, go to the prisoner for his advice? I did.

"Do you recollect any particular instance, and if yea, will you state what passed on that occasion?—When I was at the Kitty from a change of my owner, I felt the treatment very severe, and I went to complain to the prisoner, and when I went up to him, I laid my case before him; after Mr. Smith had given me knowledge, and I returned home, I found myself entirely in the wrong; and from Mr. Smith's advice to me, I became a faithful servant until I was sold.

"What was the advice Mr. Smith gave you?—He told me a servant must be dutiful to his master, and all that are put over him.

"Do you remember any of the doctrines and duties taught you and the people by the prisoner?—I do. He told me, if my master sent me any where about his duty, that I must be very particular in see-

ing it done; and if I had not got this advice from Mr. Smith, the prisoner, I should not have been my own man this day.

"Do you remember the prisoner calling up all the members, and asking them where they had been, and when they said their masters gave them work, he told them they were fools for working on a Sunday for the sake of a few lashes?—I do not know any thing of that; it did not happen in my presence." [Ibid. p. 102.]

MARY CHISHOLM, (Free.)

"Have you any slaves of your own; and did they attend on the prisoner's chapel?—I have; and they did attend the prisoner's chapel.

"Had you ever any fear that the prisoner's instructions would make your slaves dissatisfied with you as their mistress?—No, I never had any fear of that.

"Did you attend the Sunday morning services?—Sometimes.

"Were you, when you attended, attentive to the prayers offered up by the deacons and members on those occasions?—Sometimes I was.

"When you were attentive, did you hear any thing particular in those prayers?—Yes, I heard them pray for the world at large, the king, and their master, and for themselves, their children; and every body.

"Were persons in the habit of coming in during the prayers of the deacons?—Yes." [Ibid. p. 105.]

MARS.

"Did you ever give any money to the prisoner for the Missionary Society?—Yes.

"After you had given the money, did you ever feel that you wanted it back; or did you ever wish that you had never given it?—No.

"Did you ever find that the prisoner's reading or preaching made you unhappy, or dissatisfied?—It satisfied me.

"Did it make you dissatisfied with your condition as a slave?—It did not; it made me satisfied." [Ibid. p. 112.]

BILL.

"Did you ever hear the prisoner tell the negroes, "that if their masters had work for them, to say, that Sunday was God's day?"—No, I never heard him say that." [Ibid. p. 115.]

With respect to the order and conduct of the prisoner's negro church, we hesitate not to say, that it would do honour to the most regular of the congregational pastors and people of his native land; for the evidence most satisfactorily proved, that great care was taken in the admission of members; that every vigilance was used in watching over their behaviour; and that those prompt and effectual measures for correcting their faults were adopted, which the discipline of our churches of the same denomination will allow.

Their assemblies were public, and, even at the ordinance, open to the inspection of any white person who chose to attend them, either as auditors, or as some occasionally did, as spies. It was an accusation against their pastor, gravely preferred by the advocate-general and first fiscal of the colony, filling consequently the offices both of its ordinary and extraordinary public prosecutor, that he took money from the negroes; and it is proved by the witnesses called in support of such a charge (if charge it can be for a moment termed, without the most violent perversion of the very A B C of our judicial phraseology,) is, that they contributed, according to their very limited means, and altogether of their own free will,—at the sacrament a bitt or two apiece towards the bread and wine of which they partook, and the lighting of the chapel in which they worshipped,—and at an annual collection in aid of the funds of the Missionary Society, to whose benevolent exertions they were indebted for all they knew of a well-founded hope of an hereafter, whatever their gratitude prompted, and their industry, sobriety, and frugality, (virtues for which they were indebted to the Christianity which that Society had taught them,) enabled them voluntarily and cheerfully to give, for the purpose of making others as wise and comparatively as happy as themselves. The petty malice of his persecutors condescended also to stoop to a minute inquiry into how many fowls, and ducks, and geese might have been given to Mr. or rather to Mrs. Smith, from the produce and stock of those grounds, to the cultivation of which their exhortations had induced these negroes diligently to attend; and with the overwhelming fact of her having very occasionally accepted a few such trifling marks of gratitude, from those whose children she had taught to read, and endeavoured to train up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord,—those for whose instruction in the way of righteousness, she and her husband had voluntarily abandoned all the delights of country, kindred, home, for an unhealthy climate, and daily and hourly experience of the scorn and contumely of men the most selfish and hard-hearted of their race. Yet by such a mean and despicable course, the unsought testimony to a continued and unwearied kindness, meriting a more liberal return, was accidentally extracted, of their supplying the sick negroes with wine and other comforts, and frequently furnishing many of them with their Sunday's meal. But a charge still more ridiculous was minutely examined into, the selling bibles and other religious books and tracts to the atten-

dants on his ministry, to the relevancy of which, Mr. Smith very properly objected, that he was not tried for obtaining money under false pretences; but the court sagely overruled the objection, on the ground, we apprehend, for we can discover no other, that, acting as an agent to the Bible Society in Demarara, by selling bibles to the negroes, is an overt act of treason against the state. Some hours were consequently wasted in examining witnesses to this point, who all of them proved, that the bibles were sold by the prisoner, as is the custom with the agents of the noble institution for which he acted, amongst whom had been an episcopal chaplain to the colony, at full price to such as could afford to buy—for less, to those who could not,—and even given to those who had nothing wherewithal to buy the word of God on any terms.

Another matter of garve charge against Mr. Smith was, his permitting and encouraging the deacons to pray by themselves amongst their brother slaves; and were not the nature and termination of this inquiry too serious for a joke, we could laugh most heartily at the absurd importance attached to the office and conduct of the said deacons, in their regular ministrations in the church, which induced the assistant advocate-general so to stultify himself, as gravely to ask, whether they were known to each other by any secret signs; as though, to the great terror and alarm of his majesty's good loyal and peaceful subjects, the planters of Demerara, the shibboleth of freemasonry, and the anarchical and unchristianizing fraternization of the German illuminati, had entered into the humble worship of the converted slaves of the colony. But the evidence called by the prosecutor, to prove this most dreadful conspiracy, instead of deposing to secret signs, meetings with closed doors, and all the caution and privacy of a dark, divan, most incontestably proved, that the deacons held no private meetings; that from none of the assemblies of the church, not even at the sacrament itself, were the white people excluded; but that, on the contrary, whoever would, might at all times enter the open door of the place of worship, to take notice of their order, and scrutinize as closely as they pleased, every thing that was said, and done, and read, and prayed, and preached within. This will be clearly shewn by the few extracts which we shall give from the testimony of Azor and other slaves.

AZOR.

“The first service is called morning prayer: they sing hymns and

read, and the two deacons pray; first, Quamina prays, next Bristol; sometimes, next Sunday, Jason, and sometimes Seaton: this praying is aloud; every body is admitted at these morning prayer meetings; white people may come at the morning prayer if they please; the doors are open whilst the deacons are praying. I know the prisoner: his name is Smith; he is a parson; he is the parson of Bethel chapel: the prisoner reads and explains to us at all times passages in the bible: at noon-time he explains the text; in the morning he explains the word about David and Moses." [House of Commons Report, p. 13.]

ROMEO.

"I am a deacon of that chapel. The duty of a deacon is to teach the catechism, or so; the deacons do not meet by themselves, but in the chapel, along with the members and others." [Ibid. p. 14.]

"Every body is admitted at morning prayers. The prisoner does not pray alone at the morning service, he takes two of the negroes, members, and makes them pray first, and then he prays afterwards: the prayers are aloud, the doors are open during the prayers." [Ibid. p. 15.]

BRISTOL.

The deacons do not meet together by themselves. Sometimes after the service of a morning and afternoon, the deacons stop behind with the parson; that is, after the other people are gone. When we stop it is for the purpose of going with him into the house, to reckon up money. Some of the members stop besides. The money we have thrown up for the Missionary Society is what we stop to reckon." [Ibid. p. 20.]

Having thus disposed of all the irrelevant matter relating to Mr. Smith's general conduct in his ministrations among the slaves, as to no part of which was the inquiry instituted, or evidence given, legal, or even approximating to the ordinary forms and wholesome restrictions of English law; we come to the more regular part of the charge, if in such proceedings any thing can, even by comparison, deserve the name of regularity. We allude to the exciting, and concealing when it had been excited, the insurrection of the 18th of August. The only proof of excitement attempted to be given, is the very extraordinary one of his having preached on the Sunday preceding that tumultuary movement, from the 41st and 42d verses of the 19th chapter of the gospel of St. Luke,—“When he was come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it, saying, if thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes.” Upon the propriety of preaching from this text, we shall give a better opinion than our own, in the following extract from the evidence of the Rev. Mr. Austin, chaplain to the gar-

rioon in George-town, and officiating minister in the only place of worship belonging to the established church in the colony of Demerara.

"Will you have the goodness to look at the 41st and 42d verses of the 19th chapter of Luke, and say whether you consider that an improper text for a sermon?—I consider it one of the most beautiful texts in scripture,

"Have you ever taken these two verses, and preached from them as a text?—I am sorry to say I have not.

Is it not a text very often preached from?—I believe so: the passage is very frequently introduced in sermons, and I believe I have introduced them myself." [House of Com. Rep. p. 95.]

Nor do we shrink from examining the evidence of those slaves who deposed to having heard this discourse, as it will be manifest from the extracts which we now give, that not a single word or syllable was said, capable of being tortured into an application of this text to any impending danger to the colony, still less to any excitement of the slaves to become the avengers of their accumulated wrongs. And first for

ROMEO.

"I recollect the revolt, it was one Monday night: I was at church the Sunday before the Monday: the text the parson preached from that day was the 19th chapter of St. Luke, beginning at the 41st and 42d verses: the 41st says, 'When Jesus came near the city, he wept over it.' I forget the discourse." [Ib. p. 15.]

So much for its treasonable and insurrectionary tendency. So little impression did it make upon a man who had for some time known the intention of the negroes to revolt, that he forgot it altogether. The same account of it is given by the next witness.

NEGRO JOE.

"I was at church at Le Resouvenir the Sunday before that Monday; I do not recollect what the text was, but there are some words in the chapter I know. The parson said, the Lord Jesus Christ sent a disciple into a certain village, and you will see a colt tied there, bring it unto me, and if the master of the colt should ask you what you are going to do with it, you must say, the Lord hath need of it; and they brought it to the Lord, and laid some raiment on it; and He rode it to Jerusalem, and He rode it to the top of a mountain, where He could see Jerusalem all over; and he wept over Jerusalem, and said, if they had known their peace, that is to say, if the people knew what belonged to them, they would believe in Him; now their trouble would come upon them. So far I can make out. I cannot remember any thing more.

“(*Question by the Prisoner.*)—Were the words you mention spoken by the prisoner, or read from a book or bible?—He read them from the bible.” [Ib. p. 16. 17.]

Nor did it otherwise affect any one, as we shall find by the accounts given of it by the witnesses, in the order in which they stand.

MANUEL.

“ I remember the Sunday before the Monday that the war broke out: I was in Bethel chapel on that day. I remember the text on that day. Jesus came out, and He stooped down and looked, and He wept. He looked down upon the city, and said, this city shall be destroyed this day, meaning Jerusalem. This city, Jerusalem, was to be destroyed, because they did not believe in God; that made Jesus Christ speak this word.” [Ib. p. 17.]

BRISTOL.

“ I was at the forenoon service. I believe Mr. Smith read something about Jesus looking upon the city of Jerusalem and weeping.” [Ib. p. 22.]

MARY CHISHOLM.

“ Did you notice any thing particular in the sermon on the Sunday before the revolt?—It was something about Christ’s going through Jerusalem; I cannot say exactly.

“ Were there any whites present at that sermon?—I believe there were.” [Ib. p. 106.]

The second and third of the written charges, attributes to Mr. Smith, the having, on or before the 17th of August, “ advised, consulted, and corresponded with a certain negro called Quamina, touching” the revolt which confessedly broke out on the following day; and with having on the same 17th of August come to the knowledge of such intended revolt, without making it known to the proper authorities. Now there is no pretence from the evidence, to suppose that Mr. Smith either conversed with Quamina on this subject, or knew any thing about it, until the Sunday fortnight before the insurrection broke out: the account of what took place then, is thus given by

MANUEL.

“ I know a negro, Quamina, of plantation Success. I went with Quamina to the prisoner’s house. I remember the last time I went there; it was three Sundays before this war came. A conversation took place that day between Quamina, Mr. Smith, and myself. Jack came to me one night, and told me that a paper had come out for us about freedom. I asked Jack if he had the paper in his hand already; Jack told me no, but that he would get it. I came to Quamina, and I asked him, What is this Jack has been telling me about the paper of freedom? I asked him if he knew any thing about it. He told me, no; he could not tell me yet: and I told

Quamina he had better ask the parson, and he would let him know better about it. Quamina told me, I don't believe that he will tell you. I said, never mind, ask him nevertheless. I begged Quamina to let me go with him. Quamina then was going, and told me I might follow him. I went into the parson's kitchen to get water to drink. Quamina went into the room before me. Quamina said to the parson, I understand Mr. Stewart and Mr. Cort came here on Friday; what did they come about? they came to ask the parson if any negro ever came to ask him about this paper. He said, yes, Quamina had come to ask him, and he told Quamina as far as he could. The parson said that he wanted to read this paper to the negroes inside in the chapel, but Mr. Cort told him not to do it. Mr. Cort said he wanted to read it to the Success people, but he was afraid of the governor. The parson told Quamina that Mr. Cort and Mr. Stewart had given him and the Success people a very good character; that Seaton was of good service on the estate in teaching the people. After this, Mr. Smith told Quamina that there was no freedom in the paper, and that their masters could not afford to lose so much money as to let them all go free; and he told Quamina there was no freedom in the paper at all. He told them to bear with patience, if there was any thing good come, it was come for the women, because the drivers were not to carry whips any longer in the field. Quamina told Mr. Smith to take Jack and Joseph, and talk to them. Mr. Smith agreed to take them after chapel; and after one o'clock he did take them, but I cannot tell what he said. Quamina told the parson, in my hearing, that Jack and Joseph wanted to make trouble on account of this affair about the paper, and to make a push for it, and for that reason he wished the parson to speak to them. Joseph lives at Bachelor's Adventure, and Jack lives at Success, Jack is the son of Quamina. Joseph is a teacher and member of the church." [Ib. p. 17, 18.]

"Where was the prisoner when you and Quamina went to speak to him?—Quite up in the top story of his own house, the place where he writes.

"Was the door of the room open or shut?—The door was shut; always when we go in there, the door is shut.

"Was the door shut at the time you and he, and Quamina, were talking together?—The door was shut.

"Did you hear all the conversation that passed at that time between Mr. Smith and Quamina?—Yes." [Ib. p. 19.]

To this extract of the whole of this negro approver's evidence, as applicable to this conversation, we add the following sentence most disingenuously omitted at the end of that extract, in the official copy, but supplied in the one furnished by the counsel for the accused, "always when he is there alone, the door is shut," so that if any thing turned

upon the shutting of the door, it appears to have been the regular course for it to be shut.

But to proceed with this case by steps. Taking the evidence of Manuel to have been all true, though it was proved that the conversation with respect to Mr. Cort and Mr. Stewart, which Mr. Smith is represented to have referred to, had not then taken place,—we boldly ask whether it does not prove that Mr. Smith, instead of exciting to revolt, did every thing in his power to repress every intention of the kind in his irritated and but half-instructed flock? Our readers need not be reminded, that no part of the conversations with the different negroes, at different times, at which Mr. Smith was not present, was evidence against him, nor, as he was the only person on trial or under charge, was it admissible as evidence in any shape; yet, as though the prosecutors were acting under a blind but uncontrollable fatality, in subverting all the rules of law for his conviction, but the more triumphantly to display his innocence,—we learn from it, what was the real cause of the revolt, namely, the improper withholding by the governor from the negroes, the instructions received from England, to desist from the unmanly, brutal, and indecent practice of flogging female slaves. Some exaggerated reports of privileges arrived for them, were evidently abroad; and what so natural as that they should apply to their pastor to know what they were? Finding that they had magnified into a charter of freedom, what was, in fact, but a deliverance from a small portion of their pain and ignominy, he answers their application by doing all he can to undeceive them upon the subject, and exhorts them to patience, instead of driving them to rebellion. To this he is accused of having in particular excited Quamina, one of his deacons; yet this very man, with whom he is supposed to be a conspirator, dissuades the others from going to him to ask about their freedom, on the ground that he did not believe he would tell them any thing about it. He had previously been assured by Mr. Smith, that the paper for which they were so anxious, did not, as they supposed, set them free; yet (most inconsistently, if the imputation be true,) does he take his son and another negro to Mr. Smith, to beg of him to talk to them on their determination to adopt some violent measures on the subject; and who can doubt but that his object was to induce his pastor to use his influence with those headstrong slaves, to persuade them to be quiet, when it appears in evidence, that Manuel asked Jack, one of these men,

the son of Quamina, what Mr. Smith had told him; and the counsel for the prosecution do not venture to inquire what that was. Their conduct upon other occasions, and even throughout the examination of this very witness, abundantly proves that it was no objection to hear say evidence, which restrained them upon this occasion. The accused has, therefore, a right to the legitimate presumption in his favour, that they asked not what advice he gave, because from their previous examination of the witness, they knew full well that it would make against their charge. That it must have done so, is manifest from the conduct of Quamina, as detailed by this witness, not only on this occasion, but on the Sunday preceding the revolt, when he went a second time with Bristol to Mr. Smith, to inform him, on the suggestion of Manuel, of the violent disposition of some of the slaves. On the latter occasion, it was in evidence, though, to the eternal disgrace of those who prepared it, there is no record of that evidence in the official copy of the trial, that his companion declared that Mr. Smith said *it was wrong, and they ought not to do any such thing*. Instead, therefore, of proving an encouragement to rebellion by Mr. Smith, this witness proves most decidedly that he did all that lay in his power to convince his negro flock of their mistake as to the order recently arrived from this country, and to prevent their taking any violent means to obtain even a knowledge of its contents. No communication of an intended rising is proved by Manuel to have been made to him, but is expressly negatived by other witnesses; and if he ever was informed of the wish of some turbulent spirits, to force a communication of what they considered to be their charter of freedom from their masters, it is clear that he had every reason to suppose that his exhortations had prevailed upon them to lay aside whatever wild schemes of violence they had entertained, especially as, for a fortnight after such disposition had been known to him, they had remained in perfect quietude. It is worthy of remark also, that this man's testimony, so far from proving Quamina to have been a leader of the insurrection, affords strong reason for believing, on the contrary, that up to the last moment of his communication with Mr. Smith, he, as a deacon of the church, was endeavouring to employ the influence of that gentleman, as their pastor, to repress the spirit of insubordination which was rapidly spreading among the people; and if the latter had no reason to suspect the former to be a rebel, or meditating rebellion, the charge of

subsequent correspondence with him is as unsupported in fact, as in the present case it is void in law.

The next witness to conversations with Quamina, is Bristol, whose account of that on the 17th, is as follows:—

“After service was over, did you go straight home?—No, I did not.

“Were did you go to?—We stopped close to the chapel a little while, when we heard Jack and Joseph talking about a paper that had come from home, that the people were all to be made free. Emanuel told Quamina, that he had better go and ask Mr. Smith about it. And when Quamina was going into Mr. Smith’s house, I went in with him; and when we went in, Quamina asked Mr. Smith if any freedom had come out for them. Mr. Smith said no, but that there was good law come out for them, but no freedom for them; he said, you must wait a little, and the governor and your masters will tell you about it. Quamina then said, that Jack and Joseph were speaking very much about it, and he said that they wanted to take it by force; he, Smith, told them to wait, and not to be foolish. How do you mean that they should take it by force? you cannot do any thing with the white people, because the soldiers will be more strong than you, therefore you had better wait. He said, well, you had better go, and tell the people, and Christians particularly, that they had better have nothing to do with it, and then we came out; and I saw a man belonging to Vigilance remaining at the church; I called him; Quamina began to speak to him, and asked me if I had any money in my pocket? I told him two bitts; he told this man; then giving him the two bitts, run up as fast as you can, and call down Joseph; Mr. Smith wants to see him. I then went home, and told Manuel that I had seen Mr. Smith, and that he said there was no freedom in the paper for us, and that we must tell all the people so. I told him that we had sent to call Joseph already; a little while after, Jack and Paris came up to the back buildings of Chatteau Margo, and Manuel told them that Mr. Smith had told them not to have any thing to do with this business, and that Manuel had been telling them so before; Jack and Paris said, well, do you have nothing to do with it, you are cowards.

“*That is all I want.*

“When Mr. Smith said the soldiers would be too much for them, what did Quamina say?—He said, he would drive all the white people, and make them go to town.

“Did Quamina say what he would do with the soldiers?—That the report was, the soldiers would not come, they would have nothing to do with it; he did not tell Mr. Smith that, he told it after we came out from Mr. Smith.” [Missionary Society’s Report, p. 24.]

Had such remarkable expressions been used, as those relative to the soldiers, we put it to the candour of every one, whether they would not have made as deep an impres-

sion upon the mind of others who heard them, as upon Bristol; yet we shall by and by shew distinctly, not only that they did not so impress them, but that they were not used. Nor is this the only important point on which the evidence of these two is contradictory; for whilst he represents himself as sending the man from Vigilance to fetch Joseph, because Mr. Smith wanted him, Manuel, who was confessedly present when he despatched him, swears that he was sent after Bristol had been the second time to Mr. Smith, to tell him not to do any thing with the white men's guns. It is manifest, therefore, in what spirit, and under what influence, this active agent in the insurrection gave his evidence; and we shall be able to make it still further manifest, that he is so completely contradicted as to the main part of his statement, that it cannot for a moment be believed. From such a witness, whatever is favourable to the accused, acquires, however, a double value; and we therefore direct the attention of our readers to the strong facts of this alleged exciter of sedition and dissatisfaction in the minds of the slaves, having told them that the law which had come out for them was a good one;—having recommended them to wait a little till their governors and masters told them about it;—repeated that advice;—and expressly directed them not to have any thing to do with force for the attainment of their object. And were there no other testimony in his favour, can any thing, we would ask, be more absurd than charging with treasonable intentions, the individual, who, by the testimony of the very men whom he is said to have excited to insurrection, exerted all his influence to allay every angry feeling in their minds? It is worthy also of remark, that the evidence of this negro proves that there had been no particular plan of insurrection formed, until the meeting of the slaves in the middle-walk of Resouvenir, and that was some time after any of them had been in communication with Mr. Smith. It is, therefore, the height at once of absurdity and injustice, to charge him with not having communicated to government what he never knew, and what, at the last moment when he held conversation with any of the insurgents, previous to their revolt, they themselves had not agreed upon. It is clear also, that whatever might be meant by driving the white people, or rather the managers, to town, no intimation was given to Mr. Smith as to the period at which this was to be done. This is placed beyond all doubt by the following extracts from his cross-examination of Bristol:—

“ Did Quamina tell Mr. Smith by what means they intended to drive the white people to town?—No; he did not.

“ Did Quamina say for what purpose they were to be driven to town?—No; no further than I said before, that Jack and Quamina had said their freedom had come out.

“ Did he, Quamina, say when the white people were to be driven to town?—No.

“ Did you hear all the conversation that passed between Quamina and Mr. Smith at that time?—Yes.

“ Did you and Quamina and Mr. Smith talk about any thing else at that time?—No, not that I remember.

“ Did you talk to Mr. Smith on that Sunday about your little girl?—Yes, I believe I did before that, before Quamina went in; when I spoke to him about the little girl, Quamina was not with me.” [Ib. p. 26.]

We have transcribed a little more of the evidence of this man than relates to the ignorance of Mr. Smith of the time of any intended rising of the slaves, because in the latter part he clearly contradicts himself; having previously sworn most distinctly that he and Quamina went in together; whilst it will soon be shewn that other persons were present during that conversation, of which Bristol gives the only account of any thing passing, which bears even the slightest resemblance to a criminal concealment of a projected insurrection. Had he been the fomentor of this insurrection, as he is charged with having been, is it possible that he should have been kept in the dark as to the intended rising? yet from the evidence of Bristol himself, it is evident that he was not even informed of the meeting after the second service on the Sunday, at which the plan of that insurrection was for the first time discussed and arranged. The following extracts from his re-examination by the court, puts this matter beyond all doubt.

“ Did you know any thing of the meeting that was held on Success Middle-walk on Sunday?—No; I knew there was to be a meeting somewhere, but did not know where.

“ Did you, or Quamina, mention the circumstance of the intended meeting to Mr. Smith?—No.

“ Did you know of the meeting at the time you and Quamina were with Mr. Smith?—Yes.” [House of Com. Rep. p. 28.]

We now come to the contradictions of Bristol, as to the remarkable conversation with respect the soldiers. He declared upon oath that he did not see any person present during that conversation, but Quamina. Seaton, however, swears that he was there with them; and that there was no

one else. His version of the dialogue with Mr. Smith, differs, it will be seen, very materially from that of Bristol, and contains not a syllable about the soldiers.

“ Whilst you were present with Quamina and Mr. Smith, did you hear any conversation between them?—Yes.

“ Will you state it?—Quamina went there to Mr. Smith, and asked him about this paper; Mr. Smith said yes; ‘that the paper is come out—that the paper had come out so far as to break the drivers; and that nobody should be licked any more again; and that if any body should be licked, it would be by their masters, or their managers; and if any thing more than that, they were to be confined.’ After I had heard that, Quamina told me to go away to the middle-walk of Success, to stop the people till he came, and I went with Manuel to stop them.

“ What was the purport of Quamina’s first visit from the chapel to the prisoner?—He went to ask Mr. Smith about the letter that had come out from home.’ [Ib. p. 36, 37.]

He, however, is contradicted in his turn by another witness, Peter, who increases the number of negroes present at this discourse to five, namely, Quamina, Bristol, Seaton, Shute, and himself; and he swears that Seaton was with them during the whole of the conversation, which lasted but a minute, and that they all five went out of the house together. His account of what took place is altogether different from that already given, and proves Mr. Smith to have acted then, as he appears always to have done, the part of a man most anxious to allay, rather than to create, dissatisfaction in the minds of his negro flock.

“ Did Quamina say any thing to the prisoner; if yea, what was it?—Yes; he said he was going to drive all them managers from the estates to the court, to see what was the best thing they could obtain for those slaves; then Mr. Smith answered and said, that that was foolish, how will you be able to drive them white people to town? and he said, them white people try to do good for you, and that if the slaves behaved so, that they would lose their right; and he said, *Quamina*, don’t bring yourself into any disgrace; that the white people were now making a law to prevent the women being flogged, but that the law had not come out yet; and the men should not get any flogging in the field, but when they were to be flogged, they should be brought to the manager, attorney, or proprietor for that purpose; then he said, *Quamina*, do you hear this? and then Quamina said yes, and we came out.” [Missionary Report, p. 128.]

He also thus expressly contradicts the advice about the soldiers, which Bristol speaks to so particularly, and Seaton gets rid of, by falsely swearing that he was sent away by

Quamina at an earlier part of the conversation; for that he did so swear falsely, is proved not only by Peter, but by Shute, who, with Peter, swears that the whole five went away together:

“(By the Court.)—Did Mr. Smith say any thing about the Christians?—Nothing.

“Did you hear Mr. Smith say any thing about the soldiers?—No, sir.

“Did you hear Quamina say any thing about Jack and Joseph?—No, sir.

“Did you hear Jack and Joseph's name mentioned at all?—No; he did not call any body's name.” [Ib. p. 129.]

Shute also convicts Bristol of another gross falsehood, for he proves that so far from its being possible for him to mistake as to who was with him at the conversation, he himself came from Quamina to fetch the witness and Peter to Mr. Smith. His account of what took place there, corresponds in substance with that of Peter. As it is short, it may be more satisfactory to extract it.

“Did any, and what, conversation pass on that occasion?—Yes; Quamina said to Mr. Smith, he was going to drive all the managers down; and Mr. Smith told him, no; for the white people are doing many good things for you, and if you are going to do that—you must not do that, Quamina, I tell you: Quamina said, yes, I will see: and after that we all came out of the house from Mr. Smith.

“Did Quamina say what he was going to drive the managers down for?—That they must come down, that they may have a good law to give them a day or two for themselves.

“Was Seaton there all the time?—Yes.” [House of Com. Rep. p. 118.]

Upon evidence thus contradictory, it would be impossible to convict any one even of the most trifling offence; but when it is remembered that this is the evidence of accomplices on their own confession, whose lives were forfeited by their actual revolt—that it was the evidence of negro recollection of conversation with a white man, some months ago—we cannot but strike it out altogether, as utterly unworthy of a moment's consideration, where a fellow-creature is upon trial for his life, for the highest offence of which a subject can be accused. The evidence of a *particeps criminis* is always to be received with the greatest caution, and never to be believed but where it is confirmed. This is the doctrine laid down every day by the judges in our courts; whilst, as to the other point, the conclusion of

our own common sense is thus fortified by the very competent opinion of Mr. Van Cooten, a planter of Demerara, and attorney to the estate on which Mr. Smith resided.

“How many years have you been in this country?—These fifty years past; it was fifty years last February.

“How much of that time have you been in the habit of observing the character of negroes?—I suppose from the beginning.

“Are they in general capable of relating correctly any conversation that has taken place in their presence?—I think very badly in general; some of them may be more capable than others.

“Is it customary to send negroes with verbal messages when accuracy is required?—No, it is not; at least I would not do it.

“For what reason would you not send such messages verbally?—Because I think negroes in general bad messengers; ten to one if they carried it correctly.” [House of Com. Rep. p. 81, 82.]

Upon this the court interposed a question, which the prisoner might be obliged to them for asking; we therefore readily give it with its answer.

“(Question by the Court.)—In your judgment, would not any negro remember the substance of a conversation about a revolt, or the soldiers being more strong than them if they revolted?—I think they might.” [Ib. p. 82.]

Be it so, we would add. If then any thing was said about soldiers and revolting, the four other negroes present with Bristol would have remembered it as accurately as he did; yet not only do they omit all mention of it in their account of the conversation, but whenever their attention was expressly called to it, unequivocally deny having heard any thing upon the subject. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible, that no such thing was ever said, though we believe it to be a fiction of deeper brains than the slave who swore to it, abundant as was his temptation to attempt to withdraw his own neck from the halter, by placing his benefactor's there in its stead. We quit, however, such miserable evidence with the remark, that although the whole of the witnesses called to relate this conversation, were implicated in the revolt, and therefore accomplices with the accused, had he been guilty of the crime laid to his charge, they are obviously entitled to double the credit whilst speaking in his behalf, as they could claim when swearing for the other side, since their interest was diametrically opposite to the tenor of their depositions.

Having thus disposed of the proof of a guilty and concealed knowledge of the revolt on the part of Mr. Smith, on which the prosecutor mainly relied, we pass to that

attempted to be extracted from a letter written on the very evening of the insurrection, to Jackey Reed, a negro attendant at his chapel from a neighbouring estate, in answer to one received from him, with an enclosure from Quamina's son, both of which he immediately destroyed. The contents of them were, however, thus given by Jackey, from recollection, though no one can put much faith in their accuracy, when reminded, that these memoriter copies were not made until the originals had been destroyed at least two months.

“ I recollect the contents of the letter I received from Jack Gladstone, which I sent to the parson: viz. ‘ My dear brother Jackey, I hope you are well, and I write to you concerning our agreement last Sunday; I hope you will do according to your promise; this letter is written by Jack Gladstone, and the rest of the brethren of Bethel chapel, and all the rest of the brothers are ready, and put their trust in you, and we hope that you will be ready also; we hope there will be no disappointment, either one way or the other; we shall begin to-morrow night, at the Thomas, about seven o'clock.’ There was no name at the bottom. I will tell you, as near as I can recollect, the contents of the letter I wrote to the prisoner; I said, ‘ Dear sir, excuse the liberty I take in writing to you; I hope this letter may find yourself and Mrs. Smith well. Jack Gladstone has sent me a letter, which appears as if I had made an agreement upon some actions, which I never did; neither did I promise him any thing, and I hope that you will see to it, and inquire of members, whatever it is they may have in view, which I am ignorant of, and to inquire after it, and know what it is. The time is determined on for seven o'clock to-night.’ My name was at the bottom of it. I gave my master a copy of it from memory.” [Ib. p. 42.]

The answer of Mr. Smith was as follows:—

“ ‘ To Jackey Reed. I am ignorant of the affair you allude to, and your note is too late for me to make any inquiry. I learnt yesterday that *some* scheme was in agitation, but without asking any questions on the subject, I begged them to be quiet, and I trust they will; hasty, violent, or concerted measures, are quite contrary to the religion we profess, and I hope you will have nothing to do with them. Your's, for Christ's sake, J. S.” [Ibid.]

Now these notes prove, in the first place, that the general conduct of Mr. Smith amongst his flock, instead of being such as to foment dissatisfaction, was of so contrary a tendency, that he was the first person to whom one of their number communicated the knowledge he had obtained of some combination among the slaves, with a view to his investigating into its nature, and using his influence in preventing any evil consequences from it. Secondly, it shews that all

the information he had previously obtained on the Sunday, was of some scheme in agitation among the slaves, but that he was perfectly unacquainted with its particulars, and could not, therefore, know that it had any thing in it unlawful, or dangerous to the state. Thirdly, that he had then begged the negroes to be quiet, and had every confidence that his exhortation would be attended to; and lastly, that so far from encouraging them in any acts of violence, or the concerting any measures to obtain their rights, or redress their wrongs, be they real or imaginary, he expressly declared, in a private communication to one of the negro attendants upon his ministry, that such proceedings were quite contrary to the Christian religion, and therefore urged him to have nothing to do with them.

The note from Jackey was not received until about six o'clock, too late certainly to institute any inquiry into the motives and intentions of the negroes, then dispersed over the plantation; and intending, according to the letter, to begin their operations, whatever they were, four miles from Mr. Smith's residence. He therefore wrote his answer in pencil, it being too dark to mend a pen; and ere he and his wife could proceed more than 70 or 80 roods up the middle-walk, consulting what had best be done, a tumult of the negroes at the manager's house, convinced them; that a disturbance had begun. Of any knowledge of the intention of the negroes to make that disturbance, still less to follow it up by a revolt, the whole evidence, which we have carefully examined, clearly proves Mr. Smith to have been destitute; and had he suspected any violence to be in contemplation, he must surely have taken leave of his senses before he could not only have gone himself, but have conducted his wife towards that very spot where it is alleged that he knew a treasonable plot had been formed the day before, and at the very hour too which he had just learned to have been fixed upon by the negroes for some meeting, which he might fairly presume to be for deliberation and confederacy only.

That he could have had no knowledge of the intended rising, must surely be evident to every one who has examined, with us, the evidence adduced to prove this miserable case, which imputes it to him. To bolster it up, however, two servants, the one coachman in the service of the president of the court-martial, the other out of place, but formerly in the employ of the storekeeper of the ordnance, were called, to prove a sort of confession by the prisoner of his previous knowledge of the insurrection, a week after it had taken place; but inde-

pendent of the palpable absurdity of a gentleman of Mr. Smith's habits and profession selecting two men in livery as his confederates, and that too, whilst they had been invited into his house for shelter, on meeting with a delay in the conveyance of troops to quell this insurrection, they so flatly contradict each other, as to the only material point of their evidence, that it comes to nothing. The first states, that Mr. Smith said he knew about this rising for six weeks before it took place, and swears positively to the word *knew* having been used, which the other as directly negatives, and swears as distinctly, that what Mr. Smith said was, "This is a thing which has been *expected* these six weeks;" and there is no doubt but that some violent resentment of the delay which had taken place in publishing the order of government, about which the slaves were so anxious, yet so completely in the dark, was, and had for some time been, a matter of general expectation throughout the colony.

Another still more desperate and contemptible effort at proving a confession, was made, by calling lieutenant-colonel Reed, a planter on the East Coast, and aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief and governor of the island, to narrate a conversation between him and the prisoner, then not only in custody, but having been for three or four days upon his trial, which could only have been entered into for the purpose of entrapping him into some declaration which might be given in evidence against him. Yet the result of this performance of the part of a thief-taker's retainer, by the gallant officer, is, like all the other violations of justice and law, and decorum, so disgracefully resorted to on the present occasion, beneficial to the very man whom it was intended to destroy, as our readers may learn from the evidence itself:—

"Did any thing pass, between the prisoner and yourself, concerning the revolt?—Yes. I said to the prisoner, I am afraid you have been preaching very improper doctrine to the negroes, as, it appears, the principal members of your chapel have been leaders in this insurrection; to this he replied, when I have been preaching, I have sometimes wished to illustrate what I was saying, by reference to the situation of a manager or overseer of an estate; and, when I have finished my discourse, I have asked some of the most intelligent of my hearers to explain what I have been saying, and they have told me that I have been abusing the manager and overseer. The prisoner then observed, that this was not the first insurrection that had taken place in the colony. I said, it was an insurrection of a peculiar nature. He then remarked, that much

blood had been shed at different periods in religious wars, or words to that effect.

“Where was Mr. Smith at this time?—In the room in this house where he is confined.

“(*Cross-examined by the Prisoner.*)—Did not I tell you, what you have said concerning my illustrating my remarks, by reference to the situation of a manager, or overseer, of an estate, and my having asked the negroes, afterwards, what I had said, and their saying that I had abused the managers, as an instance of the aptness of negroes to misunderstand all that is said to them?—It did appear to me, that the prisoner wished to impress upon my mind, that if the negroes had acted rebelliously, they must have misunderstood his doctrine.” [*Missionary Society's Rep. p. 50.*]

But we have not quite done with Colonel Reed, whose eagerness to procure evidence to convict Mr. Smith, even by means to which none but the lowest of those wretched beings, who get a miserable pittance by regularly bearing witness, true or false, against their neighbours, could consistently resort, may serve as a specimen of the justice he was likely to meet with from the planters of Demerara. He figures again upon this trial, as a witness, called by the prisoner, to prove his free grant of land to build a chapel upon; and, as such, is obliged to admit his own letter, not only offering the land which Mr. Smith had expressed a wish to purchase, but the aid of his subscription towards building the chapel, and any other assistance in his power to render, provided, amongst other conditions, that the leave of the governor could be obtained. Yet he swears, after craving of the court ten minutes' indulgence to recollect himself, which of course was readily granted, that to obtain permission for the erection of this chapel, Mr. Smith had intruded himself at his domestic board, and even at his sick bed-side; though he afterwards admits, that this intrusion consisted in his having himself invited this reverend gentleman to breakfast, as he met him on his way to treat for the land—in his having three or four times visited at his house, once with Mrs. Smith, and always under circumstances which would have prevented his deeming his visits intrusions, but from his subsequent conduct, *i. e.* we presume from his having fallen under the displeasure of the governor, to whom Mr. Reed is an aid-de-camp, we know not of how recent appointment, and of whom he had previously stated to Mr. Smith, that he was not understood to be very favourable to his object, as he thought that the negroes had too much light. The latter statement is made indeed by Mr. Smith only, Colonel Reed's recollection very

conveniently refusing to serve him as to the conversation which passed upon the subject, though he did distinctly recollect that Mr. Smith intruded himself at his sick bedside, where, however, he was afterwards compelled to admit he never came without having been invited. And this is Demerara intrusion—this a specimen of the manner in which the gentlemen and military officers of rank, in that colony, give their evidence, from which we may turn, without any feelings of surprise, to the contradictions and the perjuries of its livery servants and its slaves. We turn, however, with more satisfaction, to the close of our examination of that part of the charges against Mr. Smith, which imputes to him a knowledge of the intended insurrection, on the 17th of August, and a guilty concealment of such knowledge from the proper authorities. That he had no such knowledge, is distinctly proved by the witnesses for the prosecution; and his letter to Jackey Reed, which they produced as evidence of his guilt, shews, that he had it not down to the very moment of the insurrection breaking out. He could not, therefore, have communicated what he did not know for twelve hours after, when it was known to every one, at the visit which he is proved to have paid at an early hour on Monday morning, to his physician at George-town, to whom he went for advice on the state of his health; yet his not having then made a communication of this plot to the governor, is matter of serious accusation against him upon the present charge. It is worthy of remark also, that if Jackey Reed's recollection is correct, in the copy of Jack Gladstone's letter with which he furnished his master, the gallant colonel of the same name, the insurrection was planned on the Sunday week before it broke out; yet with all the advantages which they possessed over their conspirator-witnesses, by having their necks in the noose, in which some of them have since been hung, the counsel for the prosecution could not give any evidence, even of the very lame, contradictory, and incredible nature, with that which they did produce, of his acquaintance with the plot, or any hint of one being in agitation, until the afternoon of the following sabbath-day. Yet surely our common sense must teach us, that if, as the prosecutor charged, Mr. Smith was the inventor, or at least the encourager of this revolt, the slaves engaged in it must have communicated their plans to him, or, at any rate, would not have expressed any apprehension of his disapproving their conduct in forming or pursuing them. The whole evidence, however, shews

directly the reverse to have been the case, that they were fearful of his knowing what they were intending, and rather than coming to consult him, that they studiously kept out of his way. Of this we have had abundant proofs in the following testimony adduced against him, which has already been examined; we add therefore but a sentence from the evidence of

ROMEO.

"I saw Mr. Smith, in his own house, after church, on that Sunday: I cannot recollect I saw him on Monday. I saw him on Tuesday. In the evening I went to visit him, seeing the negroes made such a great noise, as my heart was uneasy: I bid the prisoner good night, and he answered me good night: he then asked me if I had seen Quamina or Bristol? I replied no: he made answer, that they were afraid to come to me now: he said further, I wish I could see any one of them." [House of Commons, p. 15.]

Afraid—afraid, we cannot but ask, of what? but that he would at least condemn their measures, and probably deliver them up to justice. To such justice as negro-slaves were to expect, for opposing the authority of their masters and owners, the planters of the colony of Demerara, he was not, however, either as a man, a subject, or a Christian, required to hand over the members of his flock, on any vague, or even well-grounded suspicion only, that they were meditating some combined proceedings for obtaining a knowledge of certain directions from government for their relief, with which they ought long since not only to have been made acquainted, but familiar in practice, with the comparatively slight mitigations of the sufferings of their wretched lot, which it peremptorily directed their owners to allow, though the governor most improperly withheld it. By exerting himself to the utmost, to persuade them to wait patiently their announcement, as he is proved on all hands to have done, he better fulfilled all the duties which devolved upon him, in the absence of a knowledge of any intended violence, in the midst of which, had he been aware of it, he would never have left his wife, in such a state of uncertainty and suspense, as to be unable to sleep from apprehensions for his life and her own, as soon as the insurrection had begun. He did, too, his utmost to quell it, save that he did not obey, so readily as was wished, the peremptory order of his old enemy Mc Turk; to take up arms for its suppression, or that ignorance of law which seems to be universal in Demerara, supposing, that as a minister of the gospel, he was as exempt from bearing arms after martial-law had been proclaimed, as he was before it. For this offence, and not

for any share in the rebellion, was he originally taken into custody, *periculo predicti Mac Turki*; and a long history of his contumelious opposition to the authority of this burgher-captain, doctor, and captain of militia, is given in evidence, on charges with which it had not the slightest connexion. We therefore leave it with this remark, that had it been a relevant matter of inquiry before this court-martial, all the offence proved was, an error in judgment, and mistake in point of law, into which Mr. Smith was led by the oversight of the conductors of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, (to which he referred,) in not informing us, under the head of *Martial-law*, that its proclamation suspended all law, but that of the sword, and the happy privilege of being tried by so impartial and competent a tribunal as that which sentenced Mr. Smith to death, and of being dragged out of bed to mount guard, or shoot rebels, at the good will and pleasure, and under the able direction, of some such accomplished commander of militia as captain Mc Turk.

But wasting no more words upon this medico-military hero, we finally observe, upon this charge of abetting and wilfully concealing, on the 17th and 18th of August, an insurrection which broke out on the latter day, that, could it have been proved as clearly as it was disproved, the court which tried it had no jurisdiction over it, inasmuch as martial-law was not proclaimed until the 19th; and, until it was proclaimed, no man could be guilty of an offence against its provisions; nor has it any retrospective cognizance of offences previously committed.

We pass on now to the last charge, which is in substance, that Mr. Smith, after the commencement of the revolt, did, on Tuesday the 19th and Wednesday the 20th of August, advise, consult, and correspond with Quamina, touching the same; that he then held communication with the said Quamina, well knowing him to have been engaged in such revolt, and that he did not then use his utmost endeavours to secure or detain him, but, on the contrary, permitted him to go at large. Of these charges we shall dispose very summarily, the ground for doing so having been sufficiently established in the preceding part of our inquiry, to demand but the addition of a few words, applying more to the law than the facts of the case. Upon the latter, however, we shall offer an observation or two.—Romeo is the first witness who speaks to this point. His evidence is as follows:

“ I saw Mr. Smith after church on the Sunday, in his own house; I cannot recollect I saw him on Monday; I saw him on Tuesday,

I went in the evening to visit him; seeing the negroes were making great noise, and my heart was uneasy, I bid him good night, and he answered me good night, and asked me if I had seen Quamina or Bristol; I replied, No; he made answer, they are afraid to come to me now, and said, I wish I could see any one of them.

Now, taking this evidence to be correct, it proves but that Mr. Smith, the pastor of the negro congregation, at Le Resouvenir, on the day after a sudden revolt of the negroes of that estate, expressed to one of them a wish to see two of his deacons, who with the rest had tumultuously left their work; accompanying that wish by a declaration that they would now be afraid to see him, no doubt, from an apprehension of his anger at the steps they had taken, and which it is fairly to be presumed, that he wished to persuade them, as far as possible, to retrace. At all events, there was nothing either unnatural or wrong in his wish to see these men, that he might learn from them the real nature and object of proceedings, which it is manifest that he utterly condemned. But two of the witnesses whom he called, who were in his house at the time, swore that there was no noise upon the estate that evening. The probability, therefore, is, that Romeo was mistaken as to the night, speaking, as he did, to a recollection of two months, and that if this wish was ever expressed by Mr. Smith, it was on the Monday evening, after he and Mrs. Smith suddenly found themselves in the midst of the insurgent negroes, surrounding the house of Mr. Hamilton, the manager, where he saw Quamina and Bristol, and might therefore very naturally wish for an opportunity of learning from them what this disturbance was about. It is perfectly immaterial, however, to the establishment of Mr. Smith's innocence of any illegal communication with Quamina, whether this witness was accurate, or no, as to the day on which a conversation took place, indicative of a wish, harmless in itself, most probably indeed, intended to further the restoration of order, but which, as far as he knew, was never carried into effect. If he rightly remembered the day, his evidence altogether neutralizes that of Mitchell, the negro groom of the estate, who swears to seeing Quamina go into Mr. Smith's yard, on the morning of that very Tuesday, and, as he concluded, to see Mr. Smith, though this he could not have done, if Romeo's account of that gentleman's anxiety to see him or Bristol, on the Tuesday night, was correct. On this evidence we shall do little more than transcribe the very pertinent remarks made by Mr. Smith in his defence:—

“The boy Mitchell is of notorious bad character, and I verily believe his testimony is altogether false; *he does not understand the sacred obligation of an oath*, and if he did, what does his evidence amount to? that he saw Quamina come into my yard on Tuesday morning, in open daylight, when the sun was high. I do not believe the boy, and I must solemnly declare, I never saw Quamina on the Tuesday morning; he may have gone into the yard, or he may not; I never saw him, nor had I ever any direct or indirect knowledge of his being there, until I heard the evidence of Mitchell in court.” [Missionary Society’s Rep. p. 88.]

This, we are aware, is a mere statement, yet, were it necessary to do so, we should not hesitate to ask our readers to credit it, in preference to the oath of an ignorant negro, without any notion of religion, or of the obligation to veracity under which he spoke. But in truth it signifies nothing whether he swore truly or not, as all he proves is, seeing Quamina go into the yard of the house without ever bringing him in company with Mr. Smith. As to the meeting on the Wednesday, it is distinctly proved, that on the Tuesday about noon, Mrs. Smith sent for a female slave to ask her what the people were doing, a plain proof that she herself knew nothing of the object of their insurrection, the day after she and her husband had together accidentally witnessed its first movement of insubordination; and a presumption also so strong, as almost to amount to demonstration of the like ignorance on the part of her husband, who, had he been in the secret, could not have failed partially communicating it to her, to allay those fears, which, during the whole of the preceding night, had been so strong as to prevent her getting any sleep. In this state of alarm, she expressed a very natural wish to see Quamina or Bristol, the two negroes whom she best knew, with a view, no doubt, of ascertaining from them what was the nature of their proceedings, and the danger to which the white population would thereby be exposed. The witness, who was herself also much alarmed, sent for Quamina, who came in the evening to her house; and on his despatching her, to see if any one was at Mr. Smith’s, when she found a woman of colour there, who had come to the house for protection, Mrs. Smith desired her to take her out of the way, but did so in a low tone of voice, or whisper, so that Mr. Smith could not possibly hear what was said, though he was in the room; from which it is manifest, that the sending for Quamina was an act of Mrs. Smith’s, done without his knowledge, and apparently studiously concealed from him. What took place when he did

come, could not be proved in evidence, as Mrs. Smith was the only person present, and although her acts, and even her declarations in his absence, were most illegally given and admitted in evidence against him, her testimony in his favour could not be received. We can only, therefore, give his own statement of the transaction, which agrees altogether with the probabilities of the case, and the general tenor of the evidence against him.

“It has not been proved that Quamina was a rebel; if he was, I did not know of it. I did not send for him, nor did I know any thing of his arrival. I gave him no communication touching and concerning the revolt, for I had nothing to communicate; and if I had, still I would not have done any thing so improper; it was not until I asked him where he had come from, that even his manner became changed, and without answering me, he suddenly turned round and went away. Mrs. Smith was the only person present, and if the Court could admit her testimony, she could explain the whole. One of the facts which appear to militate against me, I think I can prove is incorrect, viz. that Mrs. Smith shut the door. I can do this, because I have a witness. With regard to the other two points, I could explain them also, had I any other witness than Mrs. Smith to support my statement.” [House of Com. Rep. p. 77.]

The shutting of the door is accordingly contradicted by the servant of Mrs. Smith, who also incidentally furnishes this strong collateral proof of her husband's ignorance of the intended insurrection or its objects, that when she came home from the house of Mr. Stewart the manager, where she and her husband fell in with the negroes just as they had risen, she was alarmed and in tears. She also proves, that their conversation was not such as would have been held by conspirators, or even of a secret nature, as both Mr. Smith and Quamina talked so loud, that she heard them in the kitchen, which is an out-house, at least 20 paces from the hall where Mr. Smith was sitting. The only other facts connected with this interview, are, that the same servant (a little girl who did not know her age) swore that Mrs. Smith afterwards threatened to lick her, if she told any one that Quamina had been there, a thing not very probable in itself, and if true, not in the least criminating Mr. Smith, who could not in law be criminally answerable for the actions of his wife; and that when Quamina left the house, he had with him a bottle, which he said contained porter, and which it is inferred, and not unnaturally we admit, that he got at Mr. Smith's, though from whom does not appear; most likely from Mrs. Smith, or one of the negro servants,

and of all persons in the house, least probably from him. The present was, however, of so trifling a nature, and so utterly unconnected with any ideas of furthering the objects of the insurrection, that it is immaterial from whom this bottle was received.

We pass on, therefore, to the law of the case, which is as decidedly in favour of the accused, as are the facts proved, or fairly presumable, destitute of all legal evidence of any thing approximating to a criminal communication with Quamina, which, if ever so distinctly proved, falls entirely to the ground, unless it could be shewn that such communication was for the purpose of aiding and abetting him in his treason, or of supporting and maintaining him after his guilt as a traitor was clearly known. Nor could any one, by the English law, be indicted as a principal in treason, in this secondary degree, where the principal in the first degree, or actual traitor himself, has not previously been legally convicted. We object, then, on the authority of all the text-writers on our law, to any proof of a receipt and comforting of this traitor by Mr. Smith, because, Quamina never was legally convicted of treason, having been summarily shot in the woods, without ever being brought to trial. But, even admitting that he was engaged in planning this very insurrection, is there any proof that Mr. Smith knew him to have been so, save what the testimony of Bristol, with respect to the soldiers, furnishes, and that, we have already shewn, cannot be entitled to belief. Manuel and the other negroes, as we have before remarked, rather proved him to have sustained, in all his communications with Mr. Smith, the character of a man anxious to restrain his hot-headed son, and other slaves of a like ardent spirit, from outrage. Hence, after the insurrection had broke out, he might naturally, and not only allowably, but praiseworthily, have wished to see Quamina, and even sent for him, (as he did not, and is not proved to have done,) in order to avail himself of the disposition, which his deacon had previously manifested, to bring the revoltors back to the path of duty and submission. But we will go further, and maintain that the latter is not proved to have been a traitor, engaged in this revolt, for no man can say, that such proof is afforded by evidence like the following, from his alleged accomplice Bristol.

“The revolt began at Success. I know Quamina, of Success; he was engaged in that revolt, because I heard they took him up before the revolt began. Jack and Paris were the leaders of the

revolt; they said they would go on with it, and then did so." [Ib. p. 21.]

The account of his conduct given by another of the insurgents, Seaton, tallies precisely with the previous representation of Manuel.

"After Quamina came to the meeting, did you make any agreement as to the rising?—It was made before.

"Did Quamina join in that agreement when he first came to the middle walk?—No.

"Why did he refuse?—He said Mr. Smith told him he must not rise."

"Did he afterwards agree?—After the people heard what Quamina said, they would not agree.

"Did the people then persist in their intention to rise?—Yes.

"How long did the meeting last?—A quarter of an hour.

"Had Quamina any hand in the revolt?—He did not rise before he was taken up, but did afterwards." [Missionary Society's Rep. p. 44.]

These two pieces of evidence coupled together, would naturally conduct us to the conclusion, that Quamina, though aware of the intention of his son and others to take some violent measures for the attainment of what they considered their new rights, was not an original ringleader in them, or if he was, become anxious to prevent their adoption, from his knowledge of Mr. Smith's decided condemnation of every thing of the kind; and that after his conversations with him on the Sunday he was particularly desirous to persuade his fellow slaves to listen to his good advice; though after his son and he were taken, and not till then, he did actually join the revolt. His disposition to put a stop to any violent proceeding, is still further manifested by the following extract from Seaton's evidence of a declaration of Quamina's, (which was no evidence by the way at all against the prisoner,) on going to Mr. Smith's a second time on the same day.

"What did Quamina go to Mr. Smith's for, the second time?—He did not tell me properly; but he told me on the way, that he did not know what to say to Goodluck to stop him from going on; and that if he could get any person that same night, he would send to Jack, to stop the people over the coast." [Ibid. p. 44.]

But a still stronger corroboration of the correctness of this view of Quamina's conduct, is afforded by the evidence of Mr. Stewart, the manager of the Success estate, who very distinctly declares, that, whilst all the other negroes

named were most active in the attack upon his house to obtain arms, Quamina was not only doing no harm that he saw, but was engaged in keeping the rest back, and preventing them from doing him any injury. From the whole of his conduct, therefore, from the beginning to the end of this disturbance, it is manifest that Mr. Smith had every reason to believe Quamina at the very most an unwilling actor in it, and therefore a person most likely to use his influence and exertions for the restoration of order. Every thing negatives his knowledge of his being a leader of the rebellion, or even a rebel—every thing disproves his abetting him in or approving of this rebellion—every thing in fact tends to shew his ignorance, moral as well as legal, of abetting, harbouring, supporting, or wilfully neglecting to secure a man whom he knew to have been a traitor, and to whom he might have rendered all those services, without subjecting himself to any punishment for the misprision of treason with which he was charged, as the treason of Quamina was never proved. Upon this point, we prefer, however, giving the authority of Lord Hale, as very properly (though to such a court ineffectually) quoted by Mr. Smith in his defence, to our own.

“It is not shewn that Quamina was a rebel. Some questions have been asked, and answers given, to shew that Quamina was engaged in the revolt; but this is not sufficient; it ought to have been shewn that he had been *convicted* as such. It is laid down in Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 234, “That if a person be arrested for treason, he that rescues him is guilty of treason;” but according to the same author, 235, “*this case is not at all now in force, nor binding.*” That therefore at this day, if one be committed for suspicion of treason, and another break gaol to let him out, yet unless the party imprisoned were really a traitor, this is no treason at this day.” The same author, in page 237, says, “He that rescueth a person imprisoned for treason, or suffers him voluntarily to escape, *shall not be arraigned for that offence till the principal offender be convicted of that offence*; for if he be acquitted of the principal offence, the gaoler that suffered the escape, and he that made the rescue, shall be discharged; and the reason is, because, though rescuing a person charged with treason, or suffering him wilfully to escape, be a great misdemeanour, yet it is not treason, unless in truth and reality he was a traitor; *for a man may be arrested or imprisoned under a charge of treason, and yet be no traitor*;” again, in page 238, “and though the receiver of a traitor *knowingly*, be a principal traitor, and shall not be said an accessory, yet this much he partakes of an accessory.

“That if he be indicted by a several indictment, *he shall not be*

tried till the principal be convicted, upon the reason of the gaoler and the rescuer before given, for the principal may be acquitted, and then he is discharged of the crime of receipt of him. If he be indicted specially of the receipt, in the same indictment with the principal offender, as he may be, yet the Jury must first be charged to inquire of the principal offender; and if they find him guilty, then to inquire of the receipt; and if the principal be not guilty, then to acquit both; and accordingly it was ruled in Arden's case (G.) For though in law they be both principals in treason, and possibly process of outlawry may go against him that receives, at the same time as against him that did the fact, and though the principal appear, process may go on against the other, yet in truth he is thus far an accessory, that he cannot be guilty if the principal be innocent.'" [House of Com. Rep. pp. 75, 76.]

Upon the defence whence this extract is taken, we had intended to have made some comments, but our limits have been so very far exceeded, by shewing, from the prosecutor's own case, that, to use a phrase proverbial in our courts, it had not a leg to stand upon, that we can say no more, than that it was temperate, judicious, and able; though, had it been made by counsel, several contradictions omitted, and to which we have directed the attention of our readers, as we went on, and many other objections to the legality of the proceedings, might have been taken, and before any court of justice, properly so called, must have prevailed.

The most material parts of the evidence adduced by the prisoner, in contradiction of that given against him, have already been extracted and commented upon. We can only therefore state in a word, that he proved in addition, from the testimonies of planters themselves, that the negroes who attended his chapel, had behaved better in consequence of doing so, and particularly, that they were more obedient than formerly; that the overseers and agents of those planters, some of whom subscribed towards the chapel, at which they occasionally attended, and to the society to which it belonged, were in the habit of sending to him, to settle disputes among their slaves, and to punish them as he thought proper, as a minister, for their immoral conduct; and, that so far from encouraging them to run away, he had caused them to be sent back to their masters when they had done so. It was also shewn, that the intention to revolt on Monday night, was known to captains Mc Turk, and Simpson, and to the manager of the Success estate, two, four, and even six hours before it was made known to Mr. Smith that any proceedings were to be taken on that evening, by the letter

of Jackey Reed, yet they gave him no information on the subject; whilst so far was he from concealing his knowledge of the negroes, and amongst them Quamina in particular, having formed erroneous expectations of freedom, from the orders lately come from England, that three weeks before the insurrection broke out, he mentioned the circumstance of their applications to him upon the subject to more than one person concerned in the management of plantations, and who were officers also in the colonial militia, expressing at the same time his wish to undeceive them from the pulpit, which he only refrained from doing at their suggestion, that it might give offence to the ruling powers. He proved also, that after the insurrection had broke out, and he was accidentally thrown, with his wife, (no fit companion, sure, in such a scene, had he been aware of it,) into the very midst of its tumultuary movements, he did every thing he could to dissuade the rioters from their purposes; and that his name was never mentioned by any of them, as encouraging their insurrection, or in any way connected with it. This was so particularly spoken to by that highly respectable minister Mr. Austin, the chaplain to the colony, who, for the candour and liberality with which he gave his testimony on this occasion, has become as obnoxious to the tyrannical planters of Demerara as was Mr. Smith, to whose intended fate, indeed, they do not very obliquely commend him,—that we cannot avoid giving his very words.

“On Wednesday morning, about six o'clock, I disembarked in a schooner, on the coast opposite, or nearly opposite, Plantation Lowlands; I was on my way to Haslington. I met a great number of the insurgents; they were induced to come to me, principally, I believe, by their ascertaining who I was. I reasoned with one or two of the more intelligent, stating, that I was shocked at what had occurred, and came up the coast with a view of preserving the lives of my fellow-creatures. I was anxious to ascertain the cause of such extraordinary conduct, and was particular and minute in my inquiries. I had received an impression, that the prisoner, Mr. Smith, was highly instrumental to the insurrection, and proceeded to inquiries. A variety of reasons were given, which I do not consider necessary to recapitulate, farther than as they apply to the prisoner. I must add, that in no one instance among my numerous inquiries, did it appear, or was it stated, that Mr. Smith had been in any degree instrumental to the insurrection; a hardship of being restricted in attendance on his chapel, was, however, very generally a burden of complaint.

“Will you be pleased to state the other reasons; as you have said the restriction from attending Mr. Smith's chapel was one?—

The inquiry was either made by me, or by some one in my presence, expressing surprise that bloodshed had not marked the progress of this insurrection; the answer was, 'It is contrary to the religion we profess, we cannot give life, and therefore we would not take it.'"
[Ibid. p. 93. 94.]

The same benevolent and excellent man gives very important evidence also, as to the real cause of the revolt, shewing that, many months before, complaints had been made to him by the negroes of their having been flogged and otherwise punished, for attending Mr. Smith's chapel, and for reading their bibles, and that the manner in which they expressed their sense of this injustice, was so strong (such, for instance, as that "an attempt was made to set down their religion, but they would sooner die than give it up,") that he was so apprehensive of serious consequences, as even then to have deemed it his duty to warn the governor of the danger. Both he and Mr. Elliott testified that the course of reading the scriptures in rotation adopted by the prisoner, was the one which they pursued, the latter in the morning, the former in the afternoon, the time when the greatest number of slaves attend his ministry, and this in imitation of the conduct of his predecessor at St. George's church. It was also in evidence, from the officer of militia who arrested him, and who, by orders of Captain Mc Turk, seized all his papers, that Mr. Smith very willingly permitted them to be taken, expressing his perfect conviction that they would prove his innocence of any crime.

Had we room, we should here perform our promise of exposing the violence and gross injustice of the acting advocate-general's reply, which he was allowed five days to prepare; but after the comments which we have already made upon the evidence, it will surely be enough to say, that in a speech, by fifty times longer than the opening of his leader, so little does he discharge the duty which he owed to the accused and to the court, as a man ought to have done who was performing the part of a judge in his charge, combined with those of a public prosecutor, (who should never unduly press against a prisoner, but always give him every benefit he can) in his reply, that, though he puts the most harsh and inconsistent construction upon the conduct and the expressions of the accused, he never once admits, or even insinuates, that there could be a doubt as to any thing which his own witnesses had sworn, although the only important ones were *participes criminis*, and therefore hardly admissible witnesses,

but coming into court with every inducement to swear falsely to save themselves, and therefore with but the greatest caution to be believed when confirmed:

Having thus laid the whole of the case before our readers, we doubt not that they will individually adopt with us the language of Mr. Arrindell, the counsel for the accused,—“ I do believe Mr. Smith to be innocent; nay, I will go further, and defy any minister of any sect whatever, to have shewn a more faithful attention to his sacred duties, than he has been proved, by the evidence on this trial, to have done.” We omitted an adjuration at the commencement of this declaration, because, strongly as it marks the sincerity of the opinion of him who uses it, it is at the least unnecessary and improper here. But it is on other, and very different grounds, that we also omit a further prefatory remark, “ It is almost presumption in me to differ from the sentence of a court,” because we think, with such a sentence, pronounced by such a court, no man who feels as he ought to do for the cause of truth and justice, and the honour of his country, can agree.

That sentence was one of *guilty*, as our readers well know, save that, as to the first charge, they very sagely convicted of the facts, but acquitted of that guilty intention which could alone give to those facts the character of crime. As to the others, they merely made some slight alteration as to the number of days on which the offences were committed, and acquitted the accused of not doing his utmost to secure Quamina on the Wednesday, it being too absurd even for them to suppose, that a man, who but two days before had been obliged to consult a physician as to the general decay of his health, could, if he had been so inclined, have detained a sturdy able-bodied slave, on a charge which put his life at stake.

As to the gross irregularity of the proceedings of the court, we have already expressed ourselves in no measured terms; yet, ere we close, we will select a few of the more glaring instances of its constant and unparalleled violation of every notion of justice, and the most established principles and ordinary forms of law.

In the first place, then, the questions were asked by the judge-advocate and his assistants in the most irregular manner in which it was possible to propose them; leading questions being uniformly put to witnesses who appeared in the character of accomplices, and who had previously been examined by the very men by whom those questions

were put, with an ignorance of one of the first rules of their profession, of which the merest tyro at quarter-sessions would, on his maiden examination, be ashamed ; or, on the other hand, with a hardihood and effrontery in despising every principle of law or of justice, which Jeffereys himself would scarcely have displayed. This language may appear harsh as well as bold, but it is abundantly justified by such driving questions (leading is too mild a term for them) as the following :

“ If you did work in your own grounds, or went to market on Sunday, did the parson reproach you for it? [Mis. Soc. Rep. p. 17]

“ Did you never hear the negroes say that something did not please them ?

“ Did you never hear of this revolt a long time ago ?

“ This is not what I want ; I want to know whether it is a part of his duty to look after the conduct of the negroes upon other estates, and to report it to Mr. Smith ?” [Ib. p. 20.]

“ Did the deacons have signs to know one another without speaking ?

“ Did you never hear about it when the prisoner read it ?” [Ib. p. 21.]

“ After you have appointed them, do you not report them to Mr. Smith ?” [Ib. p. 22.]

The next glaring violation of all the rules of evidence was the admission of hearsay, which every schoolboy knows cannot be received in a court of justice ; yet by this was the guilt and fate of Quamina mainly, if not entirely proved, though that was a point above all things necessary to be established by the most unquestionable and strictly legal evidence, as, without its being so, Mr. Smith could not be charged as a principal in the second degree, in consulting with, aiding, and abetting him in his treason. “ *I hear* that he was gibbeted ;” “ *I hear* he was shot in the back ;” “ *I hear* they bring him home, and chain him in the middle walk ;” “ After I came here (*i. e.* to prison,) *I heard* he was shot by the blacks ; and gibbeted about Success middle path :”—thus is the guilt of the principal traitor proved by men who, if they were associates in his crime, could easily have shewn what he did, instead of but reporting what they subsequently had heard. The very character of the insurrection itself is also mainly to be drawn from evidence of what Jack told, or Quamina said, long before it broke out, or was even planned ; and, still more monstrously, if any thing can be so, by general declarations and complaints of a number of slaves, made nobody knows by whom, or when, or where, save that it is

manifest the accused never had any thing to do with them ; therefore they had as much to do with the trial of Thistlewood for the Cato-street conspiracy (there was, by the way, a black engaged in that) as with that of Mr. Smith. Yet, to mark the gross partiality of the court, of which a word or two more perhaps anon, long after the entire evidence for the prosecution had been closed, of which the most material part was hearsay, and after, too, the cross-examination of the planters, militia officers, and others, whom the prisoner was obliged to call out of the enemy's quarters, as to all they had heard, and a great deal they had said, was over,—on the appearance of his friend and colleague, Mr. Elliott, Mr. Smith was informed by the acting judge-advocate, that the court had ordered him to say, that he must confine himself to the strict rules of evidence, and that in future hearsay evidence would not be admitted. This direction, for *the future*, given on the nineteenth day of the trial, speaks volumes ; for it shews, that all the irregularity of the eighteen preceding days sprang not from any ignorance of the strict rules of evidence, but from a determination to relax them to any extent that might be necessary to secure the conviction of the prisoner, and rigidly to enforce them when that purpose might be hazarded by a similar license, to which, as the irregularity had so long been permitted, and its injurious effects could not be removed, he was in justice and equity entitled. Nor is other proof wanting, that this vague tittle-tattle did not creep in as evidence unawares, as will sometimes be the case where every caution is used to exclude it, for it was most shamefully and illegally invited by the counsel for the prosecution, by such questions as are put by them in the following instance, of as gross a violation of one of the primary rules of evidence, as ever disgraced a British court of justice.

“ Did you never hear the negroes say that something did not please them ?—No, only so far that I have heard them saying, that since Sundays was taken to serve God, they ought to have Saturday to work their grounds, or even the afternoon of Saturday.

“ Did you never hear of this revolt long time ago ?—No, about a month and a half ago, before it.

“ What did you hear about this war ?—Jack told me about the apper of freedom I spoke to the Court about already.” [Ib. p. 17.]

When we add, that these barefaced violations of the two first rules of conducting an examination were committed by the judge-advocate of Demerara himself, no one can hesitate in denouncing him as either unqualified to hold his

office for a moment longer, from ignorance at which the student who has but half read his Blackstone once, and attended court a single day, must blush; or, as unworthy to fill it, from an illegal and oppressive discharge of its important functions unparalleled in modern times.

A third irregularity is, the previous private examination of the witnesses by the very advocates who, as prosecutors for the crown, examined them in open court. We are aware of the practice prevailing in our West India colonies, of uniting the office of the attorney and advocate; but when we witness such monstrous perversions of all the rules of examination and of evidence, as we have already exposed, we cannot think the suspicion unnatural to a person placed in Mr. Smith's situation, that the negro witnesses who were admitted as king's evidence, though deeply engaged in the revolt, had been previously instructed in their lessons. Nor can we help intimating that the acting judge-advocate would have acted more professionally in abstaining from all previous intercourse with the witnesses, than by giving the flippant answers contained in the following examination of him as a witness by the court.

"Have you examined the witnesses for the purposes of this prosecution?—I have examined several of them, and the witness is one.

"Have you attempted to mislead or instruct the witnesses as to the evidence?—As a witness here, I must answer, No; but I should think, on ordinary occasions, such a question too degrading to be put to me." [House of Commons Rep. p. 36.]

Whether Mr. Smith is but an attorney acting as a barrister, or an English barrister transporting himself to the West Indies to act there also as an attorney, we know not, but most assuredly, we do know many attorneys in England, who would not scruple a little priming and screwing up of their witnesses, especially if they could secure to themselves the advantage of re-putting, in open court, the very leading questions which would prove a man guilty of treason, or whatever else you choose, by the mere formal repetition of the monosyllables no and yes. After his disavowal upon oath, we suspect not Mr. acting-judge-advocate Smith of such disgraceful conduct; yet repeating our opinion, that he had better have avoided all ground of suspicion, we cannot but add, that we do shrewdly suspect that the story about the soldiers was the invention of an acuter mind, and more legal skill, than belonged to the negro who alone deposed to it.

Can our readers require further proof of the determination of the Demerara prosecutors of Mr. Smith, *per fas aut nefas*, to convict and hang him? Let them look for it in the facts, of no question being allowed to be put, that could by possibility reflect upon the governor or his measures;—of no inquiry being permitted as to the real causes of the revolt, falsely ascribed to the machinations of the prisoner;—of the court arbitrarily directing to be struck out of the defence whatever they chose to construe into a reflection upon their proceedings, down to a complaint of an answer to a question not having been properly recorded. Let them trace it again in the preventing Mr. Austin from being asked a question which he seemed perfectly willing to answer, as to whether he had not received similar presents from his negro auditors to those, the taking of which by his wife was given in evidence against Mr. Smith on a charge of treason; and still more strikingly in the atrocious injustice of his having been compelled, notwithstanding his very proper remonstrances, to answer a question propounded by the court itself, as to his having heard some negro, (no one knows who,) when examined before the board of evidence, by which the proceedings on these trials were got up, implicate Mr. Smith in this insurrection. To this, we would add their preventing evidence being given, as to the knowledge of the governor of the instructions under which Mr. Smith acted as a missionary, on the ground that the prisoner having said he had called the witness to speak to the handwriting of those instructions, no other question could be put to him; but after the flagrant act of injustice last referred to, we shall only quote the arbitrary direction of the court, to strike out of the prisoner's defence the expression of his conviction, that whatever suspicion might have been attached to him, it would "not be possible for any gentleman to declare upon his oath, or upon his honour, that *he was guilty*," and having done this, we conclude with asserting that this conviction would have been ours, had not fifteen officers at Demerara done that, which we are satisfied no fifteen "men free from prejudice," "gentlemen of honour," (other offensive expressions struck out by their orders,) would have done, within the compass of those dominions upon the administration of whose laws their conduct has reflected an indelible disgrace.

The Investigator.

OCTOBER, 1824.

"On the Standard of Taste." An Essay intended to compete for a Prize, given by the University of Glasgow. By the late WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT.—PART III.

EVERY judgment of the mind is correct or incorrect—accordant with the actual nature of things, or not so accordant,—and the same judgment, when subsequently suggested, according to the laws which regulate the succession of mental phenomena, will possess the same qualities that it did possess at its first formation. Although, then, neither beauty nor sublimity are qualities of the object, considered abstractly; and although the mental operation by which emotion is excited, may not involve any judgment with regard to the qualities of that object by which the train of thought is suggested,—yet as such a train exists, the particular ideas, whether recalled or otherwise, of which it is composed, must be true or false, must agree or disagree with the real nature of things.

Besides all this, certain habits of association are at once causes and consequences of correct thinking. To go into the evidence of a fact so often stated, and so universally admitted, would be worse than unnecessary; I shall, therefore, assume that fact as the ground of my future reasonings. It would be at present superfluous to investigate the exact nature of those habits or tendencies which are thus productive of accurate thought, and which are fostered by that very accuracy of which they are the causes. I only wish to point out the indubitable fact, that the predominance of certain principles of association is uniformly connected with the correspondent prevalence of certain habits of thought: I am aware that the differences which obtain in what may be termed the associative tendencies of mankind, are, by some metaphysicians, considered as of themselves sufficient to account for all the varieties of intellectual character. It has been conceived, that where our associates are—in consequence of original constitution, or of habits subsequently formed—regulated principally by some one particular law, the direction and energy of our mental exertions will be characterized by some strictly analogous peculiarity. It

has even been asserted, that all the different intellectual powers are resolvable into the laws of association or *suggestion*. It is enough, however, for my purpose, that a connexion is universally acknowledged to exist between the mental character and those principles or laws, according to which the succession of ideas and emotions is regulated. As a consequence of this, it will necessarily follow, that powerful minds are generally marked by the prevalence of certain principles of association, which, although modified in every individual instance by a thousand accidental circumstances—although bearing different proportions—standing in different relations to each other, and consequently giving, in each particular case, some personal and inimitable peculiarity, are yet essentially the same, or, at any rate, are marked by important features of resemblance.

Taste, then, I conceive to be correct, 1st. When the several conceptions, which go to make up the train of thought by which emotion is preceded, agree with the actual state of things; or, 2dly, When the association, in consequence of which thought and emotion have been occasioned, is such as is likely to have presented itself to a mind accustomed to accurate and concatenated thought.

Perhaps I ought before to have remarked, that I do not make a distinction between correctness and delicacy of Taste. Delicacy implies correctness, and correctness implies delicacy. To shew the difficulty, not to say the impracticability, of satisfactorily distinguishing the one from the other, I will refer to a circumstance, which, however minute, is not altogether unworthy of notice. Mr. Stewart remarks, that “the two distinguishing characteristics of good Taste (it has been justly observed by different writers) are, correctness and delicacy; the former having for its province the detection of blemishes, the latter the perception of those more refined beauties which cultivated minds alone can feel.”* Now, then, let us turn to that illustration with which Mr. Hume commences what he, oddly enough, terms “*a definition of delicacy*.” “One of them tastes it, considers it; and, after mature reflection, pronounces the wine to be good, *were it not* for a small Taste of leather, which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precautions, gives also his verdict in favour of the wine, with the reserve of a Taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish.”†

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay iii. chap. 3.

† Hume's Essays and Treatises, part i. essay xxiii.

Here, then, is delicacy of Taste displaying itself in the detection of that which detracted from the excellence of the wine. Yet is this very illustration quoted by Mr. Stewart* with evident approbation, although in general he dissents from the conclusions, and objects to the reasonings, which are contained in Mr. Hume's twenty-third essay. I only mention this to shew the difficulty of drawing a line, and to justify myself in the view I have ventured to take of the subject. The fact seems to be, that the same powers of thought and feeling which constitute a delicate, will also constitute a correct Taste—that the detection of blemishes implies a previous acquaintance with excellencies, and that a power of receiving pleasure from the beautiful, when present, is necessarily followed by a sense of its absence, when it is present no longer. All those circumstances, whether of original conformation, of situation, of habit, or of prejudice, which tend to humanize or to embitter the tempers and dispositions of mankind, will produce an evident effect on the decisions, and even on the emotions, of Taste. He who hates the possessor of an ornamented parterre, will be delighted to fix his attention on every thing that argues a want of judgment in the original plan, or of care in the subsequent culture. In a different frame of mind, he might perceive occasional deformities; but he would avert his eye from them—he would dwell on the beauties of the scene—he would describe the enchanting feelings of delight it had occasioned, while he would avoid the mention of those minor circumstances which might, nevertheless, have called for disapprobation. Just such are the effects of that universal misanthropy, which renders me the enemy of every man; or of that diffusive benevolence, which inclines me to look on every man as a brother. This moral reason may, perhaps, be given for the *correctness* of Swift, and the *delicacy* of Addison. Such at least are the views which have determined me to use the one word *correctness* as expressive of that idea, which some writers have been pleased to consider in greater detail. I need not say, that it is rather a question of nomenclature than of philosophy; that I attach no great importance to its decision; and that I, therefore, merely state my sentiments, without deeming it worth while to spend much time in defending them. If, however, remarks so simple as those which I have made above, needed corroboration, I might add, that they are supported by no less an authority than that of Mr.

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay iii. chap. 2.

Stewart. Speaking of "that general disposition to be pleased and happy, in which the essence of good nature consists," he observes, that such a temper, when transferred "to the study of the fine arts, can scarcely fail to incline the Taste more strongly to the side of admiration than of censure."*

Assuming, then, this extensive signification of the word *correctness*, we shall, I think, find that it is nothing more than I have already described it to be. The difficulty of giving any satisfactory definition, arises from the circumstance I am about to notice. Were I called upon, in as few words as possible, to define the sense in which I use the term *correct Taste*—I should say, that it is the power of deriving from what is beautiful, that peculiar pleasure which beauty is calculated to communicate, without receiving similar gratification from any object which really is *not* beautiful. This doctrine, however, appears fitted to controvert all my previously expressed opinions. The line of argument hitherto pursued has been intended to shew that there is no such thing as intrinsic beauty. Yet such a definition, as has been proposed, seems to go on the supposition of its existence. Here, then, some further explanation becomes necessary.

By attending to analogous cases, which, in consequence of their infrequent occurrence, or of some other peculiarity, have never engaged the attention of philosophers, and have not, therefore, been perplexed by the ingenuity of disputants—considerable light may sometimes be thrown on speculations like that in which we are at present engaged. The objection just stated is to the following purpose: If beauty be not an inherent quality; and if it be, in fact, nothing more than the connexion which exists between the suggesting causes of certain trains of thought and emotion, and those trains themselves;—what meaning is conveyed by the terms in which your opinion is stated? How can *that*, by which these successions of thought and emotion *are* occasioned, be otherwise than beautiful? or, when you assert, that a man of correct Taste derives from what is beautiful, and only from what is beautiful, that peculiar pleasure which beauty is calculated to communicate, on what principle is it that you deny to any thing that is in any case actually productive of this pleasure, an epithet which is simply expressive of the power of producing it? On exactly the same principle, (I reply,) on which, in analogous

* Phil. Essays, p. ii. essay iii. chap. 11.

cases, the application of words is frequently restricted. Let us take, for instance, the word *frightful* or *terrific*. I observe, then, that many things may create alarm, to which we should not think of applying the epithet *terrific*. A timid woman may turn pale at the sight of some minute and harmless animal; while a man of the stoutest heart may be appalled by a well contrived optical illusion, if he be unacquainted with the principles of its construction. Where, then, is the ground of distinction? There is no more danger in the one instance than in the other, because a squirrel (for example) and a magic-lantern are alike innocuous, and the emotion of terror is in both cases equally strong, while it is in both cases equally unfounded. How, then, comes it to pass, that while we should never think of calling the squirrel a frightful animal, we are ready to admit, that the illusive pageantry of the stage, or of the phantasmagoria, presents a terrific appearance? Clearly, because in a mind ordinarily well regulated, and at all accustomed to deduce proper inferences from the information of the senses, an animal so small—so evidently powerless—and so notoriously innocent—could never produce that strong conception of approaching evil, and those consequent emotions of terror. Although, therefore, the creature is certainly terrific in the particular instance in which its appearance excites alarm, I do not think of designating it by an epithet which, with whatever propriety it may be used in individual cases, is far from being generally appropriate. On the contrary, a mind perfectly trained to draw correct inferences from external appearances, may be shaken by an optical deception, because the originals of those shadowy representations which pass before the eye have always, in previous experience, been connected with real and imminent danger. That, therefore, and that alone, is denominated terrific, which would produce the emotions of terror with the majority of those whose anticipations of evil are, in a great majority of cases, correct. The emotions of terror never exist apart from the anticipation of evil. The emotions of Taste are also preceded by an intellectual process as real, although not, perhaps, so susceptible of definition. As, then, the anticipations of evil may be in an individual case excited by an object which would scarcely produce the same effect under any other circumstances, so is it possible for the sentiments of beauty or of sublimity to be, in an individual instance, suggested by an object not calculated to produce them in the case of any other individual. Now, I should no

more think of calling the one object *beautiful* or *sublime*, than of denominating the other *terrific*; for the epithets would, in both cases, be inapplicable and absurd. The object is not naturally beautiful or terrific. In other words, the power it possesses of inspiring the emotions of beauty or of terror, has not its source in the "general" principles of human nature, (comprehending, under this phrase, not only the natural *constitution*, but the natural condition of man.)* There are, however, some trains of thought so universally connected with certain suggesting causes, that those suggesting causes are, in every instance, followed by the same effects. Our minds may, indeed, be so immediately called off to other objects, that the train of thought and feeling may be interrupted: but wherever no such extraneous influence is exerted, and the current is allowed to go on undisturbed, that current undeviatingly flows in a particular channel. Some trains of this description there are, which are accompanied by the peculiar emotions of beauty; and these emotions, therefore, although not instinctive, are, in certain circumstances, uniformly and universally excited. It is not unworthy of remark, however, that to the Taste by which such beauties are appreciated, we rarely apply the epithet *correct*. Were a man to assure us that the sun, setting in all the rich but mild resplendence of a summer's evening, possessed for him no charms, we should not call his Taste incorrect—we should deem it absurd, preposterous, and unnatural. We should, in such a case, conceive not merely that there might be some want of intellectual vigour or cultivation, but that there was some positive mental deficiency:—not that some casual warping association might exist, but that there was a total absence either of sensibility or of thought. If the same man, however, were to prefer the Asiatic pomp of a gilded mosque, before the severer beauties of the Pantheon, or the stiff mythological sculptures of the Gentoos, before the productions of Praxiteles, or of Canova,—we should undoubtedly conceive that his Taste was, to the last degree, puerile; but could scarcely esteem it unnatural; because, without any original defect either of understanding or of sensibility, the associations, by means of which such a Taste is created, may, in ten thousand instances, occur.

As there are, then, certain associations so universal, that no man is exempted from their influence,—others there are, which are confined to particular classes of mankind. I

* Phil. Essays, p. ii. essay iii. chap. 3.

have before remarked, in the words of Mr. Stewart, that when we speak of human nature, we include the natural condition, as well as the natural constitution of man. Now, the principles of human nature are every where the same; but the results which ultimately flow from these principles in their development, vary with the varying circumstances of individual experience. If, therefore, all mankind agree in certain associations, it is only because all mankind, possessed of a common nature, partake, to a certain degree, of a common condition. Now, similar causes operating in a narrower field, will, as far as *their* influence extends, produce similar results. If, therefore, a *general* resemblance of condition produce these *general* effects on the sentiments of the human race,—a resemblance which obtains not universally, but among individuals of a particular class, will produce an effect coextensive with the limits of that class to which these individuals belong. This similarity cannot, indeed, equalize all the varieties of mental character,—supply deficient sensibility, or create new powers of intellect. Its existence implies nothing more than that the mental energies are, in each individual case, called forth in a particular direction. Indeed, it is thus with those beauties which are the most extensively recognized. A peasant and a Virgil would both acknowledge the charms of the setting sun; and each would feel emotions in general character not dissimilar from those experienced by the other. Yet who would compare the sentiments of the uninstructed countryman with those of the poet? As was before remarked, however, certain pursuits, by producing peculiar associations, render certain classes of men susceptible to the emotions of beauty, in circumstances under which other minds would remain unaffected. Now, the whole human race may be distributed into two or three great divisions, containing the *educated*, and the *uneducated*—the *thoughtful* and the *inconsiderate*. These great divisions have, of course, certain habits of thought which are peculiar to those of which each is composed. Different as may be the tendencies of individuals—apparently antithetical as may be the diversities of character among minds which are, by this general classification, reduced under one great division—the very circumstance that they may fairly be ranked together, demonstrates the existence of some points of resemblance constitutional, or induced by habit. As far, then, as this resemblance extends, there will be, among those minds in which it exists, a general similarity of operation. This

similarity of thought will produce a similarity of emotion in kind, if not in degree, in the external causes to which it is ultimately traceable, if not in the force or duration of the effect. A certain peculiarity in the principles of association is, therefore, found to exist among that part of the community which is gifted with intellectual superiority. This peculiarity has, on the emotions of beauty, an effect which we have before attempted to point out; and the enlightened are, consequently, affected by objects different from those which agitate the rest of mankind, or by the same objects in a different degree. Professional men form other classes, which may be considered as inferior divisions of that to which we have just alluded. Other points of resemblance are thus introduced; and if no new feelings are created, another set of exciting or suggesting causes is pointed out as affording novel sources of pleasure. Thus, then, thinking and educated men will all have, in common, some associations which have no influence over the other portions of the human race. The individuals who compose the several subdivisions of this general class will have other modes of thinking and feeling peculiar to their own society, and will, consequently, derive their emotions—and, among the rest, the emotion of beauty—from objects which excite no kindred feeling in minds devoted to opposite pursuits. Without, therefore, going into detail, I would in general remark, that men who are in the habit of thinking correctly with regard to the same objects, must resemble each other, either in the original constitution of their minds, or in the intellectual discipline to which they have been subjected. This resemblance implies a general similarity in their associations, in relation to that particular subject with which they have successfully cultivated an acquaintance. While the associations by which this subject is suggested, are multiplied in proportion to the frequency with which it has been contemplated, the particular ideas which present themselves are generally correct, and the succession is regulated, less by fortuitous coincidence, than by the perceived regularity of philosophy and nature.

Thus, then, it is that a perfect acquaintance with any branch of knowledge communicates correct ideas, creates new associations, and destroys those which were founded in prejudice and misconception. This effect on the succession of thought has a natural and necessary influence over the composition of our complex feelings; so that, *on every subject*, those who possess the most extensive acquaintance

with the objects it presents, will derive from them an emotion, in kind or in degree, essentially differing from that with which the same objects affect the uninitiated. I conceive, therefore, that a man may be said to have a correct Taste on any subject, when the trains of thought it suggests, and when the emotions he derives from contemplating it, are such as would naturally arise in the mind of a wise and educated man. The epithet is, I conceive, applied to the sentiments of Taste, because each emotion, which the objects of Taste occasion, implies some previous intellectual operation, to which that emotion is attributable. Similar emotions are naturally and properly ascribed to similar trains of thought. Similar trains of thought, suggested in different cases by the same object, imply the existence of some association, or even of some habit of association common to the two minds in which the succession takes place. Associations, and more especially habits of association, are indicative at once of original constitution and of mental culture. Those emotions, therefore, which certain objects generally produce in vigorous and highly cultivated minds, are, whenever they are excited by the same objects, considered indicative of the same intellectual character. I do not mean to say, that men in general, before they use the phrase in question, actually go through this train of reasoning. Ordinary observation is sufficient to teach them the constant connexion which exists between mental excellence and correct Taste. This uniform coexistence is quite sufficient to produce some idea of necessary connexion, and it is this idea—how vague soever in the majority of cases it may be—which leads mankind to apply to Taste—and not only to critical Taste, which is, of course, a mere modification of judgment, but to the sentiments of beauty and sublimity—epithets which are, in strictness, applicable only to operations purely intellectual.

Of this theory, the importance attached to classical Taste is at once illustrative and confirmatory. The classics undoubtedly contain much of what is intrinsically beautiful. By intrinsic beauty, I mean that which produces its appropriate emotions in consequence of its adaptation to the unchanging principles of human nature. There is, however, much that is indifferent—perhaps, even positively faulty—to which, nevertheless, antiquity has lent adventitious lustre. A classical Taste and a correct Taste are thus terms so nearly synonymous, that it would be difficult to draw between them any line of distinction. This arises, no

doubt, in a great measure, from that genuine excellence to which I have before adverted. It is not, however, to be forgotten, that classical associations necessarily exist in every highly cultivated mind; and that their existence is, therefore, an indication of mental superiority. Classical attainments are connected with our first notions of literary excellence. Classical knowledge is imbibed at a period when the heart is at once susceptible, and tenacious of impression, and when the sunshine of opening life communicates a sort of consecrating brilliance to all the objects which it has illumined. Every scholar, therefore, feels a peculiar interest in all that has any connexion with his earliest studies. Youth too is the period of emotion, and, therefore, as our knowledge of Greek and Roman literature is principally acquired during the first years of our existence, almost all the ideas which classical allusion excites, are "ideas of emotion." Classical associations, therefore, have a peculiarly powerful influence over men of classical education. As classical education is necessary to the scholar and gentleman, as such an education necessarily produces classical Taste in minds of ordinary thought and sensibility—this result is considered as a mark of intellectual cultivation.

At all events, we shall find that wherever we look, *that* Taste, and *that alone*, is generally esteemed correct, which accords with the feelings of those best acquainted with the nature of the object by which the emotions of Taste are excited. This coincidence of fact with theory, gives considerable probability to the opinions I have hazarded. While, therefore, I am far from supposing, that I have no difficulties with which to contend, I presume to hope that my notions are not altogether incorrect, and that the results of the preceding investigation tend to throw considerable light on the subject of our inquiry.

The difficulties of any inquiry into the philosophy of Taste principally arise from the ambiguity of the language usually employed on subjects of this nature. It was, therefore, necessary to devote a considerable portion of this exercise to preliminary—perhaps, very uninteresting—discussions. To settle the meaning of words, is, however, a work of no slight importance, and if this object seem to have attracted a disproportionate share of attention, let it be remembered that *obscurity* frequently vanishes altogether when definition has taken the place of inaccuracy. Although, therefore, my principles of reasoning may be liable

to objection, and my reasonings to the charge of inconclusiveness, I do flatter myself that my meaning, whether *correct* or *incorrect*, is *easily discoverable*; and that, assuming the truth of former propositions, the inference to be deduced from them will appear to be their simple and natural consequence. It may, indeed, appear as if this section had been completely anticipated; and as if nothing more remained than the formal enunciation of conclusions involved in what has been already admitted. This would, perhaps, really be the case, were there not certain points to which it will be necessary to advert before we conclude, and which, without our adopting any more complex division, may be discussed in the course of the present section.

The standard of Taste, then, is to be sought for in the sentiments of those who are best acquainted with the nature and properties of the object which is denominated beautiful or sublime. This is, as far as my observation has extended, the only test by means of which the correctness of Taste can be ascertained; and this test we learn to apply, under all those various modifications of circumstances by which the sentiments of beauty are affected. That ship, and that only, is universally acknowledged to be beautiful, which pleases the eye of the experienced sailor; and no one can pretend to a good Taste in horses, if he dissent from the unbiassed decisions of the jockey or of the groom. No man in his senses would, on such subjects, think of defending his sentiments by appealing to the decisions of Milton or of Locke, unless he could shew that Milton and Locke added to their other acquirements an intimate acquaintance with the dock-yard and the manege. I have, in the preceding section, endeavoured to point out the foundations on which this conclusion rests. If any doubt exists as to the truth of the principle, I have only to request the objector to apply that principle, under every variety of circumstances, and thus to ascertain if it coincide with the results of experience. Should such an examination terminate in our favour, our sentiments are supported by all the evidence, which, under ordinary circumstances, it is possible to obtain. We have a theory, of which the great principles are accordant with the facts which are brought under our notice.

Much confusion has, in truth, been introduced by an undue spirit of generalization, in consequence of which, principles, in themselves correct, have been extended to cases to which they are not properly applicable. Hence has arisen an ambiguity of statement, which has perplexed a

subject already sufficiently complicated, and which, by presenting an obscure medium, renders it sometimes difficult to ascertain the real meaning which authors have intended to attach to their own statements. Dr. Blair, for instance, whose want of original thought renders his writings a pretty fair index by which to judge of the fashionable philosophy of his day—seems totally at a loss when he attempts to ascertain the standard of Taste. In his second lecture, we meet with statements, which, if not in juxta-position, would seem to be absolutely and intentionally opposed to each other. He first observes, “That which men concur the most in admiring, must be held to be beautiful. His Taste must be esteemed just and true, which coincides with the general sentiments of men. On this standard we must rest.”* This is absolutely false, or universally true. It is wholly futile to bring in subsequent explanations to restrict the meaning of a proposition like that which has just been cited. Any statement, which implies a limitation, involves a contradiction. If by the “concurring sentiments of men,” we are to understand nothing more than the sentiments “of men placed in such situations as are favourable to the proper exertions of Taste,”† then does our appeal lie no longer to “the common feelings” of mankind, but to feelings common only to a few who happen to be peculiarly situated. Aware, however, that a statement so unqualified, would conduct to the most erroneous conclusions, he does attempt to shield himself by the limitation which has just been alluded to; and restricts “to men placed in *certain* situations,” the number of those persons whose “concurring sentiments” on all questions of taste are to be considered as decisive. The fact appears to be, that because there are certain objects, concerning which all men possess a nearly equal share of information, there are also certain objects by which similar trains of associated thought are in each individual instance suggested, and similar feelings universally excited. In this case, the general Taste of mankind is universally correct; because no one can have had opportunities of forming, in relation to the beautiful or sublime object, associations essentially differing from those which are generally prevalent. Any occasional exceptions are attributed, not to peculiarity of association, but to an inherent defect either of intellect or of sensibility. There are, however, a great number of cases in which the peculiarities of individual circumstances, or of individual character, may infinitely vary the degrees of knowledge, toge-

* Blair's Lect. on Rhet. sect. ii.

† Ibid.

ther with the facilities of its acquirement. Here the *standard* of Taste is to be sought for, not in the "concurring sentiments" of mankind, but in the opinions and feelings of those who are the most perfectly acquainted with the object which is denominated beautiful or sublime.

It may be worth while here to mark the difference which subsists between Taste and sensibility. By *Taste* here, I do not mean that exercise of judgment by which we are enabled to discern the fitness of certain means to excite certain pleasing emotions; but I intend, as I have done all along, to denote the mental process which enables us to derive pleasure from beauty and sublimity. Those peculiar states of mind, which are denominated *passion*, will, if subjected to a nice analysis, be found to consist of two distinct elements, *thought and emotion*. Thought and emotion are, I admit, united by a close and inseparable bond of connexion; still they are to be considered as different parts, although belonging to the same complex whole—although frequently coexisting, yet, as in every case, virtually separable. It is, therefore, very possible, that although they are always to be considered as originally bearing the relation of cause and effect, and although they may not unfrequently be so united as afterwards to form one complex state of mind, the relative proportions, in which they are found in different individuals, may not be regulated by any invariable standard. We do certainly find, that while the same sensations are, as far as we can judge, universally consequent on the same external impressions, the intensity of the sensation may be in a multitude of cases affected by the peculiarities of individual constitution. In this way it is possible that certain conceptions may be, wherever they occur, "ideas of emotion," while yet the degree of the emotion by which they are accompanied, may be, in some minds, incalculably greater than it is in others. It may, therefore, happen, that to two minds the same object may suggest the same train of thought—that this train of thought may, in both cases, be productive of emotions, in kind exactly similar, but in amount extremely unequal. In this case, it would, I apprehend, be correct to ascribe the distinction; not to dissimilarity of Taste, but to some original and constitutional difference of sensibility. It is, therefore, possible that, where little emotion is experienced, the Taste may be perfectly correct. If the feelings which are excited bear to each other the same *relative* proportions which are found to exist in vigorous and well-informed minds, we denomi-

nate the Taste correct, although emotion may, in the cases of different individuals, be in different *actual* proportions to the causes by which it is produced. When reading the Iliad, we may experience emotions of beauty or of sublimity in the perusal of those very passages, by which Aristotle and Longinus were similarly affected. In this case, our Taste is exactly the same with that of these illustrious critics. Yet Aristotle and Longinus may have derived, from these passages, pleasure more exquisite than we can, by any stretch of imagination, conceive. In this case, there is, I imagine, no difference of Taste, but a great difference of sensibility. It is thus in analogous cases. A public benefactor dies. I am aware of the value of that which is now lost to the world. For a moment I pause and moralize—give way to a few gentle emotions of transitory sorrow—and again return to the business and pleasures of life. The gloom that hung over my path is dissipated by the first gleam of sunshine, and the scene once more smiles with unvaried brightness. On the other hand, let a man of melancholy temperament hear the very same tidings. The reflexions which arise, perfectly harmonize with the general character of his mind; and a string has been touched which in his heart is ever ready to vibrate. Instead, therefore, of experiencing the transient emotion of general sympathy, he cherishes the most gloomy feelings, and looking around on nature with his eye unprepared to take delight in her beauties, seems to view them all through a discoloured medium; and thus diffuses over the whole landscape a darker hue of melancholy. I acknowledge, however, that this subject is attended with a considerable difficulty, which it is not, perhaps, possible for the nicest analysis entirely to remove. Trains of thought may, in their general character, resemble each other, while the individual conceptions, of which the one train is composed, may considerably differ from those which go to make up the other. The same objects, therefore, may suggest to different minds, trains similar in their general character of emotion, while the thoughts of which each is composed are, in many points of view, distinguishable from those which form parts of the rest. Mental phenomena, however, as far as they come under our cognizance, and, perhaps, the varied tone of feeling in our own minds at different periods, may tend to persuade us that it is possible for the *same* conception to be in different cases followed by emotions, which, if they all possess the same general character, are not all the same in the degree of their intensity.

If, then, it were possible for a human being to exist so entirely and exclusively intellectual, as to be altogether devoid of emotion—to such a being, Taste could not with any propriety be ascribed. Taste is, in fact, *emotion*: but then it is emotion, considered *not abstractly*, but considered in relation to the thought by which it was preceded and excited: and Taste is denominated *correct*, when the nature of the emotion indicates the existence of vigorous and accurate thought; or, at least, of such thought as could have arisen only in a vigorous, or in a cultivated mind. If, therefore, sensibility were utterly destroyed—then, supposing thought, and accurate thought, to remain, yet that peculiar indication of its existence which is now to be found in the peculiar nature of the excited emotion—would no longer have any being. The degree of sensibility may, however, be diminished, where such a diminution does not involve, by any means, the same consequences. If emotion still exist, it may serve to denote the character of the mind by which it is experienced. Its proportions may be the same with those which are found in vigorous and cultivated minds, and although its amount may be so small as to argue a deficiency of feeling, enough will remain to indicate the mental character. A man may, therefore, possess correct Taste, although he be deficient in sensibility; since the correctness of Taste is estimated less by the absolute, than by the proportional, amount of those emotions which the objects of Taste excite. Could I, for instance, feel assured that Virgil derived from any given scene in nature, a pleasure ten times exceeding that with which my own mind is affected on viewing the same collection of objects; and could I also ascertain that the poet's general sensibility exceeded my own in the exact ratio of ten to one—I should have a right to consider my Taste, as in this case, coincident with that of the illustrious Mantuan. The emotion, although its intensity would be in the one case greater than in the other, would, in both cases, be an equivalent indication of thought. These views I deemed it right to bring under the notice of the reader, although I certainly have done so with considerable hesitation, yet I am, on the whole, inclined to believe that this sort of diversity exists. When, however, I consider the amazing varieties of intellectual character—the nice shades of difference by which mind is distinguished from mind—and the marked diversities which are, nevertheless, every where observable—I am far from wishing to deliver any confident opinion. That there are

certain differences of original sensibility, will be universally admitted. It is not, however, so easy to believe that these inequalities bear no fixed proportion to the disparities of intellect, and, consequently, to the vivid distinctness of those conceptions by which all emotion is preceded. It is nearly impossible to mark those slight varieties of thought, which may, perhaps, considerably vary the subsequent emotion. Until this has been accomplished, it is not for us to assert that the *same conception* is *not*, in every instance, followed by the same emotion. It is, I presume, unnecessary to remark, that when I speak of one conception as *the same* with another conception, I consider them in relation, not merely to the object to which each of them refers, but to the clearness, the minuteness, the accuracy, and the strength, by which they are both alike distinguished. On the whole, however, the view which has been already taken, appears to me to be more consistent with what we know of the phenomena of mind. If the reader be inclined to entertain the opposite opinion, he will find the difference to be of very secondary importance. For, however curious in a philosophical point of view, may be the question to which I have alluded—very little ingenuity is, I believe, requisite to reconcile with either of these opinions the conclusions to which we have been led in the course of this investigation. Should the latter opinion be embraced, it may still be considered possible for correctness of Taste to exist where there may be comparatively little sensibility. The nature of the emotion would still shew the general character of the preceding train of thought, although its feebleness would, at the same time, indicate a want of vigour and of vivid distinctness in the ideas of which that train might be composed. The sentiments, however, which I before expressed, seem to me more consistent with the facts which I have had any opportunity of observing. Sensibility and delicacy of Taste, “seem,” says Mr. Stewart, “to depend in no inconsiderable degree, on original temperament.”*

Such, then, are the restrictions and explanations with which our opinions are to be received; and having made these preliminary remarks, we are led to *this conclusion—The sentiments of the wisest and best instructed of mankind, are the Standard of Taste.*

A question here presents itself, without a reply to which, the principle that has just been laid down, is available to no practical purpose whatever,—In what way are we to

* Phil. Essays, part ii. essay iii. chap. 4.

ascertain the actual state of feeling among those whose sentiments constitute the standard of Taste?

It may be very true, that "none of the rules of" criticism "are fixed by reasonings *à priori*."* The very existence of a rule, however, of course implies the possibility of applying it as varying circumstances arise. If we have to wait till some particular phenomenon displays itself, no rule can properly be said to exist till this phenomenon has made its appearance. If, then, the sentiments of the wisest and best instructed of mankind, constitute the only standard—how are we to ascertain the correctness of Taste in any individual instance, where we have no means of collecting the suffrages of others? This difficulty—obvious as its solution seems to be—appears sadly to have perplexed Doctor Blair.—"Must we," says he, "collect the voices of others before we form any judgment for ourselves of what deserves applause in eloquence or poetry? By no means. There are principles of reason and sound judgment which can be applied to matters of Taste, as well as to subjects of science and philosophy. He who admires or censures any work of genius is always ready, if his Taste be in any degree improved, to assign some reasons for his decision. He appeals to principles, and points out the grounds on which he proceeds. Taste is a sort of compound power, in which the light of the understanding always mingles, more or less, with the feelings of sentiment."† But to what does all this tend? Dr. Blair has just asserted, that "to the sense of mankind, the ultimate appeal must ever lie in all works of Taste."‡ What, then, can judgment do, if it be supplied with no materials on which to work? Of what avail is argument, when there are no premises on which to found our reasonings? And yet, it seems, we may come to a decision, without ascertaining the sense of mankind, although to that sense "the ultimate appeal must ever lie." All this confusion arises for want of ascertaining, or of clearly defining, the nature of the subject to which these "principles of reason and sound judgment" are to be applied. If the correctness of Taste can be ascertained by abstract *à priori* reasonings, or by that vague, mysterious principle to which the name *sentiment* is so frequently given, there is surely no necessity for any other standard. The difficulty and contradiction are, however, removed, if we ascribe to this exercise of reason, its true province. A standard exists, and to

* Hume's Essays and Treatises, part i. essay 23.

† Blair's Lectures on Rhet. lect. ii. ‡ Ibid.

its decisions every man necessarily bows. To these decisions *every man* bows: for those who are most perversely opposed to the sentiments of others, do not pretend to assert that their own Taste is more correct than that of the wisest and best instructed of mankind; which would, in fact, be to look down on the whole human race as their inferiors—but that the majority of suffrages will be in their favour, when future generations shall sit in judgment on the productions of the past. To this universally recognized standard, however, we have frequently no access. Either we are totally ignorant of the appearances it presents, or we have reason to suspect that we are contemplating those appearances through a delusive medium. Here, then, the “principles of reason and sound judgment” may be applied with the highest advantage.

The standard of Taste has, in certain cases, presented appearances so unequivocal, that we can no longer hesitate to consider them the natural results of unchanging principles. Having marked these appearances, and the circumstances in which they have uniformly displayed themselves, we learn to consider the latter as the concurrent causes, the former as the effects resulting from this co-operation; and, reasoning analogically, to anticipate, or to infer, the existence of the one, wherever we can ascertain the presence of the other.

The rules of criticism are no more than general enunciations of results which have been obtained by this mode of patient investigation. We remember the past—we compare it with the present—we anticipate the future. We know that certain combinations of thought have administered pleasure to vigorous and cultivated minds. By comparing several of these combinations, and by thus ascertaining how much may be abstracted without diminishing the effect, we learn to separate what is necessary and elementary from its unessential concomitants. Thus are we taught to expect that the wisest and best instructed of mankind, will be affected in a particular way in those cases in which we discover the elementary principles from which their gratification has already, in so many instances, been found to arise. Thus, then, it is that these sentiments, once fairly ascertained, become, in the proper sense of the word, a standard of Taste. It is not necessary for us, in every individual instance, to be possessed of the strong evidence of actual experience. Without its aid, we can apply this standard. Assured as we are of the uniformity of nature,

we may, by analogy, judge of the correctness of Taste in particular instances; because analogical reasoning enables us, with tolerable certainty, to anticipate the decisions of minds vigorous and cultivated. It matters not whether previous observations have been reduced under their several heads, so as to constitute general rules, each applicable to a variety of particular cases; or whether, without scientific arrangement, these observations serve as directions in those numerous instances in which the results of experience may be of importance to guide our practice. In either case, the consequence is, in fact, the same—depending on the same principles, and leading to the same end. It is thus that these sentiments constitute a standard universally and immediately applicable, so that, by its means, the correctness of Taste may be ascertained with tolerable exactness. Taste is, in fact, correct only when it coincides with the sentiments of certain classes of mankind. The actual state of these sentiments is, therefore, of course the standard of correctness. After having been led to these conclusions, it only remained to point out the mode of ascertaining the real indications of this standard. This is to be effected chiefly on the principles to which I have adverted; although, when the opportunity shall present itself, we may notice another method of obtaining the same result.

To these remarks, it may perhaps be objected, that the intervention of reasoning and argument, according to this account of the matter, is absolutely essential to success—that the existence of the standard does not preclude the possibility of error; and that the rule itself cannot be completely ascertained, without our being exposed to the danger of mistake. But is any one absurd enough to imagine that the standard of Taste resembles a mechanical rule, or even an algebraic formula? Wherever this is not the case, thought and reasoning are requisite, not only for applying the standard, but for ascertaining what that standard really indicates.

The state of those sentiments which may be considered as constituting the standard of Taste, is to be ascertained by analogical reasoning, as much as by actual observation and experience. It is, however, sufficiently evident, that the existence of analogical reasoning implies previous observation and experience; because, until we are acquainted with the existence, with the accompanying circumstances, of certain phenomena, we can never be led to anticipate, when the same antecedents occur—the same results. It is, there-

fore, highly desirable to remove all doubt on a subject of so much importance; and to point out the principles which ought to regulate us in conducting those previous observations, any defect in which, will necessarily vitiate every conclusion drawn from them.

In this attempt, one of our first objects should be to effect what may not improperly be denominated a classification of the objects of Taste, according to the extent and degree of their influence. If we admit the truth of what goes before, we must believe that there are certain objects which produce the emotions of beauty, or those of sublimity, throughout the great family of man. No situation is so remote, no mind so uncultivated, as to be unsusceptible to their influences. The associations from which they derive their power, are dependent neither on the caprices, nor on the prejudices, of mankind. The cause of their effects is to be sought for, not in the accidental variety of character or of circumstances, but in the great principles of human nature. Under this last term, however, I would include, according to the very accurate definition of Mr. Stewart, not only the natural constitution, but the natural condition, of man. To these universal beauties, then, let us first direct our attention.

That which is intended to minister to the exclusive gratification of the educated and enlightened classes of the community, must, to the majority, be unmeaning or distasteful. On the contrary, all that is addressed to the principles of our common nature will be felt alike by the learned and the rude, by the most uncultivated and the most refined. The former is like a dead language, intelligible to the instructed only—the latter is, to the great brotherhood of man, what, to each particular community, is its own vernacular tongue—intelligible to every individual member of the body. It is, therefore, of great practical importance for us to ascertain the nature of these associations—that we may thus be able confidently to appeal to the universal sentiments of mankind. It may here be alleged, that where sentiments are so universal as has been represented, we cannot stand in need of any standard beyond the evidence of consciousness. The circumstance of their universality implies their existence in my own bosom, and why should I go abroad to discover the nature of that which is every hour forcing itself on my notice? The reply, however, is sufficiently obvious. To effect an alteration in our own sentiments, is not the ultimate intention, although it may be the

immediate and the most obvious effect, of the attention we pay to a standard of Taste. I cannot perceive in what consists the *intrinsic* inferiority of those emotions which are experienced by a man of the most vitiated Taste. If an Indian pagod, and a Tahitian idol, please their respective worshippers, as well as the Venus of Praxiteles, or as her modern rival, the Venus of Canova, pleases me,—we are, I think, in this view, on a par. If the contemplation of Asiatic finery, communicate to my mind a degree of enjoyment equivalent to that which you derive from the simple and almost severe elegance of Grecian architecture,—in what respect—since our pleasures are equal in amount—are my sentiments intrinsically less valuable than yours? The difference will, however, appear in our practice. My vitiated Taste will lead me into a thousand senseless extravagances. If I do not, by means of that great standard which has been pointed out, discover the incorrectness of my own sentiments, I shall, of course, make no effort to conceal them. I shall, therefore, shock those whom it is my intention to delight; and thus afford indications of that inaccuracy of thought from which such inaccuracy of Taste must have proceeded. To illustrate this, permit me to have recourse to—a vulgar perhaps—but a simple analogy: let us imagine a *cook* so constituted as to derive from tobacco, the sensation of sweetness—from sugar, the sensation of bitterness. It is clear that to this man's palate, a dish, in which the place of sugar should be supplied by a proper quantity of tobacco, would be as pleasing as the original composition might be to a person ordinarily constituted. In this sense, then, there could be “no disputing about Tastes;” since the fact of his gratification would, in point of evidence, stand on the same basis with the fact of my dislike. In each case the individual would possess the evidence of consciousness; those around him, the evidence of testimony. If, however, this cook, never having ascertained the existence of any opposition between his own Taste and that of his fellow-creatures—were to shower around him the universal sweetener—what nauseous compounds of disagreeable elements would he present to his unfortunate customers!

In one respect, and in but one, the analogy fails. The oddity of these compositions would, indeed, render probable the existence of some correspondent peculiarity in the palate of their former, but that peculiarity itself, would be no indication whatever of any intellectual inferiority. Not so in the analogous case. A vitiated Taste, while it is discovered

by mistakes as numerous and as gross as those to which we have just referred—is universally attributed to some defect in mental constitution, or in mental culture. If, therefore, a standard of Taste be desirable at all—it is so in every case in which the emotions of beauty or of sublimity exist; because, although every man has experienced those universal feelings which belong to the individual in common with the species—this kind of knowledge will not prevent many practical errors. The sentiments of mankind are so various, and the emotions which succeed each other, or which co-exist, so rapid, so undistinguishable, and linked together, in each individual instance, by so many peculiar associations, as to produce a compound mass which it is not easy to analyze, and of which, reason, unassisted by frequent observations, cannot ascertain the component elements. In company with emotions that are attributable to suggesting causes, by which all men are similarly affected, many other trains of feeling may chance to be excited. Those emotions, which are common to the species, and those which are peculiar to the individual, may thus coexist in time, or may, at all events, succeed each other so rapidly, as undistinguishably to co-operate in the production of one really or apparently complex result. If, therefore, the peculiarity of these associations be a secret to the mind which is under their influence, how many practical mistakes may be the consequences! Our own feelings naturally guide us in our endeavours to excite emotion in the breasts of others. Thus, then, might we completely neutralize all the good effects which would have resulted from our appeals to the universal feelings of mankind, by introducing circumstances which may be disgusting, or uninteresting, to a mind differently constituted or circumstanced from our own. The desirableness of consulting some standard is, therefore, sufficiently evident; and since we have already seen the nature of that standard, the only remaining question is—how are its decisions to be correctly ascertained? To this inquiry, I have already attempted to give a satisfactory reply. There is, however, another process to which I have not before adverted.

True, in a certain sense, it is, that “none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings *à priori*.”* We must be acquainted with facts, before we can argue upon them, and, if no works of art had ever appeared, it would, perhaps, have been impossible, by any abstract reasoning, to

* Hume's *Essays and Treatises*, part i. essay 23.

have arrived at correct conclusions on subjects of Taste. It does not, however, necessarily follow, that, in all speculations of this nature, past experience is our only guide, and that we derive no light from any other quarter. If, as I have attempted to shew, the sentiments of Taste are to be ascribed to the ordinary powers and susceptibilities of the human mind, it appears probable, that a *general* acquaintance with the laws of mental phenomena, may, at least partially, supersede the necessity of any peculiar intimacy with the facts relating to those *particular* phenomena, with which criticism is solely conversant. I know that acquaintance with the laws of mind, cannot be obtained without experience, and without accurate observation. Every *à priori* argument, however, depends on an acquaintance with some first truth, or on the admission of some general principle, from which our conclusion is supposed to be a necessary inference. There are, then, it seems to me, two methods, according to which the rules of composition may be ascertained. Of these methods, one is, I am aware, more generally applicable. Still, both of them have their respective uses; and in no case, perhaps, is either of them employed to the total exclusion of the other. The first, and most ordinary method, has been already described. Experience teaches us that certain combinations have produced the emotions of beauty or of sublimity. Extensive observation of these effects, enables me to anticipate their occurrence, and ascertain their causes. On this species of knowledge, then, rules are founded. Such knowledge, however, is, after all, nothing more than an intimate practical acquaintance with certain laws of the mental constitution. A careful induction of particulars, has taught us the invariable connexion between certain emotions, and the circumstances and situations which are favourable to their excitement: and we thus learn to produce the one, by creating or recalling the other. It is, however, by no means impossible, that a more extensive induction may have taken place—that we may have laboured to ascertain the laws, not of certain emotions, but of emotion in general—in a word, that we may have attended, not to the peculiarities of Taste, but to the phenomena of mind. Having, then, in this way arrived at general conclusions, why may it not be possible to deduce a particular inference on this as well as on any other subject? Acquainted, as I am supposed to be, with the laws of mind, why may it not be possible for me to anticipate the operations of mind? In this sense, then, the rules of composition

may be fixed by reasonings *à priori*. I am fully aware that the methods which have been before mentioned are more generally applicable to practice. But to leave unnoticed this latter mode of ascertaining the correctness of Taste, would be to disregard one important source of information. It is, indeed, inaccurate to suppose, that in either case, observation and experience are unnecessary. The only difference is, that in one instance the attention has been exclusively directed to the emotions of Taste, while in the other, a general survey has been taken of the phenomena of mind. In both cases, an induction of facts precedes the general conclusion. From that conclusion, particular inferences are, in both cases, drawn. In the one view, however, the rules of criticism are to be considered as *immediate* inferences from the admission of still more comprehensive conclusions. This last method is peculiarly conducive to the attainment of a correct Taste on subjects of general interest. Those peculiarities of sentiment, which are the consequences of superior mental acquirements, vary so perpetually, as we ascend in the scale of intellect, and so much depend on the possession of information which it is in the power of only a few to obtain, that it is difficult or impossible for any man to arrive at general conclusions concerning them, except after repeated and accurate experiments. It is, therefore, in such cases almost unavoidable, to depend on the report of those who may have possessed the means of accurate observation. Our general conclusions, therefore, must be entirely founded on what we can ascertain of past decisions on similar occasions. The feelings of the heart are, however, every where the same. The glory of the rising sun is in every mind associated with images of cheerfulness. To all, it suggests the notions of renewed vigour, diffusive happiness, and universal animation. The splendour of his setting cannot be noticed without inspiring ideas of tranquil serenity, finished labour, and approaching repose. The roar of the mountain cataract must every where produce that awe and elevation, in the union of which the emotion of sublimity is found to consist. There are, too, in every breast the seeds of kindly feeling, which, however repressed by habit, or how nearly soever eradicated by depravity, will sometimes shoot forth, and demonstrate their existence by their effects. These are the foundations of sentiments and associations on which we may securely depend; and a forcible appeal to which can never be entirely disregarded. Our first business, therefore, should be, by collecting the opinions of others, and by

a careful analysis of our own feelings, to ascertain the nature of those associations which are most generally prevalent, and consequently, of those circumstances in which the emotions of beauty and sublimity are most frequently excited. The merit of a work of Taste must generally be estimated according to the power which it possesses to suggest those trains of feeling which every member of the great human family is capable of experiencing. Those emotions which are peculiar to men of cultivated minds, are necessarily founded on associations which have been formed in a comparatively late period of life. No great disparity can exist between the acquirements of different children, because no one of them has had time greatly to outstrip his cotemporaries in the race of intellectual competition. The associations formed in the first stages of our existence must be connected with the objects of early observation, and those objects must be, in all cases, nearly the same, at a period when the varieties of intellectual character have had no time to display themselves—when the differences of mental culture have scarcely produced any perceptible shades of distinction—and when the inequalities of fortune have hardly begun to exert their influence over the infant mind. These circumstances, which, in after life, turn the course of thought into channels as numerous as are the diversities of character and situation, possess no power to direct the motions and feelings of infancy. Those associations, therefore, which are found in every mind, are, for the most part, formed during the earlier period of our existence. In our younger days, emotion is at once more frequent and more lively than it is afterwards. I know not whether it be the novelty of the scene around us which occasions surprise, and keeps up expectation—whether it be to some peculiarity in the early constitution, which gives vivacity to the emotions of childhood—or whether it be to a thoughtless disregard of the future, and an exclusive attention to that present feeling, of which experience has not taught us to anticipate either the termination or the consequence—that this frequency and force of emotion must be attributed. The fact, however, can scarcely be doubted, that although emotion, deep, violent, and lasting, may be occasionally experienced—there is not, in after life, the same unvaried flow, the same ceaseless play of feeling. Besides all this—the violent emotions of the man are so generally preceded by crime, or followed by grief, or made up of various and discordant elements, as in the retrospect to present no images of gladness unasso-

ciated with images of melancholy. The griefs of childhood, on the contrary, are so trivial in their origin, so small in their amount, or so short in their duration, that when we look back on the period, they scarcely cast a shade to vary its brightness. Its joys too, unallayed by anticipations of evil—unpurchased by the sacrifice of virtue—obtained by no criminal efforts, and succeeded by no remorseful recollections—afford, in after life, that soft green on which the eye loves to repose, when it is fatigued with the glare of the surrounding prospect. All these circumstances concur in giving to our earliest associations, peculiar power and fascination. Now, as the most universal are also, generally speaking, our earliest associations, another reason exists for paying particular attention to those kinds of beauty in which the whole human race is similarly interested.

It is, nevertheless, desirable to gain a Taste more generally correct. The associations which classical education and habits of philosophic thought produce, are, in many cases, sufficiently powerful to give a particular character to the whole tone of feeling. Superior charms are thus added to those things which nature rendered charming; and many objects are invested with a beauty, of which the untutored eye could not have discovered the existence. Besides any immediate pleasure which these beauties are fitted to produce, a relish for them, wherever it displays itself, is so strongly indicative of those intellectual habits from which alone it can spring—that in minds capable of duly appreciating, it excites a sentiment of admiration, and of delightful sympathy. It is, then, highly desirable to possess in this case also, some standard, that we may not disgust by affectation, where we intend to please by delicacy of allusion; nor, in our search for recondite beauties, collect unmeaning conceits.

The standard to which we must ever revert, is to be sought for in the sentiments of those who are best informed on the subject which may chance to be before us. In the application to practice, some difficulties undoubtedly present themselves. We must always take into account the situation of those minds over which we intend to exert an influence. It may thus, perhaps, sometimes consist with correctness of Taste to admire, or to introduce a figure or an allusion, which our own feelings, unrestrained, would induce us to reject, and which a nice critic would undoubtedly condemn. Here, however, the rule which has been laid down is not infringed. Those who are best acquainted with our object,

and with the state of the popular mind, perceive the perfect adaptation of the instrument to the work it is intended to accomplish. The perception of this fitness may be productive of the highest admiration, and even of a feeling nearly akin to the emotion of beauty.

In writing for mankind, therefore, we must not write for one subdivision of the species. When we address a particular class of men on that subject which has engaged the particular attention of them all, we must study the habits and feelings which their common pursuits may have engendered. That is most pleasing—most beautiful—which displays a Taste perfectly coincident with the Taste of those who possess, on this subject, the greatest share of information. Such a Taste is, under such circumstances, denominated *correct*, because it is indicative of habits of correct thinking. But if, when writing for mankind at large, we use exactly the same style, our Taste may justly be called in question. Let it ever be remembered, that the *correctness of Taste* is synonymous with the *indication* its presence affords of *habits of correct thought*. The remotest approach to pedantry tends to demonstrate the non-existence of such habits. It shews that we have forgotten our object—were unequal to our task—or were unacquainted with the extent of our duty. It shews the want of that comprehensive survey which takes in the extensive, while it does not overlook the minute; and enables us to assign to each its relative importance. It shews that the eye has been so long accustomed to confinement within the limits of one little circle, as to be incapable of taking in those larger views, which every where offer themselves to the philosophic observer.

To the same standard, then, we should, on all occasions, appeal, although doubt may sometimes arise from the peculiarity of the circumstances under which it may be necessary to apply it to practical uses. The chief difficulty will be, to ascertain the concurrence of enlightened men in any one decision. This difficulty is, however, diminished when we consider, that if it be our intention to please any subdivision of the human species, it will be, in most cases, comparatively easy, from the recorded results of past experience, to deduce rules for the guidance of our practice. When we write for mankind at large, correctness may appear more unattainable. If, however, we remember that correct Taste is chiefly or entirely valuable, as it is indicative of correct thinking, the force of this objection will be removed. No

man has reason to blush because there are some things with which he is imperfectly acquainted. No man, therefore, is expected to possess a Taste indicative of that with which no man is endowed. As the deficiency itself is not disgraceful, the mark of that deficiency is not so. If a work which is expressly intended for a particular class of the community, be characterized by such a Taste as betrays the absence of those habits which the author's professions have led us to expect, we condemn that Taste as incorrect, because it marks reprehensible incorrectness of thought. The production is chiefly intended for those who are capable of perceiving the deficiency, and seems to put forth pretensions for its author, which are contradicted by internal evidence.

He whose object it is to please mankind at large, must be content to take a comprehensive view of his subject, instead of searching for those little beauties which must be unseen or unfelt, except, perhaps, by a few isolated labourers in some unfrequented field of literature or science. He must please, by the boldness of his outline—the disposition of light and shade, the depth and mellow richness of his colouring—and the expression of the whole picture—not by the Flemish minuteness with which he paints a peas-pod or a cabbage-leaf. A gardener or a botanist may perceive the accuracy of the resemblance, and the beauty of the drawing: and if the painting be intended for none but gardeners and botanists, this accuracy is not merely desirable, but necessary. If, however, the attention of *mankind* is to be arrested, some other charm must be perceived, or mankind will pass by unaffected. The great object, therefore, should be to display a Taste indicative of those modes and habits of thought which belong to the *man*, the *gentleman*, and the *scholar*.

It is, perhaps, in cases of this kind, impossible to erect any perfectly unvarying standard. Those pursuits which engage the attention of the higher and better educated classes of society, may sometimes change their objects; and whatever these pursuits may be, they will always have an adventitious charm superadded to their intrinsic worth. They are the badges of a class, and thus become the marks of other and more valuable acquisitions. The Taste which these pursuits generate, is looked upon as an evidence of their existence, and thus becomes indicative of that which is itself indicative of something still more important. With the variations of learning, therefore, the standard of correct

Taste will vary. That kind of education which gives the human mind a fair opportunity for unfolding its powers, implies, in Europe, an acquaintance with the classics; in Hindoostan, with the shasters; in China, with the writings of Confucius. In Europe, consequently, that Taste is admired, which naturally arises from early attention to classical learning: and I doubt not that among the Chinese and Gentoos, the same ideas of correctness and elegance are attached to that species of Taste (whatever it be) which demonstrates a complete acquaintance with the writings in which the learning of those countries consists. I do not now refer to the admiration which is justly conceded to the Taste that is able to appreciate the intrinsic excellence of these very writings. This may exist apart from the feelings to which I now more particularly allude. Things happen to be so arranged, that men of liberal education universally go through certain preparatory studies, which are, by common consent, placed at the threshold of knowledge. Where regular attention has been paid to these preparatory studies, we are, at least, assured, that opportunity for improvement has been afforded. And although the converse may not be in every case strictly true; yet, wherever we find that these studies have been neglected, we have, *prima facie*, every reason to suppose that no considerable progress has been made in polite or useful learning. On these subjects, therefore, it may not be possible to obtain any invariable standard; or, rather, perhaps, from the application of essentially the same standard, to deduce unvarying results.

After all, it must be admitted, that, out of the strict sciences, mere rules are wretchedly defective. Genius must be its own guide. No sooner have the rule, compass, and square of criticism, marked out the path to which it behoves all future generations to adhere, than some eminent mind sets at naught the enactments of self-constituted legislators, and overthrows the system which they had so laboriously erected. It is as if, on the sand, you were to trace a line, and call it the boundary of the ocean: the next returning tide would obliterate every vestige of your labour. Thus do the systematic critics of every age, calculate with the same precision—adjust with the same nicety—define with the same care—decide with the same confidence—undergo the same disappointments—and, with a few exceptions, sink into the same oblivion.

Yet let me not be supposed to assert that genius acts without a rule. Observation and experience guide all its

procedures. But then it is an observation so penetrating—an experience on which are founded reasonings so subtle, yet conclusions so comprehensive—that ordinary men are incapable either of arriving at the same facts, or of deducing the same inferences. General results are, indeed, apparent to all; but, without a knowledge of all the secret springs which conduce to their production, it is impossible to estimate the infinite modifications which may be introduced, without detracting any thing essential from the ultimate effect. The difference between the man of genius and the man of rule, is to be sought for less in the standard they use, than in the manner of using it. The able calculator, and the blundering novice, have each the same rules and formulæ; yet how differently do they apply the same instrument? The one, by a constant exercise of ingenuity, gives to his art an extent of application to which the other is a total stranger; and, under the most complicated circumstances, renders his elementary knowledge subservient to purposes with which the other is entirely unacquainted. Thus, too, the man of genius has only the opinions of mankind, and the analysis of his own feelings, to direct him; but those opinions are accurately ascertained, those feelings ably analyzed. While effects present themselves, causes are investigated; and thus, instead of arbitrary rules, disconnected, or united only by the bond of system, he possesses the results of philosophical thought; and is able, from his elevated station, in one comprehensive survey, to include, not isolated facts merely, but facts with all their distinct relations and dependencies.

This train of reflections I cannot bring to a conclusion, better than by quoting the just and eloquent remarks of Sir Joshua Reynolds, sanctioned as they are by the still higher authority of Mr. Stewart: "What we call genius begins not where rules, abstractedly taken, end; but where known vulgar and trite rules have no longer any place."—"It is true, these refined principles cannot be always made palatable, like the more gross rules of art; yet it does not follow but that the mind may be put in such a train, that it shall perceive, by a kind of scientific sense, that propriety which words can but very feebly suggest."

The History of Ethics: a Course of Lectures delivered at the Surrey and Philomathic Institutions. By the Reverend WILLIAM BENGOT COLLYER, D.D. LL.D., F.A.S. President of the Philomathic Institution, &c. &c. &c.—LECTURE II.

THE difference between the various writers on morals has been less relative to the subject itself, than to the principle into which it is to be resolved. Mankind, from the very earliest inquiries after right and wrong, have arrived, for the most part, at the same conclusions, but they have not deduced them from the same source. Paley has justly observed, that if it be asked, "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" six different persons will give as many different answers to this important inquiry. "Because it is right," says one: "Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things," says another: "Because it is conformable to reason and nature," says a third: "Because it is conformable to truth," says a fourth: "Because it promotes the public good," says a fifth: "Because it is required by the will of God," concludes a sixth. These are the principal, although not all the bases assumed by those who have written on Ethics. The first, begs the question, which is to ascertain what is right. The second, places morals on intellectual superiority, which is necessary to decide on the fitness of things. The third, perplexes the inquiry with metaphysical disquisitions, from the perplexities of which the mind escapes bewildered, with the mere advantage of finding that it is unable to decide by such a mode what is conformable to reason and nature. The fourth, advances a position, without assigning a reason why we are obliged to conform to truth; asserts the principle, without supporting its claims. The fifth, makes it a question of jurisprudence, rather than of morals generally. The sixth, lays a basis which will be found to be the only secure one, but is met with the objection, How is the will of God to be ascertained? Is it by revelation? *that* is limited at present in its circulation, and the obligations of morals are universal. If not—by what means shall this will be learned? and by what argument shall the fact be established, that any supposed duty is really so; that any particular requisition is conformable to the Divine Will? This supposes a knowledge of the Divine Being, which has not obtained universally, except in so limited a degree that it can be scarcely so termed.

Yet will these men, setting out as from the different points of a circle, converge towards a common centre. They will

arrive at the conclusion, that to keep one's word is a moral duty—and, at variance as to the principles which they advance, they will ultimately coincide in respect of the object. This is a most important fact in connexion with Ethics—a demonstration that, whether we can develop the process or not, the law of our nature, and that of morals, is coincident: and the system which most closely approximates them, tracing both to the Deity, is most likely to approach nearest the truth. To trace distinctly the operation, may be more difficult than to find the basis—but to agree in the result, even while we differ as to the detail, establishes morals beyond dispute. The subject has engaged the attention of every civilized country—and man in a savage state, which has perhaps been unjustly called a state of nature, since we have no certain reasons to conclude that he was from the beginning what he is found to be in an uncivilized condition,—man even in a savage state, is not without his fixed principles of moral action, and a sort of intuitive perception of duty. To argue that such a perception supersedes the necessity of moral investigation, would be absurd: but it is here alluded to, simply to shew, that the basis of morals, whatever it is, is laid in the very constitution of our nature. No language is to be found in which terms expressive of virtue and vice, describing the boundaries of right and wrong, conveying praises and censures as connected with the one and with the other, do not subsist. Language is the communication of feeling—the vehicle of imparting thoughts, convictions, principles, perceptions; and such terms argue correspondent impressions, or they had never been invented.

The question relates to the origination of this common principle: and I cannot but think metaphysical disquisition has clouded the subject which it intended to elucidate. Because fables were abused, and because tradition was sometimes absurd, Aristotle resolved to reduce every thing to reason, and to account, therefore, for every thing. He perplexed himself; and others, who adopted his mode of investigation, without possessing his magnificent powers and his discriminating judgment, mistook sophistry for reason, and disputation for wisdom. We must be satisfied to know some facts, without being able precisely to understand how to develop them. A result may be clear, where the process is concealed. To investigate mind, to trace its operations, to discover how it is wrought upon, as well as how it acts, is a noble and interesting study. But if on

physics, we are obliged occasionally to be satisfied with a fact, without being capable of accounting for it, shall metaphysical research be always clear and undoubting? or shall any grand fact, relating to morals, be resigned, because we cannot trace the mode of its operation upon the human mind? The same rule applied to subjects, on the results of which no doubt is entertained, will be found to involve the same perplexities. The evidence of the senses is held unquestionable testimony; yet philosophers, when their inquiries are exhausted after the reasons assignable for the admission or rejection of their testimony, must be content at last to resolve it into the constitution of human nature; and to receive it as legitimate proof relative to those things which lie within the department of the senses. I have wished, therefore, to separate the inquiry after morals, so far as possible, from physical and metaphysical disquisition, and to associate it with facts, that we may obtain from these some information applicable to purposes of general utility.

It has been already seen that Pythagoras, and the earlier moralists, satisfied themselves with suggesting general rules for the regulation of the conduct, as precepts, admonitions, or doctrines, without combining them into theory, or inquiring far into their foundation and their sanctions. They rather produced them as self-evident propositions, addressed to a moral faculty, which could not fail to convince by their coincidence with this unknown and undefined principle. As a plain man would say to another, this is green, and this is blue; this is white, and this is black; without speculating on the theory of colours—simply addressing the senses—these early sages contented themselves with appealing to the understanding and the heart, and saying, this is right, and this is wrong.

We shall take our former stand, and begin with Socrates. The grand distinction between this philosopher and others, was not simply that he arranged morals into a more perfect system, reducing to form the crude and mingled elements of his predecessors, although he was the first to do this—since others, who succeeded him, organized Ethics still more carefully than he did, and would have borne from him the meed of praise, had this been his primary excellence—but the glorious characteristic of the philosophical labours of this great man, was, that they were practical—that they all tended to useful results, and demanded active obedience. Speculative morality regards truth abstractedly; but the

great study of Socrates was Man. His object was not merely to lead to an apprehension of truth, but to produce the practice of virtue. While, therefore, he sacrificed all other sciences to the study of morals, he separated from morals themselves, that which was speculative, retaining only that which was practical. In this, I apprehend, consisted his grand distinction and his chief excellence.

I would not be understood to insinuate that the speculative philosophers wholly withdrew their disquisitions from practical results. Plato affirms that "to philosophize is to know, to love, and to imitate God," and that "he deserves ill of philosophy, who lives not philosophically;" which is but saying, in other words, that the speculations which regard truth are unavailing, except they are also practical in morals. Seneca asks, therefore, "What is philosophy, but a law of life?*" Plutarch affirms, that "to be truly wise, is not only to understand what constitutes being, but to be engaged in what contributes to well-being.†" Epictetus charges his disciples, "not to tell the world that they were philosophers in words, but by deeds." Even Aristotle, who abounded so much in speculation, allowed the superiority of practical ethics. "Many," said this great man, "neglect these things, and, resorting to their reason, they philosophize, and so expect to be virtuous; resembling a man who should call in medical advice, listen attentively to the physician, but never follow his prescriptions: if speculation in the one case could not heal the body, in the other it will never cure the mind.‡" All, therefore, allowed the necessity of practical over theoretical morality; but Socrates alone, excluding speculation, confined himself to the preceptive part of Ethics. And I have dwelt the more earnestly upon this, because, while he was the centre whence the different schools proceeded, we are not to expect any very accurate definition of principles from what is recorded as spoken by him, his whole study being to urge the practice, and to discountenance speculative philosophy.

Xenophon and Æschinus adhered precisely to the Ethics of Socrates, while various modifications admitted by others of his disciples gave birth to the different sects of the Ionic school successively: these again, as we shall now perceive, even from a superficial and hasty glance, originated the various bases which have been assumed by modern writers on Ethics. Briefly to point out the evidences of this state-

* Epist. 90.

† Plut. de placit. philos. lib. 1.

‡ Arist. Eth. i. 2. c. 4.

ment, by a rapid comparison between them, will occupy the remaining space of this Lecture; which is but a continued sketch of the history of morals, embracing more particularly the separate or combined principles on which they have been usually enforced.

Aristippus the Cyrenian founded the sect called the Cyreniac; proposing *happiness* as the chief good. Antisthenes was the father of the Cynics, who taught that *virtue* was the principal thing. He was followed by Zeno, with whom the Stoics originated; whose principles accorded of course with this grand maxim, and with the general opinions of Socrates. Euclid gave birth to a sect called variously Megarics, Eristics, and Dialectics. Phædo established the Eleatic sect; and Plato, the most distinguished of all, was the founder of the Academics. Having gathered into one beautiful combination the scattered parts of philosophy, he distributed them into physics, morals, and logic; with the second of which we have to do. Plato makes happiness the chief end of moral prudence, which he branches out into comprehension of circumstances, promptitude and felicity of determination, and precautions relative to things which may arise, that they should not take us by surprise, nor impede the advancement of the individual towards this ultimate good. He calls this faculty by various names; dexterity of judgment, sagacity, a natural facility, a sort of intuitive science; he says that it is blended with, and perfected by, experience; and this combination alone forms the true philosopher. The self-reflection in which all this terminates is but another name for *conscience*. The rule of moral prudence he affirms to be according to *right reason*, called also, the light, or law, of nature—the common law—and he refers it to the eternal law of nature, which, amidst the various laws of nations and their vicissitudes, continues uniform and the same; which, therefore, he calls *Being* (*το ον*). We find ourselves plunged at once into the various theories by which moralists have attempted to define Ethics: for whether the appeal be to sympathies, conscience, the moral sense, the fitness of things, or other bases, they all find some counterpart in this broad exposition of Plato, which he branches into endless ramifications as to their application. One thing is clear, he resolves them eventually into conscience, founding this innate principle, as the law of morals, upon the law of nature; which law again he ascribes as an effect of an eternal law which he calls sacred, and evidently assigns to the Deity. The conclusion conforms precisely

with the great principle of Socrates; who associated indissolubly the maxims which were fitted for the regulation of human conduct with "sublime conceptions respecting the character and government of the Supreme Being; and called the first principles of virtuous conduct, which are common to all mankind—laws of God, from which," he says, "no man departs with impunity." Conscience, or the moral sense, seems to have been the rule established by Socrates; and to this point, the elaborate and extended details of Plato visibly converge.

With this great master the different sects substantially agree. Aristotle, when his sentiments are disengaged from his logical and metaphysical subtleties, seems to divide virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, the one exercising the understanding, the other tending to the active pursuit of that which is right and good, happiness being the end, and consisting in conformity to virtue. We arrive at the same conclusion—happiness the object; conscience and reason, allied and exercised, the rule of morals.

The Stoics traced morals to conformity to nature, and contended that circumstances had nothing to do with happiness—that pain was therefore no evil—that all external things were indifferent, for virtue was itself happiness. However preposterous is the argument, and untrue, as it violates the law of nature, by which man is so constituted as to be affected necessarily by circumstances, the object of morals is still the same—happiness. And what can be intended by conformity to nature, as the means of securing this happiness, which they represent as but another name for virtue, unless they believed that in nature a law was written, call it conscience, or moral sense, or by whatever other name may be preferred? Thus resolving, in effect, the rule into that assumed by Socrates, as well as agreeing with him in the object.

Widely removed as Epicurus appeared to be from the Stoics, he agreed in fact both as to the end of morals, and the means. Pleasure was with him but another term for happiness; since his pleasure professedly, and in respect of himself practically, consisted in virtue. His followers, who so grossly abused his system, and have attached such unmerited dishonour to his name, should have rather arranged themselves under the banners of Aristippus, who, while he employed the term happiness, meant only pleasure, and referred pleasure to sensuality; with Protagoras, with

Pyrrho, and those other atomists, who taught that the distinctions between virtue and vice are arbitrary—that nothing is just or unjust in itself—that every thing depends upon human laws—and is in its own nature perfectly indifferent—and that to gratify himself, in whatever way his passions may stimulate him, is the only good of man. These abominable sentiments (for may we not so characterize them, when the very being of society is endangered by their adoption?) have been charged upon Epicurus, and his memory loaded with a reproach, which it has borne from century to century, but which belonged to another, and totally distinct party. These, too, are the conclusions to which the plausible, but dangerous doctrine of expediency will lead, if the principle be practically admitted, and honestly acted upon; and it would not be difficult to trace the analogy which actually subsists between a creed which avows the absolute indifference of right and wrong, and one which refers it to human passions and interests, to decide upon what is most expedient to the individual, who, constituted his own judge, will draw his inferences irrespective of society, according to the cupidity of his own imaginary interests or pleasures.

The Eclectic philosophers professed to take what was excellent from the various schools, without respect of party; and to combine into one grand system, the labours and opinions of those who preceded them, so far as these were conformable to truth and nature. But the execution of this design did not correspond with its pretensions: and it has been well observed, while they combined the dogmas of Aristotle and Zeno with the extravagance of the East, professing to found their general principles upon Plato, that “they added nothing to the purity of Plato’s ethics; and “they increased the obscurity and mysticism of his physics and metaphysics.”

I will only add, respecting the Stoics, that as they held but one substance in the universe, whether active or passive—as they called the active principle *God*—in making virtue consist in conformity to nature, they in effect agreed with those who lay, as the basis of morals, conformity to the Divine Will. In fine, Warburton has characterized the leaders of the Grecian sects of philosophers, with more accuracy than has sometimes been admitted, when he styled Plato the advocate of *moral sense*; Aristotle, of *essential differences*; and Zeno, of *arbitrary will*. The Academics and Stoics seem to divide the ancient moral world between

them ; while their contiguous boundaries discover how much they were once one, ranging under their mighty monarch Socrates. He was in the philosophical world what Alexander was in the political. The last subdued until no more remained to conquer, and when he died, left no hand sufficiently powerful to grasp the sceptre of his universal monarchy, composed of discordant elements, which he alone had the power to control and the skill to blend : when he expired, his empire was broken into fragments, and divided among his captains. So, when Socrates fell, his distinguished disciples, unable to retain the imperial authority which he had exercised over morals—a department so exclusively his own, that he seemed to have been created for it—each took the portion which his own genius or studies preferred, and while the separations became visible, they were not so formidable as to destroy the evidence that the whole had been once undivided. To the Academics, we attach the illustrious name of Cicero ; and to the Stoics, the no less glorious title of Epictetus. The writings of these extraordinary men will not fail to impress upon us that respect and reverence, which we ought to bear to the ancients in regard to morals, whatever might be their mistakes on other subjects, and will fully justify our modern writers on Ethics, in rallying round one or other of these great masters, who differed in the detail, but united in the aggregate.

It is now that I feel all the difficulty of my undertaking, especially in connexion with the present Lecture, and I have more than ever repented that I did not make it what I had originally intended, a mere continuation of the history of morals. For a general examination of the various bases of morals assumed by different writers, obliges me to give a summary of systems, no inconsiderable volumes in themselves, each of which demands to be examined at still greater length ; and this at the hazard of mistaking or misrepresenting men, who, on such a subject, ought to be heard for themselves, and to speak their own language. I have, however, undertaken, and must accomplish my engagement as well as I am able : nor shall I trust wholly to my own investigation of these theories, but suffer myself to be guided by those who have more deeply studied, who more fully apprehend, and who are more capable of accurately representing them.

Of the system of Hobbes there can be no danger of misrepresentation. It is scarcely possible to make any statement relative to it, at all varying from the original principles,

which must not be considered an improvement. He adopted without scruple, and to all the length of their licentious tendency, the opinions (for who can call them principles?) of Protagoras; and affirmed that the laws of every state are the proper and only criteria of right and wrong; that man is to be restrained only within positive institutions by the penalties of their enactments, and that the whole being a system of convention, and (shall I say?) *expediency*, the characters of good and evil, ciphers in themselves, gather their importance exclusively from the law. It would be gross injustice to the advocate of such a palpably mischievous system, not to state, that the evil was found in his system exclusively, for that its framer was a man of unimpeached character; and any severity of expression is intended in this, as in every similar instance, for the system, and not for its author. Corrupt theories are, however, more dangerous in their influence, as they emanate from men of amiable tempers and irreproachable conduct: and while the individuals are treated with the respect and consideration due to their personal virtues, it becomes more obviously our duty not to spare their pernicious systems.

Cudworth demonstrated, on the contrary, that moral principles are not to be derived from human institutions, but are founded in human nature. He refers to the *understanding*, as the power by which the discriminations of right and wrong are to be made; and combined this sentiment with the Platonic tenet, that all knowledge was a kind of reminiscence. The objection against this system, besides Platonic mysticism, lies in the fact, that our moral errors scarcely ever originate in ignorance of duty, but from other causes, not connected with the understanding. Dr. Price, therefore, agreeing with Cudworth, that the sanctions of morality arise out of the reason, refers our notions of right and wrong, "not to a deductive process of the understanding, but to immediate intuition." The objection here will lie in the indefinite sense in which the term *reason* is employed, and the various notions, distinct, and even opposite in themselves, which he assigns to this faculty.

Dr. Clarke, Mr. Wollaston, and Lord Shaftesbury, may all be considered of this school; resolving moral approbation into "sense of propriety acting according to the fitness and congruity which appear in certain relations of nature," or, "agreeably to the truth of things in their proper nature,"

or, according to the latter, "in reason preserving a proper balance of the affections." The answer to all this appears to be, that the system, however modified, which founds the principle of Ethics upon the understanding, or perception of the fitness of things, would require, as its fair deduction, that the most intelligent should also be the most moral man; which is assuredly contradicted by the experience of every day; and demands that we should refer to something beyond merely mental powers and intellectual perceptions, as a foundation of morals. Besides which, if this law could ever apply with certainty, it could only do so partially, not only as it respects the varying faculties of individuals, but the different circumstances of culture in which man is placed. Morals require an universal law, being of universal obligation: but a capacity to judge of the fitness of this, must depend, not merely, for its proportions, upon original mental power, but upon the extent of intellectual cultivation: and still further upon the actual state of society: a rule of this description, applying to a state of civilization, would be of little avail, if not totally inapplicable, to the savage, who is nevertheless, in point of fact, as man, the subject of moral obligations.

Dr. Hutcheson, in referring the origin of our ideas of right and wrong to a *moral sense*, illustrates its action by comparing it with the operation of the senses: but if virtues be but sensations, they are not permanent in their nature: and it has been well observed, that "sensations merely relate to the mind in which they exist, and have no permanent connexion with external objects." The conclusions of a sceptical nature, which might be drawn, and have been drawn, by Mr. Hume, from this system, are not authorized by Dr. Hutcheson; but it is an objection to his system, that it cannot be sufficiently guarded against them. Mr. Hume has framed out of it one of *utility*, which will lead to *expediency*, and this again to indulgences without character, and without limit. Nor does the celebrated theory of Smith, resolving these notions into *sympathy*, escape wholly the power of this whirlpool—it plays too much about the circumference, not to lead us to fear its approximation to the vortex. Dr. Butler, always admirable in whatever he reasons upon, and Dr. Reid, appear to settle down upon *conscience*, as not a perfect law, but the most determinate within our reach, as arising simply from nature. Whether any law of nature can be equal to the subject, is another question. Dr. Reid says, "The sum of what has been said in this

chapter* is, that, by an original power of the mind, which we call *conscience*, or the *moral faculty*, we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct; of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and that, by the same faculty, we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong: that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties."

To close this general review of the various bases assumed by different writers, suffer me to relate an anecdote relative to Sir J. Pringle.† "In Mr. de Luc's letters on Religious Education, (published in 1800), a conversation is detailed between the author and Sir John Pringle, who had formerly been Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Mr. de Luc was talking of a new work on the subject of morality founded upon nature, which had just been published, and which he offered to procure for Sir John's perusal. This, he says, the Baronet refused in a tone which could not be expressed. 'I have been,' said he, 'for many years professor of this pretended science; I had ransacked the libraries and my own brain, to discover the foundation of it; but the more I sought to persuade and convince my pupils, the less confidence I began to have myself, in what I was teaching them; so that at length I gave up my profession, and returned to medicine, which had been the first object of my studies. I have, nevertheless, continued from time to time, to examine every thing that appeared upon this subject, which, as I have told you, I could never explain or teach, so as to produce conviction: but, at length, I have given up the point, most thoroughly assured, that without an express divine sanction attached to the laws of morality, and without positive laws, accompanied with determinate and urgent motives, men will never be convinced that they ought to submit to any such code, nor agree among themselves concerning it. From that time, I have never read any work upon morality but the Bible, and I return to that always with fresh delight.'"+

To sum up the whole,—A considerable approximation of the various systems to each other, is to be discovered in ancient and modern times; and the bases of morals, however apparently differing, if closely examined, will be found to

* Reid on the Active Powers of Man, Essay iii. c. 6.

† Classical Journal. Vol. ix. No. xvii. p. 76.

assimilate beyond our first expectations. The *Happiness* of Plato, and the *Pleasure* of Epicurus, were but different names for one thing. *The love of virtue for itself*, advanced by that sage, and *The admiration of what is beautiful, fit, and proper*, contended for by Shaftesbury, and others of that school, strikingly coalesce. The law of *Conscience*, assumed by Epictetus, and *the Moral Sense* of Cudworth and his followers, have a common source. Again, we look with veneration to Socrates, who made *God the author, conscience the law, and happiness the end*, of morals.

There are evidences which lie beyond the reach of argument, as conclusive and irresistible as they are indefinable. When Sterne burst into tears, under the influence of a sensibility irrepressibly excited by human misery—he said, “I am positive I have *a soul*, and all the materialists in the universe shall not persuade me to the contrary.” It was not a time to argue, but the proof was demonstrative. We may distract our attention with metaphysical disquisitions, without obtaining satisfaction; we may contend respecting the bases of morals, without coming to any certain conclusion; but morals themselves are eternal and immutable, and the homage due to them lies deeply implanted in the human heart. What but this, when the heiress of the British throne expired, caused the tears of the nation to flow? We beheld personal loveliness, conjugal affections, constitutional principles, moral excellencies, blossoming around us like another Eden. Death came, like the blast of the desert, and these flowers of Paradise all withered at once. The waste of desolation which then spread around us, in place of this garden of delights—the sense which we then had of this melancholy change—the deep anguish which we then felt—the unfeigned sorrow which we cherished—the bitter tears which we dropped upon the wilderness and the solitude, were evidences beyond all arguments, of the reality of morals, and of the inestimable character which we spontaneously assign to them, wherever they exist, as they flourished in Britain’s lost and lamented child!

Thoughts on the Slaying of the Witnesses.

(In a Letter addressed to a Friend.)

[The following judicious Letter has been transmitted to us by a friend of the Writer’s, to whose request for its appearance in our pages we yield a cheerful compliance.—EDIT.]

DEAR FRIEND,—The Slaying of the Witnesses, foretold Rev. xi., and the lying of their dead bodies for three days

and a half in the streets of the great city; must be intended as a representation of the Christian church in *her lowest estate*—*when most prevailed against by her enemies, and nearest to utter extinction*. Before this, the witnesses are *alive*, though prophesying in sackcloth; but now they are *dead*, and their enemies greatly rejoice and triumph over them. There have been till of late, and perhaps there may be at present, some learned men of opinion, that the low estate of the church, represented by the slaying of the witnesses, is not yet come; and that the Christian church before the commencement of the Millennium, is to be reduced to a state of greater wretchedness than ever. For my own part, however, I am fully satisfied with the reasonings of the late President Edwards, (see his Works, vol. ii. p. 496,) intended to prove, that the slaying of the witnesses is a representation of the dark time just preceding the Reformation. How awfully wretched was this period! What a scarcity of bibles! And how few were able to read and understand them! The Waldenses and Albigenses, among whom the true church had existed for many ages, were fully conquered, so that there was scarcely any visible remains of the Christian church to be found in any part of the world! The emissaries of Rome, traversing all the countries of Europe, for the diabolical purpose of *selling indulgences*, &c. Antichrist at this time, seemed to be seated upon an immoveable throne, without any fear of being again opposed. But, lo! from the very midst of this ten-fold darkness, the holy flame of the Reformation bursts forth almost at once amongst the nations of Europe. A natural resurrection from the dead could not have been less expected, or have displayed, to an enlightened mind, a stronger demonstration of the power of God. If we consider the state of the world at present—the rapid increase of knowledge in general—the unexampled efforts, and wonderful success, of Bible Societies—the labours and zeal of the numerous friends and supporters of Missionary, Tract, and Education Societies, &c.—If we take a general survey, and consider the present state of mankind, does it not appear impossible that such ignorance, superstition, and barbarism, should again prevail, as did prevail in the dark ages before the Reformation? Is it not utterly impossible to bring about such a change in so short a time? It could not be done without a miracle.

Although there are many things relating to the *time* and *manner* of the fulfilment of the promises enveloped in dark-

ness, I firmly think we may rest assured, that the melancholy state of the church, signified by the slaying of the witnesses, is *already past*, and that the blessed kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is to be *progressive*, till the knowledge of him shall fill the earth as the waters cover the seas.

It is agreed, that the time allotted for the witnesses to prophesy in sackcloth is 1260 years, and that at the end of their prophesying, they were to be slain. But learned men have greatly disagreed respecting the period when we are to fix the *beginning* of the 1260 years. When did the *time, times, and half a time—the 42 months, and the 1260 days*, (all signifying 1260 years,) begin? When was the woman obliged to fly into the wilderness, (Rev. xii.) and when did the two witnesses begin their prophesying in sackcloth? For my own part, I think that Paul has given us a sure clue to fix this time, 2 Thess. ii. 7, 8. “For the mystery of iniquity doth already work; only he which now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way, and then shall that Wicked be revealed.” I believe it is agreed, that what the apostle referred to, as the let or hinderance of the man of sin, was the *pagan imperial power*, which would not suffer ecclesiastical power to grow to an exorbitant height. The man of sin could not shew himself, while this power continued at Rome; but as soon as this hinderance should be removed, the wicked one was to be revealed. We all know that this event took place just at the beginning of the fourth century, when our countryman, Constantine the Great, who professed himself a Christian, was advanced to the imperial dignity. By attending to the history of the church immediately after the time of Constantine, we discover the man of sin appearing in a most appalling and terrific form.

“Whether the conversion of Constantine, commonly called the Great,” says an elegant author, “was effected by political motives, by public expedience, or by serious conviction, may be fairly questioned. To whatever cause that event may be attributed, it was under his government, that Christianity became the religion of the empire. It was now that the divine plan was abandoned for one of man’s invention. That system, which was once like the tree of God,—beautiful for its foliage, and loaded with fruit, which was a blessing to the world, became a feeble sickly *parasytical* plant, that weakly leans upon foreign support, while it mars the beauty, and paralyzes

the energies, of the parent trunk. What the church now gained in wealth and power, she lost in purity, simplicity, and fervent devotion;—what she gained in pomp and parade, she lost in spirituality. The worship which once was distinguished for its plainness, was now exchanged for forms and ceremonies, and bodily exercise which profiteth little. Lordly revenues were appropriated to the support of the ministry of the word, and the humble ministers of the primitive gospel were succeeded *in office* by lordly priests, who fettered the consciences, and made merchandise of the souls, of men. The discipline of the church became a mere engine of temporal power, and an authority thus crept in, totally unknown before, and ill adapted to the spirit and principles of a kingdom which is ‘not of this world.’”*

Now if we date the commencement of the 1260 years, about the beginning of the *fourth century*, their end must have been in the *sixteenth century*, which was famous for the Reformation.

I am inclined to think that there are *three* grand periods described in the book of Revelation previous to the commencement of the Millennium. The *first* commencing about the day of Pentecost, and continuing till the time of Constantine. During this period, the church, although in a prosperous state, is grievously persecuted by the pagan powers. The *second* period commences at the time of Constantine, continues for about 1260 years, and ends about the time of the Reformation, in the tenth century. In this period the church is in the wilderness, greatly oppressed by the antichristian power. The *third* period commences at the time of the Reformation, and ends at the utter fall of Babylon, and the commencement of the Millennium. The length of this period does not seem to be particularly specified; but it must be very evident to the attentive reader, that the resurrection of the witnesses is not the commencement of the Millennium. At the resurrection of the witnesses it is said, “There was a great earthquake, and the *tenth part* of the city fell, and in the earthquake were slain of men ten thousand.” But how different is this from the description that is given of the *utter* destruction of the city in the xvi. xvii. and xviii. of the Revelation? In the first

* See an Introductory Discourse, delivered at Newcastle, in Staffordshire, Oct. 10, 1811, at the Ordination of the Rev. Thos. Sleight, by the late Rev. William Evans, of Stockport. Also, Formey’s Ecclesiastical History, Vol. I. page 70.

period, the man of sin is *conceived*, but not born. In the second, the monster is *born*, and makes his terrific appearance, and grows in strength and power till he seems to have all the world under his dominion. In the third period we see the *decline* of the man of sin. At its very commencement he receives his *mortal wound*, and then one plague after another is poured upon him, till he is utterly destroyed. To the first period, seems to belong, *the opening of the seven seals*,—to the second, *the sounding of the seven trumpets*,—and to the third, *the pouring out of the seven vials*. But it seems that the opening of the *seventh* seal, is introductory to the sounding of the trumpets; the sounding of the *seventh* trumpet, introductory to the pouring out of the vials; and the pouring out of the *seventh* vial, introductory to the Millennium.

It is not easy, perhaps, to determine with certainty, what vial is running out at the present day. It is said that “the sixth angel poured out his vial upon the great river Euphrates, and the water thereof was dried up, that the way of the kings of the east might be prepared.” *Rev. xvi. 12.* There is evidently an allusion, here, to the taking of the city of Babylon. It was by means of drying up the bed of the river Euphrates, that Cyrus prevailed against and conquered the city. The pouring out, therefore, of the vial on the great river Euphrates, as President Edwards observes, must intend some *energetic preparations* for the taking of the spiritual Babylon. And are there not *now*, my friend, extraordinary preparations made for the taking of the city? Is it not probable, at least, that the sixth vial is rapidly running out, and that the pouring out of the seventh vial *into the air* (denoting universality) is soon to follow, when the great voice out of the temple of heaven, from the throne, shall be heard, saying, “IT IS DONE.”

The hope that the above remarks may afford you some degree of profit and pleasure, will abundantly remunerate, for the little trouble of writing them.

Believe me,

My dear friend,

Your affectionate fellow-labourer in the Gospel,

JOHN ROBERTS.

Llanbrynmair, Sept. 9th. 1824.

REVIEW.

Jerusalem Delivered. An Epic Poem in 20 Cantos. Translated into English Spenserian Verse, from the Italian of Tasso, &c. &c. By J. H. Wiffen. In two vols. Royal, 8vo. Vol. 1. London, Hurst, Robinson, and Co. pp. 619.

PERHAPS there never was an age or a country in which so much eagerness has been displayed in the cultivation of science, nor so much anxiety exhibited for its promotion and encouragement, as in our own. The human mind, emancipated at length from the shackles of custom and of prejudice, seems determined to re-assert its independence, and to make up by the vigour of its present exertions for the inglorious slumbers of past ages. Science is placed upon its proper footing—first principles have been diligently sought, and when ascertained, have been carefully recorded as the foundation of future discoveries. Theories, which were once sufficiently upheld by a name, have been referred to the test of experiment; and none have been permitted to stand, but such as have been confirmed and supported by the unerring testimony of fact. To whatever point of the horizon we direct our attention, we shall find that all is bustle and activity—life and animation. New schemes are perpetually producing, new discoveries are continually making, fresh candidates, in every department, are presenting themselves for the meed of public fame and favour. Competition calls forth talent, and emulation provokes excellence. On all sides we hear of literary achievements, almost any one of which would have been enough to illustrate and distinguish a former age. To what does all this tend? Doubtless to the reproduction of a golden era, in which liberty and knowledge shall diffuse themselves, and thus spread happiness over the face of the earth; when religious, and political, and intellectual tyranny shall give place to unbounded freedom of thought, and the wide world will become a vast arena, for the exhibition of all that is noble and manly in nature. We do not, however, by these observations, intend to depreciate the ages that are past, nor to assert an absolute monopoly in our own of all that is rare and excellent; we only mean to maintain, that the energies of the human mind are in more robust and lively exercise at the present period than they ever were before. We are, undoubtedly, highly indebted to those who have

preceded us, for the immense hoards of learning which they have amassed, and of which we are now reaping the benefit; but we are more especially indebted to those enlightened sages who first gave liberty to inquiry, and taught us the true methods of thinking. Nor are we so vain of the age in which we live, as to suppose that all its labours bear upon them the stamp of immortality, or that the inexhaustible fountains of knowledge are likely to be drained by the thirst of the present generation. We are quite aware that much of this prodigious birth of literature is but ephemeral, and that a small portion only of the mighty mass is destined to inherit perennial fame. Many things that are now known will again be neglected and forgotten; much of what is now believed will be again exploded; posterity will laugh at some of our absurdities and prejudices, as we have laughed at those of our ancestors; and the race that is to come, availing themselves of the labours of those that have gone before them, will in all probability reach a much higher point of perfection than we can ever hope to attain.

In an age thus devoted to science and literature, it may seem to some to be not a little remarkable that poetry should be found flourishing in such extreme profusion. It might have been thought that the reasoning faculty in a state of maturity would have poured contempt upon the vagaries of fancy, as fit exercise and amusement only for the vacant mind, and that it would have deprecated the cultivation of an art so little profitable, as it has been said, if it be not absolutely pernicious to society. Reason, however, has not been hitherto able to effect this revolution in the tastes of mankind, and in all likelihood it never will: but it has nevertheless done much to curb the licenses of fiction, to check its excesses, to restrain its absurdities within the bounds of decorum, and to encourage a more rational species of poetry addressed to the head and to the heart, through the medium of ordinary circumstances and probable incidents: and while circumscribed within these limits, we can see no greater objection to the art of poetry, than to any other. We certainly should not exclude it from our Utopia, since we can perceive no good reason why each and all the faculties and tastes of our nature should not receive their appropriate encouragement and gratification; not to insist upon what we are yet inclined to believe, that poetry, like eloquence, under proper management and in proper hands, might become again what it frequently has been already, a powerful engine for the promotion of virtue, and

an acting incentive to deeds of generosity and of patriotism. That such were the primitive objects of poetry, there can be no doubt, and though she soon became degraded to meaner, and often to the basest purposes, condescending even to become the handmaid of superstition and of vice; yet her divine original should not be forgotten. Possessing the power of delighting mankind, she may well be employed as the auxiliary of virtue; and when deprived of her meretricious attractions, and her false ornaments, and stripped of all her splendid machineries, her apparatus of gods and of angels, of nymphs and of dæmons, with all her phantasmagoria of unseen and unknown worlds, she may, in this enlightened age, yet find ample scope for the display of her powers, and ample resources within the regions of probability, among the beautiful realities of nature, and inexhaustible varieties of human character, to instruct, to elevate, and to delight. Whatever cause we may assign for the fact, it is certain that the age is not less prolific in poets than in scientific writers, nor is it wonderful that amidst the multitudes who are aspiring after celebrity, those whose imaginations are fertile should avail themselves of this superiority, as a means of rising into honourable notice. No class of writers, in short, have been more strenuous in their efforts to obtain the popular favour. Their labours have been so multifarious, their pretensions have been frequently so nicely balanced, and their demands upon our attention so clamorous, that we have often felt ourselves under the necessity of waving our claim to decide upon their respective merits, from an inability to do justice to all, and an unwillingness to give needless offence to any.

Yet among this host of competitors, our eyes have still been fixed upon a few, whose superior elevation of stature, and more decided dignity of deportment, distinguish them from the crowd by which they are surrounded, and in their gradual approaches towards perfection, we have always taken and do still take a very lively interest. To these we feel ourselves bound to devote our particular attention, at the risk even of offending the rest of their fraternity. We need say no more as an apology for the introduction of an old friend Mr. Wiffen, whose works, as well original as translated, have already acquired for him the notice and approbation of the public. It will be recollected by many of our readers, that this gentleman published, some time ago, a prospectus of the splendid work that lies now before us, which he prefaced by a dissertation, intended to shew

the necessity of a new translation of this wonderful Poem. We were quite satisfied of the propriety of a fresh attempt, from the arguments contained in that dissertation, and we were convinced, from the specimens he gave us, of his competency to do more complete justice to the immortal poet than had been rendered him by any preceding English translator. We have therefore anxiously awaited the publication of the volume which now makes its appearance, nor have we been disappointed in our expectations. It is printed by Moyes, in his most admirable style, and embellished with a beautiful portrait of Tasso, and with wood engravings, richly executed, illustrative of the story of the poem. On opening the book, we were struck with the elegance that characterizes the whole concern: the type is uncommonly fine, and the eye reposes with perfect satisfaction upon the page. It is evident that the author must have been at very great expense, to have produced a work so extremely finished in all its parts. It is dedicated to the Duchess of Bedford in the following beautiful stanzas:—

I.

YEARS have flown o'er since first my soul aspired
In song the sacred Missal to repeat,
Which sainted Tasso writ with pen inspired—
Told is my rosary, and the task complete:
And now, 'twixt hope and fear, with toil untired,
I cast the' ambrosial relique at thy feet;
Not without faith that in thy goodness thou
Wilt deign one smile to my accomplished vow.

II.

Not in dim dungeons to the clank of chains,
Like sad Torquato's, have the hours been spent
Given to the song, but in bright halls where reigns
Uncumbered Freedom,—with a mind unbent
By walks in woods, green dells, and pastoral plains,
To sound, far-off, of village merriment;
Albeit, perchance, some springs whence Tasso drew
His sweetest tones have touched my spirit too.

III.

O that as happier constellations bless
My studious life, my verses too could boast
Some happier graces, (*should I wish for less?*)
To' atone for charms unseized and splendours lost!—
No! the grand rainbow mocks the child's caress,
Who can but sorrow, as his fancy's crossed,
That e'er so beautiful a thing should rise,
To' elude his grasp, yet so enchant his eyes.

IV.

On the majestic Sorrentine I gazed
With a familiar joy—methought he smiled;
But now the vigil's past, I stand amazed
At the conceit, and sorrow like the child.
What second hand *can* paint the scenes that blazed
In Tasso's brain with tints as sweet and wild?
As much the shapes that on his canvass glow
Their birth to Frenzy as to Genius owe.

V.

Yet may I hope o'er generous minds to cast
A faint reflection of his matchless skill,
For here his own Sophronia, unaghast,
Flings firm defiance to her tyrant still,—
Clorinda bleeds, lovelorn Erminia fast
Hies through the forest at her steed's wild will;
And in these pages still Armida's charms
Strike the rapt heart, and wake a world to arms.

VI.

Thus then, O Lady, with thy name I grace
The glorious fable; fitly, since to thee
And thine the thanks are due, that in the face
Of time and toil, the Poet's devotee
Has raised the' enchanted structure on its base,
And to thy hand now yields the' unclosing key.—
Blest if in one bright intellect like thine
He wins regard, and builds himself a shrine! [p. iii.—vi.]

Both the Preface and the Life of Tasso are uncommonly interesting. They are written in a very rich and musical style, approaching as nearly in their construction to the Italian model as the genius of our language would permit. We are only sorry that our engagements and our limits will not allow us to do more than merely advertise our readers of the pleasure they may expect to derive from the perusal of the Life. We believe it to be by far the most correct account that has been published in any language. The author has taken the greatest pains to clear up the difficult passages of the eventful story, and by a diligent comparison of various records, as well as from the internal evidence of Tasso's own writings, he has undoubtedly established the certainty of the poet's secret and ardent, though most unfortunate, attachment to the Princess Leonora of Este, as well as the disgraceful conduct of her brother the reigning Duke of Ferrara, beyond all controversy. The reader will perceive from the following extract what trouble the author has taken to elucidate these topics, and we shall be greatly

disappointed if this delightful piece of biography does not obtain his entire approbation.

“The life (says Mr. Wiffen) prefixed to the Poem, will, I trust, be found to shed some additional lights on the subject of Tasso's love for the Princess Leonora. Materials for this memoir were so abundant, that the greatest difficulty was to select and to compress. The biographical work of Manso was, it is well known, written some years after the poet's death, and having known Tasso only in the last years of his life, his accounts of the early and most interesting portion of it, are often exaggerated and without foundation. It seemed preferable, therefore, to follow in the main the details of Serassi, whose volume bears throughout marks of the greatest research, and who had at his command a vast number of original and unedited documents. Dr. Black, however, in his elegant and elaborate Life, whilst deriving from this source the bulk of his materials, has greatly elucidated some points which were left obscure by Serassi, and in particular the history of that malady of mind with which the poet was afflicted. I have accordingly made an equal use of the English as of the Italian author, weighing well, however, the statements of both on the long controverted questions of the poet's love and imprisonment. I had soon cause to acknowledge, in the evident disguises which Serassi casts over Tasso's attachment, the justice of Dr. Black's observation, ‘that his country, his profession, his prejudices, his fears, and perhaps his hopes, all took from the Abbé that liberty of mind, without which it was impossible to elucidate the truth;’ nothing, in fact, is more apparent than that the truth has been concealed by him. Though avowedly sensible of this, the Doctor's opinions on the point are coloured more deeply than one would expect by the Abbé's representations. I was satisfied with neither; but having been recommended by the Sig. Foscoló to introduce translations of Tasso's lyric poetry, a superior edition of which he was so obliging as to lend me, I found in the poet's verses to Leonora, passages that seemed greatly to elucidate the subject, and I have accordingly drawn largely from this interesting source of information. The conclusions which I formed from these passages, were afterwards greatly confirmed by a perusal of Ginguené, in whom I discovered a singular unison of sentiment, both with regard to Serassi's disingenuousness and the poet's ardent passion. With his arguments accordingly I have strengthened my own, citing, however, in a number of translated verses, proofs which even Ginguené seems wholly to have overlooked.

“Restricted as I was, I found it impossible to narrate more fully the particulars of this great man's life; less I could not say. It was my wish to have added another volume to the work, consisting of a selection from his smaller poems, which have been too much neglected, as well as from his literary correspondence, valuable alike to the poet and the philosopher, and deeply interesting to all,

from the exhibition which it furnishes of one of the most ardent, the most amiable, and, alas that I should say it! the most unhappy minds, that ever existed to excite the pity and the admiration of mankind. But so many instances have occurred to me of an author's fatiguing the public ear by too voluminously dwelling on some favourite subject, that it has seemed preferable to wait for an invitation to the task, rather than to be guilty of what might chance to be considered an infliction on the public indulgence. Should such a volume ever engage my attention, an account of the various editions of the 'Gerusalemme' may find in it an appropriate place, as well as of the unknown translation of Sir George Turberville, which occupies in merit a middle station between those of Fairfax and Carew. This I have ample means of illustrating, from my short-hand transcript of the original MS. preserved in the Bodleian library. Meanwhile those bibliographers who are desirous of seeing a specimen of his powers as a translator, may be referred to Dr. Bliss's valuable addition to Wood's 'Athenæ Oxonienses.'— [Preface, pp. x.—xiii.]

We will quote one of the translations from Tasso's lyric poetry, with which Mr. Wiffen has managed to elucidate and render interesting the poet's life.

TO LEONORA OF ESTE.

Al nobil colle, ove in antichi marmi.

To the romantic hills where free
To thine enchanted eyes,
Works of Greek taste in statuary
Of antique marbles rise,
My thought, fair Leonora, roves,
And with it to their gloom of groves
Fast bears me as it flies;
For far from thee in crowds unblest,
My fluttering heart but ill can rest*.

There to the rock, cascade, and grove,
On mosses dropt with dew,
Like one who thinks and sighs of love †
The livelong summer through,
Oft would I dictate glorious things
Of heroes on the Tuscan strings
Of my sweet lyre, and to
The whispering brooks and trees around,
Ippolito's high name resound.

* *Che mal può da voi lunge omai quietarmi.*

† *Pur come uom, che d'amor pensa e sospira.*

But now what longer keeps me here,
 And who, dear Lady, say,
 O'er Alpine rocks and marshes drear,
 A weary length of way,
 Guides me to thee, so that entwined
 With leaves by poesy bequeathed
 From Daphne's hallowed bay,
 I trifle thus in song?—adieu!
 Let the soft zephyr whisper who.

[Life of Tasso, p. li.]

In this critique, we think it altogether unnecessary to go into the merits of the original poem; those merits are too generally understood and too fully appreciated to require any discussion here; the beauties of Tasso's composition are now universally recognized, while the cavils that were once raised against it are buried in oblivion. Not that the poem pretends to be faultless, or that the objections formerly urged were altogether groundless, but the imperfections of the piece are so few, compared with its beauties, that there would be something invidious in recalling them anew into notice. Neither shall we consider it worth our while to agitate again the comparative merits of this translation with those that have preceded it. The specimen to which we have already alluded, must, we presume, have set the matter at rest in the minds of most competent judges. We have already declared our affection for the Spenserian stanza, notwithstanding all that has been said against it, and to that sentiment we still adhere. We shall therefore confine our attention to the peculiar merits of Mr. Wiffen's translation. There are two points essential to the perfection of a translation, first, that it be accurately rendered, and secondly, which is at least of equal importance, that its character and keeping be the same with that of the original: in both these respects we think that the present translator is entitled to a very high degree of commendation. He has contrived to transfuse into the English version much of the fervour, the solemnity, the tenderness, and the sublimity of his prototype; and very many of his stanzas float in all the airiness, and dazzle with all the freshness and brilliancy, of original compositions; he enters profoundly into the poet's feeling, he manifests throughout an accurate conception of the plot, he discovers all the passion and piety of an ancient crusader; in love with his subject, and earnestly desirous of doing it justice, he has spared no exertions, as he truly informs us, to prepare himself for his undertaking; he has

ransacked ancient as well as contemporary authors, and has made himself well indeed acquainted with the most poetical phrases, and terms of art, which he introduces with great propriety, and without the least affectation or pedantry.

With the possession of so much superior talent, and the application of so much persevering labour, combined with an uncommon affection for his task, it was natural for him to expect, and certain that he would obtain, more than ordinary success. We find, indeed, in this translation what we ourselves had anticipated, a superiority not only over all preceding attempts at the same work, but over all others that have fallen for many years beneath our observation.

To do justice to the various excellencies of this translation would be impossible, within the limits to which this review is necessarily confined, and we most earnestly request our readers therefore to read the work, and judge for themselves; but before we proceed to present extracts from the poem, which we intend to do somewhat copiously, we cannot refrain from pointing out to their particular attention those parts of the work which strike us as being of superior excellency. The description of the grand review which discloses the names of the principal crusaders and their several forces, is, we think, of this order; to which may be added the scene in the tent between Godfrey and the Egyptian ambassadors, whose different characters are very artfully and strikingly portrayed; the funeral of Dudo is delightfully pathetic; the infernal council is horribly grand; the description of the person of Armida, and her specious arts, contain stanzas of uncommon beauty; to these we would subjoin a great part of Canto 6, much of Canto 7, and nearly the whole of Canto 8, which, taken entire, we are disposed to regard as the most successful of any; nor would we omit to remark many passages of great force and uncommon excellence in Canto the 9th and last.

It is high time, however, that we should furnish something like testimonials to the justice of the opinions we have been passing, and we hasten to produce specimens of the work, which the reader may peruse and criticize at his leisure.

The opening stanzas appear to us to be very happily executed. We give them with the original.

*Canto l'Armi pietose, e'l Capitano,
Che'l gran sepolcro liberò di Cristo.
Molto egli oprò col senno, e con la mano;
Molto soffrì nel glorioso acquisto:*

*E' invan l'Inferno à lui s' oppose, e invano
S'armò d'Asia, e di Libia il popol misto :
Che'l Ciel gli diè favore, e sotto ai santi
Segni ridusse i suoi compagni erranti.*

I sing the pious arms and Chief, who freed
Christ's holy sepulchre from thrall profane :
Much did he toil in thought, and much in deed,
Much in the glorious enterprise sustain ;
In vain all Hell opposed him, armed in vain
Of Africa and Ind the mingled crew ;
For Heaven with prosperous fortune crowned his pain,
And, under his mild guardianship, anew
To the grand Red-Cross flag his errant comrades drew.

*O Musa, tu che di caduchi allori
Non circondi la fronte in Elicona,
Ma sù nel Cielo infra i beati cori
Hai di stelle immortali aurea corona,
Tu spira al petto mio celesti ardori,
Tu rischiara il mio canto, e tu perdona,
S'intesso fregi al ver, s' adorno in parte
D'altri dilette, che de' tuoi, le carte.*

O thou, the Muse that not with fading palms
Circlest thy brows on Pindus, but among
The happy Angels warbling heavenly psalms,
Hast for thy coronal a golden thong
Of ever-during stars, make thou my song
Lucid as light, breathe thou the flame divine
Into my bosom, and forgive the wrong,
If with grave truth light fiction I combine,
And sometimes grace my page with other flowers than thine !

*Sai che là corre il mondo, ove più versi
Di sue dolcezze il lusinghier Parnaso ;
E che'l vero condito in molli versi,
I più sehiu allettando hà persuaso :
Così all' egro fanciul porgiamo aspersi
Di soavi licor gli orli del vaso ;
Succhi amari, ingannato, intanto ei beve,
E dall' inganno suo vita riceve.*

Thou know'st that thither the world swiftest flies,
Where most Parnassus thrills the' enchanted winds,
And that harsh truth, in music's rich disguise,
Allures the coyest, charms the lightest minds ;
So the fond mother her sick infant blinds,
Sprinkling the edges of the cup she gives,
With sweetest nectar ; pleased with what he finds
Round the smooth brim, the bitter he receives,
Drinks the delusive draught, and, thus deluded, lives.

*Tu, magnanimo Alfonso, il qual ritogli
Al furor di Fortuna, e guidi in porto
Me peregrino errante, e fra gli scogli
E fra l'onde agitato, e quasi assorto,
Queste mie carte in lieta fronte accogli,
Che quasi in voto à te sacrate i' porto.
Forse un dì fia, che la presaga penna
Osi scriver di te quel ch' or n'accenna.*

And thou, Alphonso, who from fortune's shocks,
And from the agitated sea, didst save,
And pilot into port from circling rocks
My wandering bark, nigh swallowed by the wave!
Accept with a glad smile,—'tis all I crave—
These my vowed tablets, in thy temple hung
For the fresh life which then thy goodness gave;
Some day perhaps my prophesying tongue
May dare to sing of thee what now must rest unsung.

*E' ben ragion (s'egli avverrà, che'n pace
Il buon popol di Cristo unqua si veda,
E con navi, e cavalli al fero Trace
Cerchi ritor la grande ingiusta preda)
Ch'a te lo scettro in terra, ò se ti piace,
L'alto imperio de' mari à te conceda.
Emulo di Goffredo, i nostri carmi
Intanto ascolta, e t'apparecchia all'armi.*

If e'er it chance that in harmonious peace
The Christian Potentates again unite,
With steed and ship their ravished spoils to seize,
And for this theft the savage Turk requite,
To thee shall they concede, in wisdom's right,
The rule by land, or, if it have more charms,
Of the high seas; meanwhile, let it delight
To hear our verse ring with divine alarms; [p. 1—3.]
Rival of Godfrey, hear, and grasp thy glittering arms!

The reader will be delighted with the portrait of the lovely and modest Sofronia, which is thus delicately sketched.

Of generous thoughts and principles sublime,
Amongst them in the city lived a maid,
The flower of virgins, in her ripest prime,
Supremely beautiful, but that she made
Never her care, or beauty only weighed
In worth with virtue, and her worth acquired
A deeper charm from blooming in the shade;
Lovers she shunned, nor loved to be admired,
But from their praises turned, and lived a life retired.

Yet could not this coy vigilance prevent
 The' admiring gaze and warm desires of one
 Tutored by Love, nor would fond Love consent
 To hide such lustrous beauty from the sun:
 Love, that through every change delight'st to run,
 The Proteus of the heart! who now dost blind,
 Now roll the Argus eyes that nought can shun,
 Thou through a thousand guards unseen dost wind,
 And to the chastest maids familiar access find!

Sophronia hers; Olindo was his name;
 Born in one town, by one pure faith illumed;
 Modest—as she was beautiful, his flame
 Feared much, hoped little, and in nought presumed;
 He could not, or he durst not speak, but doomed
 To voiceless thought his passion; him she slighted,
 Saw not, or would not see; thus he consumed
 Beneath the vivid fire her beauty lighted;
 Either not seen, ill known, or, known, but ill requited.

And thus it was, when like an omen drear
 That summoned all her kindred to the grave,
 The cruel mandate reached Sophronia's ear,
 Who, brave as bashful, yet discreet as brave,
 Mused how her people she from death might save;
 Courage inspired, but virginal alarm
 Repressed the thought, till maiden shyness gave
 Place to resolve, or joined to share the harm:
 Boldness awoke her shame, shame made her boldness charm.

Alone amidst the crowd the maid proceeds,
 Nor seeks to hide her beauty, nor display;
 Downcast her eyes, close veiled in simple weeds,
 With coy and graceful steps she takes her way;
 So negligent yet nice, one scarce can say
 If she her charms disdains, or would improve,
 If chance or taste disposes her array;
 Favoured by Heaven, by nature, and by love,

: Her mere neglects of art most artificial prove. [p. 56—58.]

The lament of the lovers at the fatal stake must not
 be omitted.

Around them now the unctuous pyre was piled,
 And the fanned flame was rising in the wind,
 When, full of bitter thought, in accents wild,
 The lover to his mate in death repined;
 "Is this the bond then which I hoped should bind
 Our lives in blissful marriage? this the fire
 Of bridal faith commingling mind with mind,
 Which I believed should in our hearts inspire
 Like warmth of sacred zeal and delicate desire?

"Far other flames Love promised to impart
 Than those our envious planets here prepare;
 Too, ah too long they kept our hands apart,
 But harshly now they join them in despair;
 Yet does it soothe, since by a mode so rare
 Condemned to die, thy torments to partake,
 Forbid by fate thy sweetnesses to share;
 If tears I shed, 'tis but for thy dear sake,
 Not mine,—with thee beside, I bless the burning stake!"

"And oh! this doom would be indeed most blest,
 My sharpest sufferings blandishments divine,
 Might I but be permitted breast to breast,
 On thy sweet lips my spirit to resign;
 If thou too, panting toward one common shrine,
 Wouldst the next happy instant parting spend
 Thy latest sighs in sympathy on mine!"
 Sorrowing he spoke; she when his plaints had end,
 Did thus his fond discourse most sweetly reprehend.

"Far other aspirations, other plaints
 Than these, dear friend, the solemn hour should claim;
 Think what reward God offers to his saints;
 Let meek repentance raise a loftier aim;
 These torturing fires, if suffered in his name,
 Will, bland as zephyrs, waft us to the blest;
 Regard the sun! how beautiful his flame!
 How fine a sky invites him to the west! [p. 33—36.]
 These both console our pangs, and summon us to rest."

We cannot refrain from extracting the concluding stanzas
 of Canto III.

His bosom friends the high bier had adorned
 With ceremonial pomp, a solemn show;
 And when their Prince appeared amidst them, mourned
 In louder accents with a tenderer woe;
 But pious Godfrey gave no tear to flow,
 Not all serene, nor clouded was his look;
 Dum for a while, his fixt eyes seem to grow
 To the loved form they contemplate;—he broke
 Silence at length, and thus in calm dejection spoke.

"Tears are not now thy due! from the world's toil,
 Gone to assume in heaven the better birth;
 A winged Angel from thy mortal coil
 Escaped, thy glory lingers yet round earth!
 Christ's hallowed warrior living thou went'st forth,
 Christ's champion didst thou die; and now, blest shade,
 The crown and palm of righteousness and worth
 Thou wear'st, with joys unspeakable repaid,
 Feeding thine eyes on things no fancy e'er portrayed!"

“ Yes! thou liv’st happy, and if yet we keep
 Vigils of grief, and echo groan for groan,
 ’Tis not for thee, but for ourselves we weep,
 In thee our noblest pillar lies o’erthrown;
 But, although Death (a title we disown)
 Of earthly aid has stripped and rendered vain
 Our arms, bright legions stand before the throne,
 And raised thyself to that selected train,
 Still may thy suit for us celestial aids obtain.

“ And as we saw thee, whilst a mortal, shield
 With mortal arms our cause, let us descry
 Thy conquering hand for our advantage wield
 Heaven’s fatal arms, a spirit of the sky;
 Hear now the vows we offer up, be nigh,
 And in the hour of ultimate distress
 Send down immortal succours from on high;
 So will we raise to thee for wrought success,
 Hymns of triumphal praise, and in our temples bless!”

He ceased; the last bright beams of day were spent,
 And Eve ascending in the starless air,
 Imposed a sweet oblivion on lament,
 Rest to each toil, a truce to every care;
 But Godfrey still watched, thoughtful to prepare
 Those mighty engines, without which he knew
 The toil of war would be a brave despair;
 Then how to frame their shape, and whence to hew
 Materials for the work, perplexed his mind anew.

But when the morn looked forth on Jordan’s flood,
 The funeral pageant he lamenting led;
 An odiferous ark of cypress wood,
 Near a green hill, became Lord Dudon’s bed:
 The hill adjoined the Camp, and overhead
 A stately palm its verdant foliage flung;
 Last, white-robed Priests their anthem o’er the dead,
 Slow-moving hymned, and many a tuneful tongue
 Sweet in the solemn march his requiescat sung:

Whilst here and there the tree’s proud branches bore
 Ensigns and arms, the banner and the bow,—
 Spoils, which in fights more fortunate he tore
 Or from the Syrian or the Persian foe;
 In midst, his own pierced cuirass they bestow,
 His hollow helmet, his inverted spear,
 And grave this legend on the trunk below:
 “ Pilgrim! a champion of the Cross revere,
 And pass this tomb with awe; brave Dudon slumbers here!”

The Duke, when thus his piety had paid
The funeral rites, and shed his duteous tears,
Sent all his skilled mechanics to invade
The forest, guarded by a thousand spears;
Veiled by high hills it stood, the growth of years—
A Syrian shepherd pointed out the vale,
And thither brought the Camp-artificers
To fabricate the engines doomed to scale
Salem's imperial towers and turn her people pale.

Each cheers on each, and to the general call
Unwonted ravage rends the woods around;
Hewed by the iron's piercing edge, down fall,
And with their leafy honours heap the ground,
Pines, savage ashes, beeches, palms renowned,
Funereal cypresses, the fir-tree high,
Maple, and holm with greens eternal crowned,
And wedded elm, to which the vines apply
Their virgin arms, and curl, and shoot into the sky.

Some fell the yews, some fell the warrior-oaks,
Whose trunks have budded to a thousand springs,
And braved immoveable the thousand shocks
Of Boreas rushing on his wintry wings;
And here the alder nods, the cedar swings
On rattling wheels; some bark the trees, some square;
With shouts and clang of arms the valley rings,—
Sick with the sound, the nymphs their haunts forswear,
The stork her nest forsakes, the lioness her lair.

[p. 134—139.]

Some idea may be formed of the delicacy and warmth of the translator's imagination, from the following description of the beautiful Armida:—

Never did Greece or Italy behold
A form to fancy and to taste more dear!
At times, the white veil dims her locks of gold,
At times, in bright relief they reappear:
Thus, when the stormy skies begin to clear,
Now through transparent clouds the sunshine gleams,
Now, issuing from its shrine, the gorgeous Sphere
Lights up the vales, flowers, mountains, leaves, and streams,
With a diviner day—the spirit of bright beams.

New ringlets form the flowing winds amid
The natural curls of her resplendent hair;
Her blue eye its soft glance withholds, and hid
Are all Love's treasures with a miser's care;

The Rival Roses upon cheeks more fair
 Than morning light, their mingling tints dispose,
 But on her lovely lips, from whence the air
 Of paradise exhales, the crimson rose
 Its whole voluptuous bloom in peerless beauty throws.

Ripe as the grape just mellowing into wine,
 Her bosom swells to sight; its lily breasts,
 Smooth, soft, and sweet, like alabaster shine,
 Part bare, part hid by her embroidered vests;
 Whose jealous fringe the greedy eye arrests,
 But leaves its fond imaginations free,
 To sport, at will in those delicious nests,
 And their most shadowed secrecies to see;
 Peopling with blissful dreams the lively phantasy.

As through pure water or translucent glass
 The sunbeam darts, yet leaves the crystal sound,
 So through her shining robes unruffling pass
 The thoughts to wander on forbidden ground:
 There daring fancy takes her fairy round,
 Such wondrous beauties singly to admire,
 Which in a pleasing fit of transport bound,
 She after whispers to refined desire,
 And with her charming tale foment the' excited fire.

[Canto iv. p. 157—159.]

A fairer specimen cannot be given of his knowledge
 of the ancient modes of attack and defence than the follow-
 ing stanzas afford.

Warily deals each warrior's arm its thrust,
 His foot its motion, its live glance his eye,—
 To various guards and attitudes they trust,
 They foin, they dally, now aloof, now high,
 Recede, advance, wheel, traverse, and pass by,
 Threat where they strike not, where they threat not, dart
 The desperate pass, or with perception sly
 Free to the foe leave some unguarded part,
 Then his foiled stroke revenge, with art deriding art.

Prince Tancred's thigh the Pagan knight perceives
 But ill defended or by shield or sword;
 He hastes to strike, and inconsiderate leaves
 His side unshielded as he strikes abroad;
 Tancred failed not instinctively to ward
 The stroke, beat back the weapon, and, inspired
 With eager hope, the guardless body gored;
 Which done, of either gazing host admired,
 He nimbly back recoiled, and to his ward retired.

The fierce Argantes, when he now beheld
Himself in his own gushing blood baptized,
In unaccustomed horror sighed and yelled,
With shame discountenanced, and with pain surprised;
And both by rage and suffering agonized,
Raised with his voice his sword aloft to quit
The sharp rebuke; but Tancred, well advised
Of his intent, afresh the' assailant smit,
Where to the nervous arm the shoulder-blade was knit.

As in its Alpine forest the grim bear,
Stung by the hunter's arrow, from its haunts
Flies in the face of all its shafts to dare
Death for the mad revenge no peril daunts;
Just so the' untamed Circassian fares, so pants
For blood, as thus the foe his soul besets,
When shame on shame, and wound on wound he plants;
And his revenge his wrath so keenly whets,
That he all danger scorns, and all defence forgets.

Joining with courage keen a valour rash,
And untired strength with unexampled might,
He showers his strokes so fast that the skies flash,
And earth even trembles in her wild affright;
No time has the alarmed Italian knight
To deal a single blow; from such a shower
Scarce can he shield himself, scarce breathe; no sleight
Of arms is there to' assure his life an hour
From the man's headstrong haste and brute gigantic power.

Collected in himself, he waits in vain
Till the first fury of the storm be past,
Now lifts his moony targe, now round the plain
Fetches his skilful circles far and fast;
But when he sees the Pagan's fierceness last
Through all delay, his own proud blood takes fire,
And staking all his fortunes on the cast,
He whirls his sword in many a giddy gyre,
Requiting strength with strength, and answering ire with ire.

Judgment and skill are lost in rage, rage gives
Resentment life, fresh force resentment lends;
Where falls the steel, it ever bores or cleaves
Chainplate or mail; plumes shiver, metal bends,
Helms crack, and not a stroke in vain descends;
The ground is strewn with armour hewn asunder,
Armour with blood, with ruby blood sweat blends;
Each smiting sword appears a whirling wonder,
Its flash the lightning's fire, its sullen clang far thunder.

Both gazing nations anxious hung suspended
 Upon a spectacle so wild and new ;
 With fear, with hope the issue they attended,
 Some good or ill perpetually in view :
 Not the least beck or slightest whisper flew
 Midst the vast hosts so lately in commotion ;
 All nerve alone, all eye, all ear, they grew
 Fixt, mute, and soundless as an eve-lulled ocean,
 Save what the beating heart struck in its awful motion.
 Now tired were both ; and both, their spirits spent,
 Had surely perished on the field of fight,
 Had not dim eve her lengthening shadows sent,
 And even of nearest things obscured the sight ;
 And now on either side in apposite
 Array, a reverend herald rose, and sought
 From the stern strife to separate each his knight ;
 This Aridos, Pindoro that, who brought
 Of late the' insulter's boast, and terms on which they fought.
 [Canto vi. p. 266—270.]

One more specimen of the same kind in Canto vii.

But he to ward off harm is not so swift
 As that fierce foe is active to assail,
 Battered his helm, his shield's already cleft,
 And bored and bloody is his plated mail.
 Of Tancred's meditated blows, none fail
 Of their effect ; not one descends in vain,
 But keenly wounds ; the' apostate's face turns pale,
 And his heart writhes at once beneath the pain
 Of anger, pride, remose, love, conscience, and disdain.
 On one last effort of despairing pride
 Resolved at length his dying hopes to set,
 He casts the fragment of his shield aside,
 Grasps with both hands his sword, uncrimsoned yet,
 And closing nimbly with his foe to get
 The full command and vantage of the ground,
 Quits with so sharp a stroke his heavy debt,
 That through both plate and mail the flesh it found,
 And in the warriors side impressed a grisly wound.
 Next on his spacious brows he struck, the steel
 Like an alarm-bell rang ; a stroke so dire
 And unexpected made the warrior reel
 Some paces back, yet left the helm entire.
 Red grew the Prince's cheeks for very ire,
 In agony of shame his teeth he gnashed ;
 His eyes were like two coals of living fire,
 And every glance that through his visor flashed,
 Blasted the Gascon's pride, both blasted and abashed.

He heard the hissing of the' Avenger's steel
Brandished aloft, its shining he descried,
Already in his breast he seemed to feel
The' accelerated sword his heart divide,
And tremblingly recoiled; the blow fell wide
On an antique pilaster that embossed
The marble bridge,—sparks flashed on every side,
Fragments sprang forth and in the skies were lost,
Whilst to the traitor's heart fear shot its arrowy frost.

Back to the bridge he rushed, in speed reposing
His hopes of life,—behind the' Avenger hung
On his fleet steps, now near, now nearer closing,
One hand already to his shoulder clung;
When lo! from trembling air the lights are wrung;
The cressets disappear, the tapers die;—
Gone was each star that in blue ether hung;
The yellow moon drew in her horns on high,
And all grew hideous shade beneath the vacant sky. [p. 40-44.]

Canto viiith is replete with beauties, but we must confine our extracts to the following stanzas.

“ Wounded amidst my slaughtered friends I fell,
And there was left for dead, nor what our foes
Since or sustained or acted can I tell,
An icy torpor all my senses froze;
But when at length my faint eyes did uncloze
From dark unconsciousness, the wings of Night
Seemed o'er the shadowy landscape to repose;
Feebly I oped them, and a glimmering light
Far-off, appeared by fits to swim before my sight.

“ Albeit no strength had I to recognize
Even nearest objects through the void opaque,
But saw as one whose overwearyed eyes,
Nor all asleep, nor openly awake,
Close and uncloze without the power to take
Regard or cognizance of things most nigh;
And now my cruel wounds began to ache,
Bit by the keen night-air, thus doomed to lie
Faint on the naked earth, beneath a freezing sky.

“ Meanwhile the light drew momentarily more near,
Till it arrived and rested at my side,
Then gentle whisperings murmured in my ear,—
I raised with pain my eye-lids, and descried
Two tall commanding figures near me glide,
Clothed in long robes, and shaking in the air
Two torches: ‘Son,’ I heard them say, ‘confide
In him who oft consents the good to spare,
And with his grace forestals the sacrifice of prayer!’

“ I looked, and as the brilliant fireball rolled,
 (Or rather midnight sun) a ray descended,
 Which like a glorious line of liquid gold
 Ruled by the pencil, straight to earth extended,
 And o'er the body, when its flight was ended,
 Shook from its skirts so beautiful a flood
 Of coloured light, that all its wounds shone splendid,
 Each like a ruby ring or golden stud,
 And straight the face I knew in its grim mask of blood.

“ He lay not prone, but as his high desire
 Was ever turned towards the stars, his face,
 Ev'n as the martyr's from his couch of fire,
 Looked upward still to heaven's blue fields of space.
 Closed was his red right hand in strict embrace
 Grasping the sword, in act to strike, whose blade
 Such ravage wrought; his left with careless grace
 In meek devotion on his breast was laid,
 As though for peace to God the parting spirit prayed.

“ And sudden where the warrior's corse reposed,
 A rich sarcophagus was seen to rise,
 Which in its heart his relics had enclosed,
 I know not how, nor by what rare device;
 And briefly blazoned with heraldic dyes
 Shone forth the name and virtues of the dead;
 From the strange sight my fascinated eyes
 I could not lift; each glance fresh marvel bred;
 Now I the porphyry scanned, and now the' inscription read.
 {Canto viii. pp. 381—388.]

The ixth Canto, which contains the celebrated night-attack of Solyman on the Christian camp, may be illustrated by the following spirited stanzas, and with these we are compelled to close our extracts.

Lo, through the gloom the sentinels he spies,
 By the faint twinkling of a casual lamp!
 Nor can he longer hope in full surprise
 To take the cautious Duke and slumbering Camp.
 The sentries soon behold his lion-ramp,
 And their alarum sounding loud, bear back,
 Warned of his numbers by their sullen tramp;
 So that the foremost guards were roused, nor slack
 To seize their ready arms, and face the grand attack.

Sure of discovery now, the Arabs wound
Their barbarous horns, and raised their yelling cry,
"Lillah il Allah!" to the well-known sound
Neighed all their steeds, earth rang as they rushed by:
Bellowed the mountains, roared the rifted sky,
Roared the deep vales; the' abysses caught the tone,
And answered in drear thunder, whilst on high,
Alecto the blue torch of Phlegethon
Shook toward Zion hill, and signed its legions on.

First rushed the Soldan on the guard, ev'n then
In lax confusion unnarranged; less swift
Leaps the grim lion from his bosky den,
Shoots the fierce eagle from her mountain clift;
Floods that pluck up and in their rapid drift
Roll down huts, rocks, and trees; lightnings that blast
Strong towers with bolts that leave a burning rift;
Earthquakes whose motions make the world aghast,
Are symbols weak to paint the power with which he passed.

His sabre never through the grisly shade
Falls but it smites, nor smites without a wound,
Nor wounds but straight it kills,—should more be said,
The truth would like romance or falsehood sound.
Pain he dissembles, or he has not found,
Or scorns the blows which feebler arms imprint;
Yet oft his burganet of steel rings round
Like loud alarm-bells with the lively dint
Of pole-axe, spear, or sword, and sparkles like a flint.

Just as his single sword to flight delivers
This first-raised phalanx, a gigantic deed,
Like a sea swelled with thousand mountain-rivers,
His rushing Arabs to the charge succeed.
Then the scared Franks flew tent-ward at full speed,
The' audacious Victor following as they fled;
And with them, rapt sublime on his black steed,
Entering the Camp-Gate, he on all sides spread
Havoc, and grief, and pain, loud wailings, rage, and dread.

High on the Soldan's helm, in scales of pearl,
With writhen neck, raised paws, outflying wings,
And tail rolled downward ending in a curl,
A rampant dragon grinned malignant things.
Its lips frothed poison, brandishing three strings
You almost heard it hiss; at every stroke
Heaped on its crest, through all its burning rings
It seemed the monster into motion woke,
Spit forth its spiteful fire, and belched Tartareous smoke.

Such and so Gorgon-like the Soldan's form
 Shewed by those fires to the beholders' sight,
 As Ocean tossing in a midnight storm
 To sailors, with her million waves alight.
 Some give their timid trembling feet to flight,
 Some their brave hands to the revenging blade;
 And still the' infuriate Anarch of the Night
 Increased the risks by darkening them in shade,
 And to the midnight winds tumultuous discord brayed.

[Canto ix. pp. 425—428.]

This is unquestionably very powerful poetry; our inclination reproaches us for not having quoted the interesting flight and fortunes of the fair Erminia, at the commencement of the 7th Canto, which are given with the happiest possible fidelity, harmony, and grace; but necessity has no alternative.

In a work of such extent we are prepared to meet with some inequalities of execution, yet these, we do not hesitate to say, are fewer than in almost any work of equal length. Having, however, so unequivocally expressed our approbation of the work before us, it becomes our duty, as impartial Reviewers, to confess that our taste does not, in some few instances, coincide with that of the ingenious translator, and we think that the same talents are capable of advancing this very beautiful poem to a still higher degree of perfection. We have some sort of objection, which we know not precisely how to express, to a few of his epithets, and to some of his phrases, which we will not call affected, but which we could nevertheless wish to see exchanged for others less novel and somewhat more natural. Even upon this point, although speaking *ex cathedra*, we would not wish to press too hardly, or to insist too strongly, since we well know what differences of opinion prevail upon matters merely of taste and feeling.

We have one more suggestion to make, and we have done;—the translator's zeal in the cause which he espouses, combined with his natural affection for the ornamental and the beautiful, has, we think, in some instances, induced a slight overcharge of colour,—a little excess of embellishment,—and in a few cases, a partial exaggeration of character.

Bating these slight faults, if such they deserve to be called, and which a second edition of the version may easily remove, we cannot but express our cordial approbation of the manner in which the translation has been performed. The music of the versification, the richness of the phrase-

ology, the solemn earnestness of the style, and the continuity of interest produced by the pleasing flow of the stanzas, cannot fail, we should hope, to ensure to Mr. Wiffen the favour of an enlightened public, whilst the extraordinary expense and pains which he has unsparingly lavished upon this, his favourite performance, seem to entitle him, in all respects, to the support of those who make it their pride to patronize genius, more especially when combined, as it is in the present instance, with great good sense, and enlisted under the banners of virtue.

* * Since the above was written, we have been informed that the late dreadful conflagration in Greville-street has consumed by far the greater part of this edition of the first, and the whole of the second volume, which was fast advancing to its completion. We learn it with regret, no less from the value of the version, the publication of which this unfortunate accident must greatly retard, than from the loss to Mr. Moyes, of whose extraordinary merit in his profession, the present volume, unequalled in typography, forms a most interesting proof. We are happy, however, to hear that the wood-engravings are safe, and, what is of much more consequence, that there is a duplicate copy of the MS.

Matthew Henry at Hackney: to which is added, Strictures on the Unitarian Writings of the Rev. Lant Carpenter, LL. D.
8vo. London, 1824. pp. 142. Seeley and Son.

We have experienced very considerable pleasure in the perusal of the learned little work, the title of which stands at the head of this article. By a lively, though perhaps somewhat too bold a turn of genius, the interest of the reader is powerfully awakened to a serious and important subject. In a visionary scene, the venerable Matthew Henry is recalled from the shades, and once more placed in the pulpit, at Hackney, from which, in his lifetime, he was accustomed to deliver, in all their purity, the great and essential doctrines of the gospel; but which has latterly become the theatre whence the principles of the Unitarian heresy are promulgated. Addressing an assembly, composed chiefly of ministers of religion, he, in a striking and powerful exordium, bewails the desolation of the sanctuary; and forcibly

reminds them of the sound and practical doctrines which he had preached to their fathers. He then opens on his hearers with the important questions, "*What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he?*" After noticing various replies which have been given to those inquiries, and particularly the opinions of Dr. Priestley, whom he, more strongly than courteously designates as "a man of Birmingham, whose blaze expired like a meteor," he proceeds to deliver a grand argument in defence of the *Homo-ousion* faith, that the Son is one substance with the *Father*, founded on the universal testimony of all the early nations, and flowing down the stream of ages to the time of the Christian fathers.

This argument, founded on universal testimony, has not been overlooked by former writers, who have engaged in the defence of the Christian faith; but it has seldom been considered as forming, by itself, a sufficient basis whereon to rest the great doctrines of revelation,—doctrines on which hang the best hopes and highest expectations of the Christian believer. The fact is, that all those writers who have impugned or denied these sacred doctrines, have proceeded on the presumption that they cannot stand the test of rational investigation; and therefore ought not to be believed, however supported by the testimony of ancient and universal faith. In this appeal to the bar of human reason, against the claims of revelation, we are sorry to observe, what we esteem by far too ready a disposition to concur, on the part of Christians who have hitherto been deemed orthodox.

A celebrated Scotch professor, a few years ago, attempted to demonstrate the existence of a Trinity in the *Θεός*, or *Godhead*, by metaphysical argumentation alone. We never heard that any good was effected by the ratiocinations of the learned professor, although his essay was approved by the majority of a select party of ministers and friends, convened for the purpose of hearing it read, and, we believe, was afterwards published. We suspect, however, from the connexion of the parties, that it is to this notable attempt to demonstrate, metaphysically, the existence of the glorious Trinity, that we are indebted for the no less notable dogma of a modern commentator, of great learning, but far too bold in his speculations, and confident in his opinions, that the doctrines of revelation, being doctrines of *eternal* reason, *human* reason can both *apprehend* and *comprehend* them.* This

* Dr. Adam Clarke's Commentary. See his General Principles, at the end of the New Testament.

maxim once established, the inference seems natural and just, that a man should believe nothing, whether a doctrine of the bible or not, unless he can both *apprehend* and *comprehend* it: and we should really think this a ready way, not indeed to establish, but to get rid of all belief in those doctrines of revelation which appear to man mysterious.

As our attention is now called to this subject, and as it has been rendered important by the wide circulation of the Commentary alluded to, and the credit which it has obtained amongst a body of Christians, for whom, as a body, we entertain great respect; we hope to be excused, if we here make, what perhaps is not unusual with reviewers, a large digression, and take this opportunity of declaring our opinion upon the subject.

We observe then, that the distinction between *eternal* reason and *human* reason is as great as the distinction between truth and problem—between certainty and uncertainty—between fallibility and infallibility. Reason is that faculty of the mind by which we acquire knowledge by comparison, deduction, and inference. The mind, by comparing two ideas, deduces or infers a third idea, as a consequence of this comparison. This third, or consequent idea, if rightly deduced, is that portion of truth which lies between the two former ideas; and to the knowledge of which the mind has attained by this simple operation of reason. Thus we premise, in the first instance, that the Messiah was the Son of God; and secondly, that Jesus Christ was the Messiah; from which premises we deduce, in the third place, that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, which is the consequence of the two former ideas. In this simple operation of reason, the consequence is so self-evident, that the mind is instantly satisfied with its own deduction, and the judgment immediately receives the third proposition, that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, and passes it into the store of knowledge, as an ascertained truth. But where the operations of reason are more complicated, and depend on intermediate knowledge between the premises and the consequence deduced from them, the case is different; and the consequence remains a mere problem, until demonstrated by proof,—as for instance, we premise, first, that God cannot die; secondly, that Jesus Christ did die: if from these premises we deduce, that Jesus Christ was not God, we make a false deduction; and the cause of our mistake is, the want of the intermediate knowledge that Jesus Christ, by his

incarnation, possessed two distinct natures, in one of which he was mortal, and therefore could die; but in the other of which he was incapable of dying, and therefore, as to this nature, he might be God. Here in fact lies the grand distinction between *eternal* reason and *human* reason. *Eternal* reason is ever attended by that knowledge which never fails; and is incapable of any false deduction. All her premises are true; all her inferences are just; and all her results are clearly demonstrated, or rather they demonstrate themselves as self-evident propositions.

Human reason, on the other hand, is ever liable to be thwarted by error and mistake. The human mind is limited in all her powers; and in the exercise of these powers she is beclouded by ignorance, obscured by passion, and fettered by prejudice. And though her pride will not always stoop to acknowledge her helplessness, she is nevertheless compelled, in all her researches after divine truth, to confess her obligations to revelation. The best proof of all this is to be found in experience, "the world by wisdom knew not God." Those ages and nations which have carried human reason to the highest possible perfection, have ever been the most dark and degenerate with regard to religion and morals. The Hebrew and the Christian churches have alone possessed the secret of the most High. The former received their law, by direct revelation, from Mount Sinai; and the latter imbibed the truth from the lips of Him who "spake as never man spake." Hence arises the necessity of subjecting all the deductions of human reason to proof, in order to demonstrate their truth. In this process it is found, that many of these deductions can never be proved, and therefore they are rejected as *false*, or justly exposed to suspicion. Others, though they cannot be fully proved, receive such a degree of confirmation as entitle them to rank as *probabilities*. Suspected and probable results pertain exclusively to the enfeebled exertions of *human* reason; they have no place in the operations of *eternal* reason. When, however, the consequence deduced by any effort of human reason is capable of demonstration, it is received and acknowledged by all, as ascertained truth: and small indeed is that portion of religious or moral truth which has been elicited by the unaided operations of human reason. In natural philosophy, it is true, she has been far more successful; for here the subject lay more within her view,—the universe was spread open before her,—her efforts were assisted by sense,—she was enabled to found her theories on observation, and to draw

from nature the proofs by which they are sustained. But when that which may be known of *Him* who made the universe, was to be discovered; when the counsels of the Eternal, respecting the redemption of a lost world, were to be explored, and when the hopes of an immortal spirit were to be confirmed, and her guilty fears allayed—human reason more than confesses her incompetency, and leaves the anxious soul to sigh for a revelation from God. We must therefore agree with St. Paul, that we are not sufficient of ourselves, λογισαίτε τι, to reason out any such sublime system of doctrine as is contained in the gospel; our sufficiency is of God, from whom we have received that revelation of truth to which human reason could never have attained.

But what is revelation? It consists in making known to man some portion of truth—some *result* of eternal reason—the knowledge of which man could never have acquired by any operation of human reason. If man could have attained this knowledge, it was his duty and interest to have done so, and then there had been no necessity for the revelation. Now, there is nothing superfluous in the works of God; we have no instance of his ever having made that a subject of revelation which lay within the ordinary range of human reason. It belongs to the character of revelation to make known that, which was above the reach of man by any exercise of his rational powers. It follows, therefore, that the human mind must, to be benefited by revelation, have some other medium of receiving knowledge than the mere exercise of its reasoning faculties; and hence arises the necessity of faith in matters of revelation. There are in fact three *media* by which knowledge is communicated to man. The first, and that through which most of our knowledge is derived, are the *natural senses*. Where sense fails, *reason* takes up the subject, and pushes its inquiries and discoveries to the extent of its powers; and when reason can go no further, the mind has then no other resource than to exercise *faith* in the testimony of some other being, whose intelligence and knowledge are greater than its own. It follows, therefore, that as the results of human reason depend for their character of truth, on the degree of proof or metaphysical demonstration of which they may be susceptible, so the authority of revealed truth, or rather our obligation to receive it by faith, rests on the credibility and weight of that testimony by which the revelation is supported. In each of these cases, the medium through which truth enters

the mind is distinct ; and so is the nature of the evidence on which it is received.

But it has been said, by the commentator to whom we have before alluded, that although the doctrines of *eternal* reason could never have been found out by *human* reason, yet, "*when revealed*, reason (that is, *human* reason) can both *apprehend* and *comprehend* them." The truth of this proposition depends, however, on the nature of the subject revealed, and on the extent of the revelation. It is possible that there may be subjects, which lie beyond the stretch of human reason, but which revelation may place within its power. But this implies an extension of human reason, by the communication of all that intermediate knowledge, which lies between the ordinary attainments of human reason, and the doctrine or truth revealed. Where this knowledge is communicated, human reason is, as to this subject, presumed to be placed upon a footing with eternal reason ; for it has attained the same result, and by the same degrees of knowledge. But this is not the ordinary course of revelation, which is to unfold to man some *grand result* of *eternal* reason, which is proposed to our faith on the authority of the divine testimony, and without the intermediate process by which that result was obtained in the operations of eternal reason. Here then, whatever human reason may *apprehend*, it cannot fully *comprehend* the doctrine revealed ; because we want that intermediate knowledge, which can alone connect our present ideas with the subject of the revelation. Let us arrest the progress of some rude and untutored child of nature, who roams across the desert, and hunts his food in the savage wilderness. Inform this man, for the first time, that the sun is stationary in the heavens, and that the earth revolves upon her axis. He may be made to *apprehend* your meaning, though you contradict his senses ; but can he ever *comprehend* the subject, until he have first acquired a knowledge of the great principles which govern the course of nature ? And if he be disposed to receive the truth which you impart, it is not on any demonstrations of his own reason, but on the faith of your testimony. It is from a sense of his own ignorance, and because he believes that your knowledge embraces the subject fully, and that you are incapable of deceiving him. If he reason at all, it is on the proper subject ; not on that which he cannot comprehend, but on that which lies within his reach, viz. the credibility of your testimony.

The learned commentator admits that there are some

doctrines of revelation which are above the comprehension of human reason; for he says that "a man may safely credit (in any thing that concerns the nature of God) what is *above* his reason; and even this may be a reason why he should believe it. I cannot comprehend the divine nature, therefore we adore it: if we could comprehend, we could not adore; forasmuch as the nature or being, which can be comprehended by my mind, must be less than that by which it is comprehended, and therefore unworthy of its homage." All this is perfectly correct, but it appears to us completely at variance with his former observations on this subject. There are in fact few doctrines of revelation, which do not, in some degree or relation, concern the nature of God. His perfections and attributes concern his nature; and the glory of these perfections and attributes is imbodyed in every revelation which he makes to man. Hence, in all probability, arises the painful difficulties in which human reason finds herself involved, whenever she attempts to investigate the doctrines of revelation; and hence the necessity of our receiving, on the *faith* of God's *testimony*, the doctrines of *eternal* reason, which *human* reason cannot adequately comprehend. To our reason it does not appear *possible* that the infinite and eternal God should be manifested by incarnation. Great indeed to us is that mystery, "God was manifest in the flesh." And if the *possibility* of such a fact could be demonstrated to our reason, still it appears to us most *unreasonable*, that He, who, being in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God, should, for our sakes, become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Yet we apprehend and believe this astonishing fact; but we apprehend it by faith, and we believe it on the testimony of God, and not by any comprehension of human reason.

That the human mind must have some *apprehension* of every doctrine of revelation, is certain; otherwise there could be no *revelation*: for we have no revelation of that of which we have no apprehension. But the human mind can *apprehend* by faith that which it cannot *comprehend* by reason; and he who will receive nothing into his creed, but what his reason can both *apprehend* and *comprehend*, blocks up one inlet of knowledge to his soul, and puts out one eye of his mind. We know not that such a man can be considered wiser, than he who, feeling the incompetency of his reason, is disposed to stretch his faith to credulity; and receives that for a revelation from God, for which he has not suffi-

cient evidence of the testimony of God. We will even go further, and say, that it does not appear to us, from the instances furnished in the scriptures, that the evidences of a divine revelation are always addressed, in the first instance, to the *reason* of man. When Jehovah appeared to Moses, in the wilderness, did he appeal to his reason in the first instance? Certainly the first evidences were addressed to his *natural senses*. Moses "*looked, and, behold!* the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed." He *heard* the voice of God, which called unto him, out of the midst of the bush; which warned him not to draw nigh, but to put off his shoes from his feet, saying, "I am the God of thy fathers, the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob: and Moses hid his face, for he was *afraid* to look upon God." Here Moses, through the medium of his *natural senses*, sufficiently *apprehended* the subject of a divine revelation, before *reason* had leisure or opportunity to perform her sober operations. And when God speaks to man, he can be at no loss to make him understand,—we seldom err in our first apprehensions of a divine revelation. Our errors in general flow from our vain attempts to reason on that which we cannot comprehend. We cannot, therefore, go the length of saying, with this commentator, that no man either *can* or *should* believe a doctrine that *contradicts* reason. If by *reason* is here meant *right reason*, how many instances have we, in the Romish church, of men who have *sincerely* believed doctrines diametrically opposed to right reason: but if, (as is evidently the case,) we are here to understand *human* reason, then we shall be prepared to admit this proposition, so soon as we shall have gotten rid of the doctrine of the fall of man, and the consequent impairs of all his powers, natural, moral, and intellectual. *Right* reason indeed is *eternal* reason, but *human* reason is neither *right* reason nor *eternal* reason; and so long and so far as *human* reason is liable to error and mistake, so long and so far must it ever be contradicted by every revelation of the doctrines of *eternal* reason.

We have now probably said enough to induce this celebrated commentator to class us amongst those of whom he says, "Some men, it is true, cannot reason; and therefore *they* declaim against reason, and proscribe it, in the examination of religious truth." We are not, however, declaimers against human reason. We would apply it to its proper use, and are anxious only to guard against its abuse. The right use of reason, in matters of revelation, is a subject which we

cannot now discuss ; but we are willing to employ it freely on the *evidences* on which a revelation professes to rest ; and to decide whether these evidences are sufficient to establish it as a revelation from God. When this point is gained, we will allow human reason to investigate the *doctrines* of revelation, so far as its powers will extend : we allow this for the improvement of human reason, and to enable her to deduce more satisfactorily, the duties and obligations which the revelation has imposed on mankind ; but not for the purpose of *testing* the doctrines revealed. Many of these doctrines, as we have seen, are *above* the range of human reason ; and therefore she has no *test* which she can apply. Nor is it necessary that they should be so tested ; for if they be doctrines of revelation, they have already stood the test of *eternal* reason. — Shall we then still be told by this writer, that, “ were all the nation of this mind, *mother church* might soon re-assume her ascendancy, and feed us with *latin* masses and a *wafer*-God ? ” Let him indulge his fears. Human nature is liable to error and imposition, as he can readily prove. Her principal safeguards are *sense*, *reason*, and *experience*. In natural things these are in general sufficient. On the doctrines of revealed truth she still employs them as far as they are applicable ; but they prove inadequate. Revelation transcends them all. What then remains to be done ? We humble our pride, and gratefully accept that testimony which is sure ; the *word* of God.

We have extended these remarks until we had nearly forgotten the work which suggested them ; and we fear that we cannot now do that justice to the book which its merits demand. The anonymous author is evidently a man of sound learning, of extensive research, and largely acquainted with ancient literature. It would be unreasonable to expect, in what professes to be an oration from the pulpit, that amplitude of discussion, and copious development of secondary principles, which belong to a regular treatise ; but the author has done sufficient, in our opinion, to prove that he is completely master of his subject, and fully competent to maintain the ground he has taken. The discourse consists of four parts. The first of these, extending to about 19 pages, embraces the traditional relations and symbolical representations of the early heathen nations ; comprising the Phœnicians, the Egyptians, the Hindoos or Brahmins of the East, the Greeks, the Romans, and the northern Goths. The clear result of all these quotations is, that the whole heathen world ascribed to the

Deity a SON, whom they conceived to be of the same *nature*, *essence*, and *substance* with his Father; and to whom they assign all the perfections and attributes of essential Deity. The Egyptians believed him to be the author of his own existence, and to have "*kindled himself*" from the ONE God. "Wherefore he is called also his own father and his own origin. For he is the original Being, and the God of gods. One of One, before any thing existed. From him came the *possibility* of being, and *being itself*." It is equally clear, that the ancient heathen world placed all their hopes and expectations in this *Son of God*, whom they frequently represent as becoming incarnate, in order to effect some gracious design in behalf of man. The Hindoo literature has recently become a subject of great interest in this country. The author has not only given us an extract from the sacred books of the Brahmins, but a *comment* containing some sensible remarks on the incarnations of Vishnoo, of which the *tenth* is still expected under the name of Kūlkee Uvūtarū; on which the author observes, that, "it were to have been wished that Mr. Ward had written the word *Kulkee* with *c* hard; for *k* had no existence in the first alphabets. The word *culte*, or worship, is common to all the languages of Europe, and is of frequent occurrence in the Icelandic Edda."

From the ancient stanzas of the *Voluspa*, as quoted in the *Edda*, we have also an interesting extract, on the creation of *Ask* and *Embla* (Adam and Eve,) which we here transcribe, with the supposititious preacher's sensible remarks upon it.

"The *Voluspa* or oracle of the prophetess Vola, in sixty-five stanzas, celebrates much the same themes as those in the pagan Sibyls, and in the Hebrew prophets. This is a standard work of our northern fathers, and often quoted in the Edda.

"Speaking of the creation of *Ask* and *Embla*, I would say, Adam and Eve (the introductory lines being lost) she says, "***** Until there came out of the throng of the Holy Gods (*ginuheilog goth*) convened on the plains of Ithavelli three ASAS to the temple, and found *Askar* and *Emla* extended on the ground, and undetermined to their future designation. They had neither spirit, nor mind, nor blood, nor aspect, nor beauteous tints. Odin gave them spirit, Heinir gave them intelligence, and Lothur superadded blood and beauteous tints.

ICELANDIC.

17

Fundo á landi,
Litt Megandi,

SWEDISH.

17

Funno de a landet,
Litet formaende,

Ask ok Emlo,
Aurlau-glausa.

18

Aund thau ne atto,
Auth thau ne hauftho;
La ne lati,
Ne lito gotha,
Aund gaf Othinn,
Oth gaf Hanir
La gaf Lothur,
Ok litu gotha.

Askera ok Embla,
Aldeles radlosa.

18

Anda de icke atte,
Bildn de ei hade;
Barma ei heller late,
Ei utseende goda,
Odhin gaf Andan,
Hanir gaf bilden,
Loder gaf barman,
Ok det skona unseende.

“Two obvious remarks here present themselves, that whatever might be the peculiar mythology of our gothic fathers, they cannot be suspected of having had the least intercourse with the priests of the Hebrew temple. Odin, the Goth, had come from the shores of the Don, bringing with him, like Cadmus, sixteen letters of the alphabet: prior to the building of the second temple, he, and his chiefs, were mostly called by the name of their God; a practice begun by the antediluvian fathers; so we may read, Genesis iv. 26: ‘Then men began to call themselves by the name of the Lord.’ Hence EL, Ethel, Asa, Atta, Allah, Adonai, Hadin, now Odin. It is secondly evident enough that the three persons concerned in the creation of man, indicate a belief in the Godhead, of whose unity our fathers were ignorant.

“The subsequent stanzas in the Voluspa coincide with the Hebrew prophets, and the Sibylline predictions; as well as with the expectations of the Brahmins in the tenth and long expected incarnation of Vishnoo. In the 63d, 64th, and 65th stanzas, she augurs like Isaiah, that ‘the unsown earth should yield a spontaneous increase; that all evils should subside; that *Baldur*, (the Lord, the Baal or Bel of antiquity) should come and dwell with Hauthr in Hropt’s sublime abode. Then too shall Haner come, and fill the earth with light and joy.’—Dr. Eben. Henderson adds, in his Travels in Iceland,

‘A hall she sees
Out-shine the sun,
Of gold the roof,
It stands in Heaven;

The virtuous there
Shall always dwell,
And evermore
Delights enjoy.’” [p. 27, 29.]

This universal prevalence of a uniform tradition, our author justly traces to the long-lived sons of Noah, who were the fathers of all the nations, and priests of the ancient altar. The promise of redemption was to them the dearest pledge of heaven, and must have been handed down to posterity, as their best hope and heritage. Every promise and hope known to Abraham by tradition, was equally known to them, and for a time preserved pure, until a depravity of manners induced an affectation of mystery which disguised facts by

fiction, and imposed a monstrous mythology on the world. It can scarcely be doubted, as the author admits, that the Jews communicated much sacred knowledge to the Gentiles; but how, he asks, could they find means to communicate that knowledge to the Brahmins of India, and cause it to be inserted in their sacred books? how could the Druids, how could the northern poems or sacred prophecies be fraught with these expectations? whatever might be the peculiar mythology of our gothic fathers, they cannot be suspected of having had the least intercourse with the priests of the Hebrew temple.

The second part of this discourse consists of testimonies, from the Hebrew prophets, in support of the divinity of the Messiah; which is followed by some quotations from the elder rabbins, to shew that they understood these predictions in the same sense in which they are now understood by the Christian church. From this portion of the work we give the following extracts, which may serve as a fair specimen of the spirited manner in which the whole is executed.

“The xlvth Psalm, the nuptial song on Solomon’s contemplated marriage with Pharaoh’s daughter, exhibits the early opinion of David, and the constant opinion of the church, respecting Christ. The holy prophets, ever worshipping with the Messiah in view, in hope of whom they served God day and night, spake of auspicious events as figures of the better hope. Hence they use metaphors too bold for the greatest license of poësy to authorize. The Sire says of the Son, ‘Thy throne, O God is for ever, and the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of righteousness.’ And in war this son is every where victorious; whereas Solomon had no war. Solomon was to die like his father, and have but a limited kingdom; but the God-man, the Lord Christ, was to reign to the ends of the earth, and live as long as the sun and moon should endure? Some questions may here arise.

“How did David understand his own words? Hear what he says in other Psalms. The Lord said to my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand till I make thine enemies thy footstool. The Lord shall send the rod of his strength out of Zion.—*Εκ γαστρος προ εωφορου εγενεα σε*: Before the morning I have begotten thee in the womb. Psal. cx. And Psalm ii. 7, after speaking of the same wars, and subjugation of the Gentile world, he says, ‘Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee.’ Kiss the Son *****. What is that whisper, that mutter which comes round to my ears *****. You shudder at a begotten God! You shudder *****, I shudder too;—I shudder to see the law and the prophets torn and mangled by a spirit of haughty reason, as Baal’s priests once stoned the servants of the Lord. I shudder to see children of yesterday rise up against

he once pure and primitive faith of the whole world. The graves themselves shudder to think that the fathers should suffer for the true religion, which their children now destroy; to think that they should die for the Saviour, while a presumptuous offspring 'crucify the Lord of glory.' Can mortals speak at all of the Divine Essence but under the figures of Creator, Father, Lord, and Judge? Can they speak of the sociality in the Godhead at all, or how love and goodness could exist in the Divinity from everlasting without an object in himself, but under the figures of Father, Son, Spirit, begetting, procession, manifestation, word, wisdom, ineffable generation? You quarrel with all these words; and yet you bring forth nothing from all your boasted treasures of reason, which is anything like an equivalent.

"Be calm on this point; if we all misunderstand the meaning of David, it is no way likely that Solomon should be wholly ignorant of his father's hope. Let us hear him. He transcribes the words of Agur. 'Who hath ascended up into heaven, or descended? Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? Who hath established all the ends of the earth? What is his name? And what is his son's name, if thou canst tell?'—Proverbs xxx. 4. Here a plurality of persons in the Godhead is most plainly indicated; else it would be the profanest antithesis ever used to bring a mortal sinful man into the highest heavens, and make him of equal family with the Creator and Lord of all. If any doubt remain, this Solomon makes the Son, the Word, the Wisdom of God, say to his eternal Sire, 'Thou, Lord, possessest me in the beginning of thy ways, before thy works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.—When he prepared the heavens, I was there. When he gave the sea his decree that the waters should not pass his commandment, when he appointed the foundations of the earth; then was I with him, and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing in the habitable parts of his earth, and my delights were with the sons of men.'—Prov. viii. 22, &c.

"The Wisdom or Word of God is said to proceed from the mouth (or face) of the Most High, being the brightness of the Father's glory. Eccles. xxiv. 3. Heb. 1. 3. The word *קָנָה Kanah*, rendered by the Septuagint *ἐκτίσας μέ*, created me, is also understood of possession. Eve said *קָנָה Kaniti*, I have gotten or possessed a man from the Lord, Gen. iv. 1. God could not create his own wisdom. Therefore the Lord possessed the Word or Wisdom, who was set up from everlasting.' 'Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee.' Psal. ii. 7. Now, there never was either morning or evening, or noon or night, with God. The Son was 'set up from everlasting.' He was, 'without beginning of days or end of life.' 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word.' John i. 1. God the Father, according to Methodius, said, 'Thou ART,' not thou becamest my Son; indicating that the Son acquired no

unexisting filiation, the words being understood declaratively, or by way of manifestation, as this author adds in the sequel. *Ει γὰρ υἱός, αὐτῷ εἶπεν, καὶ οὐ, γεγονός* &c. *Apud Phot. Cod. 237, p. 960.*

“Do not fear to take the holy prophets, the guides of the church, for your guides. My hopes are, that there is yet at the bottom of your hearts, a sincere desire to seek the truth. Pray, pray; and lay your theories aside: a heart unhallowed is not prepared for divine researches. Then the promise is yours; ‘The meek he will guide in judgment, the meek he will teach his way.’ Psalm xxv. 9. Isaiah, speaking likewise of future things as present, says, ‘Unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given.’ Surely this is not a mere metabole: here is a double geniture foretold, a child born of a Virgin, a Son given to us, for God gave his only begotten Son; and ‘thanks be to God for his unspeakable gift!’ [p. 32—36.]

The third part contains a critical examination of about five-and-twenty texts from the Unitarian Version, in which the corruptions and false renderings of the sacred text are exposed with great learning and ability. Here, however, the author occasionally breaks out in expressions of indignation at the efforts made to pervert what he conceives to be the truth, conceived in language rather too strong for the courtesy which marks even the controversies of the present day, though not out of character, in the mouth of a pillar of orthodoxy, who passed more than a century ago from his labours to his rest. A wish impartially to discharge our duty induces us to extract a specimen of this vituperative eloquence, in which we would gladly have seen, with the wisdom of the serpent, a somewhat larger infusion of the gentleness of the dove.

“Mark i. 3. ‘Prepare ye the way of the Lord.’ More than twenty times you notice Griesbach, as having omitted such and such a word, or a reading. Our regret is, that he had not omitted the whole of the New Testament. He notices the preceding verse of the Codex Argenteus, or Gothic version of the four Gospels by Bishop Ulphila, written about the year 350; but he fails to cast his eye on a remarkable variation in that version on the adjoining text. *RAIHTOS WAURKEITH STAIGOS GOTHIS UNSARIS*: that is, word for word, ‘Right work the stages of our God.’ This reading is in unison with Isaiah xl. 9, 10. Say to the cities of Judah, Behold your God. Behold the Lord God will come with a strong hand. He shall feed his flock like a shepherd, &c.’ Who is this *ADONAI JEHOVAH*, this good shepherd that laid down his life for his sheep, whom Griesbach could not see? This reading is proof enough that the good, the very laborious Ulphila, who preached the burning charity of his *LORD JEHOVAH* in the colder regions of

the north, had not reached the yet more frozen regions of *rational Christianity*.

“Ah! we mourn; we lament over the pride and error of your fathers. It was to those professors, those Griesbachs, that they sent over the young candidates for the presbyterian pulpits; they were sent in humble simplicity, but returned light, and vain, and proud-robed declaimers. They returned destitute of faith in a crucified ADONAI JEHOVAH. For decency's sake, they gave Jesus a good character, and held him up as a pattern of virtue. Ah! it was this pride of your fathers; it was these professors that sapped the foundations for which we suffered; for which our Martyrs burned in their conflicts with Papal Rome. I hear you flattering yourselves, that had those men been now alive, whose bones once filled Smithfield, Gloucester, and Oxford with light, they would all have followed the new light of Leyden professors. This is a species of filial impiety not to be endured. It is equivalent to a declaration, that they would all, like you, have taken salaries for teaching a religion, little of which they believed. It fills our bosoms with anguish and indignation; yea, with momentary sentiments just the reverse of those with which our noble martyrs suffered. Were we left to a choice between the corruptions of popery, and the evils of the present apostasy, our one prayer, our sole wish, would be for the full return of the catholic superstitions. Oh! give me Popery; Oh! give me Popery with all the grossities of the dark ages; I would pray at every altar, I would kneel at every shrine—I would make no scruple of adoring the crucifix, while I saw there ‘the Lord of glory,’ compared with declamations on the virtues of ‘the legitimate son of Joseph;’—‘the founder of the Christian religion.’ While popery flourished, we had an atoning altar; we had a Mediator, a second Adam, the Lord from heaven. To-day we have a faith which seems to lower and lower its *credenda*, or things to be believed, in every succeeding publication. ‘O daughter of Zion; what shall equal to thee, that I may comfort thee; for thy breach is great like the sea; who can heal it? Thy prophets have seen vain and foolish things for thee; they have not discovered thy iniquities.—But let us hope and quietly wait for the salvation of God.’—Lam. ii. 13. ii. 26.” [p. 45—47.]

The concluding part of the discourse is an appeal to the Christian fathers, on four grand points. 1. That the Son existed before the Blessed Virgin. 2. That he is one substance with the Father. 3. That he is co-eternal with the Father. 4. That he is subordinate to the Father, in no other sense than as God of God, Light of Light, &c. In this part of the work, the author has availed himself largely of Bishop Bull's celebrated work.

As a supplement to *Matthew Henry at Hackney*, is added a letter entitled, “*Strictures on the Unitarian Writings of*

Lant Carpenter, LL.D. of Bristol." This letter, we fear, will try at once the Doctor's learning and his patience: but we must leave him to it; as our limits will not allow us to enter on the subject. We cannot, however, but wish that its author, while writing in his own character and person, had not indulged in language so closely bordering upon vulgar abuse as the following.

"The cry of 'false readings, spurious texts, modern corruptions,' I generally find to be a box of heresy: my deliberate opinion of Griesbach is, that he is a jack-a-lantern, leading the well-disposed student to the morass." [p. 107.]

"The word was A-God.' Why, Dr., do you return five times to this text in different parts of your book? I perceive that it chafes and gravels you very much, and if you are not satisfied, how should your English reader be satisfied, whom you profess to guide? you might as well lay your axe and paddock aside, as you never will either fell the tree, or stub up its roots. THE WORD WAS GOD." [p. 115.]

This is not a mode of conducting controversy, by which the cause of Truth or Christianity can be a gainer, and we always regret that any of its advocates should resort to it. There are also some other matters, in this able and spirited, rather than temperate work, though, on the whole, we cordially recommend it to the notice of our readers, which we might feel disposed to censure; but, we are not sorry to plead want of space, as an excuse for not further quarrelling with an author, whose book has afforded us much real pleasure, and who, though anonymous, has justly entitled himself to our thanks.

Il Pastore Incantato, a Drama: Pompeii, and other Poems.
By a Student of the Temple. London. Hurst and Robinson. 1823. pp. 136.

The Star in the East; with other Poems. By Josiah Conder.
London. Taylor and Hessey. 1824. pp. 195.

In the present ambitious age for writing, it is impossible for a periodical journal like this to keep pace in its notices with the mass of poetical publications, which are almost daily issuing from the press. All we can hope to do is, to vary our pages with a few of the most striking, or of those which present some peculiar qualities to claim regard, and to excite our sympathy. It is not that there are not more

splendid exhibitions of talent in other unreviewed productions, which might awaken in the mind of the reader a more powerful interest, that we have selected those at the head of our article,—but that, with a large share of poetical and moral beauty, they possess that unpretending modesty of merit, which, whilst it looks for no great popular celebrity, renders us but the more desirous that it should be brought forward to that point of observation which may both enhance its charms, and render its excellencies appreciated.

The first of these productions would not, we are informed in the preface, have met the public eye, but for a misfortune which seems likely to close upon the author, at once, the doors both of life and fame; that they are sent into the world merely to gratify the simple, but very natural, desire of leaving something, however trivial, behind him, which may tend to prolong his memory among those whom he has valued upon earth; and that he has rather chosen to construct this little funeral pile with his own hands, composed as it has been out of a larger collection of juvenile and long-neglected materials, than to leave the care of them to any individual, whose partiality might have made him less sparing in the selection.—This declaration was to us, when we first took up the volume, fraught with a very touching interest, but our interest has been greatly increased by a perusal of the book, which, immature as some of its productions are, contains much to excite our admiration. It is not often that young poets stride at once into the right track of improvement; they often, perhaps we may say, they most generally, take some reigning favourite for their model of imitation, and rarely indeed drink so deep of the waters of Dirce, as to be inspired with the warmer love of those elder worthies of British song, which, notwithstanding the richness of succeeding years, must ever be recommended as the noblest and the best exemplars to the young aspirant of poetical renown. It was therefore delightful to us to find, at the commencement, that our divine Milton occupied so far the thoughts and admiration of our student, as to furnish him with the direct model for his principal poem: we regarded it as a good omen, and we have not been disappointed in the fruits of his attentive study.

“*Il Pastore Incantato*,” or “*The Enchanted Shepherd*,” is constructed on the plan of *Comus*, to which, in the conduct of the piece, it avowedly bears resemblance. This circumstance may, with some, be regarded as detracting from the originality of the author’s imagination, but we confess

Enter ARIEL, singing.

When the sun went down the sky,
 Of his all-glorious train was I ;
 On a purple cloud I sate,
 To augment his setting state.
 Seas of blood and sands of gold,
 Broad lakes, mountains, castles old—
 A thousand forms I there portrayed,
 In a thousand hues arrayed,
 More rich—more fair, than fan or screen
 Ever waved by Indian queen—
 Than tropic plume, or deep-dyed ore
 Of Peru's mines, or gemmed store,
 Which Thetis in dark caves doth hide,
 To light her pomp, or deck her pride.
 Now May's moon is mounted high,
 My delight is most to fly
 Round and round her shining zone,
 To behold whatever's done
 On half the outside of this earth—
 Sights of wo, or scenes of mirth.
 My name is Ariel, he who wrought
 All that the noble Prosper sought ;
 But now a higher post I fill,
 Constant friend to virtue still ;
 Never of evil deeds make I my boast,
 Like some, assuming shapes of unlaïd ghost
 Or megrim quaint, who love to joke
 With fuddled swains and harmless village folk ;
 But here upon this tufted knoll,
 Whose luscious perfume might control
 The subtler sense of purest spirit,
 To own its transcendental merit,
 With breath of violets consecrate,
 Pale-faced primrose, blowing late,
 And musk-rose, mixed with evening flower,
 On whom day's eye hath not the power
 To make them once their lids unclosed,
 Till the spruce gnat his trumpet blows—
 Shrill signal to the cobweb race
 Their elfin empress' court to grace,
 Spread on some verdant carpet near
 While the welkin burneth clear.
 On this sweet spot his summons I observe,
 Who bade me here, without plea or reserve
 Of elsewhere duty, or ill-timed pleasure,
 Patient wait his sovereign leisure,
 Who holdeth a commissioned 'hest

From Jove, the greatest and the best,
This night to be performed and done,
Ere the rising of the sun,
About the youth of whom much hath been said,
And much more will be aread
In after time, if hope speak true.
Here must I wait, with reverence due,
The soon approach of him whose strict command
Shall be obeyed with head, heart, voice, and hand.

[p. 10—13.]

We are next presented to Setebos the Demon, who in the cavern of his volcano, surrounded by rocks and cypresses, and crowned with nightshade, fulminates his portentous threats and spells against the youth who has interrupted the rites of his ancient votaries. His three Sisters in watch around his couch in the romantic grotto, vary the scene, and with the disclosures in their dialogue considerably heighten our interest in the shepherd's fate. Setebos summons up Hecate to his aid: she comes in storm and tempest, and to the sickness under which the shepherd labours, they inflict all that they are permitted by the guardian spirit—the plague of nightmare. The following beautiful little composition might safely be placed upon a par with the touching simplicity of our ancient ballads:—

A dreadful Storm, with thunder and lightning.

ARIEL enters.

“This is the most terrific storm I ever
Encountered yet. The elements seem mingled;
The boisterous sea buffets the angry shore;
The deep foundations of this Emerald Isle
Quake; vivid lightnings rend heaven's steadfast pillars,
And bring its crashing dome about one's ears;
The moon and the stars are hid behind the clouds:
I'll creep into this cocoa-nut shell, and wait
Till it subside, and I can dry my feathers.
Meanwhile, for lack of company, I'll sing:

I would not be compelled to ride
Over this stormy sea,
For all the gold that misers hide
Under the hawthorn tree.

I would not be obliged to run
Upon this sharp sleet air,
To be made monarch of the Sun,
Without a monarch's care.

My life, upon this wind or wave,
I should not deem secure;
But, ah! what will not mortals brave,
Led on by fortune's lure?

Yet if but *one* small tear 'twould dry,
On the lid of a maiden fair,
I'd climb these waves, though mountains high,
And skim the sharp sleet air.

' Heigh, ho!

' The rain and the snow!

' But fast come, soon go!"

[p. 36—38.]

The Guardian Spirit in the end presents himself to the Sisters in the form of a Hermit, and with Ariel's assistance frees him from the enchantment, by aspersion of holy water and intervention of the Sacred Volume illuminating his eyes,—an imagination managed in perfect accordance with the Doric spirit of the drama. The emotions of the youth in awakening from his trance, are thus beautifully painted.

Methought I heard the voice of some one calling;
Distant at first it seemed, and scarce perceived;
But as it nearer grew dissolved my dream,—
Not therefore less delightful; for such dream,
Never till now, though often visited
By Morpheus' train, abused my fantasy—
Never, till now, did such atrocious forms
Of black-mouthed monsters dog and hunt me down—
Me, singled out from all the world beside,
To be the butt of an invisible hate,
And an invisible dread of powers unknown.
I have been waked from sleep by the shrill lark,
Soaring betimes to welcome the young day;
I have been roused by Autumn's mellow horn,
Winding its rich voluminous notes along
The vaulted night, until the welkin warbled;
And I have heard such sounds of harp and lute,
In dulcet chorus joined, as made me hope
The morning of the retribution come;
I have been gently called by one I loved,
And the first object was her cherub face;
But, oh! to be awaked from such a dream—
So horrible—by this celestial voice,
And find it but a dream—surpasses all!

[p. 52, 53.]

The Guardian Spirit on his disenthralment enters into benevolent communion with him. Ariel winds up the converse with an interlude of perhaps yet greater beauty than

the one already quoted : a band of shepherds, crowned with garlands, appear in front of the grotto, and chant their dutious salutations on the youth's recovery, and the drama concludes with music, dancing, and rural entertainment.

Our readers will see, that the basis is slight upon which the fabric of the drama is built, but we do not know that it is slighter than that of *Comus*. What principally charms in the production, is not so much the progress of the story, as the chaste and antique diction, the Doric simplicity and imagery, that pervade the fable. We might select numerous delicate verses to illustrate this *curiosa felicitas*, but the passages already cited must suffice. If the author in his admiration of Milton has erred in aught, it is, we think, in introducing too many of those discords in his versification which his master uses ; but, which in modern times, though they often come upon the memory with a certain varying charm, are as little acceptable to the general ear, as inimical to harmony in even that of a poetical reader, unless managed with extreme caution, judgment, and address. But whatever slight objection might be raised on this account, to the versification of the drama, none can be brought to attach to the second principal poem in the collection, which has throughout a harmony, clear, full, and flowing, combined with the same pure fancy and beautiful description. The destruction of Pompeii is a subject that has, if we mistake not, more than once been chosen for poetical lament, but never with so much success as in the present case. A vein of the richest fancy runs through it, and there is something both remarkably original and expressive in the commencing figure of the following extract, and melodious in the conclusion.

“ The shroud of years thrown back, thou dost revive,
Half-raised, half-buried, dead, yet still alive !
Gathering the world around thee, to admire
Thy disinterment, and, with hearts on fire,
To catch the form and fashion of the time
When Pliny lived, and thou wert in thy prime ;
So strange thy resurrection, it may seem
Less waking life than a distressful dream.

Hushed is this once gay scene, nor murmurs more
The city's din, the crowd's tumultuous roar,
The laugh convivial, and the chiming sound
Of golden goblets with Falernian crowned :
The mellow breathings of the Lydian flute,
And the sweet drip of fountains as they shoot

From marble basements : these, all these are mute !
 Closed are her springs, unnumbered fathoms deep,
 Her splendid domes are one dismantled heap,
 Her temples soiled, her statues in the dust,
 Her tarnished medals long devoured by rust ;
 Its rainbow pavements broken from the bath,
 The once-thronged Forum an untrodden path ;
 The fanes of love-forgotten cells, the shrines
 Of vaunted gods inurned in sulphur mines,
 The' abodes of art, of luxury, and taste ;
 Tombs of their once-glad residents—a waste
 O'er which compassionate years have gradual thrown
 The trailing vine, and bade the myrtle moan." [p. 71—73.]

The catastrophe is faithfully described after the younger Pliny, and with much pomp of language.

" From the deep womb of mountains, soars on high
 Columnar smoke, and heaves into the sky,—
 Then, like the broad black branches of the pine,
 Spreads o'er the plains, a dark, funereal sign !
 And showers, as driven by Pluto's angry ghosts,
 Its withering ashes o'er those charming coasts.
 Vesuvius burns ; earth quakes ; the thunders roar ;
 And the rocked sea shrinks startled from the shore.

————— " Then the burning mould
 Quick, quick impression took ; the young, the old,
 Flying in haste, by Death's stern hand were fixt,
 And with the molten lava intermixt,
 Nor dropt the' uplifted arm with decent grace,
 Nor form composed, to meet his hot embrace ;
 Ev'n as they fled, they perished—they remained,
 And still the tide flowed on, the ashes rained.
 Three days, three nights crept past in blackest shade,
 Then broke the clouds, and sick the sunshine played,
 Not on high towers and temples, which the morn
 Had erst been proud to worship and adorn,
 Not on Pompeii ! but her awful ghost,—
 A mass of ashes, whitening all the coast !" [p. 74, 77.]

Of the smaller pieces we select the following.

To fill the Title Page of a beautiful Collection of Lace Patterns.

" LADY, when I this chronicle of taste,
 Taught in Arachne's school, much pleased, regard,
 And think how British fair ones have wrought hard,
 With burnished needle, and bright armour placed
 On their white fingers, to make good the waste

Which envious years (because a lady's bloom
They may not injure) lavish on her loom—
I'm proud to be selected for their bard,
Comparing the same beauteous Arabesques,
Of various pattern, flowered or foliate,
With those so much esteemed of Raphael's fresques
Which all admire, but few dare emulate;
Or to the divine skill of Grecian dame,
Whose works the ancient world has given to fame." [p. 98.]

A sonnet of equal beauty, and Miltonic cadence, occurs in page 94;—but we are more desirous of finding room for the following fragment, which, we will be bold to say, contains a finer *personification* of Death, than any in the whole compass of our poetry.

“(A FRAGMENT.)

* * * * *
“I saw Death standing with his tapers there,
Not darkly glimmering, but intensely bright:
All high uplifted—whose strong glare shot down
On his fair shining countenance, direct,
Sickening suffusion of unearthly light—
Erect he stood—not the spare grisly form
Of monkish terror carved in effigies,
But a most beautiful youth with damask cheek—
Cupid of hell!—sweet cherub of the tomb!
His profile somewhat sharpened—in his eye
Beamed tenfold life and never-dying fire.
I saw him thus—and I perchance had loved him
But for the strange unnatural union
Of qualities and shape so much opposed.
He spake not, and the waxen pageants round,
His fair attendants equal silence held—
Each in his hand a curious garland bore
Of rosemary, violet, and the mingled hues
Which erst allured Proserpine in the vale
Of charming Euna:—one peculiar flower
Bloomed there 'midst evergreens, the yew, the bay,
Holly and cypress, Death's own favourite flower.
On earth, 'tis called Ephemeron—with awe
I touched it—down it fell, reduced to dust,
Emitting thence odours more rank and faint
Than lawless poppy or the unholy bane—
Death smiled to see his bauble thus destroyed!—
* * * * *

I saw no scythe—his final purposes
Are all accomplished by his silent breath,
Surged up the nostrils of the fated wretch

Whene'er he comes to kiss the sons of men
And take them home to dwell at peace with him—

O beauty, never can I love thee more,
For ne'er wert thou in such perfection seen
As in that beautiful emblem of decay."

[p. 88—90.]

This is assuredly a singular and most original production: regarded as a youthful composition, it is an extraordinary conception, and if, (which we sincerely desire,) the author's life should be spared, and his mind still continue to be directed to these pursuits, we feel persuaded that the glowing fancy which produced it, will give forth other creations of a very high order indeed. We do not, however, regard his taste, pure as it is in the main, to be fully formed at present, having pencilled down some considerable inaccuracies and affectations of expression, the natural consequences of immaturity; but these are so few, in comparison with the elegancies, that we have little care to describe them. The volume, we may remark, is dedicated to Mr. Wiffen, and contains, besides, some verses addressed to that gentleman, with a Lemon gathered in Tasso's Garden, in a strain of delicate compliment, and of virtuous sentiment, that do no less honour to the heart than the head of the young writer. They are too long, however, to quote, and we must therefore conclude, by observing that we have not often, of late years, met with a first publication that gives so fair a promise of future excellence.

But how much soever the Christian reader may admire the power of youthful genius employed upon works of fancy or of fiction, it is when he reverts to subjects connected with the best interests of man, that he feels the purest gratification, and the greatest disposition to abandon his mind to the imaginations and pictures of the muse. Sacred subjects, however, though to a contemplative mind they lay deeper the foundation of pleasure and improvement, and give that foundation a solidity capable of bearing a more towering structure, is proportionally more difficult to build upon, so as to suit, in any successful degree, the architecture to the grandeur of design. The majesty and beauty, moreover, of the sacred poetry, in the inspired volume, present a foil to all merely human attempts, the effects of which never have been, and never can be wholly overcome.

A feeling of inadequacy, in this respect, has deterred many from attempting sacred subjects at all, whose spiritual

inclinations would otherwise have led them to exercise their talents on the sublimities or attractions of the dealings of God to man; whilst the far greater number of our poets have preferred that easier path, which lies through the passions of mankind, surrounded by merely sublunary scenes. Few indeed are those who can say

“ Into the heaven of heavens, His vast abode,
I have presumed, an earthly guest, to enter,
And draw empyreal air.”

There are many stages, however, in sacred poetry, between supereminent success and total failure, and we always hail with great cordiality every attempt to recommend serious and solemn themes to our affections, through the medium of harmonious verse. Mr. Conder, in his “*Star in the East*,” has introduced us to a poem of most benign aspect, and of no common merit. It is written in blank verse, that most stately and dignified of all our measures, and we must needs say, it is here managed with considerable skill, variety, and effect. The title conveys at once to the mind, the subject upon which the poet treats. The poem opens with a happy allusion to the song of the Angels at the Redeemer’s Advent,

“ unearthly symphonies,
Which o’er the starlight peace of Syrian skies
Came floating like a dream.”

The ancient and present state of Jerusalem and the Jews are next sketched out with much poetical power, and the spread of Christianity through the nations, rapidly, but most spiritedly described. The imagery introduced is admirably characteristic, the versification full and clear, and the sentiments and diction glowing like a prophet’s. Let our extracts speak for themselves; India has been spoken of, and the poet now glances at Persia, China, and the Isles of Polynesia.

“ Land of the Sun, once thy fond idol! Land
Of rose-gardens, where aye the bulbul sings
His most voluptuous song! Thou mother-land
And cradle of the nations! Land of Cyrus!
(Shall e’er a second Cyrus spring from thee?)
Thy palaces have heard a heavenly voice:
A prophet’s feet have trod thy burning soil:
A ‘man of God’ has left his name with thee.
Thy sage Mollahs, say, have they yet resolv’d
The Christian’s knotty interrogatives?
Go, send for aid to Mecca. Ha! the Arab!

The Wahabite is there! The Caliphate,
 Shrunk to the shadow of a name, survives
 But in thy Othman rival, who e'en now
 Sees Egypt lost, and quails before the Greek.
 Rouse thee! shake off the trammels of a creed
 Forged to enslave thee. From thy Scoffish dreams
 Awake to manlier life; and, if thou canst,
 Call up thy ancient Magi from their rest,
 To lead thee to His rising, who returns
 To gladden thee, with healing in his beams,—
 The SUN whom thou *mayst* worship. Thy Euphrates
 Shall flee his ancient channel, to prepare
 A passage for the monarchs of the East.

“And thou, ‘Celestial Empire!’ teeming hive
 Of millions! vast impenetrable realm!
 The hour is writ in heaven, thy yellow sons
 Shall bow at the holy name, and women there
 Relent into the mother. Human loves
 And softest charities shall in the train
 Of heavenly faith attend. Thy wondrous wall
 Is scaled, thy mystic tongue decipher’d now.

“Where, in the furthest deserts of the deep,
 The coral-worm its architecture vast
 Uprears, and new-made islands have their birth,
 The Paphian Venus, driven from the West,
 In Polynesian groves long undisturb’d
 Her shameful rites and orgies foul maintain’d.
 The wandering voyager at Taheite found
 Another Daphne. On his startled ear,
 What unaccustom’d sounds come from those shores,
 Charming the lone Pacific? Not the shouts
 Of war, nor maddening songs of Bacchanals;
 But, from the rude Morai, the full-toned psalm
 Of Christian praise. A moral miracle!
 Taheite now enjoys the gladdening smile
 Of Sabbaths. Savage dialects, unheard
 At Babel, or at Jewish Pentecost,
 Now first articulate divinest sounds,
 And swell the universal loud Amen.”

[p. 10—13.]

Greenland, North America, Sierra Leone, and central Africa, come in for their share of this pomp of language and gratulation; the progress of knowledge, circulation of the Scriptures, and signs of the times, are commented on in strains of like devout rejoicing, and the subject is skilfully concluded by a beautiful apostrophe.

“O Star! the most august of all that clasp
 The star-girt heav’n, which erst in eastern skies

Didst herald, like the light of prophecy,
 The Sun of Righteousness,—the harbinger
 Of more than natural day; whether thou track
 The circuit of the universe, or thrid,
 As with a golden clew, the labyrinth
 Of suns and systems, still from age to age
 Auguring to distant spheres some glorious doom;
 Sure thou thy blessed circle hast well nigh
 Described, and in the majesty of light
 Bending on thy return, wilt soon announce
 His second advent. Yes, even now thy beams
 Suffuse the twilight of the nations. Light
 Wakes in the region where gross darkness veil'd
 The people. They who in death's shadow sat,
 Shall hail that glorious rising: for the shade
 Prophetic shrinks before the dawning ray
 That cast it: forms of earth that interposed,
 Shall vanish, scatter'd like the dusky clouds
 Before the exultant morn; and central day,
 All shadowless, even to the poles shall reign.

"Volume of God! thou art that eastern Star
 Which leads to Christ. Soon shall thy circuit reach
 Round earth's circumference, in every tongue
 Revealing to all nations, what the heavens
 But shadow forth, the glory of the Lord." [p. 16—18.]

As the poem is of no great length, our readers must be satisfied with these quotations from it. The remainder of the volume is arranged under the three heads of Sacred, Domestic, and Miscellaneous Poems. The Sacred consist of metrical versions of Psalms and Hymns, alike creditable to the piety of our author, and the powers of his muse. Amongst these we were glad to see his "Monody on the Death of Kirke White," and that charming Reply to Henry's stanzas, commencing, "But art thou thus indeed alone?" which first, we remember, introduced us to Mr. Conder's poetry; and which has always rested on our memory like the fragrance of a sequestered wood-flower, or of music heard amongst the mountains, "pleasant," as Ossian beautifully says of departed joys, "pleasant, but mournful to the soul."

The Domestic Poems disclose and exhibit in a very pleasing light, the amiable qualities of the writer. Many of them remind us, in their unambitious flow and structure of verse, and in the impression made upon the mind by the perusal, of the sweet, the plaintive, and deep-thoughted muse of Montgomery, who, if we mistake not, has been the model

after which they have, although perhaps half-unconsciously, been built. Let the following tender composition vindicate the justice of our praises.

“ ABSENCE.

“ Do I not love thee? Yes, how well,
 Thou best, thou only, Love, canst tell:
 For other eyes have never seen
 How much a look of mine can mean;
 Nor other lips than thine can guess
 How deep the feeling mine express.
 But thee both eyes and lips have told,
 Most truly, that I am not cold.
 Yet now, in absence, all thou art
 Rushes afresh upon my heart,
 And makes me feel that heart not yet
 Has ever half discharged its debt.
 For Memory, as to mock me, brings
 A crowd of half-forgotten things,
 That Love before had scarcely leisure
 To think upon, for present pleasure;
 Reproaching me with virtues slighted,
 And deeds of kindness unrequited:
 While shadowy, awful, undefined,
 The Future rises to my mind,
 And as its depths my thoughts explore,
 I seem to feel thine absence more.
 Shuddering I strive to pierce its shade,
 By Love a very coward made;
 Then turn to meet thy smile. But thou
 Art distant—future—shadowy now.
 Oh, art thou still a breathing form,
 Lovely, and tangible, and warm?
 So parted utterly we seem,
 As though the past were all a dream;
 And thou, as if unearthly, Dearest,
 A hallow'd, saintly thing appearest:
 So long from sight and touch estranged;
 I almost dread to meet thee changed.

“ Oh, say, do wayward thoughts like these,
 Tender regrets, wild phantasies,
 And vague misgivings, ever find
 Unbidden entrance to *thy* mind?
 Oh, it would absence half repay,
 To know my spirit held such sway
 O'er thine, as that thou couldst not be,
 Nor feel thyself, apart from me.

**"But absence cannot be repaid :
Fast, fast, the fleeting moments fade,
That make up life's allotted sum,
Brief and uncertain all to come.
Then let us not consume apart
The youth and spring-time of the heart.
Enough has absence proved thy power :
Return, and I will bless the hour
That tells me all my fears were vain,
And gives me back my home again."** [p. 110—113.]

Amongst the Miscellaneous Poems, we may mention that entitled "*The Voice of the Oak*," as containing poetry of a very high class : it thus commences :

**"Genius! if such may chance to dwell
Within the excavated bound
That rudely shapes this oaken cell,
And closes in its knotty round,—
Genius! with acorn chaplet crown'd,
Thy hoar antiquity might well,
If fraught it were with mortal sound,
Of elder years a legend tell.
For many a course of sun and shade,
Tempest and calm, thy growth matured ;
And many a year its circle made,
The while thy summer prime endured :
To flood and flame of heaven inured,
Slow centuries hast thou o'erstaid ;
By stern, majestic might secured
From storms that wreck, or blights that fade.
Thou, like a hermit sad and sage,
In silence lone thy dwelling hast :
Thine aspect is a living page,
Where times o'erflown their annals cast.
For, through the watches of the past,
Thou hast beheld, as age on age
Dawn'd, hast beheld them setting fast,
And Time on his long pilgrimage
Still hurrying to the last.
And thou that saw'st them wear away,
Dost fail. Ev'n as the season's glide,
Thy grandeur creeps to sure decay,
Amid the devastation wide.
For Time thy giant strength has tried,
And sparsely deck'd, thy branches gray
Hang, like old banners, at thy side,
To mark his conquering sway."** [p. 139, 140.]

There are some images, in other parts of the poem, truly magnificent, but they are too closely intermingled with the main current of moralizing description, to be transferred to our pages without diminishing their effect. The "Verses to the Nightingale" are full as happy; they are fraught with fanciful description, of which the following extract may give some, although an inadequate idea.

"To me that song denotes no less
Than mirth and inborn happiness;
That dreams the peaceful night away
In living o'er the joys of day.
To me it a long tale unravels
Of airy voyages, Persian travels,
Gay pranks in summer's fairest bowers,
And broken hearts among the flowers;
And then of England's landscape mild,
Spring's virgin beauties undefiled,
Her violet-banks, her blue-bell glades,
Her daisied meads, her greenwood shades,
The hedge-rows where the may is blooming,
With tenderest scent the air perfuming,
The stream through richest pastures winding,
And tender corn,—of these reminding,
It seems to speak of all to me
In vocal poetry."

We admire many of the Sonnets introduced: we think Mr. Conder has fully succeeded in breathing into them that kind of spirit which Wordsworth introduces in his with such imaginative power: they prove with how keen an eye, and how warm a love, the author has regarded nature; nothing can be in better keeping than the picture here presented.

"AUTUMN,

"A glorious day! The village is afield:
Her pillow'd lace no thrifty housewife weaves,
Nor platters sit beneath the flowery eaves.
The golden fields an ample harvest yield:
And every hand that can a sickle wield
Is busy now. Some stoop to bind the sheaves,
While to the o'erburden'd waggon one upheaves
The load, among its streamers half conceal'd.
We heard the ticking of the lonely clock
Plain through each open door—all was so still.
For busily dispersed, near every shock,
Their hands with trailing ears the urchins fill.
Where all is clear'd, small birds securely flock,
While full on lingering day the moon shines from the hill."

[p. 173.]

Others there are of equal beauty, descriptive of other seasons, but our limits restrict us from more particularly adverting to them. We must be satisfied in recommending the volume to the perusal of all, who, like ourselves, value the charm of poetry employed in the cause of virtue, in awakening the mild affections of our nature, and in striking up in our homes and daily haunts, the harmony that flows from a well-regulated heart, when devoted to innocent and holy themes. We rejoice to see Mr. Conder, whilst avowing the vanity of these early wishes after literary distinction, which have agitated at times the bosoms of the best, not neglecting the gift with which he is endowed, and we love the verse with which he has thus presented us, more dearly, from the circumstance of his having learned to "subdue those vivid shapings of his youth." The modesty of his pretensions derives a greater charm from this association, and we consider ourselves as having fulfilled no less a duty than a pleasure, in thus drawing, so far as our means enable us, the public attention to a work of such desert.

The Modern Traveller. Part III. IV. V. VI. Containing Syria and Asia Minor. Two Vols. 18mo. pp. 354, 356. London. Duncan.

ANOTHER portion of this most interesting little work having been completed, we gladly devote a page or two of our review, to bear our testimony to the continued excellence of the execution of a plan, of which we have already spoken in terms of high, but of most richly merited commendation. It was originally intended to comprise the description of Syria, in two parts; but owing to the peculiar interest attaching to that country, and the copiousness of the materials which the visits of recent travellers have amassed, the Editor thought it more desirable to extend his limits, and to attach to the description of Syria an account of Asia Minor, another interesting portion of the Turkish empire, with which it naturally stands in a very close connexion. For this arrangement he is well entitled to the thanks of his readers, who, in those parts of his valuable compilations, which we now warmly commend to their notice, will find, at least, as much to please, to inform, and to interest them, as they did in the account of the Holy Land, to which Syria and Asia Minor form the most proper succession in a series of travels like these.

The travellers, upon whose authority these volumes are

judiciously compiled are Bellonius, Ratwolf, Moryson, Maundrell, Pococke, Hasselquist, Niebahr, Van Egmont, Heyman, Dandini, Thevenot, Tournefort, La Roque, D'Arvieux, Chandler, Russell, Tavernier, Mallet, Wood, Dawkins, Lucas, Gouffier, Picheni, Raffeneil, Le Chevalier, Volney, Morritt, Browne, Clarke, Seetzen, Cockerell, Chishull, Buckingham, Burckhardt, Walpole, Light, Banks, Mangles, Irby, Richardson, Squire, Kinnier, Mackworth, Leake, Beaufort, Kockler, and Jowett. But, besides the Christian Researches of the last-named tourist, the Editor has very properly availed himself of the Journals of Messrs. Connor, Barker, Fiske Palmer, and other active and devoted agents of the Bible and Missionary Societies of Great Britain and America, for illustrating the present state and condition of that interesting portion of the globe, to which they have long and laboriously been endeavouring to restore the light of that pure and holy faith, whose earliest beams illuminated their now dark, degraded, and superstitious inhabitants.

Among the most interesting portions of a work, the materials for which are thus ample, we place a very spirited account of Shiekh Daher, the Bedouin Arab pasha of Acre, of which he was the second founder, (I. 6—26); the description of Tyre and Sidon, ancient and modern, (Ib. 40—61); of the Druses and Maronite Christians, (Ib. 74—126); the Cedars of Lebanon, (135—142); Baalbec, (Ib. 194—215); Palmyra, (II. 1—36); Damascus, (Ib. 37—66); the seven Apocalyptic Churches of Asia Minor, viz. Smyrna, (Ib. 100—118); Ephesus, (Ib. 123—134); Laodicea, (Ib. 147—149); Philadelphia, (Ib. 154—158); Sardis, (Ib. 158—164); Thyatira, (Ib. 173, 174); Pergamos, (Ib. 174, 175).¹ To these we add the very interesting account of Haivali, (Ib. 175—194). It must be obvious that a work of the connected nature of this narrative, can afford but few extracts for a review, we cannot however deny ourselves the pleasure of transcribing the Editor's concluding remarks upon each of the very interesting countries embraced in the present portion of his work, characterized as they are by good sense, and the liberal yet temperate views of a Christian politician. The account of Syria is thus wound up:

“ Let us cast a retrospective glance at the country we have been surveying,—a country so highly favoured by Heaven, that it unites, by a happy combination of various properties of soil and climate, the advantages of every zone; of an almost inexhaustible fertility, and capable of supporting a most dense population; yet, in every age, wasted and depopulated by the ravages of conquerors, the very

play-ground of ambition; and now consigned to comparative barrenness and helpless anarchy by a rapacious and cruel despotism, which 'destroys more than it feeds upon;'—the country of the vine and the olive, the oak and the cedar, the mulberry-tree and the palm,—which can boast of the richest pastures, the finest cornlands, and the most exquisite fruits,—the birth-place of commerce, the emporium of the East; in a word, the country which numbers among its cities, Tyre and Sidon, Tripoli and Antioch, Baalbec and Palmyra, Aleppo and Damascus. And all this is in the hands of the Turk! What is still worse, the Turks, who form a very small proportion of the inhabitants, though illiterate, are not the most ignorant; though Mahomedans, are not the least Christian part of the population. Here, religious bigotry is found reigning and raging peculiarly among the hostile votaries of different benighted communions,—the Greek, the Syrian, and the Papist; while the Bible is almost unknown, and Divine service is performed in a foreign tongue. The Moslem worships his prophet, the Christian prays to the Virgin and the Saints, the Druse to neither; while, in the recesses of Lebanon, the heathen still clings to the infamous rites of the old classical idolatry. Such is Syria! It is not our province to speculate on the changes which future years may introduce. It is certain, that the natives groan for deliverance; and even the Moslems have a superstitious presentiment that their power is drawing to its termination. 'It is surprising,' says a recent traveller,* 'to hear the universal desire expressed by all classes of people in this country, that a European Christian power should be induced to come and take possession of it.' Four thousand British troops, this writer thinks, (himself a military man), 'with the indubitable assistance of the native inhabitants,' would easily take possession of all Syria, while 10,000 would suffice to conquer Egypt; without which, indeed, it might prove a precarious possession. Acre and El Arish secured, Palestine could oppose little resistance. A few thousand men garrisoned in the strong posts of the Haouran, Burckhardt says, would effectually keep the peace, and put an end to the exactions of the Arabs. El Hossn, Deir el Kamr, Szaffad, Sanhour, and Kerek, present other strong positions very available in the hands of a European power. The Christians of the Greek church naturally look towards Russia; and when Seetzen travelled, they caught at the idea that he was sent by *Melek el Aszfar*, the Yellow King, (the title they give to the Russian emperor,) to examine the country preparatory to an invasion, for the purpose of delivering it from the Turkish yoke. The Druses and the Arabs, it is thought, would prefer the English, who have, even in the eyes of the Turks, the merit of not being idolaters. Should another Fakr el din or Sheikh Daher, or, were it possible, another Judas Maccabæus, arise, he might have, in the present distracted state of the Turkish empire, with European alliance, a

* Major Mackworth.

fairer opportunity than has yet presented itself, of becoming the liberator of his country. In the mean time, a silent revolution is gradually working by less doubtful and less aggressive means. Religious prejudices are giving way before the influence exerted by British travellers. The Arabic Scriptures are finding their way all over the country. The Terra Santa convents are happily on the decline, while Protestant Missionaries are, for the first time, turning their attention to the holy city, and the Syrian Christians. Should the Turkish government be induced to tolerate the measure, it is contemplated to establish a Protestant church at Jerusalem,—a nobler achievement than Godfrey of Bouillon effected by his sword, and than Tasso has sung. From such a focus, the rays of Scriptural light would diverge in all directions; and in the footsteps of Christianity would follow, as they ever have done, industry, freedom, social order, and all the charities of life.”—[Part V. pp. 86—88.]

In the same spirit, though more briefly, does he conclude his description of Asia Minor, and with it the portion of the Modern Traveller now under our review.

“But there is no end of describing the wonders of art and the scenic beauties which once rendered this country the richest, the most populous, and the fairest portion of the globe,—the favourite abode alike of its Eastern and Western conquerors, and the chosen residence of their fabled gods. This Eden is now a wilderness—a vast necropolis. The scattered hordes which rove over its most beautiful regions, are, for the most part, tenants of a desert, while the oppressed and degraded population of the towns, may be said to dwell amid the tombs. Except in Egypt, no part of the world exhibits in such striking contrast, the wide extremes of ancient power, grandeur, and genius, in their loftiest achievements, and human nature in the most pitiable state of deterioration and littleness. And perhaps there is no part of the Turkish empire, in which the destructive effects of that hideous and baleful despotism are more unequivocally conspicuous. But the Porte, by its impolitic jealousy, is undermining its own security, and preparing its own downfall. Its commerce, its population, its resources, its political energies, are rapidly diminishing. Let the Greeks but succeed in Europe, and their example will not be lost.”—[Part VI. p. 355—356.]

We are happy to find that the spirited publisher of this beautifully neat little pocket tourist, has already experienced such encouragement from the public, as to enable him to promise a continuation of the liberal extension of his original engagement, by giving regularly two engravings instead of one, with each part of the work. The four occupied by Syria and Asia Minor, besides two very neat maps,

contain prettily executed views of an Arabian banditti in sight of a caravan; the Ruins of Palmyra; a Karamanian waitwode, (or market); a Turkish burying-ground; Smyrna; and a portrait of Hassan Pasha, in his full costume.

William Barlow, A Sketch from Life. By Esther Hewlett, Author of *Eliza Harding, Legend of Stutchbury, &c.* 18mo. London, 1823. pp. 226. Holdsworth.

THIS little tale for youth, is, as will be perceived from the title page, another production of the useful and judicious pen of Mrs. Hewlett, of whose *Eliza Harding* we spoke, with merited commendation, in a former number of our journal. Its object is to state and to refute the popular objections to the truth of revelation in such a form, as to render them attractive to the young and unexperienced, who in these days, in which such extraordinary efforts have been made for the spread of infidelity, are the most exposed to its open or more subtle attacks upon the sublime truths of our pure and holy faith. This she has accordingly done, in a very simple story, of a pious family in humble life, whose happiness is attacked by the son being tempted by wicked companions, to quit the path of his fathers for their new ways—of the despondence and despair which followed a conviction of the gloom and uncertainty of his sceptical notions, from the reasonings of his faithful pastor with his infidel companions, (taken chiefly by the way from Leslie, Paley, Gregory, and other popular writers on the evidences of Christianity, though clothed for the most part in the language of the authoress,) his horrible apprehensions, that as an apostate, he could never be received again into the fold of Christ, and the removal of his fears on witnessing the peaceful departure of his father, in the faith once delivered to the saints. On the whole, we can confidently recommend the tale, of which we have thus given the outline, (though we should add, by the way, that the infidel perverters of the hero meet with their deserts,) not only to our young readers, but to those who have the superintendence of their education, as a very useful antidote to the mischiefs it is intended to prevent.

We could not, however, avoid smiling at the incongruity into which most writers of fiction seem destined more or less to fall, in making the minister engaged in refuting the advocates of infidelity, who had seduced from his fold one

of the younglings of his flock, appeal to two journeymen watchmakers, as having fagged over Virgil and Horace, as conversant with the precepts of Plato, Lycurgus, Solon, Socrates, Seneca, and as being so well acquainted with classical authors, that they were familiar with the indirect confirmation afforded by Juvenal, Longinus, Diodorus Siculus, and others, to the truths of some parts of scripture history; though these learned men maintain the infidel side of the argument with infinitely less ability than many of their less gifted associates in impiety have done.

POETRY.

THE DEATH OF MUNGO PARK,* BY J. H. WIFFEN, Esq.

(Concluded from Vol. III. page 406.)

XXXV.

'Tis day—what sounds at so serene an hour
 Startled the echoing solitudes of Yaour?
 The' adventurer looked, and saw with careless eye
 Two Negro horsemen on fleet barbs sweep by,
 Along the vale's clear waters, which to view
 Rich with the ravishment of morn—the hue
 Drawn from the golden-tissued clouds, might charm
 From Wrath's wild eye the meditated harm,
 If, eager for destruction, aught of wrath
 Could tread at such a time so bright a path;
 But charmed not them: they paused, till on the tide
 The far Bambarran vessel they descried,
 Winning its way in gladness from the shores,
 The broad wave whitening with the flash of oars.
 To them that sight seemed bitterness: a frown,
 Gloomy as thunder on their brows came down:
 Then turned they to the North impatiently,
 Guilt on their cheek, defiance in their eye:
 And fast, like Heaven's destroying angels, sped,
 Nor check'd the scourging heel—nor turn'd the head,
 Till reached the subject plain where Haoussa stands,
 Lone sentinel amid the silent sands!
 The portals are unbarred; they haste—and now
 Before the high-pavilioned monarch bow.

* We remember to have stated, that part of the MS. of this poem was lost by accident: it is only of late that it has been recovered, and the lost passages supplied.—ED.

XXXVI.

Superior was his mien, his brow austere,
Ploughed by the furrowing thoughts of many a year;
And the high spirit of ascendancy
Spake in the shining of his lion-eye;
A soul all passion, haughtiness, and fire,
And but once kindled, sleepless in its ire.
Barbaric was his state; a leopard's hide
Hung round his throne, ministrant to his pride;
His hand the sceptre held; a plate of gold
His forehead starr'd, his vest and turban-fold
Were purple—at his side a sabre shone
Unsheathed, and braced in a Morocco zone.
He waved his arm, the busy clash of spears
Which ushered in the hasty messengers
Was hush'd, as swift the crowd's raised murmurs fall,
And all is silence in his armed hall.
Then to the strangers: "Who and whence ye are,
" And at whose bidding, if for peace or war
" Your visit is—resolve me hastily;"
The monarch thus: the envoys make reply:
" Instant from Yaour we come: by us, O King,
" He greets thee: and this message bids us bring.
" —A White Man from the islands of the West
" Is sailing on the Niger—with the rest,
" Ourselves his bark have seen; on wings that bind
" The palm's hewn trunk it flies, and mocks the wind,
" Nor want there sturdy rowers, with the might
" Of numerous paddles to assist its flight.
" Furrowing the river into gold, it bore,
" At twilight near our village;—the throng'd shore
" Meanwhile we filled with spearmen, but the morn
" Hath spread its wondrous wings and it is gone—
" In most admired presumption! with what aim
" The audacious stranger to these deserts came,
" In sooth we know not; but of this be sure,
" He courts not thine, in his own strength secure:
" Nor tribute-gift he sends;—the coral-tree
" Blends with his spoils, but blushes not for thee;
" Nor think the golden product of the mine
" Shall gem thy brows or on thy turban shine.
" Thus unpermissioned through these realms to go,
" A trustless friend or an insidious foe,
" Ill with a monarch's greatness can accord,
" Whilst waves around him one revenging sword.
" Already distant, and——but why delay?
" Thy glory he defrauds, and scorns thy sway."

"Quick! seize your oars—your fleetest camels rein,
"And be his doom the prison and the chain."

XXXVII.

Slant shines the Sun; beneath his fiery wing,
Rock, wood, and wave are deeply slumbering;
So deeply slumbering, they with awe inspire
The heart which lingers only to admire.
Viewed by so calm a heaven, whose beams diffuse
O'er them—the magic of their evening hues,
They are like things so lovely in their birth,
One moment gives, the next recalls from earth,
Ne'er to return: nor long on earth must dwell
The sweet-sad glory of that sun's farewell!
And, sharing in its glory, there is one
Would bless it parting, and bewail it gone;
And watch through restless vigils of the night,
Till the red morrow rolls again in light.
It may not be: to him, alas! is given
Night, but in death,—a morrow, but in heaven.
Mark'st thou yon giant rock whose summit proud
Gathers the rich tints of the passing cloud?
Bridg'd by its rude romantic battlement,
There all the fury of the stream is bent:
Swift, furious, in tumultuous foam it flies
Through its dark arch—impatient for the skies.
Strong are the oars which breast that eddying tide,
And firm the hearts which strain them to their pride—
Yet seems yon bark reluctant to obey
The force that wings it on its idle way.
Round its slow stern the baffled billows fret,
In wrath besetting, as with wrath beset,
And ever as they dash, a fearful sound
Starts sadly from prophetic caves around,
As though the viewless destinies would weave
A web of death, and for the tissue grieve.

XXXVIII.

Now full in view the yawning pass appears;
O Heaven! the bristling of a hundred spears
Is seen upon the rock, like mountain-pines,
That blaze and tremble when the lightning shines.
And ostrich plumes on plumes confusedly
Dance to and fro athwart the silent sky,
Now seen, now lost,—till—hastily arrayed,
Leaps the dark phalanx from its ambushade.
Raised is each Negro arm, in act to throw
The barbed lance, and bended every bow.
Hark to the war-shell's signal! at the sound,
The rough rock shakes, the waters heave around;

Nears but that victim-bark the fatal flood,
And all is conflict, agony, and blood.

XXXIX.

It came! O never yet its chieftain knew
Fear's blank amaze where startling danger grew;
It came! a few contending thoughts might roll
O'er the proud grandeur of his daring soul,
But settled soon; well can it bear the weight,
Of angry malice and of thankless hate.
One prayer to Heaven he speeds, one secret sigh
Breathed to his country, and his heart beats high.
Before—around—all eyes are turned to him,
A graceful vigour shines in every limb,
Deliberate valour in each glance;—his hand
Points to the foe, and this his last command:
“Here ply your stoutest oars: is victory sweet?
“The storm lowers round us—’tis the last we meet.
“’Twere madness to retire; what hope, what chance,
“Could save you from the swift Massylian lance!
“Here then, O lineage of the free! be shown
“Your country’s ancient prowess and your own.
“A lordly lion dogs your path to-day,
“And since you cannot shun him, you must slay;
“Bethink you of each dear domestic tie;
“Homes—altars—wives—beyond that rock they lie;
“The reflux billows should you cease to stem,
“What agony to you—what grief to them!
“That shrill barbaric signal do ye know?
“Glory to Haoussa! to the White Man wo.
“In me no grim barbarian sees his slave,
“I win the pass, or perish on the wave.”

XL.

These dauntless words his flagging crew provoke,
They lash the whirling current into smoke.
Repulse but adds a keener nerve to toil;
The vault murmurs as the billows boil.
Some strain the slackened cordage; some the sails
Obliquely wheel to meet the veering gales.
Hope aids them in their labour, each to each
Passes loud greetings; now almost they reach
The yawning precipice: on! on! the foe
Bends o’er, to deal the meditated blow.
But the warped floods flow back: tis vain! unwon—
Hark to the shout, and thunder of the gun!
Peals its loud knell: its clouded path unseen,
Boots it not now to mark where it hath been:
That bursting sound, o’er the still desert rolled,
A fearful tale of agony hath told;

Wild Echo shouts it through her winding caves,
 And frightened Niger rocks with all his waves,
 'Tis vain! 'tis vain! can the lanced lightning shock
 The desert vulture from his cloud-crowned rock?
 Paints not that storm his savage glories higher—
 The fluttering plumage and the eye of fire,
 Fixed as in marble, ere the bolt below
 Wakes his shrill scream—the harbinger of wo.

XLI.

From that rude tower no trumpet's wailing breath
 Drowned the deep bitter groans of hasting death.
 But one loud shriek of anger—wild and high,
 From the stained wave to the cerulean sky
 Rung dirges for the dead: on viewless wing
 Bounds the swift arrow from its eager string;
 The unquarried rock in ireful hatred hurled;
 As earthquakes rend the pillars of the world
 Snaps in its fall the mast—with dreadful crash
 It falls—the lightnings of the waters flash,
 The quivering vessel reels—what now remains?
 Slowly and sad the fire of battle wanes.
 O'erpowered by numbers, weary, faint, beset—
 Still for the pass they toil—they struggle yet.
 Whilst lives a hand to grasp, an eye to aim,
 The death-shot slacks not in the desperate game.
 Yet in their thinned array of ranks, the white
 Could find no truce from blood, no pause for flight.
 Fixt where they stood, they fell;—dim evening sunk
 O'er many a cloven crest,—and gasping trunk;
 And varying sounds of triumph and lament
 Shrill o'er that heaving world of waters went—
 The affrighted camel burst his bridle-rein,
 With blood-shot eye, and snorted o'er the plain.
 The wild hyena snuff'd the distant dead
 Drew from his woods,—the wolf the covert fled:
 And e'er that long tumultuous strife is o'er,
 The Afnore-Eagle flapped his wings in gore.—

XLII.

And Haoussa's wrath is wreaked,—but not before
 The plume she worshipped, and the Chief who wore,
 The battle's guiding-star—a nation's pride
 Cumber with lifelessness the insulting tide.
 Long had he moved—the spirit of each spot
 Where havoc raged,—now by a random shot
 Pierced through the naked breast, he rues too late
 The tribute which destruction claims of hate.—
 Slack falls the arm which waved his followers on,
 And the fierce lustre of his eye is gone;

Yet ghastly still it glares : yet his white lip
 Essays to speak, and toward the tossing ship,
 His failing limbs would press ere life be fled,
 And the rock's brink denies all farther tread :
 Then like a lofty pine that long has thrown
 Defiance to the storm, by winds o'erblown,
 Swings on its crag, till by the whirlwind rent,
 It ploughs the mountain in a swift descent,
 Sheer down the abyss in his tremendous fall,
 And Niger shrouds him with a watery pall.—

XLIII.

Still strove the bark to reach the caverned vault,
 But fierce and fiercer grew the foe's assault,
 Their Leader fallen, revenge and shame supply
 To their fierce wants a deadlier energy.
 Fast and more fast the hurtling arrows sound
 Twanged from the bow, and scattering deaths around.
 Alas yon Chief ! what hope inspires his air ?
 A hope but borrowed from supreme despair.
 O'ermatched by numbers, impotent of aid,
 The shore, rock, river, he by turns surveyed,
 And saw where'er he turned, above, beneath,
 The pomp of ruin and the spoils of death.
 Here in his latest agony, the rower
 Foregoes his grasp and his abandoned oar
 Sways on the waters, there, the slave with sighs
 Thinks of his distant home, and shrieks, and dies.
 Must he too fall—the barbarous native's prey,
 Or pine in long captivity away ?
 With nought of glory left its martyr, nought
 But the vain visions of distempered thought,
 And hourly pangs on pangs that ebb and flow,
 To break the still desertedness of woe ?
 More welcome rise those rocks in horror's shape
 And the dim waters that invite escape.
 Swift at the thought, as on the stern he stood,
 He nerved his soul, and leapt into the flood.
 Thence waved a mournful and a mute adieu
 For daring friends who will his course pursue.
 When next he looked behind, and saw the deck
 Deserted,—and his ship a silent wreck ;
 Grasping a floating fragment in his hand,
 He cheer'd the swimmers toward the destined strand.
 O haste ! haste ! haste ! time yet exists to save
 A life so dear—waft on, thou idle wave,
 And sink, thou lingering Sun !—

————— The billow passed
 Swiftly along,—afar—away at last

In splendour vanishing;—and night hath blent
 The sun with slumber in the golden west;
 And thou, poor wanderer of the desert, thou,
 Art but a vain,—a nameless nothing now!—
 Yes, Mother of the Negro! weep—for so
 He mourned thy anguish in his joy and wo,
 And ere the wild wave closed around his head,
 Ere memory wavered, and ere reason fled—
 Thy form, reveal'd in trembling vision, drew
 His latest gaze and anguish of adieu;
 Ere the light spirit fluttered to be free,
 It breathed its silent eloquence for thee;
 Then, winged with joy, forsook its earthly sphere
 To watch thy course through heaven's eternal year.

XLIV.

But ~~See~~ whose starry pinions sweep sublime
 Ocean's wide wave and earth's remotest clime;
 Whose eye had hailed, with joy unknown before,
 The olive-plant approach thy ravaged shore,
 Caught the sad tale, in sorrow tore away
 From her fair brow the coronal of bay,
 And closed with wo and wildness in her air,
 Her smile in gloom, her triumph in despair:
 So the pleased child, in summer's sultry hours,
 Circles the wild wood for perennial flowers:
 In rosy joy—but should his airy tread
 Rouse the coiled adder from his flowery bed,
 Chill, speechless, pale, the' arrested wanderer stands,
 And the gay wreath falls from his little hands.—
 Yet shall thy triumphs, wanderer's long engage
 Fame's sweet-toned voice, and charm the historic page,
 To after-times the dauntless spirit breathe,
 And form for future brows the laurel-wreath;
 And when that wild mysterious wave is traced,
 And the rose blossoms in the desert waste,
 Long shall the sculptur'd stone to Europe tell
 Where Science languished and her Pilgrim fell.—
 There, when the vestal flame of Truth shall burn,
 And long-lost Justice back to earth return;
 Science and Peace their sister-course pursue,
 And a fresh Eden open on the view,
 There shall the Moor, from lust of rapine freed,
 The humble votary of a milder creed,
 Repairing, muse on thy sepulchral stone,
 And make thy many sorrows all his own.
 Haply e'en now thine imaged woes impart
 Mild pity to the Negress' anxious heart:

As the thick rain falls fast, the lightning flies,
 And the red whirlwinds travel through the skies,
 Oft through her lattice will she look, and bless
 Thy friendless spirit in the wilderness.—
 But Oh, what tears by manly sorrow shed,
 Or hymn by Beauty warbled for the dead
 May best accord to charm away the gloom
 Of widowed wo that mourns his early doom,
 The coral-rock his bed, and Niger's wave
 At once his mournful requiem and his grave!
 Unwatched by her the kindling of his eye,
 As peril darkened and his hour drew nigh,
 Unsoothed by her sweet smile and dulcet breath,
 That latest pang which triumphs over death.
 Ah! vain the tears of manly grief will flow,
 Or Beauty breathe her melody of wo.
 They cannot lull rapt Fancy, on the wing
 To wake each thought that adds fresh pangs to sorrow's
 Yet, when the flight of Time shall waft away [sting.
 The murmuring swell of Feeling's troubled day,
 Religion shall diffuse—with blest controul
 Her sacred calm—her sabbath o'er the soul,
 And Joy reveal his visionary form,—
 Bright as the wave that dances from the storm.

CANTILENA.

(From the Spanish of Villegas.)

BY J. H. WIFFEN, ESQ.

I have seen a nightingale,
 On a aprig of thyme, bewail,
 Seeing the dear nest that was
 Hers alone, borne off, alas,
 By a labourer! I heard
 For this outrage the poor bird
 Say a thousand mournful things
 To the wind, which on its wings,
 From her to the guardian sky
 Bore her melancholy cry,
 Bore her tender tears,—she spake
 As if her fond heart would break;
 One while in a sad sweet note,
 Gurgled from her straining throat,
 She enforced her piteous tale,
 Mournful prayer and plaintive wail;

One while with the shrill dispute
 Quite outwearied, she was mute;
 Then afresh for her dear brood
 Her harmonious shrieks renewed:
 Now she fluttered round and round,
 Now she skimmed along the ground,
 Now from branch to branch in haste
 The delighted robber chased,
 And alighting in his path,
 Seemed to say, 'twixt grief and wrath,
 "Give me back, fierce robber rude,
 "Give me back my pretty brood!"
 And I heard the rustic still,
 Answer, "That I never will."

WHAT IS LIFE?

What is life?—a rapid stream,
 Rolling onward to the ocean.
 What is life?—a troubled dream,
 Full of incident and motion.
 What is life?—the arrow's flight,
 That mocks the keenest gazer's eye.
 What is life?—a gleam of light,
 Darting through a stormy sky.
 What is life?—a varied tale,
 Deeply moving, quickly told.
 What is life?—a vision pale,
 Vanishing while we behold.
 What is life?—a smoke, a vapour,
 Swiftly mingled with the air.
 What is life?—a dying taper,
 The spark that glows to disappear.
 What is life?—a flower that blows,
 Nipp'd by the frost, and quickly dead,
 What is life?—the full-blown rose,
 That's scorch'd at noon, and withered.
 Such is life,—a breath, a span,
 A moment, quickly gone from thee.
 What is *Death*?—Oh! mortal man,
 Thy entrance on eternity.

6.

 END.

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